I’m taking my Godfather into battle!

Hot Topics:

• BJDaily (BJ日报): Beijing Daily
• Show-Off Girl (炫富女), Ma Lihong (马力宏): Weibo user Yang Zilu (@杨紫璐) wrote that her godfather chartered a plane for 8.88 million yuan for himself and Yang to see the London Olympics, posting snazzy photos as well. Some netizens think the “Lihong” Yang mentions is not the pop star Wang Lihong, but instead Zhejiang Province Communist Party Party Provost Ma Lihong.
• Ma Chi + Ferrari + Singapore (马驰+法拉利+新加坡): Reportedly, Ma Chi is the wealthy Sichuan man who died while driving recklessly in Singapore.
• Liu Mingze (刘明泽): Blogger Han Han sued Liu Mingze in January following allegations by Fang Zhouzi that Han Han’s writing is produced by ghostwriters. Liu is said to have sent information about the ghostwriters to Fang. But Han Han withdrew his case against Liu just one day after he had filed at the Shanghai Putuo District Court. Danwei details the Han Han v. Fang case.

Internet “Nicknames” for Security Chief Zhou Yongkang, an alleged backer of Bo Xilai:

• Zhouyong (周永)
• zyKang (zy康)
• zYongK (z永K)

Note: All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Beijing Daily, Bo Xilai, Fang Zhouzi, Ferrari, filtered words, Han Han, sensitive words, sina weibo, Wang Lihong, weibo, Zhou Yongkang
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Ryssdal: … Somebody’s making money.

Schmitz: Right. Developers are obviously making a lot of money. And of course the government of China itself is getting rich and that’s something that irks a lot of the people I spoke to. In the past five years, much of China’s economic growth has come from building infrastructure. The party has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on this and most of these contracts have gone to state-owned companies. So in other words, the government is giving money to itself. So one man I spoke to was really frustrated with this.

Man speaking

Ryssdal: “Nothing’s OK,” right? Everything is not all right.

Schmitz: Nothing is OK. So he’s saying that the Communist party originated from the poor, but now has basically left the poor behind. He’s a security guard who makes $5 a day and he lives in a 30-square-foot apartment with his wife and his daughter and he isn’t happy at all. So I asked him. I said how could the government improve the situation in China. And so get this, he said that China should start a war.

Ryssdal: No, come on. Really?

Schmitz: Yeah. And I said with whom and he said it doesn’t matter. 

The Los Angeles Times reported the study’s release last week, and described China’s use by economists as “a real-life laboratory to study how money, inequality and change are tied to our satisfaction with life”.

Easterlin and his fellow economists based their findings on six surveys on life satisfaction in China, most of them conducted by Western firms. The fall and rise of happiness levels in China mirror the trends seen in Russia and other European countries transitioning from communism, Easterlin said.

But what makes China especially interesting is that happiness levels dipped and rose while incomes were soaring, showing that joblessness can drag happiness levels down even as national wealth is on the rise. The results echo earlier studies that have found that growing wealth does not tend to increase happiness because expectations rise along with it. People also tend to compare their wealth with others’.

“If somebody got a higher salary this year than last, he might not be happy,” Jiaotong University professor Wang Fanghua told The Times last year. “But if his income is better than his friends’, then he will be happy.”

At TIME, Austin Ramzy noted that Bo Xilai’s gestures towards addressing economic inequality helped build his broad popularity among Chongqingers.

When Bo Xilai, the rising Chinese Communist Party official who was purged in March, gave his last public comments before disappearing into detention, he was wrong about a lot of things. That bit about not being under investigation, for instance. But one line he uttered has the clear ring of truth, and it poses a serious issue for China’s leadership as it attempts to navigate this year’s political transition, the economic slowdown and the ripples loosed by Bo’s removal. Bo revealed that China’s Gini coefficient — a statistic that measures the gap between rich and poor — had entered into worrying territory. He described the number, which hasn’t been made public in more than a decade, as over 0.46. Anything higher than 0.4 is considered dangerously high and capable of fueling unrest.

In Chongqing, where Bo was Communist Party secretary for 4½ years, he made building economic protections like subsidized housing for the megacity’s poorest residents one of the tenets of his “Chongqing model.” The wholesale corruption he and his family have been accused of may have steered the wealth gap in the wrong direction, but Bo understood the political importance of appearing to care about the problem, just as he knew the appeal of cracking down on crime and reviving Mao-era culture.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, economic growth, food prices, gini coefficient, happiness index, income divide, income inequality, inflation, property prices
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On a sweltering night in July 2011, 17-year-old Zhang Juanzi arrives at her farmhouse in the remote village of Silong in Hunan province. Despite the cramped 12-hour van journey from Shenzhen, the young girl bounds past the wooden doors to wake up her 5-year-old brother, Zhang Yi, whose face scrunches in the flickering light. He is thrilled by her arrival, but when he sees his mother, Huang Dongyan, he recoils into his sister’s arms. He will not look at Huang, who is squealing at him, begging him to say “Mommy ….”

Huang and her son have a strained relationship, one damaged by Huang’s absence. It has been months since they last saw each other. Her son seems to view Huang as a stranger who visits once or twice a year and demands his affection. Huang blames the country’s housing registration policy, or hukou system, for their broken bond. The hukou system denies social benefits to China’s some 150 million rural migrant laborers who move to urban areas for work. Because of this policy, migrant workers like Huang are forced to leave their children behind in the village to receive schooling, health care, and other necessary services.

Roughly 58 million children like Yi are left in China’s countryside without their parents. This might be economically necessary, but it is emotionally disastrous: Chinese University of Hong Kong researchers found that adolescents left behind in their villages were more likely to engage in risky behavior such as binge drinking, and have increased thoughts of suicide. The children separated from their migrant parents are also more likely to have learning disabilities and psychological problems, says Zhang Ping, a researcher at the Psychological Science Institute of Guangdong Province. In school, they lack focus; at home they lack guidance.

Xinhua photographer Liu Jie poignantly captured the problem of divided families last year in a set of group portraits in which absent family members were represented by empty chairs. See past posts on CDT for more on labour migration and the hukou system.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: hukou, migrant workers, rural migration, Shenzhen, urban rural divide, Zhang Ping
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No question, China has many problems. Years of one-sided investment-driven growth have created obvious excesses and overcapacity. A weaker global economy since the 2008 financial crisis and rapidly rising labor cost at home have slowed China’s vaunted export machine. Meanwhile, a massive housing bubble is slowly deflating, and the latest economic data is discouraging. Real growth in GDP slowed to an annualized rate of less than 7 percent in the first quarter of 2012, and April saw a sharp slowdown in industrial output, electricity production, bank lending, and property transactions. Is China’s legendary economy in serious trouble?

Not just yet. The odds are that China will navigate these shoals and continue to grow at a fairly rapid pace of around 7 percent a year for the remainder of the decade, overtaking the United States to become the world’s biggest economy around 2020. That’s a lot slower than the historical average of 10 percent, but still solid. Considerably less certain, however, is whether China’s secretive and corrupt Communist Party can make this growth equitable, inclusive, and fair. Rather than economic collapse, it’s far more likely that a decade from now China will have a strong economy but a deeply flawed and unstable society.

See also Tom Orlik’s guide to battling China bears at China Real Time Report, via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: economic slowdown, GDP growth, housing bubble, income inequality, social justice, social stability, United States
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This may seem strange, given that the Chinese have propelled their country into the top ranks of global economic powerhouses over the past 30 years. There are those who predict a hard landing for an overheated economy — where growth has already slowed — but the acquisition of wealth is better understood not just as an economic cushion, or as pure greed, but as a political hedge.

China’s Communist leaders cling to Deng Xiaoping’s belief that their continuance in power will depend on economic progress. But even in China, a mandate based on competence can crumble in hard times. So globalizing one’s assets — transferring money and educating one’s children overseas — makes sense as a hedge against risk. (At least $120 billion has been illegally transferred abroad since the mid-1990s, according to one official estimate.)

…

Today, the party’s 80 million members are still powerful, but most join the party for career advancement, not idealism. Every day, there are some 500 protests, demonstrations or riots against corrupt or dictatorial local party authorities, often put down by force. The harsh treatment that prompted the blind human-rights advocate Chen Guangcheng to seek American protection is only one of the most notorious cases. The volatile society unleashed against the state by Mao almost 50 years ago bubbles like a caldron. Stories about the wealth amassed by relatives of party leaders like Mr. Bo, who have used their family connections to take control of vast sectors of the economy, will persuade even loyal citizens that the rot reaches to the very top.

Last week, The Guardian reported that three retired CCP officials called on leaders to disclose their family wealth before the issue further erodes the party’s grip on power ahead of the upcoming leadership succession.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, CCP legitimacy, chinese communist party, corruption, Deng Xiaoping, luxury, princelings
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As the scandal over Bo Xilai continues to reverberate, the authorities here are eager to paint Mr. Bo, a fallen leader who was one of 25 members of China’s ruling Politburo, as a rogue operator who abused his power, even as his family members accumulated a substantial fortune.

But evidence is mounting that the relatives of other current and former senior officials have also amassed vast wealth, often playing central roles in businesses closely entwined with the state, including those involved in finance, energy, domestic security, telecommunications and entertainment. Many of these so-called princelings also serve as middlemen to a host of global companies and wealthy tycoons eager to do business in China.

“Whenever there is something profitable that emerges in the economy, they’ll be at the front of the queue,” said Minxin Pei, an expert on China’s leadership and professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California. “They’ve gotten into private equity, state-owned enterprises, natural resources — you name it.”

For example, Wen Yunsong, the son of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, heads a state-owned company that boasts that it will soon be Asia’s largest satellite communications operator. President Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng, once managed a state-controlled firm that held a monopoly on security scanners used in China’s airports, shipping ports and subway stations. And in 2006, Feng Shaodong, the son-in-law of Wu Bangguo, the party’s second-ranking official, helped Merrill Lynch win a deal to arrange the $22 billion public listing of the giant state-run bank I.C.B.C., in what became the world’s largest initial public stock offering.

The foreign press has been reporting on China’s princelings and the challenge they pose to the CCP since well before the Bo Xilai scandal erupted, with a number of China’s incoming generation of top leaders (including president-in-waiting Xi Jinping) descending from Communist Party elite. Still, the Bo scandal turned the princeling issue into a “U.S. media phenomenon,” especially in light of already existing reports of son Bo Guagua’s lavish and conspicuous lifestyle, writes Jay Newton-Small for TIME’s Global Spin blog:

China has changed in the years since the revolution when everyone was expected to live simply. Bo Guagua and his contemporaries are everything the Communist Party stalwarts have sought not to be: frivolous, glittering, pampered, privileged. And while Bo Guagua has dropped off the map, abandoning his $3,000-a-month Boston luxury apartment for something in an undisclosed location, there is no shortage of princelings to focus on. There are hundreds if not thousands of them in the U.S. alone. “The reality is [there is] a very large number of Chinese officials, not only of highest levels but throughout the system, who send their children abroad whenever they can,” says Lieberthal.

The American media aren’t the only ones to find the princelings fascinating. Indeed, it is a much more crucial development that Chinese blogs were onto Bo Guagua even before the scandal enveloped his parents. They were the first to track his glitzy existence, for example, writing about Bo Guagua allegedly using his red Ferrari to pick up the daughter of former U.S. ambassador to China Jon Huntsman for an event. The same blogs follow former People’s Liberation Army marshal Ye Jianying’s granddaughter Ye Mingzi’s latest fashion design or former Vice Premier Wang Li’s granddaughter Wan Baobao’s jewelry designs. They also traffic in unsubstantiated speculation (like whether the daughter of a prominent Chinese leader, attending Harvard under an assumed name, dated basketball phenom Jeremy Lin).

Singling out Bo Guagua may be the regime’s shot across the bow to other young princelings: keep a low profile or you could end up like him. But surely Bo Guagua is only the first installment in what promises to be a long and dramatic soap opera. It’s hard to imagine that none of the princelings want to be the Paris Hilton of China. As the story unfolds, the test will be how the Communist Party handles it. The trouble is that money and what it can flaunt is central to Chinese society nowadays. “China itself is very much focused on making money as a core goal of people throughout that system,” says Lieberthal. “In fact, there are complaints in China all the time that people are worried that the focus is so strong that it isn’t properly balanced by ethical considerations. The ethic is making money. And if that ethic isn’t tempered, you may have a rapidly growing economy but you’ve got real problems.”

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Guagua, Bo Xilai, CCP 5th generation, chinese communist party, corruption, Hu Jintao, princelings, Wen Jiabao, Wu Bangguo
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Some, like Levin Zhu, head of investment bank China International Capital Corp and son of former Premier Zhu Rongji, do not hide their family backgrounds.

But for others, while kinship to China’s political elite can guarantee lucrative business offers, it can also create problems in a country where politics has been historically volatile.

From a princeling’s point of view, changing a name, or using several names simultaneously, is often seen as a way to hedge against political risk.

As a result, it is very common for princelings to change their names or use aliases when they go overseas to study or do business, according to Johnny Lau, a veteran China watcher based in Hong Kong.

“There is a long history of this,” he says. “First, they do this to feel safe. They sometimes worry about being kidnapped.

“But they also want to guard their image, to avoid the kind of attention that could invite trouble.”

Li Xueming resigned from the board of a Hong Kong-listed state-owned alternative energy company in late April as the net of scrutiny extended to Bo Xilai’s relatives.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, corruption, Li Xueming, princelings, scandal
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Both cases are widely seen as emblematic. Bo’s embodies the corruption of an unchecked political elite: Communist Party members are investigated by the party’s own disciplinary committee, and not by the courts. Chen’s case is rife with the predatory behavior of local officials whose conduct is more reminiscent of China’s feudal past than of the “new socialist countryside” Beijing leaders claim to be building.

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the law doesn’t matter in China.

First, while Chen’s case entails the catalogue of unlawful measures that are used against government critics, it also embodies the rising assertiveness of a citizenry that is increasingly ready to defend its legal rights against official arbitrariness, corruption and injustice.

Land-rights activists, factory workers, forcibly evicted residents, arbitrarily censored netizens, ordinary consumers and environmental activists — citizens in China are increasingly committed to defending their rights.

Nevertheless, U.C. Berkeley Law Professor Stanley Lubman argues, China’s legal system is weak and the law still primarily, “serves as a tool to maintain the Party’s control of Chinese society.” He writes in the Wall Street Journal:

In considering the possibility that Chinese criminal law might be invoked to punish misconduct in either case, it would a mistake to think of China’s legal institutions as a “legal system.” Legal institutions in China, especially the criminal law, are part of a political system that ultimately directs their application and their use. They are essentially grounded on the dominant notion that law is to be used to keep the Party in power.

Laws are not implemented in a uniform manner in China. They are often vague, giving local officials the opportunity to ignore or vary their application and to exercise considerable discretion in many cases. Enforcement can be overly lax (as in cases of unlawful property takings by local governments or violations of food safety laws), excessively harsh, or downright ignored, as they were by officials in Shandong where Chen was harshly treated.

It is impossible to believe that Chen’s treatment was not well-known at high levels in Beijing. His case has provoked widespread coverage in the foreign press since 2005, and has been a topic of discussion among foreign NGOs and on the Chinese internet. The embarrassment that Chen has handed the leadership makes denial from Beijing of central government involvement in the ordeals of him and his family very difficult.

Nonetheless, admission of central government responsibility is unlikely. The most that can be expected is a conclusory statement about an investigation and its termination, probably with a token announcement about some punishment at the local level.

Read more about Bo Xilai, Chen Guangcheng, and rule of law in China via CDT.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: activism, Bo Xilai, Chen Guangcheng, legal reform, rule of law
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At least 14 people were injured in the blast at a local government office in Yunnan province. The woman also died.

The woman had been negotiating compensation for the loss of her home, eyewitnesses said.

This incident is a reminder of the tensions in China over the country’s rapid development, correspondents say.

“We have opened an investigation. I can’t tell you anything, but three people were killed and 14 were injured,” a local official told the AFP news agency.

China Daily has more details:

The 10 less injured people have been sent to a local hospital in Qiaojia county, according to the county committee of the Communist Party of China.
The incident occurred at around 9 am in Qiaojia county, Zhaotong city, the committee said.

While the cause of the explosion is under investigation, it has been reported that it was a bombing.

According to the Weibo account of a Kunming metropolis newspaper, a witness said a female went to the demolition bureau with explosives after she was asked to sign an agreement on house relocation, setting them off at the site.

Read more about land disputes and forced demolitions in China via CDT.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: forced demolition, Kunming, land disputes, suicide bombing
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Ambassador Locke and Qin Feng in friendlier times.

U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke has recently taken the spotlight. But official and online attitudes toward him couldn’t be more different: on the one hand, netizens have jokingly referred to him as “Head of the Chinese Petitions and Appeals Department who takes an American imperialist salary.” [Chinese netizens have recently taken to calling the U.S. Embassy the "Office for Petitions and Appeals after both Chen Guangcheng and Wang Lijun sought refuge there.] But in editorials published last Friday in four major Beijing papers, he was denounced for his handling of the Chen Guangcheng incident. At the same time, Weibo’s search engine function blocked results for the combination of “Gary Locke + Petitions Office.”

The niece of former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Hong Kong Satellite TV Chief Reporting Officer Qin Feng, wrote a scathing post on her registered Weibo account suggesting Locke be expelled from China. By the time Qin Feng deleted her own post, it had been resent more than 7,000 times and commented on nearly 5,000 times:

Gary Locke, that banana man, with his white heart. Is there still any doubt? I remember, last year before he came, the public had had such great hope for him. Look at his performance now! A foreign representative sets off infighting on someone else’s land (of course I know that the embassy is regarded as U.S. territory, but is he always at the embassy?). What kind of behavior is this? Are there any regulations for a situation like this, something like being able to expel foreign dignitaries that openly interfere with internal affairs?

The post was later deleted, probably by Qin herself. She gave an explanation for the vanished rant:

I started to curse without thinking and so learned the paranoia of many netizens. I said Locke treacherously interfered in our internal affairs, not anything else at all about him as an honest official, nor that we shouldn’t reflect on Chen Guangcheng’s journey to the government. In 140 characters I just wanted to have a little chat, and instead I was besieged from all sides.  You all really take Weibo too seriously and expect too much from me.  Summer’s nearly here and our internal heat is building. We must flush it out from the source. We’ll all feel relieved.

搞 不清楚就开骂，也让我认识到部分网友的偏执狂。我说骆家辉阴险干涉内政，并没有说他其他方面比如廉政做得不好，也没有说陈光诚事件一路走来政府不需要反 思。140字只找出一个点谈，就遭到围攻，各位真是太把微博当回事儿了，也大出我的意料。立夏了，火气大，从根源消除，让大家清爽舒心一点吧。

Below is a sample of how Qin was besieged. More comments from CDT Chinese. Translated by Deng Bolun.

Fuhedesai: There’s infighting? What kind of infighting? Who’s the leading character? Who does a blind man fight with? This is a good five times better than America’s clown.
复合德赛：有内斗了吗？内斗的情况如何？主角是谁？一个失明的人，跟谁斗啊？大活宝，比美国的大活宝好五倍。

dlensPhoto_329: I don’t understand how Locke instigated infighting in the Celestial Empire. A few hundred people spending heaps of the taxpayer’s silver to imprison a single blind man. Was this also instigated by Locke? Without a cause, where do the consequences arise?
d镜头摄影_329：我不明白老骆是怎么挑拨天朝内斗的?几百人花着纳税人的大把银子囚禁一位盲人,难道也是老骆给挑起来的?没有前因,哪来的后果?

YoungPrince: If he doesn’t try, then Obama won’t forgive him. If he doesn’t try, the American people won’t forgive Obama. This has nothing to do with ethnicity. This has to do with the values of the American people! Besides, Chen and Bo are different. It’s not infighting, it’s a violation of the law!
普林斯青：他不出手，奥巴马饶不了他，他不出手，美国人民饶不了奥巴马，这与是什么族裔无关，这与美国人的价值观有关！另外，陈与薄不同，不是内斗，是侵害！

RicePlace: reply to  RadishCake: You’re a media person. In a situation in which you have no proof, you open your mouth irresponsibly and say that Locke instigated high-level infighting. Aren’t you just showing everyone your IQ? Even if Minister Li is your relative, don’t be so disgusting, alright?
一地大米：回复@蘿蔔特糕:你身为一个传媒人，在没有证据的情况下就信口开河说骆家辉挑拨高层内斗，这不是在公众面前秀你的IQ吗？就算李部长是你亲戚，你也别这么恶心好不？

WangXiaoyu: Qin Feng as Li Zhaoxing himself describes her: I held her when she was about half a year old, called her “Feng Feng.” In elementary school, when other students were going to the the zoo, she would follow her father to the museum to receive education. Every year during Spring Festival she would go to the Monument to the People’s Heroes with a bouquet of flowers. When she was studying in New Zealand, Vice Premier Qian Qizheng and other leaders praised her and her classmates for attacking “Taiwan separatists” and evil cult members.
王 晓渔：李肇星笔下的侄女秦枫：她大约半岁时我抱过，管她叫“枫枫”。上小学时，当别的孩子星期天去动物园玩的时候，她就常跟着父母到一些博物馆去 接受熏陶，逢年过节还会向人民英雄纪念碑献上一束小花。在新西兰留学时，她曾和同学一道抨击“台独”和邪教分子，受到钱其琛副总理等领导同志称赞。（《枫 声》）

distant201201: Then don’t let your cousin and Li Zhaoxing’s son Hehe Li study in the United States. Take the lead and return to China. Fix a few more roads for the common people. Make transportation a bit more convenient. Realize direct elections sooner rather than later. Thanks.
悠悠201201：让你表兄也就是李肇星的儿子李禾禾别在美国工作了，带头回到中国吧，多给老百姓修点路，让交通更方便点，早日实现直选。谢谢。

CannotResist: Let’s forcefully surround and watch former Minister of Foreign Affairs Li’s niece’s comment on driving out Ambassador Gary Locke…
忍俊不住: 强力围观李前外交部长侄女发帖咨询驱逐骆家辉大使。。。。。。

MsYiTongsYutong: When will people finally understand that not all Chinese are PRC Chinese? They grow up eating American bread and drinking American milk, so what would make them partial toward China?  It’s just us who grow up drinking melamine and and eating Sudan Red G, and still live on, who are real Chinese.
依桐小姐的雨桐：华人不是中国人的道理有些人什么时候才能明白？人家从小吃着美国的面包喝着美国的牛奶长大凭什么要求人家偏向中国？只有我们这些从小喝着三聚氰胺，吃着苏丹红长大而依然能活到现在的孩子才是真正的中国人。

ronseattle: Qin, “instigate infighting in the country you’re stationed in”: who are the two so-called parties in this infighting? Are their strengths comparable? What will be the negative influences of this infighting on the people?
ronseattle：秦，“挑拨驻在国内斗”，这所谓内斗的双方是谁啊？他们实力相当吗？这内斗的结果对人民有何消极影响？

PretendingToBeInNewYork: This really is old Uncle Li Zhaoxing’s style. Brainless and heartless too.
假装在纽约: 很有其舅姥爷李肇星的风采。脑残心也残。

ZhangFachengsWeibo: Who’s anguish has Locke prodded? Ah, I see.
张法成的微博：骆家辉戳到了谁的痛楚，额明白了。

Orange_cn: Heh heh, you said it as if the blind man’s years of imprisonment and beatings in Linyi, Shandong were nothing. When the blind man escapes the fire pit and runs off to the U.S. Embassy, this becomes America’s intentional instigation of Chinese infighting! This kind of irrational argument is born from the same stuff as the Beijing Daily. Are the Chinese mouthpieces all like this?
Orange_cn：呵呵，说得好像山东临沂方面这些年对盲人的囚禁殴打都不算什么，盲人逃出火坑跑到美国大使馆就成了美国人故意挑起中国内斗了！如此强词夺理的逻辑，和北京日报真是一脉
相承啊，中国的喉舌都是如此特点？

SpiritsTrust: What do we call internal affairs? Is it closing the door to beat the wife to your heart’s content? When turning on the national machine that wantonly tramples human rights, never again is it internal affairs.
灵魂的信： 什么叫内政？是关起门来为所欲为的打媳妇？开动国家机器肆意践踏人权之时便不再是内政。

BrightMoonPrinceOfQin: At the bottom of their hearts, the common people are completely clear about what this is. What do you think you’re still hiding from us here? Public trust of the government has already become a burden.
秦时明月君：什么事情，老百姓心底都一清二白，你还在这儿装什么呢？ZF公信力已经为负了

SunChuanHsiang: Does “Banana Man” count as an insult? Miss.
SunChuanHsiang：“香蕉人”算不算侮辱？小姐

Yuanye8848: I’m warning you little girl, quit this nonsense about abuse from violent netizens. If you want to talk about cultural standing, I’m far above you. I’ll be a post-doc when you’re still suckling at the tit!!!
yuanye8848：警告小姑娘：别胡说八道这是网络暴民骂你，要说素质，我比你高得多，我做博士后时，你还在吃奶！！！

DeepMoanInTheNest: Hi, I’m from the countryside, lived in the countryside for more than 20 years. Maybe you don’t understand the seriousness of how local officials violently enforce the law. In other words, if you or someone else have been passing your days in a democratic society, you wouldn’t last half a day in Mr. Chen’s environment. If Ambassador Locke hadn’t show up–think about it–where would Mr. Chen hide? Where else could he be taken care of? Or how would you hope Ambassador Locke handles it, Reporter Qin?
沉 吟小窝： 你好，我是从农村出来的，在农村生活了二十多年，可能您不了解基层机关暴力执法的严重性，换句话说，如果是您或者是其它身在民主社会生活过人，自在陈先生 在环境中可能半天也待不下去，如果没有骆大使出面，您想象一下，陈先生能躲在何处。何处能够收容与他，或者说秦记者能希望骆大使如何处理？

Unicorn_Silver: Internal affairs? What are internal affairs? What do the internal affairs of your second red generation have to do with us?
Unicorn_Silver ：内政？什么是内政？你们红二代的内政关我们屁事？

Belconnen: “Locke treacherously interfered with internal affairs”? Chinese citizen blind Chen was forced nearly to death by the Chinese government and then requests help from America. America then responds with help. Is this what you mean by “interference with internal affairs”? If so, I represent myself in thanking America’s interference with the internal affairs. In China, there are too many people who are harmed by public power. I hope America comes everyday and interferes with our internal affairs!
Belconnen：“骆家辉阴险干涉内政”？ 中国公民盲人陈被中国政府逼得快要死了，然后求助于美国，美国便出手相助。这就是你说的“干涉内政”？ 如果是的话，我代表我个人感谢美国政府干涉中国内政。在中国受公权力迫害的人太多了，我希望美国天天都来干涉中国的内政！

Tonglifu: Why erase that comment? Ms. Qin?
通利福貎亚愤怒乌托邦：为啥删掉那个帖子呢。秦女士？

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Gary Locke, netizens' voices
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