The Economist compares the government’s reaction to thorny issues relating to the status of both Tibet and Taiwan:
The opening of regular charter flights across the Taiwan Strait, allowing thousands of mainland tourists to visit the island, is the most important of a number of confidence-building measures since the victory of Ma Ying-jeou and his China-leaning party, the Kuomintang (KMT), in the presidential election in March (see article and article). After the bellicose sniping at the pro-independence administration of Chen Shui-bian, China seems positively lovey-dovey towards his successor.
On Tibet, China appears to have won over foreign governments by making only the most token of concessions. It has reopened low-level talks with representatives of the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader. But it has barely even pretended that these might lead to a political settlement. At the latest round it refused even to issue an anodyne joint statement, lest this be deemed to accord its Tibetan interlocutors some sort of official status. In Tibet it has quelled unrest and dissent with the time-honoured repression it knows best: mass detention, heavy security and “patriotic education campaigns” (see article). China can boast that “calm” has returned.
The calm of the prison yard, however, is no long-term solution to the Tibet problem, which is that large numbers of Tibetans feel economically disadvantaged and politically ignored. Order imposed through violence, or the threat of violence, will only heighten pro-independence sentiment.