Prof Zhang […] argued that the Soviet Union provided a "tragic lesson of what happens when a party grows too large with no strong mechanism for members to quit."

Party leaders needed to find a way to jettison corrupt and opportunistic members who had "damaged the party spirit", joining the party "not because they believed in Marxism-Leninism, but because they yearned for wealth and fortune."

"Only if the Communist Party keeps improving the quality and ability of its members can it ensure lasting rule," he argued. [Source]

Minnie Chan provided more details on Zhang’s diet plan at South China Morning Post:

Zhang suggested the party’s Central Committee classify members into three categories: honorary, probationary and formal members, with the honorary group being where most of the cuts should be made, because it was largely composed of "older, sick and retired members who are unable to toe the party line".

He estimated "honorary members" could make up 20 per cent of the members, and many of them "are forced to stay in the party in order to save face, or for other political reasons". He also suggested the party extend the probation period of some "unqualified members" who failed to pass internal assessments.

To prevent party cadres from using the "exit mechanism" to kick out political enemies, Zhang said the human rights of all party members should not be "violated", and members should not be "discriminated" against, after deciding to leave the party. He stressed that the party’s constitution allows members to "join and withdraw" freely. [Source]

The Party is already one man lighter: the expulsion of former Agricultural Bank of China vice president Yang Kun was announced on Monday.

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“Chinese dream” lead story in the Beijing Daily.

Xi Jinping introduced the “Chinese Dream” last December, after he became chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and before he took on the Chinese presidency. He often dovetails speeches about the “Chinese Dream” with the invocation of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which seems to signal a nationalistic turn. Aside from that, there is little sign that Xi’s rhetoric significantly differs from Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s concept of the “harmonious society”–which makes a cameo appearance here. These are new words to bolster the status quo.

Beijing Daily, the capital’s Party newspaper, published the following piece on the front page of its April 5th edition. Beijing Daily issued several scathing opinion pieces last May criticizing U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke’s handling of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng’s case, as well as the Chinese press for valuing “Western ideas like ‘freedom of speech’ and the ‘fourth estate.’” This latest article has a gentler tone, instructing the municipal government to carry out “Chinese Dream” propaganda campaigns that reach everyone from senior cadres to elementary school children.

An April 16 editorial in the People’s Daily rings with the same call to fight a “propaganda battle” for the Chinese Dream.

CCP Beijing Municipal Committee Recommendations for Developing “Chinese Dream” Education and Propaganda Work

April 5, 2013

General Secretary Xi Jinping has poured much spiritual energy into the important discourse on the “Chinese Dream” of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, in order to lead the entire Party and people citizens of all ethnicities to join their minds and gather their strength to jointly push forward the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Deep comprehension and extensive dissemination of the basic tenets of the “Chinese Dream,” its essential requirements, and its path of practice, are of the utmost significance to deeply studying and implementing the spirit of the 18th Party Congress, and to actively encouraging the people of Beijing to accelerate the capital’s reform and development. The following recommendations are put forward for developing the city’s “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work.

A. Guiding Ideology

Lift high the mighty flag of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics. Integrate Deng Xiaoping Theory, the theory of the “Three Represents,” and the concept of Scientific Development to guide reform and development in the capital. Extensively promulgate the importance of realizing the “Chinese Dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, its essential requirements, and its path of practice. Integrate “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work with the study, propagation, and implementation of the spirit of the 18th Party Congress; with the study and propaganda work of socialism with Chinese characteristics; and with the promotion of the scientific development of the capital. Use the “Chinese Dream” to gather consensus and unify strength. Ceaselessly reinforce the faith of all municipal cadres in the mass path, the theory, and the system. Fully enable the complete establishment of a moderately well-off [xiaokang] society and the realization of the leading of the historical course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by setting an example. Provide powerful spiritual impetus to the development of strategies to effect a “cultured Beijing, scientific Beijing, and green Beijing,” and the creation of a world-class city with Chinese characteristics.

B. Primary Content

The development of “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work must closely revolve around studying and promulgating the spirit of the important speech that Secretary Xi Jinping delivered while visiting the “Road to Revival” exhibit, as well as the spirit of Secretary Xi’s comments at the [sixth plenary session of the] first session of the 12th National People’s Congress. It must also closely revolve around the policy decisions of the Municipal Committee. Fully reflect the enthusiastic responses of the capital’s cadres and masses; stand firm in your posts and fully command the active practice of solid work. Ceaselessly deepen the “Chinese Dream” of the great revival of the Chinese nation.

(1) Extensively promulgate and realize the meaning, basic tenets, and essential requirements of the “Chinese Dream.” Extensively promulgate the Party’s strategic goal of “Two 100 Years” as put forward at the 18th Party Congress. Extensively promulgate and realize that the “Chinese Dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is precisely what will strengthen the nation, revive its ethnic groups, and bless its people.  Extensively promulgate that the direction determines the path and the path determines destiny, and that persistence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the basic guarantee of realizing the “Chinese Dream.” Extensively promulgate that the future and destiny of every person is inseparably linked to the future and destiny of the country and the [Chinese] nation, and requires that we have our feet firmly on the ground, striving unremittingly towards the great “Chinese Dream.”

(2) Extensively promulgate and realize that the “Chinese Dream” must be China’s path. Extensively promulgate that the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics has come from over 30 years of the great practice of Reform and Opening, from the continued explorations of over 60 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, from profound conclusions drawn from over 170 years of development the Chinese nation, and from the heritage of over 5,000 years of Chinese civilization. It has deep historical roots and an extensive foundation in reality, guiding the city’s cadres and masses to unwaveringly forge ahead by following the correct Chinese path.

(3) Extensively promulgate that realizing the “Chinese Dream” must enhance the Chinese spirit. Extensively promulgate that patriotism is the nucleus of the national spirit, and reform and innovation the nucleus of the modern spirit. Promote patriotism as the soul of a powerful and invigorated country which joins minds and gathers strength, and as the spiritual force which strengthens and unites the Chinese people; reform and innovation were the spiritual forces which encouraged us to change with the times during Reform and Opening. Guide the entire city to push forward the enhancement of the national and modern spirit. Constantly strengthen the spiritual bond of unity and the spiritual force of unresting self-improvement, and forever march towards the future with vigor.

(4) Extensively promulgate that realizing the “Chinese Dream” requires the consolidation of Chinese power. Extensively promulgate that the Chinese Dream is the dream of the [Chinese] nation, and is also the dream of every Chinese person. As long as we are all inseparably linked, as long as we are a people united, as long as we struggle for the realization of our common dream, we will be matchlessly powerful in the force of our realization of this goal. Each one of us has vast space to assiduously realize his or her dream. Extensively promulgate that the Chinese people all share the opportunity to accomplish the outstanding, to make our dreams come true, and to grow and progress along with the motherland and the times. Encourage the people of the city to keep this mission in mind, and to keep all of their thoughts and energy directed towards the goal of promoting the capital’s scientific development of a strong spiritual force.

(5) Extensively promulgate the Municipal Committee’s decision-making spirit in using the “Chinese Dream” to push forward innovation and development in the capital. Extensively promulgate the essence of leading municipal cadres’ speeches on teaching and promulgating the “Chinese Dream,” and the essence of of the 11th municipal Party representative meeting and the first and second plenary sessions of the 11th municipal Party committee meeting. Thoroughly recognize the stepwise development of the capital and precisely grasp the points of integration of the “Chinese Dream” and the work of the capital. Use the “Chinese Dream” to guide and promote the “two-wheel drive” strategy of cultural and technological innovation. Use the “Chinese Dream” to condense power in the capital and to initiate a new phase in social and economic development.

(6) Extensively promulgate all lively efforts and successful experiences from the capital’s battle lines in realizing the “Chinese Dream.” Extensively promulgate the capital’s historical achievements in economic and social development–especially those that have occurred since the 16th Party Congress–in [improving] living standards, and in [altering] the appearance of urban and rural areas. Push every department and work unit in all districts and counties to tightly embrace the themes of scientific development and accelerated transformation of economic progress. Fully deepen the grand acts and fresh experiences of Reform and Opening. Publicize new progress and new results in the capital’s construction of socialist democracy, advanced socialist culture, preeminence as a location for harmonious society, and conservation culture. Publicize the good experiences and methods taken by all levels of city government to strengthen the able construction, progressive construction, and pure construction of the Party’s governance.

C. Priorities

Developing the “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work is a city-oriented systemic project, and a major, long-term political task. We must insist on commanding truth and detail. For best results, we must ceaselessly deepen and expand [our work]. Henceforth, we must focus our efforts on the following tasks:

(1) Improve the battle-ready force of theory. Focusing on leading cadres, we must channel the study of the “Chinese Dream” into the curricula of all levels of the Party committee (leading Party groups), as well as into the main curriculum of cadre training, making it the important contents of the municipal study model for Party organization construction. These programs will include courses and seminars organizing the majority of Party members into serious study and discussion. Primary-level Party groups must adopt a variety of forms to provide education to all veteran cadres, retired personnel, non-public economic organizations, and Party members in social organizations. This study and education must reach all social groups. All of the capital’s intellectual resources must be used to carry out an extensive propaganda campaign to bring “Chinese Dream” propaganda activities to the grassroots. A collection of related reading material is to be compiled into the “Chinese Dream” Cadre Theory Reader, a large-scale television series entitled The Correct Path to Great Change–500 Years of Socialism is to be filmed, and the song “Dream” is to be written. “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work is to become an important part of students’ ideological and political education, and should be promoted in schools, textbooks, and classrooms.

(2) Widely develop self-directed educational activities by the masses. Integrate “Chinese Dream” study and propaganda and theorists [of the “Chinese Dream”] with the grassroots and the common people’s self-directed educational activities. With “My Dream, the Chinese Dream” as the theme, continue to deeply expand “The Party in the People’s Hearts” propaganda work. Cater to the grassroots, deeply excavate, and widely promulgate the true stories of people from all walks of life and from grassroots Party organizations who, under the Party’s leadership, stand on firm ground, take real action to reinvigorate the nation, contribute novel ideas, and tirelessly struggle in order to realize complete individual development, to push social progress, and to enact the “Chinese Dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Create and present to the public a series of short films [based on] these stories in order to build a positive, healthy, progressive, and harmonious social atmosphere. Inspire people to pioneering action.

(3) Strengthen the study and interpretation of the theory of the “Chinese Dream.” Give full reign to [the preponderance of] the capital’s social science resources. Rely on a program of research into the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Focus on the major theoretical and practical issues of realizing the “Chinese Dream.” Set up a group of major philosophy and social science projects to interpret the “Chinese Dream.” Give full reign to all municipal social science theory work units. Utilize the Forum on the Sinicization of Marxism, the Academic Frontiers Forum, the Natural and Social Sciences Joint Summit, the Forum on the Study Model for Party Organization Construction, and other such academic institutions to increase exploration of the “Chinese Dream.” Rely on “Weekend Community Lecture Halls,” “Beijing Social Science Week”, and similar activities, and vehicles such as “SpeakersNet” and the “Capital City Microbloggers Community of Social Science Experts” to strengthen the “Chinese Dream” propaganda and dissemination.

(4) Carefully manage news media and Internet propaganda. Municipal news media should dedicate a number of features, columns, special reports, and special issues to introducing theoretical articles, commentary, and interviews in order to create an atmosphere of favorable public opinion. We must successfully fight a major propaganda campaign to publicize the measures our city has taken and the experiences gained in implementing important central government policy decisions; to take on the hot topics of economic trends, price regulation, transformation development, housing, traffic, social security, income distribution, and air quality; to respond to society’s concerns; and to cultivate a favorable social mentality. Municipal websites must launch special web pages on the “Chinese Dream” and assemble a series of “Chinese Dream” talks, essay competitions, and other activities that will form a positive public opinion.

(5) Encourage [the creation of] a group of literary and artistic masterworks. Use entertainment to educate. Adopt colorful forms of cultural entertainment to carry out “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work. Adhering to the creative theme of realizing the “Chinese Dream,” carefully organize key artistic creations and cultural activities, and plan and launch TV dramas, stage plays, songs, and other works of art. Adhere to the principle that “literature and art should be used to serve both the people and socialism,” the “Double Hundred” policy, and the principle of the “Three Closenesses” to fully grasp the creation of products on the themes of reality, youth, rural issues, and the elderly. Assemble and promulgate original, modern, and local masterpieces to create a good cultural atmosphere for the public to learn about the “Chinese Dream.”

(6) Strengthen propaganda education directed towards youth and similar groups. Persist in targeting propaganda education at youth. Unite with the “Chinese Dream” the dreams of youth and students to grow up and become useful members of society. Launch an education program on the theme of “using the positive energy of youth to build the Chinese Dream.” Guide young people to use their position to put the “Chinese Dream” into practice. Organize extensive “My Chinese Dream” activities in the capital’s colleges and universities and sponsor a cross-institution “My Chinese Dream” contest, a Student Creative Culture Day, and similar activities in order to guide college students towards taking [these] ideals to heart and to make steadfast their conviction [in the Chinese Dream]. Implement a plan of action for ideology and morality construction for minors. Continuously fine-tune the four-in-one educational system of school, family, society, and the Internet. In primary and secondary schools, create “My Dream, the Chinese Dream” online summer camp activities to deepen the understanding of the “Chinese Dream” among younger students.

D. Work Requirements

(1) Integrate practice, promote work. Vigorously encourage “Chinese Dream” work. Use the “Chinese Dream” to arouse the spirit and strength of all of Beijing’s cadres and citizens. Comprehensively implement central Party work requirements throughout the capital. Firmly grasp the characteristics of the capital’s step-by-step development. Deepen Reform and Opening. Strengthen the drive to innovate. Guarantee improvements to the people’s quality of life. Coordinate a holistic plan for advancing the city’s economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological development. Achieve various tasks for the scientific development of the capital.

(2) Coordinate and concentrate. “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work will be organized and implemented under the leadership of the municipal propaganda bureau. All ministries and commissions of the municipal Party committee and city government and all related work units will participate together. Actively promote the utility of labor units, the Communist Youth League, the Women’s Federation, etc. to increase the masses’ strength in self-education. All regions and counties, all ministries and departments, and every work unit shall attach great importance to making “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work a critical task for the deployment of work and education going forward. Tightly integrate the education and propaganda work of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Party’s education and implementation of the mass line, and organizational construction of “study-type Party organizations.” Consider every angle. Plan scientifically.

(3) Focal points, categorical guidance. “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work must successfully target Party members and cadres, intellectual communities, youth and students, and the grassroots masses. While the “Chinese Dream” is an essential part of the education of Party members and cadres at all levels, leading cadres should be the first to learn and lead in propaganda efforts. Realistically capitalize on intellectuals’ collective knowledge of science and technology, education, culture, and the social sciences for education and propaganda work. Develop curricula and publicity programs specifically targeted at different regions and industries.

(4) Unremittingly persevere. Persist in uniting long-term programs and stepwise planning; make “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work into everyday work that is distinguished by its unity and is consistently successful. Every district, county, and government department must unify practice, formulate specific schemes for implementation, and organize specialized strength and responsibility to enact “Chinese Dream” education and propaganda work. Purposefully strengthen guidance of subordinate and low-level work units. Promptly carry out supervision, encouragement, and inspection. Make assessments of the results. Promptly summarize propaganda advancement models and successful experiences; set examples through models; let one point guide the whole. Construct a good environment for education and propaganda work.

Via CDT Chinese. Translation by Josh Rudolph.

“Double Hundred” refers to Mao’s famous proclamation: “Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend.” Back.

“Study-type Party organizations” arose from the 17th Party Congress in 2010. They are groups organized at all levels of government to study Marxism, “scientific development,” and other tenets of the CCP. Back.

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Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” bears the dreams and great trust of millions upon millions of people, and has reignited the hope for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Realizing the Chinese dream requires steadfast confidence, persistent conviction, and lofty faith. Tremendous self-confidence in our beliefs and unwavering conviction will bring us into an even more self-aware coalition under the flag of socialism with Chinese characteristics, drawing the multitudes together in total unity in the struggle to realize our common Chinese dream. When the hundreds of millions of people assemble in confidence, conviction, and faith to hold fast, we will at last coalesce an unbeatable, boundless force from the wisdom and strength of 1.3 billion people with which to collectively realize our dreams. We welcome your participation in the People’s Forum “Confidence-Conviction-Faith” survey.

习主席的“中国梦”承载了亿万人民的梦想和重托，重燃了中华民族伟大复兴的希望。实现中国梦，需要坚定的信心，执着的信念，和崇高的信仰。高度自信的信心和坚定不移的信念，使我们更加自觉地凝聚在中国特色社会主义信仰的旗帜下，紧密团结，万众一心，为实现共同梦想而奋斗。当亿万人民的信心、信念、信仰汇聚为共同坚守，我们才能用13亿人的智慧和力量汇集起不可战胜的磅礴力量，共同实现梦想。欢迎参与人民论坛问卷调查中心“信心•信念•信仰”调查。

The survey includes these four questions:

1. Do you agree that the Chinese Communist Party has enough courage and intelligence to accelerate and push forward reform?

1、您是否赞同中国共产党有足够的勇气和智慧加快推进改革？

2. Do you agree with the argument that “persistence in and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics is beneficial to fundamental interests of the people at large”?

2、您赞同“坚持和发展中国特色社会主义有利于最广大人民的根本利益”的说法么？

3. Do you agree with the argument that “only the Chinese Communist Party can lead the people successfully down the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics”?

3、您赞同“只有中国共产党才能带领人民走好中国特色社会主义道路”的说法么？

4. What is your opinion of China’s system of “one-party rule, multi-party participation”?

4、您对中国“一党执政、多党参政”的制度怎么看？

From the results captured in the screenshot below, the Party’s sales pitch for the Chinese dream is backfiring:

75% of respondents disagreed with the first question, while over 80% disagreed with the following three questions. 3492 people participated when this screenshot was taken.

The survey has already been taken offline.

Via CDT Chinese.

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Post tags: CCP, Chinese Dream, Netizen Voices, people's daily, socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi Jinping
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State Council Information Office: We ask that website management personnel in all locales pay attention to the contents of [forum] posts over the next few days. Please delete all posts which touch upon the Taiwan elections! (March 20, 2004)

国新办：请各地网站管理员注意这几天帖子内容，凡是涉及台湾选举的政治内容帖子，请务必删除！

Taiwan’s 2004 election was an iron-hot race between Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Lien Chan and Democratic Progressive Part (DPP) incumbent Chen Shui-bian. Controversy heated up in February, when Pan-Blue Coalition campaigners were spotted courting businessmen–and Taiwanese fugitives–on the mainland. (The coalition comprises the KMT and other parties in favor of Chinese nationalism.) Then on March 19, the day before the polls opened, Chen and his running-mate Annette Lu were injured in an assassination attempt. Chen won the election by less than one percentage point, leading to street protests and Lien’s call for a recount. Lien’s wish was honored, but Chen still came out on top.

Chen is the only president of Taiwan to date who is not a member of the KMT. Despite its historical enmity towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the KMT is now pro-Beijing. The DPP, on the other hand, favors Taiwan independence.

Tang Shou-yi, a suspect in the 2004 shooting, was extradited from the mainland on January 25, 2013. He plead guilty to all charges on March 5.

These instructions, issued to the media and Internet companies by various central and local government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The original publication date is noted after the directives; the date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

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The details of how Beijing plans to allocate its 2013 defense outlays are unknown, but China’s neighbors are hungry for answers.

If the increased expenditures are dedicated to acquiring power projection capabilities such as research on new weapons systems, improved cyber warfare abilities, procurement of more land-attack missiles and anti-satellite weapons, acquisition of stealthy armed drones, submarine-building, or procurement of air- and sea-lift capabilities that could be used to invade Taiwan, China’s neighbors would likely be anxious. In contrast, if such funds are spent primarily on ground force modernization and air defenses – systems more defensive in nature – they would likely be less concerned. If such funds go primarily towards the construction of improved barracks housing, food, clothing, energy costs and salaries for enlisted soldiers, sailors, and aviators, the region would be less worried still.

But the reality is that foreign observers are unlikely to know how these funds are spent for some time to come, if ever. China’s political system gives little oversight of the military budget to legislators, civil society, or the media, leaving it to the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army alone to decide how defense funds are spent and to release only such information on funding allocation as they see fit. This lack of transparency and accountability also means some military funds are almost certainly siphoned off in corruption.

While they agree that China’s limited transparency about the specifics of its defense budget is concerning, scholars Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff point out that chatter about the issue in the domestic and foreign media can distract from the real picture and hinder the possibility of a proper policy debate. In the Diplomat, they lay out some of their key findings from several years of research based on Chinese-language commentary:

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increasingly has the resources, capabilities, and confidence to attempt to assert China’s interests on its contested periphery, particularly in the Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China Seas). This development has the potential to seriously challenge the interests of the U.S., its allies, and other partners in the region, as well as access to and security of a vital portion of the global commons—waters and airspace that all nations rely on for prosperity, yet which none own. That’s why the PLA’s development matters so much to a Washington located halfway around the world.

Yet beyond China’s immediate periphery the actual impact of PLA spending growth overall may be far less impressive than the headline numbers suggest. The PLA would need far greater resources and capabilities to pursue high-intensity combat capabilities much further away from China’s borders and the territory it claims. At least at present, Beijing is not prioritizing such capabilities. There’s no need to wait for China to achieve full transparency to see this; manifest trends, properly interpreted, speak for themselves. Meanwhile, the development of lower-end capabilities useful for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as protection of sea lanes against non-state actors, bode well for the PLA’s growing role in cooperative security. Hence, even as the Near Seas become more contested, there is significant potential to build on nascent developments in more distant waters—where Beijing has no claims—and further cooperation among China, the U.S., and other nations.

These are the key characteristics of China’s military development. Properly understood, they can inform constructive responses in a challenging time. Misunderstood and conflated, they can confuse and inflame.

Erickson and Liff’s full article on the subject, called “Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” will appear in a forthcoming issue of peer-reviewed The China Quarterly and can be downloaded in its accepted manuscript form via Liff’s web site at Princeton University.

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“They are fake parties, just a mirage created for the benefit of ordinary people, although most people are not fooled,” said Jin Zhong, editor in chief of Open Magazine, a Hong Kong political journal. “People who join them have a fantasy that they can influence the Communist Party.”

Such sentiments are vehemently rejected by the organizations’ leaders, who say the system works just fine, providing the government with detailed proposals and measured advice from those outside the Communist Party. Asked whether he hoped China might one day embrace multiparty elections, Wan Exiang, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, said such questions betrayed a Western fixation with electoral democracy.

[…] Zhou Zhongxiao, 30, an executive at an online dating site in Beijing, said his participation in the China Democratic League had provided an outlet for promoting his pet project: the preservation of traditional wedding rituals. “We provide a useful service by helping the ruling party govern the country,” he said, adding with impatience, “Why does a party always have to be seeking political power?”

Reuters’ new Connected China site provides a brief primer on the parties and their place in China’s political system:

China has eight so-called “democratic parties” but they don’t interfere with the dominance of the Communist Party. According to the government’s official website, “the CPC is the sole party exercising political leadership in this system of multi-party cooperation,” which has been “generally accepted by various parties and people across the country after decades of practice.”

The parties’ influence is limited and is “window dressing” that allows the government to say they listen to outside views, China observer Willy Lam told the BBC. Their membership rolls are comparatively minuscule, and they are barred from challenging the Communist Party’s leadership.

Heads of the parties hold vice-chairman positions on the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), according to pro-Beijing newspaper Wen Wei Po. There has only been one non-Communist Party minister since China’s opening up – China Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interests) chairman Wan Gang (万钢), who was appointed Minister of Science and Technology in 2007.

See more at Connected China via its glossary entry on the eight parties.

More influential than these eight formal parties are the unofficial factions and alliances within the CCP. At China Media Project, Wu Jiaxiang discusses these in terms of a liberal ‘market faction’, a conservative ‘Cultural Revolution faction’ and a mainstream ‘state planning faction’, while at BBC News last November, Cheng Li described the Party’s internal politics in terms of ‘populist’ and ‘elitist’ coalitions.

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The debate was unusually broad, ranging from the need for property taxes and agricultural support prices to the role of the state in influencing returns to firms and labor. Given the lack of details and firm targets, it’s not clear whether this plan will effectively tackle the sources of inequality that are most harmful to development.

Rapidly growing economies tend to experience widening disparities. China’s growth has lifted some 600 million out of poverty even as its Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, has soared to 0.47 today from 0.25 in the mid-1980s. Although high, China’s Gini is comparable to that of the U.S. and other relatively successfully Asian economies such as Singapore and Malaysia.

The Gini number is less important than the reasons behind it. Inequality is positive when it emanates from productivity increases, entrepreneurial risk-taking and structural changes that produce sustained growth. Harmful inequality comes from distortions that ultimately undermine the development process.

It is the latter kind of inequality that Beijing has been slow to address. First, policy distortions have exaggerated geographical disparities. Second, the government budget has failed to provide equal access to social services. And finally, links between government-party officials and commercial activities have led to excessive rent-seeking.

For The Diplomat, Eve Cary writes that time will tell if the Communist Party can execute on its plan and preserve its legitimacy:

Indeed, the plan, in development for several years, is quite ambitious. It is the specific points–such as garnishing more profits from SOEs and spending more on social services–that have a better chance of success, though at first they may face considerable political pushback. It will be interesting to see how far these reforms go, considering that the new Politburo Standing Committee is dominated by the Jiang faction, with 6 of the 7 protégés of the former president, according to Brookings Institution scholar Cheng Li. Of those 6, 4 are princelings, or sons of Chinese Communist Party revolutionary heroes. In general, Jiang’s faction- sometimes referred to as the Shanghai gang- and the princelings promote the interests of the middle class, entrepreneurs, and the coast, as opposed to the populists, who tend to promote the interests of the common people.

There are other reforms in the pipeline, as well. Last November the State Council backed policy changes that aim to strengthen the property rights of farmers, including such measures as identifying and registering land, and issuing land ownership certificates to farmers. This policy was pushed through by outgoing populist premier Wen Jiabao. Affordable housing has also been a hot issue: in 2012, the central government allocated 37.1 billion dollars (233.26 billion yuan) for subsidized housing projects, up almost 40% from the previous year.

Of all the problems that China faces in the next 25 years, the income gap–and all of the associated issues–is perhaps the most dangerous for the Communist Party and future social stability. For example, in its 2013 Social Development Blue Book, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes that there have been 100,000 “mass incidents” (large protests) every year for several years, and that half of these protests are related to land grabs.

It has become a commonly-held belief among China watchers that the CCP has remained in power through a Faustian bargain with its people–it retains power as long as it maintains economic growth. With so many left behind, there is a growing contingent who are left out of this deal, and they are become increasingly vocal. Despite the elitist bent of the new Standing Committee, one hopes that they have the foresight to continue to focus on this critical issue, and develop effective solutions to it.

See also previous CDT coverage of China’s income inequality.

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Post tags: CCP, economic reform, inequality, political reform, reform, wealth gap
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Xi and the other six newly elected members of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau have followed a very tight timetable in their first 100 days of rule.

They made many inspection tours of poverty-hit rural areas, sitting on brick beds, chatting with farmers and learning the real situation.

They convened many efficient, down-to-earth but frugal meetings, and promulgated a series of practical and to-the-point policies and measures.

Their jargon-free speeches have become popular soundbites.

The new CPC leaders also used their public appearances in various occasions — inspection tours, meetings and speeches — to deploy political, economic, diplomatic and national defense work, showcasing their ruling principle and concept.

These moves were hailed by media from home and abroad as the “new deal.”

Singapore’s Straits Times also spoke to a number of China observers and put together a report card for Xi:

Asked to grade Mr Xi on a scale from “A” to “F”, Singapore-based observer Li Mingjiang gave him an “A minus”. “Xi has done a fairly good job so far. First of all, he has created a new and positive political atmosphere in China,” he added.

Professor Li cited Mr Xi’s efforts such as cutting back on lavish ceremonies and receptions for officials, encouraging local governments to be less wasteful, and taking tougher steps against graft.

…

Mr Xi got a “B” grade from Nottingham University analyst Steve Tsang, who credits the leader for taking on corruption and abuse of power verbally.

“He has also projected an image of taking these issues seriously by appointing Wang Qishan to this portfolio,” he added.

…

But Hong Kong-based analyst Willy Lam gave Mr Xi “a mere pass” – a “D” grade.

He said Mr Xi has been disappointing in not saying much so far about economic and especially political reform, and has also continued the illegal treatment of dissidents such as the house arrest of jailed Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo’s wife Liu Xia.

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Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, Xi Jinping, XInhua News
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Jiang asked the party’s new Central Committee to put his name among those of other retired leaders, and behind incumbent party and state leaders, after the party’s national congress in November, Xinhua reported.

It praised Jiang’s move as “reflecting the noble character and sterling integrity and open-mindedness of a Communist”.

At the funeral of General Yang Baibing on Monday, Jiang’s name appeared after those of members of the party’s Politburo Standing Committee and state leaders for the first time since his full retirement in 2004.

Jiang had previously ranked second only to President Hu Jintao at official occasions following his retirement.

The South China Morning Post had reported Jiang’s tumble in the pecking order on Tuesday, before state media claimed the change came at the former leader’s own request. Still, one Beijing-based political analyst told the South China Morning Post on Thursday that Jiang “had most likely been forced to take a step back.” Chris Buckley of The New York Times noted that Jiang was listed third in a similar mourning announcement just two months ago:

For some political analysts seeking to fathom the undercurrents of power in China’s elite, Mr. Jiang’s reduced protocol ranking suggested something more: that he may finally curb any impulses to exert influence in Zhongnanhai, the party leadership’s compound in Beijing.

“In China, the saying goes that you must live up to your title to give your words sway, so if Jiang Zemin meddles in politics again after making this step, his reputation will be badly damaged,” said Yao Jianfu, a retired party official and researcher in Beijing.

“It’s a change in protocol, but now he’ll be expected to live up to it and stop being such a political busybody,” Mr. Yao said.

One observer, however, told NPR’s Louisa Lim that it’s too soon to say whether Jiang had really relinquished his behind-the scenes influence on party affairs:

“In terms of the symbolism, this is a step forward to mitigate and to guard against the so-called geriatric politics: the old men interfering, retired old cadres who have no position still having a big say in party affairs,” said Willy Lam, a China politics expert at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

“But on a practical level, it’s difficult to prevent Jiang Zemin from still trying to do whatever he can to interfere in party affairs,” Lam said. “In the Chinese context, tradition dies hard and you have a long record of retired party elders still interfering in party politics.”

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Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, CCP Central Committee, Jiang Zemin, party elders, Politburo Standing Committee
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Lawyer Li Guifang said he and colleague Wang Zhaofeng of the DeHeng Law Offices will represent Bo.

“The case is still being investigated … an indictment has not yet been issued,” Li said. He declined to answer further questions.

…

DeHeng is well-known in the Chinese legal community as one of the country’s largest firms, with branches in major mainland cities and overseas.

On its website, the firm says it has had good relations with large state enterprises and government departments, providing legal services in projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and acting as advisers to the finance and health ministries.

The firm also enjoys favourable standing with the party leadership: the newly appointed party leader, Xi Jinping , visited the firm’s office in Beijing in 2010 and praised its efforts in promoting party ideology within its ranks, according to a report by the official Xinhua News Agency at the time.

The Telegraph’s Tom Phillips noted last week that one of the lawyers, Li Guifang, spent time studying in the UK in 1989:

Colleagues describe Mr Bo’s lawyer as one of China’s best. Li Guifang is the deputy director of the Criminal Law Committee of the Chinese Bar Association and an expert in “economic crimes”, according to his official profile.

Read more about Bo Xilai via CDT.

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Post tags: Bo Xilai, CCP, DeHeng Law Offices, high-level corruption, Li Guifang, United Kingdom, Wang Zhaofeng
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A widening discontent was evident this month in the anticensorship street protests in the southern city of Guangzhou and in the online outrage that exploded over an extraordinary surge in air pollution in the north. Anger has also reached a boil over fears concerning hazardous tap water and over a factory spill of 39 tons of a toxic chemical in Shanxi Province that has led to panic in nearby cities.

For years, many China observers have asserted that the party’s authoritarian system endures because ordinary Chinese buy into a grand bargain: the party guarantees economic growth, and in exchange the people do not question the way the party rules. Now, many whose lives improved under the boom are reneging on their end of the deal, and in ways more vocal than ever before. Their ranks include billionaires and students, movie stars and homemakers.

Few are advocating an overthrow of the party. Many just want the system to provide a more secure life. But in doing so, they are demanding something that challenges the very nature of the party-controlled state: transparency.

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Post tags: air pollution, CCP, censorship, economic growth, freedom of speech, Guangzhou, middle class, new york times, Shanxi, Southern Weekly, southern weekly protest 2013, transparency, water pollution
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First, the inauguration of pro-market president Xi Jinping marks a shift away from the conservation-oriented, government-planned approach of his predecessor toward a model marked by increased privatization, including tax cuts for private enterprises, relaxed political controls, programs to boost domestic consumption and intensified resource exploitation. Xi insists that low-carbon growth will remain a priority and that the ambitious energy-saving targets of the twelfth Five Year Plan, issued in March 2011, will be met. But the targets were written in such a way that many of the details for implementation are open to interpretation. While the government had previously signaled that it would rely on growth in wind and solar to meet its goal (11.4 percent of total energy from renewable sources by 2015), it now looks like the bulk of that will come from nuclear and hydroelectric. Wind and solar are growing, but as a proportion of China’s total energy expenditure, coal is growing much faster.

…

Second, shifts in US energy consumption patterns, as well as changes in estimates of global oil reserves, will affect China’s long-term energy strategy. The International Energy Agency reports that discoveries of shale gas combined with new drilling technologies will make the United States the world’s largest oil producer by 2020. This is expected to make oil reserves in the Middle East and Central Asia newly available to China—which could reverse the shortage-driven incentive structure that promoted growth in China’s renewable energy sector. At the same time, China discovered that it may have the largest shale gas reserves in the world. A Chinese shale gas boom, coupled with increased output from coal and imported oil, could marginalize wind and solar energy. Moreover, with Washington now looking to shale gas rather than wind and solar for new energy resources, prospects for increased US consumption of China’s green exports are diminished.

…

Third, consumption patterns have eroded one of China’s most promising areas for low-carbon development: electric vehicles. A recent McKinsey & Co. report ranked China’s EV market a dismal fifth behind Japan, the United States, France and Germany. Even with generous subsidies for consumers and manufacturers, EV sales are sluggish, accounting for less than 0.02 percent of total vehicles sold (in the United States, it’s 0.09 percent). Demand is growing for gas-guzzling SUVs as well as luxury and medium-weight vehicles, especially foreign models, with imports of foreign-manufactured cars nearly doubling in 2010. The top-selling car in 2011 was the Buick Excelle, followed by the Volkswagen Lavida and the Chevrolet Cruze. China’s domestic vehicle manufacturers are drastically scaling back their small, fuel-efficient models and EV fleets and attempting to regroup around the new high-carbon model. In fact, China’s EV manufacturers are turning away from personal cars altogether and focusing on hybrid and electric city buses and taxi cabs. The major buyers of EVs are local governments and large state-owned corporations, not individuals.

The most glaring sign of resilience in China’s high carbon growth model, air pollution, hit record levels in Beijing last week. But the Economist reports that other cities in China are wrapped in smog too:

China’s crisis in air quality is indeed a national one. This month dozens of other cities, from Shandong province in the east to Guizhou in the south-west, recorded pollution spikes. Experts attribute this to an exceptionally cold winter that has caused more burning of coal and other fuels than usual, to temperature inversions over some places, and to unfortunate wind patterns in others.

…

Now officials must contend with the political impact of bad air. China’s government has long staked its legitimacy on being able to generate improved standards of living, and people have grown used to complaining about things they do not like. Adding chronically poisoned air to the mix could prove volatile, some think.

Dai Qing, a veteran environmental activist, says that the angry reaction to this month’s extreme pollution shows that the issue now overshadows other pressing problems such as corruption and infringements on people’s liberties. “For years, we environmentalists have been telling the authorities that GDP growth at any cost is a mistake,” she says.

The pollution has even reached other countries, according to researchers in the United States and Japan. Writing from Los Angeles, where he’s seen his share of bad smog in the past, UC Irvine’s Jeffrey Wasserstrom agrees that the Chinese Communist Party may be choking:

But public-health scares and heavy smog in Beijing and others places—believe it or not, at times other cities have even darker skies than the capital—are leaving some people skeptical about whether things are really getting better simply because they can now buy things at a mall. Is life really improving, they ask each other in private conversations, in online forums, and at protest rallies, if doing ordinary things like drinking milk and playing outside can cause your child to get sick? How can we trust a government, they wonder, that tries to hide the truth about obvious dangers, by censoring reports of doctored food and drink and until very recently used the word fog to describe the noxious substance that made it hard to see even nearby skyscrapers?

In most places, a smog crisis is an environmental danger and, on some days, a public health emergency. In China, the grey skies overhead strike at the very legitimacy of the country’s ruling party. At its worst, Los Angeles never had anything that could compare to that.

Still, writes NPR’s Louisa Lim, transparency has brought more scrutiny to the China’s “airpocalypse” ever since the government started releasing hourly PM2.5 readings this year. And The Atlantic’s James Fallows points out that the smog has seen a lot of recent coverage in the Chinese press, which used to downplay the issue.

Disputing other explanations, such as China’s experience with SARS and the perception of Xi Jinping as a reformer, The Atlantic’s Matt Shiavenza explores what may have really caused the unexpected silver lining:

Why, then, would the Chinese government allow such candor on the pollution question? Social media plays a role. Prominent Beijing real estate developer Pan Shiyi regularly tweets information about pollution to his several million followers on Sina’s Weibo, and the flurry of similar comments by more ordinary users has brought the pollution issue into the open. At a basic level, the government understands that once an issue hits critical mass, there’s little point in perpetuating the myth any further.

Also, unlike other issues which threaten the Chinese government’s hold on power, environmental concerns do not discriminate by class or income level. While many of Beijing’s citizens may not pay attention to esoteric political issues, the Communist Party surely believes that pollution has the potential to unite a large number of people against its governance. That, more than anything else, may explain why the government has approached this issue with unusual openness.

Still, the pitfalls of China’s rapid economic growth are felt beyond the skies. Writing for The Council on Foreign Relations, Elizabeth Economy reminds China watchers that “the country’s water pollution is easily as alarming:”

[...] According to one 2011 report, in 2010, “up to 40 percent of China’s rivers were seriously polluted” and “20 percent were so polluted their water quality was rated too toxic even to come into contact with.” Part of the explanation may rest in the “estimated 10,000 petrochemical plants along the Yangtze and 4000 along the Yellow rivers.” (And the Yellow and Yangtze are not even the most polluted of China’s seven major rivers.) On top of whatever polluted wastewater might be leaching or simply dumped into China’s rivers from these factories, the Ministry of Supervision reports that there are almost 1,700 water pollution accidents annually. The total cost in terms of human life: 60,000 premature deaths annually.

While the macro picture is concerning, even more worrying is that individual Chinese don’t know whether their water is safe to drink or not. A Chinese newspaper, the Southern Weekly, recently featured an interview with a married couple, both of whom are water experts in Beijing (available in English here). They stated that they hadn’t drunk from the tap in twenty years, and have watched the water quality deteriorate significantly over just the past few years, even while state officials claim that more than 80 percent of water leaving treatment facilities met government standards in 2011.

…

In the 1950s, China, like other countries, neither understood well nor had the capacity to deal effectively with the environmental and health challenges its rapid development was creating. Today, however, China has both the knowledge and the capability. In the midst of the recent air pollution crisis, Premier-elect Li Keqiang said it would take time to address the air pollution problem: “There has been a long-term buildup to this problem, and the resolution will require a long-term process. But we must act.” In the meantime, the Chinese people can only wear their masks, buy their bottled water, and hope they are not in this year’s batch of pollution-related casualties.

Listen also as Tom Gjelten of NPR discusses the cost of growth in China, and read more about pollution in China at CDT.

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Post tags: air pollution, CCP, CCP legitimacy, economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions, pollution, river pollution, social media, transparency, water pollution
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The 18th Party Congress pointed out that, revolving around this main theme, to grasp new victories for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics under new historical conditions, we must closely grasp the basic requirements in eight areas, and let them become the common convictions of the entire Party and the people of all ethnicities in the entire country. These eight basic requirements are: we must persist in the dominant role of the people; we must persist in liberating and developing social productive forces; we must persist in moving reform and opening-up forward; we must persist in safeguarding social fairness and justice; we must persist in marching the path of being well-to-do together; we must persist in stimulating social harmony; we must persist in peaceful development; and we must persist in the leadership of the Party. The basic requirements and common convictions of these “Eight Musts” are an enrichment and development of the inner meaning of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and shall become our programme of action.

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is the undertaking of the millions of people themselves, therefore, the mastering spirit of the people must be given full rein, to better guarantee that the people are the master of their own affairs.

Persisting in the dominant role of the people, is that we must believe in the people, rely on the people and consider the people as real heroes. This is the tradition and superiority of the Chinese Communist Party.

In another post, Creemers provides analysis of this article and the significance of the “Eight Musts.” Notably, Creemers believes these principles partially aim to acknowledge the popularity of certain policies put forth by disgraced Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai:

Basically, these documents confirm the Party’s intention to maintain the current political structure, strengthen and improve it. This should come as no surprise, as this basically has been the line that has been taken since 1979. In other words, anyone expecting breakthroughs in areas that the Party has identified as crucial for its hold on power, including media (as demonstrated by the Southern Weekend kerfuffle), the Internet, relations with the Army, and the Leninist political structure. What is striking, however, is that the legitimation of all Eight Musts is based on quotes from Mao and Deng. Jiang Zemin is completely absent from the articles, while Hu Jintao is only mentioned once in the People’s Daily. More generally, these articles clearly aim to reconnect pre-’79 China with the reform period. In my view, this is an effort to take over some of the success garnered by the nostalgic Bo line, and to hark back to a more egalitarian age, when the Party was less beset by the well-known illnesses of corruption, privilege and abuse that plague it today. The People’s Daily also clearly mentions that a greater role must be given to the “mastering spirit” of the people, to ensure that they are more in charge of their own affairs. This is an affirmation of democracy, but in the Chinese sense: democratic centralism in politics, but possibly a new emphasis on private entrepreneurialism and a shift away from the attention lavished on large SOEs during the previous decade.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP, ccp leadership, eight musts, political reform, socialism, wealth gap, Xi Jinping
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[…] There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China’s politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country’s ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP’s adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country’s leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West’s conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.

[…] Many developing countries have already come to learn that democracy doesn’t solve all their problems. For them, China’s example is important. Its recent success and the failures of the West offer a stark contrast. To be sure, China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But its success does show that many systems of political governance can work when they are congruent with a country’s culture and history. The significance of China’s success, then, is not that China provides the world with an alternative but that it demonstrates that successful alternatives exist. Twenty-four years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama predicted that all countries would eventually adopt liberal democracy and lamented that the world would become a boring place because of that. Relief is on the way. A more interesting age may be upon us.

Also at Foreign Policy, Yasheng Huang responds. The Party, he argues, has not so much adapted as muddled through, while Yunnan’s innovative Party vice-secretary Qiu He is no more representative of Chinese meritocracy than the corrupt torturer Bo Xilai. He praises as “sensible” Li’s suggestions for the near future but, citing the example of Taiwan, frames them as steps onto a benignly slippery slope towards democracy.

In 2011, standing in front of the Royal Society (the British academy of sciences), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared, “Tomorrow’s China will be a country that fully achieves democracy, the rule of law, fairness, and justice. Without freedom, there is no real democracy. Without guarantee of economic and political rights, there is no real freedom.” Eric Li’s article in these pages, “The Life of the Party,” pays no such lip service to democracy. Instead, Li, a Shanghai-based venture capitalist, declares that the debate over Chinese democratization is dead: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will not only stay in power; its success in the coming years will “consolidate the one-party model and, in the process, challenge the West’s conventional wisdom about political development.” Li might have called the race too soon.

[…] There are calls for more democracy in China. It is true that the party’s antireform bloc has had the upper hand since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. But recently, voices for reform within the CCP have been gaining strength, aided in large part by calls for honesty, transparency, and accountability from hundreds of millions of Internet-using Chinese citizens. China’s new leaders seem at least somewhat willing to adopt a more moderate tone than their predecessors, who issued strident warnings against “westernization” of the Chinese political system. So far, what has held China back from democracy is not a lack of demand for it but a lack of supply. It is possible that the gap will start to close over the next ten years.

See more on political reform, democracy and meritocracy, via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP, democracy, eric x. li, legitimacy, meritocracy, political reform, rule of law, Wen Jiabao, Yasheng Huang
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China has been grappling of late with political and social tension over its murky policy-making process and its growing income disparity. The party has been especially sensitive this year during the leadership change about revelations about fortunes amassed by the offspring of political leaders, known as “princelings,” by leaders of state businesses and by other politically connected people. Many ordinary Chinese blame high prices, poor quality food and pollution on guanshang guojie—meaning, roughly, officials in bed with businessmen.

[…] It is difficult to pinpoint precisely how holding political positions advances the business interests of the wealthy, if at all. They may do better because of their political positions, or, conversely, they may owe their positions to their business success. There are a multitude of reasons for Chinese companies to be on good terms with political leaders. Chinese companies routinely do business with the government, borrow money from state banks, even negotiate their tax bills with local authorities.

The web of political power and business interests is mapped in a dense and extensive infographic accompanying the report. Areddy also points to an illustrative series of deals involving former Chongqing Party boss Bo Xilai and Wen Jiabao’s son Wen Yunsong.

The transactions began when officials in Chongqing’s government who answered to Mr. Bo sold shares of a state-run grocery and electronics chain to an investment group led by New Horizon Capital LP, a firm founded by Premier Wen’s son, Wen Yunsong.

After first buying 25% of the chain-store business, the New Horizon-led group increased its holdings to 39%, according to regulatory filings and government reports. The investment group effectively became a partner of the Chongqing government in the retail business.

In October 2009, Chongqing Department Store Co., 600729.SH -1.56% a bigger retailing group also controlled by the local government, bought the chain in a 3.921 billion yuan ($574 million) all-stock merger. That deal valued the private-equity group’s initial 25% stake at 980 million yuan, almost 2.8 times what it had paid 18 months earlier.

The Wall Street Journal report coincided with a major Bloomberg investigation, also published on Boxing Day. At Bloomberg View, William Pesek discussed the implications of the Bloomberg report, and of David Barboza’s October exposé of Wen’s family’s wealth at The New York Times.

When you peruse many of the reader responses to foreign press reports about Chinese graft, conspiracy theories abound: The western media want to undermine China’s rise and is doing the bidding of officials in Washington and Tokyo. That, of course, is silly. Only a fool would hope for a crash in the world’s No. 2 economy and for 1.3 billion people to struggle to find enough to eat. Global economics isn’t a zero-sum game. When hundreds of millions of people get rich, that will benefit all of us, whether you work for Rolex, Nike Inc. or Toyota Motor Corp.

[…] The sad truth is that hundreds of millions of Chinese aren’t rolling in yuan the way Deng might have hoped. It’s getting harder to hide that reality from China’s masses, and that poses a growing threat to the Communist Party. Closing international-media websites, as China does at the sight of an unflattering article, can’t hide the internal decay as wealth becomes more and more concentrated.

[…] No industrializing economy has ever avoided a crash, and neither will China. Possible catalysts include pollution and surging living costs. Yet the one that China’s leaders are probably most loath to confront is the sight of Communist Party officials becoming modern-day Rockefellers and Vanderbilts. It surely never occurred to Deng that finding wealth would be China’s undoing. When you follow the money, it’s hard to conclude otherwise.

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Post tags: Bo Xilai, CCP, National People's Congress, rich list, wealth gap, Wen Jiabao, Wen Yunsong
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