Looking back at China’s internet in 2011, there were three broad trends that deserve greater attention. The first trend was a general shift from emotionally-driven nationalist chatter as the defining tone of China’s internet toward a more basic attention to issues of public welfare. The second was the rise of what we can call the “social power of the internet” (网络社会力). And the third trend was a more pronounced deficit in understanding on the government’s part about the role it should play in a networked society. While it became readily apparent, that is, that we now have a networked civil society in China, it became clearer at the same time that we lack government administrators who are internet literate (网络化的治理者) ….

Clearly, the winds are changing. When you cannot find safe milk for your child to drink, when their school buses are hazardous, when you worry that you might be exposed to dangerous recycled cooking oils if you go out to a local restaurant, when the city where you live is choked with pollution and you have no idea what the actual PM2.5 measures for the most dangerous air particles are, the question that possesses you above all else is what direction Chinese society is heading. You care more about how the people of China can enjoy lives of peace and prosperity, and less about the murderous logic of the Boxer Rebellion. [NOTE: Hu is suggesting here that trends of extreme nationalism in China are marked with the same sort of anti-foreign violence seen during the Boxer Rebellion.]

(Reading the entire piece is strongly recommended.)

Underlying these trends was the continued rise of the microblog. The number of weibo users reportedly quadrupled last year to a quarter of a billion, almost half of China’s online population, from 63 million at the end of 2010. But this growth tailed off in the second half of the year, according to a report from the China Internet Network Information Center [zh, PDF]. From China Real Time Report:

… [N]early half of China’s total 513 million Internet users were using microblogs, CNNIC said. The total number of Internet users, defined by CNNIC as anyone who used the Internet in the last six months, was up from 457 million at the end of 2010.

But user growth for China’s microblog services has slowed, the report said. “The explosion in users occurred in the first half of the year, with the user growth rate slowing in the second half… showing that after reaching high levels, microblog usage rates have ended their explosive growth.”

The government agency’s findings don’t entirely match data from the country’s microblog operators, possibly due to differing methodology and definitions. Tencent said it had 310 million registered Tencent Weibo users at the end of September, marking fast growth from the more than 200 million users it said it had in June, and exceeding the total number of Weibo users in China reported by CNNIC.

Sina reported having 227 million registered accounts on Sina Weibo at the end of September, an increase of 21% from the previous quarter.

The CNNIC figures don’t entirely match others issued by the government, either: State Council Information Office chief Wang Chen stated in September that the number of microbloggers in China had already passed 300 million.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, CNNIC, Hu Yong, int, Internet growth, microblogging, nationalism, online population, sina, tencent
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Based on the news I’ve seen, I want to share a few thoughts. A lot of this news is incomplete, and I also haven’t spoken to anyone who’s been on the scene. A lot of my thoughts are conjectures, and therefore might be off the mark.

 

I. In the turn of events at Wukan, we have seen two modes of thought, and from these two corresponding types of resolution.

The first mode of thought is that of class struggle, or a hostile “us-versus-them” type of thinking based on zero-sum conflict. When an outside profit-seeking group shows up and rubs “us” the wrong way, this immediately sparks feelings of enmity. If there is some sign of outside influence or some other intruding power, people’s internal defenses will be raised, and they will use every possible method to counter the intruder. Given our contemporary conditions, this mode of thought neither practical nor realistic.

 How did this incident escalate to such a fever pitch? A working group tasked after the incident says the people have voiced their desire for basic justice, and that if these issues had been carefully considered from the beginning, the situation would not have become so magnified. My guess is that at the beginning, this might have been confined to a small group of miscreants who wished to protect their own interests. They were at odds with the villagers. However, at some point, mediators perhaps regarded this as an intra-village dispute. To take this one step further, if some people had used illegal methods in order to exploit others, then this would have just been a conflict between criminals and victims. These conflicts have conventional solutions: filing lawsuits, going to court, making civil and criminal appeals, etc.

The problem is that once you touch upon [issues relating to] land and the political regime, the courts will not accept cases, and the government will not uphold justice. The villagers will be at a dead-end, and this will incite a mass incident. Because of this, higher level mediators will sense the risk that people will stir up trouble, influence the stability of [those in] power, and topple the base of political system. These [attacks] must be countered. At this time, mediators seem to have been abducted by some gangster’s private interests. We have seen that profit issues lie behind the us-versus-them mentality. If there is an economic crime, then criminals will welcome us-versus-them thinking, and are quite willing to place their own interests within the frame of government interests and their hostile relations with villagers within the frame of village-government conflicts. They might even bring the Party into it.

The us-versus-them mentality has reappeared at each level of this event’s process of resolution. I have heard the Shanwei municipal secretary, who mentioned the influence of outside hostile actors and the interference of the media, [both of which he argued] are threats. Here, the theme of us-versus-them became prominent.

Later, the provincial committee work group intervened, and Deputy Secretary Zhu gave voice to another mode of thought. He said that the villagers’ demands were basically reasonable. This “reasonableness” of course has a reference point: civil rights are the conventional standard of a society ruled by law. This is yours, this is not yours. If this is yours, then your rights must be respected. If you want more, then both sides can negotiate and let the law ultimately decide. If someone violates your rights, or even breaks the law, then the violator will be penalized, and those who uphold rights will be supported.

This reasoning leads to the “civil rights mode of thinking.” From the point of view of the government, this is the concept of rule of law. Civilian disputes over profit have no “us” or “them”–even if those involved have the us-versus-them mentality–and have nothing to do with the government. The government must only adjudicate with the law as its basis and evaluate whether each side has acted appropriately. Taken a step further, if emphasis is placed on an independent court ruling, and the court is not disturbed by administrative organs, then we will enter into a “constitutional government mode of thought.”

The working group publicized five principles, the last two of which are “total transparency and the primacy of the law.” As citizens demand basic rights and wish to have law-based solutions, there is nothing [for the government] to be ashamed of–of course, there should be no qualms with transparency. Transparency is the foundation of the rule of law, and is only logical. With regards to citizen rights, we should openly discuss whether your demands are appropriate and if any [rights] have been infringed upon. If they have been infringed upon, then we should step in on your behalf and discuss the issue at hand. If illegal behavior has taken place, then we will try to resolve problems by using the law as a guide.

Based on this working group’s thought process, [it seems that] after a crisis has passed, it is best to follow the rule of law and let the court adjudicate. Currently, the court have limited authority, and it is hard to avoid administrative interference. Working groups are necessary–however, in the future, we must resolve issues with independent court rulings and to use a constitutional government model to more thoroughly address problems.

From these two different modes of thought [us-versus-them and civil society], there are two methods of resolution.

The us-versus-them mentality easily gives way to conflict. We know that historically there have been many tragic events that have led to both sides getting seriously hurt. When the Wukan Incident escalated, it seemed to be going down that path and was conceivably going to lead to violent dispute and strong suppression, with the chief instigators getting punished and accomplices let off more easily. The public would not accept this and would be in an uproar. How many years would pass before the innocent could be rehabilitated and their unjust charges removed?

But as soon as this mentality shifts; disputes are regarded as civil rights in a diverse society; demands are regarded as either excessive or normal; and the reasonableness of demands is carefully discussed; then we will be acting properly and in a way that gives us dignity. Contemporary China has a diverse society and a market economy. Relations are primarily [based on] an exchange of profit. There still are illegal exchanges of power and money, as well as the black market; but this is, after all, the market and not the battlefield. I see that the villagers have adopted this mentality, and their situation has changed drastically. Even though this issue has not been resolved, if they continue down this path, no real disruptions will take place, and everything will ultimately be more or less fair. Both sides will have talks, and there will be no misunderstandings or eruptions of hostility.

To sum up, these two mode of thought lead to these two kinds of resolution, which in turn can lead to two completely different outcomes. I see that there has been a good resolution in Guangdong–to the credit, and not discredit, of its government.

 

II. The source of these two modes of thought can be found within the system.

The us-versus-them mentality has a deep theoretical basis within the Chinese Communist Party, and also has a very deep history. With several decades of war as its backdrop, this process has given body to theories of class warfare and a united front.

Underneath these historical roots lies a practical interest. Recently, a teacher said that us-versus-them is safe if used internally–it shows, at least, that one is taking a stance and protecting the Party’s interests. On the contrary, as soon as one frames things in terms of civil rights, it will be attacked–isn’t it an affront to our interests? Since it harms the interests of the ideology, it may also harm material interest. Are you going after pocket change or public funds? You want to deal with offenders, but isn’t the offender a powerful insider? Many people are willing to preserve the us-versus-them mode of thought since it can protect the collective interest, and find approval within the group. To look at it from another point of view might actually cast you as a troublemaker, and subject you to all kinds of attacks, such as accusations that you’ve made concessions to the adversary. Therefore, this first mode of thought has a very complex background.

The second mode of thought, that of respecting civil rights, also has a very interesting background.

The working group raised these five principles: “place importance on public will; put the masses first; people are foremost; have total transparency; and give primacy to the law.” Let’s first talk about the public interest. In this the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology has a long-standing history, that is, “serve the people.” “Everything stems from the interest of the people, not some individual or small group.” Additionally, there is the principle of “seeking truth from facts.” These all support respect for and protection of the civil rights mode of thought.

As for people being foremost and giving primacy to the law, these have their basis in the constitution and central directives. The concepts “putting the people first” and “scientific development” are the wording of leaders. Who, then, are the people? They are the citizens. To put “the people first” is really to put “civil rights first.” If civil rights are foremost, then a constitutional government will have a robust ideological basis. And it coincides with what we have been advocating, rather than being something alien.

Now, what is the substance of “scientific development”? If you make society an object of study and use the scientific method to determine what its rules are, what kind of scientific rules will we see?

Assuming that conditions remain stable, and there are no great disasters or wars, and that it is an industrial and commercial society–then under these conditions, giving citizens more economic rights and economic freedom will make society prosper. Giving citizens more political rights and a democratic rule of law will lead to a relatively stable society. To use scientific principles to express this, the rule is: civil rights and economic prosperity are related to political stability. This is a fundamental principle that applies globally and historically. If [we are] in accordance with this rule, then development and the protection of civil rights, economic prosperity, and a harmonious society will each be logical and natural outgrowths. In short, the current ruling Party’s slogan contains the ideological basis for a constitutional government.

We have just mentioned that the market economy provides a foundation for facts. Concepts should reflect reality. Real life is not a battle to the death, but rather a win-win marketplace. Us-versus-them thinking is not in touch with reality; thinking oriented towards civil society is.

 

III. How can pressure become motivation?

First, Xiaogang left its impression, and this was pressure. Pressure can motivate reform. I think this incident [in Wukan] had several pressure points, or what we might call people’s issues.

The first is the issue of land, or really property rights. This pressure was just discussed; it is a national phenomenon. Can we use this particular example to clarify the national property rights system?

The second is the issue of village-level elections. People have always thought this issue had already been resolved, but village elections are far from perfect. Only if they goes so far as to attract the attention of the outside media–to the level of the attention given to the “Wukan Uprising”–only then can village election issues be resolved. Originally, it seemed as if the problem had already been solved, but it actually had a big hole. If we had seized this opportunity to check the problems in the electoral procedure, especially in a village as large as Wukan with a population of almost 20,000, how would elections take place? In such a large village election, there will be high organizational costs, and people could easily free ride. Without a crisis, it would be difficult to have an effective system to supervise power and the political cycle. The Wukan Incident might turn into a conflict, making it seek like it’s over when the problem is only half-solved. I hope that Guangdong can use this incident to push a little further, and work on improving village elections.

The third is the issue of justice and law enforcement. After such a large incident, I have not seen any relevant reports from the courts. Going to a court to file an appeal should be the most common recourse to solve rights disputes. Why has that not been the case? It’s been said that the courts should make fair judgments. Can we use this incident to clarify the general situation a bit? One cannot arbitrarily dismiss cases; these conflicts will not disappear by being ignored by the courts. If disputes are just forced down a political channel, the villagers will go to the government and incite political struggles. Can Guangdong or Shanwei start reforms, and convert this pressure into a motivation to establish the rule of law?

The fourth is the question of media reports. If no reports are made, then this can only lead to the dissemination of rumors. Here, transparency is an asset. Hopefully this will lead to a good solution.

The fifth is the possibility that the resolution to this conflict will lead to a new method of resolution in the next conflict, and that will lead to yet another. Comparing the two, can they become a definite thing? To solve problems with civil rights and the rule of law in mind, there must be a paradigm shift for cadres. These cadres must also change the way they mediate crises. I think there is a relatively large chance that in the end, turning pressure into a force for reform and giving rise to systemic changes are possible. In this way, I think the events in Guangdong have been good, and have been an opportunity. In the process of solving people’s issues and crises, the establishment, development, and maturation of new ways of thought and new behaviors will open a new road for Chinese society.

© fionasmith for China Digital Times (CDT), 2011. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, courts, land, land rights, Law, mass incidents, Wu Si, Wukan, Xiaogang
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At a party working conference held at the end of November in China’s Guangdong Province several important civil society issues were discussed, including reducing restrictions on registration and social service outsourcing. Guangdong Province’s Communist Party Chief, Wang Yang, linked the two in one of his speeches. After the conference was over a new notice on loosening entry barriers for CSOs was posted to websites in the province. A new provincial development setting out a new policy, you say, so what’s the big deal? It was such a big deal that it was featured (with analysis) in the Legal Daily, a national Communist Party (CCP) newspaper, and the story was picked up by virtually every large newspaper in China and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. It also appeared on the national Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) website and numerous provincial civil affairs bureau websites.

The card carried by the heart says ‘Registration’ and the other text says ‘public welfare types organizing’.

For people who do not know China well (and perhaps even for some who do but are not long-term civil society watchers), the significance of the new policy can be discussed from several angles. The first of these is the government’s long-standing antipathy to independent civil society – something that amounts to a fear of independent organizations. That is certainly not going to change under the new policy. There will not be a burgeoning of activist organizations advocating for change all over China. The range of organizations that will be able to avail themselves of the new rules is, on the other hand, fairly broad, as discussed below.

It is also important to note that the developments in Guangdong were blessed at the highest levels of the Ministry in Beijing and also apparently had CCP backing in the form of Wang Yang’s endorsement mentioned above. What that means is that the government and the party are finally making more concrete their decision to partner with civil society organizations for the greater good of the Chinese people.

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Post tags: civil society, NGOs, social services
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The real significance of the protest, however, is far greater than simply another demonstration of the political potency of mass protest in China. Indeed, an editorial in China’s Global Times warns against considering Dalian simply as a “victory of a ‘protest.” Rather—and this is my interpretation—it is another symbol of how Chinese citizen activism—whether through organized non-governmental organizations, Internet campaigns, running as independent candidacies in local district congress elections, or demonstrations such as that in Dalian—has become a leading source of political evolution in China.

It is important—if often painful—to think about political change in China in the context of the intentions, capacity, resilience, and fate of the larger-than-life political figures, such as Wen Jiabao, Ai Weiwei, and Liu Xiaobo. At the same time, the Dalian protest reminds us that it is equally important to focus on the evolving intentions, capacity, resilience, and fate of the broader Chinese citizenry. China may well be in the midst of a reform movement born of the masses. The Global Times suggests that the Dalian demonstrations and their aftermath are a sign that “Both the public and the government have begun adapting both their language and actions to a more democratic time.” Let’s hope the Global Times is on to something.

Jamil Anderlini, meanwhile, argues at the Financial Times that the response to the protests betrays official nervousness at escalating unrest, which may be linked to the very economic growth by which authorities have hoped to placate the disenfranchised public:

… [Now] that most of Dalian’s citizens have enough to eat, they can afford to worry about their children being poisoned …. This trend is borne out across China: greater wealth has empowered people to take a stronger stand for their rights.

In the first of a three-part series providing background on Dalian at The China Beat, Meg Rithmire similarly notes that the protests arose from a state of relative privilege:

… [It] is striking that the largest protests to break out in Dalian since 1989, the ones that exploded last weekend, would concern an environmental issue: the main aim of demonstrators was to force the closure of a chemical plant. And it is notable as well that protests did not occur when two of Dalian’s northern neighbors experienced incidents associated with pollution and toxic spills. Nearby Harbin (whose architecture was the subject of James Carter’s recent post on this site), had to shut down the city’s water supplies for four days in 2005 as a result of a benzene spill into the Songhua River. And that spill was a result of a chemical plant explosion in Jilin City, another regional hub, which killed or injured dozens of people and resulted in a massive evacuation. But neither Harbin nor Jilin residents took to the streets six years ago.

Yet, in Dalian, middle-to-upper class residents who live in the city’s downtown area, twenty kilometers from the industrial zone in which the PX chemical plant is located, have been agitating to demand the factory’s relocation. Dalian’s economic and political trajectory since reform and opening sheds some light on why ….

… [The] PX plant protests reflect the political legacy of Dalian’s transformation. Dalian residents share a sense of entitlement to a high-quality urban environment. Many of the city’s newer residents were drawn to Dalian because of the environment, and its older residents perceive a safe and clean city as their hard-won prize from rounds of economic reforms and relocations. Protest placards with slogans like “Love Dalian, Reject Poison” underscore the centrality of the urban environment to the city’s political self-image.

The series’ other instalments explore the mixed natural and industrial heritage of the city, dating back to its past as Japanese ‘Dairen’ and Russian ‘Dalny’, which underlies this self-image.

A Wall Street Journal editorial, on the other hand, highlights suspicions that the protests in Dalian were not pure expressions of popular will, but were allowed to grow by one Party faction hoping to score points against another. The author argues, moreover, that the authorities’ unilateral closure of a private factory, however unpalatable its product, is no cause for celebration.

Whether Dalian’s current leadership had a political motive to let the demonstration gain momentum will probably never be known, though it was interesting to see Dalian Party Secretary Tang Jun stand on a vehicle to tell the protesters that their voices had been heard—an unusual move in itself. In the past, arrests of top Party officials (often on charges of corruption) tended to reveal more about their defeat in hidden power struggles than about the extent of their alleged crimes. More recently, the Party has developed a massive propaganda apparatus to “astroturf” social media sites with pro-government views. One needn’t be cynical about the sincerity of the demonstrators to suspect their cause was put to a cynical use.

Whatever the case, there should be no cheering the closing of a private plant via mass protest. As incomes rise in China, a higher priority is bound to be placed on environmental protection. But the way to implement that is through transparent democratic rules and consent. Democracies are better for the environment (cf. the Soviet Union) because they consider the costs of externalities like pollution. Dalian’s Party bosses may have welcomed the demonstrators as a means to advance various interests. But the ease with which property rights were trampled in this case shows just how far power in modern China remains beyond the hands of the people.

On the Journal’s China Real Time blog, Russell Leigh Moses considers lessons from the protests and ensuing plant closure:

The first is that public resistance and activism can prompt leaders to pause, and even reverse decisions that provoke outrage. And sometimes, as in Dalian, they might move to accelerate a plan that’s already been approved. But that’s about all. The events in Dalian demonstrate that sparks do not necessarily make prairie fires. There is plenty of sympathy on social media for the protests, but no one stepped out to stage a similar standoff elsewhere in the country. Local authorities are getting a good deal of practice in confronting discontent and they have been successful at corralling it, cowing others into not participating and coercing those who might seek to emulate it elsewhere.

The second lesson from Dalian is that there is not a civil society in China: There is uncivil politics—a place where the public is simply not invited to participate in policy discussions until after the fact. Residents and netizens can protest, but they cannot propose. That may be unfortunate and debilitating to the society, and even authoritative media admit that policy-making remains unconnected and often inefficient because of that. But alternatives to the current order are in short supply.

Sources:

China’s Dalian Demonstrations and a “More Democratic Time” – Asia Unbound – Council on Foreign Relations
Why China’s leaders respond to nimbyism – Financial Times
Dalian’s Past, Dalian’s Present, Part 1 – The China Beat
Dalian’s Past, Dalian’s Present, Part 2 – The China Beat
Dalian’s Past, Dalian’s Present, Part 3 – The China Beat
Review & Outlook: Dalian’s People—And Power – WSJ.com
China Environmental Protests a Victory for People Over Party? Not So Fast – China Real Time Report – WSJ

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2011. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, dalian, dalian px, democracy, economic growth, environmental degradation, pollution, protests
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It is true that banning a term such as “civil society” outright is a difficult proposition, and there are still plenty of examples to show that it is sticking around in China’s print media — even in those trouble-making Guangdong newspapers cited in a number of reports on the directive.

A search of the WiseNews database, which includes hundreds of mainland Chinese newspapers, returned 271 results for articles including the term “civil society” over the past month (since December 1, 2010). Since January 1, the term has been used in 50 articles in the mainstream print media. Of these 50 articles making reference to the term, 18 were from media in Guangdong province.

[...]
As traditional media have pushed gingerly against the limits of this latest ban, the term “civil society” and the ban itself have been shared through domestic microblog services, demonstration again of the potential power of these new media.

On January 3, celebrity blogger Wu Yue San Ren (????) wrote through his microblog at QQ:

Around the time I’d been in this field of journalism for just a couple of years, you couldn’t raise the concept of the ‘taxpayer,’ and now we can’t say ‘civil society’ anymore. If we say ‘the ordinary people’ that seems like a term we shouldn’t be using in a modern society. And if we say ‘the masses’ instead, then it always has the words ‘who don’t know the truth’ tacked on to it [by government officials].

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2011. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, media censorship
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?Liu Xiaobo Shocks Chinese Society by Winning the Nobel Peace Prize

By Ai Mi

Liu Xiaobo’s receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the Tiananmen Incident and Charter 08 can be traced to the same origin. From this, Chinese society has acquired a representative for dialogue with the institution. Upon hearing the news that Liu Xiaobo received the award, many wept silently. Even more gathered in celebration at restaurants. The sound of fire crackers echoed from Beijing and Shandong universities. At the Central Academy of Fine Arts, student Wei Qiang hung a banner telling people the Nobel laureate was still in prison.

4:50, 4:55, 4:59 … The journalist beside me feverishly refreshed Twitter on a cell phone. Constant refreshing rendered the screen unclear.

5:00! The news simultaneously popped up on the screen: “Liu Xiaobo receives the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.

In the Beijing taxi, the radio program was still discussing the Nobel Peace Prize when it suddenly became a pop song. It was like a drama. Tiananmen was just outside the window of the cab.

Twenty-one years ago, troops aimed machine guns at the unarmed students in the square. Even today’s premier (Wen Jiabao) couldn’t prevent the tragedy. Young, hot blood left a harsh and shameful stroke on the history of the republic. Until today, this stroke has remained unfinished.

Twenty-one years later, the death witnessed on the square, the systematic violence he met with constantly, he, however persisted as the cry for the rights of the common person, putting forth the Charter 08 and insisting the people of China “have no enemy.” And with the same honor as Nelson Mandela, Mother Teresa and Desmond Tutu, he received the Nobel Peace Prize.

5:00 on Oct. 8, 2010 is a moment worth writing into the annals of history. This page of history is so unique, it could be a novel, or even a prophesy.

As they saw the name on the computer screen, or heard it on the phone, many wept silently. Among them were scholars, corporate-types, entrepreneurs, as well as officials. Just as Liu Xiaobo had, many of them experienced the disillusionment of their youth on that square, from then on remaining silent among the crowd.

Many raised a glass and drank bitterly. They gave an Internet-age name to these “celebrations” or “criticisms” – activities for the first Chinese national to receive the Nobel Peace Prize – calling it “eating until drunk.” Among them, many were youth born after 1980. Twitter or the blogosphere is the source of their information. Most know Liu Xiaobo from the documentary “Tiananmen” they saw online, or Charter 08. They don’t know anything about him but believe he is a good person. They identify with his effort for freedom, democracy and constitutional power.

Firecrackers sounded from unknown origins at Beijing University and Shandong University. At the graduate building of Beijing Normal University, a small scale celebration was held for former classmate Liu Xiaobo’s award. At the Central Academy of Fine Arts, student Wei Qiang hung a banner telling people the Nobel lauriat was still in prison. Beijing Film Academy professor Cui Weiping received numerous text messages from students and young friends, expressing a “mixed feeling of grief and joy.”

There were also many who became abnormally busy upon hearing the news.

At No. 9 South Yuyuantan Road, a cordon of dozens of police and sentries cut off a seething crowd of more than 100 foreign journalists. Audio recorders, cameras and lenses extended toward the police line. Norwegian, American, British, French, Japanese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese … Journalists from every major news media outlet were pointing their microphones at the inapproachable building 17.

This is Liu Xiaobo’s home. His wife, Liu Xia could not move an inch without three national security officials accompanying her.

Passersby could not understand what was happening here, and would not stop inquiring. Finally one would tell another who Liu Xiaobo is, what he did and what happened tonight. At the scene, a youth told the reporter he told five people who Liu Xiaobo is, and also taught them how to evade online censorship to see the news.

Police in Beijing’s eastern district hastily extinguished an “Eat until Drunk” activity near Tandong Gate. The young scholar Xu Zhiyong, online friends Wu Gan and Wang Lihong and others wore yellow ribbons and raised a placard saying “Congratulations Liu Xiaobo on winning the Nobel Prize” in a small park near Tandong Gate. They even carried a personal stereo and played the five-minute Internationale, explaining to passersby who Liu Xiaobo is. This kind of behavior was called “disturbing the public order” by authorities. No less than 20 police stormed a small restaurant and, taking with them the crowd of 10 who had created the disturbance. Many spent a day and a night in the police station before being released. Wu Gan, Zhao Changqing and Wang Lihong all received administrative detention. One of the online friends just released told Asia Weekly he didn’t think he had broken any law, yet the police had appeared very impatient.

“They had been so lazy they didn’t check to see if the address I had written was real, so lazy they didn’t confirm my real identity. An officer even asked, “Who is Liu Xiaobo? What university is he at?”

At Shanghai’s People’s Square, another “Norwegian dinner” was extinguished by the Huangpu Police Department. Media person Shi Feike, scholar Wang Xiaoyu and another journalist were taken away while waiting to eat. They were released six hours later.

Portal posts censored late at night portal

The lights in an office building in Zhongguancun were on until 3 a.m. At 3:00 p.m. Big portal sites like Sina, Sohu and NetEase received instruction from the Network Management Office to remove all Nobel Prize news from homepages by 3:10. Several hours after the peace prize ceremony, the blog departments of big portal sites were notified that all news concerning Liu Xiaobo winning the peace prize must be strictly deleted.

Insiders described to Asia Weekly dozens of people who burned the midnight oil for the occasion:

“Our site’s entire auditing department was put into action. Starting in the evening at least 50 people auditing and deleting, post by post. Some worked until 3 or 4 in the morning before going home. First thing in the morning, at 7 or 8, they came back and continued to delete.”

He estimated, from the time the news was released until the evening peak hours, more than 30 percent of blogs were transferring information on the Nobel Peace Prize, with an estimated hundreds of thousands of posts on the topic at the big portal sites.

Overwhelmed censors stopped blog site search engines and let their computers directly block “Liu Xiaobo”, “6.4” and other first-degree sensitive words. They set “Nobel” as a second-degree sensitive word. When a second-degree word appears, behind the scenes auditors are notified at the site. They read each post and individually delete ones that don’t meet their criteria. Regulators also request big blog sites to provide a “black list” of the sources of the information. An insider who wished to remain anonymous said “Here we see the site officials’ conscience. Getting by (without providing the names) is quite easy.”

With a population 1.3 billion, how many Chinese know Liu Xiaobo? As one ordinary white-collared worker said: “I found out about this yesterday.” Just as my heart was turning, I was struck by the fragmented indifference of those around me. It pinned me down.

But the peace prize still made this young quiet intellectual feel that it was worth it.

The story is kept secret but the undercurrent is swelling everywhere.

At this moment, I’m afraid the quietest place is the prison in Jinzhou, Liaoning, 500 kilometers from Beijing.

On Dec. 25, 2009, the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and a two-year deprivation of political rights on an inciting state subversion charge. This Nobel Peace Prize receiving prisoner, who is incarcerated in the Jinzhou prison, will not be released until June 21, 2020.

Both the celebration and indifference on the evening of Oct. 8 has no relation with Liu Xiaobo. He had been in the Jinzhou Prison 10 months. He had seen his wife a total of five times – an hour each time. He still didn’t know he won the prize.

Under full monitoring by State Security, Liu Xia saw Liu Xiaobo for the sixth time on Oct. 10.

Liu Xiaobo’s wife is put under house arrest

At 9 that night, Liu Xia told online friends via Twitter that she had been put on house arrest. But she had already seen Xiaobo. He had learned from prison guards on the evening of Oct. 9 of his award. Liu Xia’s good friend Wang Jinbo confirmed on Twitter that the news described above had been sent by Liu Xia. He said: “(Liu Xia) was told by police that she could not see the media or friends. Liu Xiaobo told her the prize was for souls lost at Tiananmen Square first. He cried.”

Liu Xiaobo cried. His wife knew they weren’t tears of joy, but tears for the souls of Tiananmen.

Those who understand Liu Xiaobo know the significance of the Tiananmen Square Incident to him. Before 1989, he was the most popular instructor at Beijing Normal University. In a conversation with Li Zehou, he quipped that Liu Xiaobo is the “dark horse” of the literary world.

In May of 1980, Liu Xiaobo prematurely ended his visit to America’s Colombia University and returned to Beijing. He hopped to reason with the students at Tiananmen Square and avoid the possibility of a tragedy. But it was temptation of ideal that surpassed pure reason. To the sound of the Internationale on the square, he decided to support the student activity by fasting. Liu Xiaobo, Zhou Duo, Hou Dejian and Gao Xinzhe, “The Four Princes of Tiananmen” put forth the “June 2 Fast.” And in their “Fasting Declaration” they suggested for the first time “We have no enemies,” “Don’t allow hate and violence poison our wisdom and the Chinese people’s road to democracy.”

Two days later, troops and tanks entered the square. Even though the “four prices” straightened their backs and negotiated with the military at the last minutes, and did the utmost to convince the thousands of students to safely leave the square, young blood was already spattered across the square, never to wiped clean.

This was a turning point in Liu Xiaobo’s life. Zhou Duo recalls, in 1991, not long after Liu Xiaobo had been released from prison, his friends took him out. As their car passed Tiananmen, he didn’t dare face the square, but turned and wailed.

Zhou Duo said “This is Xiaobo’s character. He is not a simple person. Once could even describe his personality as complicated. His heart is stuck on the battle between heaven and earth, in eternal introspection, in repentance, like a saint, never compromising with himself.

I’d rather go to jail than seek survival by leaving the country

Since then, he has identified himself as a “6.4 survivor.” He bears the cross of departed spirits, slowly moving forward by the bravery of martyrs; his road has been particularly lonely. From 1989 to 1991, he was sentenced for “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” and was imprisoned. From 1996 to 1999, he was sentenced to three years of reeducation through labor for “disturbing social order.” Aside from these, he was frequently under residential surveillance and house arrest. He has never had full freedom after 1989, through the eleven years up to this specific prison sentence. His name has become a sensitive phrase, and friends have suggested to him that he become like Lu Xun by taking on several pen names to continue to write articles in China. He has refused, stating that he will never change his name or surname. Liu Xiaobo only hopes that there will be a day in China when [people] will be able to speak forth loudly and clearly. He refuses to leave China, and refuses to hide.

After receiving the Nobel Peace Prize on October 8th, Liu Xia represented Liu Xiaobo by thanking friends who have shown concern for him. She spoke cautiously that this prize was not only an honor, but also a greater responsibility. “Liu Xiaobo still has a long road ahead. Everyone, strive hard together in order to realize the ardent hopes of Chinese democracy and freedom!”

Liu wrote: “Gulag, not a noun. Auschwitz, not a noun.”

Then he rewrote his life’s “6.4” — for both the individual and the country, it was even less a noun.

The pen never finished writing 21 years ago. Eventually it will. But when?

The struggle for peace seen as a compromise

According to Zhou Duo, the Peace Prize, the Tian’anmen Square incident, and Charter 08 are all connected by the same artery. He says: “Before 6.4, very few of these kinds of voices spoke: Opposing the Chinese Communist Party in past decades was always imbued with class struggle, was a clearly black and white issue, and needed a peaceful transformation. We raised this issue on the Square, and many people said that our hunger strike declaration was of milestone significance. But till today, Liu Xiaobo has said “I have no enemies,” yet there are people who still say you are making compromises with the enemies.

On December 23rd, 2009, Liu Xiaobo presented his “I have no enemies: My final statement” in court during his final trial. He said: “I stand by the belief I expressed twenty years ago in my ‘June Second hunger strike declaration’ — I have no enemies, and no hatred … For hatred is corrosive of a person’s wisdom and conscience; the mentality of enmity can poison a nation’s spirit, instigate brutal life and death struggles, destroy a society’s tolerance and humanity, and block a nation’s progress to freedom and democracy.”

“Such new ideas regarding governance deeply accord with the aims of the Nobel Peace Prize.” Zhou Duo believes that the Peace Prize’s appeal can win over most people’s hearts, “The CCP no longer needs to use ‘anti-Chinese power’ as a reason to deceive people. The Peace Prize is extremely moderate, and gives the CCP a lot of wiggle room and ample opportunity for self-improvement.”

“This may of course have some impact on China’s political reform,” said Zhou Duo. “This system is already overworked, leaders’ self-selection has increased in frequency. Before, this would have been an inconceivable situation. The Nobel Prize will surely shake up deadlocked factions. But which faction will prevail is hard to say.”

Lack of consensus among the people

He is worried by the lack of consensus among China’s people, and even more by the lack of a path to realizing such a consensus. “A peaceful transformation requires positive interaction between the ruling party and the opposition. However, I’m not too optimistic on this point.”

Just like the “89 generation,” former police officers during the Tian’anmen square incident were jailed for supporting students. After they were released from prison, they engaged in business, wrote books, and produced much below the radar research. Writer Ye Fu is quite optimistic about this.

Ye Fu and Liu Xiaobo have known each other for over 10 years. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said Liu Xiaobo blasphemed the Peace Prize, he found it hilarious: “A totalitarian society’s rulers and its people are at odds with each other. Our expenditures on maintaining internal order are reaching the expenditure costs for our outside military. Is this not ‘a quasi-state of war’ All Xiaobo did was do his best to end this state of affairs, requesting a peaceful transformation — not like how it was on June 4th, but a real harmony.”

Yefu says: “As for this peace prize, if we look at it from the perspective of hindsight, I think [it] will take on a very profound meaning.” He agrees with Zhou Duo’s statement that “[civil society] lacks consensus”: “Our civil society has not truly developed. It is still under the iron fist of the controlling apparatus. Civil society’s slight growth might get struck hard. For example, right now, [if one wants to have] reform, the central authorities must talk with its people, and talk with whom? Our people do not have a [civil] leader. India had Gandhi, Burma has Aung San Suu Kyi, South Africa has Mandela, the Czech Republic has Havel. We don’t have anyone. In order to improve, speaking from a technical standpoint, we need an interlocutor.”

The Peace Prize has created such an opportunity. Ye Fu says: “Think about it. If there were no Peace Prize, who would this interlocutor be? Perhaps the person would have already been beaten to the point where he could not continue. Now the Peace Prize confers to Liu Xiaobo — rather, this prize is given by the Chinese Communist Party, this is the interlocutor the Party has chosen. If it weren’t for those 11 years in prison, if not for the harshest methods, this would not have led to this point. The Peace Prize’s prestige allows Liu Xiaobo to become the interlocutor of the few dissidents. Historically speaking, I believe this time and this moment will bring about a profound influence.”

From the annoying official to the interlocutor, what gives Ye Fu hope in this kind of transformation is this era’s great wave of change.

Some people have said that Liu Xiaobo has won the prize, and will excite the system’s internal conservative strength, thus taking reform several steps back.

Ye Fu does not agree. He believes that the times are already different. “Take a look at our ruling party. Now, they are using underground Party tactics to manage this country. For example, clamping down on your [hypothetical] book. [The party] will not dare to issue a document, or allow for transparency. Liu Xiaobo’s situation was quietly leaked online, and was not mentioned. By using secretive measures to rule a country, the ruling party has represented itself as an underground political party. It itself has a guilty conscience. China is no longer the China of 20 years ago; it has entered into the world, and cannot withdraw. The army can no longer open fire on people.”

In the article Liu Xiaobo wrote prior to going to prison, he wrote: “Even if I live every day under strict surveillance, but [I] have an optimistic belief in China’s future because I got the sense, after dealing with policemen, that this inhuman regime has a guilty conscience. Even its dictatorship tool cannot be regarded as being in the right.”

Liu Xiaobo’s good friend, scholar Mo Zhixu feels the same. “For many years, we have passed on this type of thinking: This is how the world is, it’s a world in which losers are always in the wrong, in which profit overrules justice. The Nobel Peace Prize tells us that the world is actually not this way. This world has a moral baseline, and justice.” He believes that the Peace Prize has an encouragement effect, “just like a snowball.”

Can this snowballing Peace Prize bring greater change?

Ye Fu excerpts a Song dynasty Zen poem on his blog: “A fishing line casts a thousand feet deep in the pond, once a ripple flows, ten thousand follow.” It is a “prophetic poem.” After the Nobel Peace Prize was given, it has already been shown that “ten thousand follow.”

On October 11, Li Rui, Hu Jiwei and other elder CCP leaders published an open letter “Enforce Article 35 of China’s Constitution, Abolish Censorship and Realize Citizens’ Right to Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press: A Letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress” to the NPC Standing Committee.

The open letter avoids talking about the Nobel Peace Prize, but it directly echoes Premier Wen Jiabao’s CNN television interview in which he talked about governmental reform. It criticized the absence of freedom of speech from state leaders down to the people, called for a media publishing law and to remove the censorship system, asked for the propaganda department to comply with trends, to change functions, and to honor the constitutional promise of “freedom of speech and press.”

After the open letter was published, on October 13, Nanjing’s “Modern Express” and Hunan’s “Xiaoxiang Morning Post” had full-page coverage of Wen Jiabao’s CNN interview content, and also invited Central Party School professors to analyze the reform’s more difficult areas, and directly criticized moneyed, influential figures. This was seen as the Chinese media’s heartfelt response to the open letter.

“Think about it a little bit. In today’s China, if a peaceful improvement like the one in 1989 recurs, what will the outcome be? It doesn’t matter if it’s the international atmosphere, or the people’s preparation, or the CCP’s own transformation — all of these are the same. A true interlocutor will appear in the public square, and history may be reversed.” This is what Ye Fu says, though he also notes that “reformers are not the best leaders. Rather, the country’s elite come from within the system. Therefore, the final change will happen within the system. This is the historical pattern, and the role of public enlightenment. Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary, but the ruler was still Yuan Shi-kai.”

The Nobel Peace Prize continues to move along these undercurrents.

Liu Xiaobo, from Linzhou prison, has already entered history alongside Mandela, Havel, and Mother Teresa.

On March 1989, he wrote in an article: “I cannot retreat, or jump from cliffs, or be destroyed. [If] I want freedom, I must face this impasse.”

He fulfills the idea of freedom, but at the same time he reminds himself of “freedom’s” true meaning — “Whether it is compliant, or rebellious, the victims of totalitarianism are an accomplice to these regimes to some degree.” “If one day, Mainland China intellectuals have all gone through the experience of hardship and struggle for the rights of freedom of speech, then they retaliate against those who censored, and put pressure on those who purged [controversial content], then we will have struggled, but will not have broken the vicious cycle of speech dictatorship: violence for violence, censorship for censorship, oppression for oppression. Freedom of speech and public opinion will then never seen the light of day.”

This is the page in the history books, and it will change. Or will it reincarnate? The secret lies within.

© cdtstaff for China Digital Times (CDT), 2010. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: authors, civil society, freedom of speech, Liu Xiaobo, Nobel Peace Prize
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Meng Si: How would you judge the NGO activities in Tianjin overall? What were the highlights and the problems?

Lu Sicheng: This was the first United Nations climate-change conference to be held in China. Sixty Chinese NGOs participated, and one of the highlights was the scale, the diversity, the closeness of coordination and the pace of events that we saw.

We only learned the talks were to be held in Tianjin in early August. In less than eight weeks, Chinese NGOs organised 20 events and published a position paper on the civil society response to climate change. We brought everyone’s original plans together and combined several events, such as a fringe meeting on corporate innovation jointly held by WWF, the Institute for Environment and Development (IED) and Alashan Society of Entrepreneurs and Ecology, and another meeting on impacts of and responses to climate change, organised by Shanshui Conservation Center, IED, Oxfam and Green River.

Our events won praise from some of our international colleagues. For example, an employee of the Global Climate Change Alliance said that “the Chinese NGO events had been better than those of the local NGOs at all previous talks.”

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2010. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, environmental activism, global warming, NGOs
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On 24 June 2010 Dr Andreas Fulda from the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham, UK interviewed Senior Attorney Alex Wang, Director of NRDC Beijing Office, China Environmental Law Project in Beijing. Alex Wang discussed the significance of environmental governance, freedom of information and public participation in the PR China. Interview in English

Alex Wang on Environmental Governance in China from Andreas Fulda on Vimeo.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2010. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: civil society, environmental activism, environmental protection, environmental regulation
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Ai Weiwei discussed the relationship between contemporary art and civil society in China. The interview informs an academic article about Ai Weiwei written by Dr Berg and Dr Fulda, to be published in 2011 (‘Public Intellectual 2.0: Ai Weiwei, Contemporary Art and Civil Society in China’). Interview in Chinese, with English subtitles.

Ai Weiwei on Contemporary Art and Civil Society in China from Andreas Fulda on Vimeo.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2010. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: activists, Ai Weiwei, civil society
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The ongoing labour unrest in China is seen by many as a labour market response to uncompetitive wages offered by foreign companies. And, to a large extent, this is true. Changing demographics are reducing the supply of ultra-cheap young labourers from the countryside to coastal export-processing zones, giving labour more bargaining power.

But explaining China’s newly assertive workers purely on economic grounds misses the larger—and more interesting—political context. For labour activism is only one of the many signs of a broader political re-awakening in Chinese civil society.

For years, Western observers have been disheartened by the lack of political change in China. Modernization theory predicts that rapid economic progress should help liberalize the political system, but this hasn’t occurred in China since 1989. Until now.

In addition to migrant workers who have risked their jobs and personal safety in joining the strikes, China has seen other forms of civic activism and political assertiveness at the grassroots level.

What’s interesting about this new political reawakening is that on the surface it doesn’t look all that political.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2010. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: activism, civil society, labor unrest, social unrest
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