Frequently updated with high-resolution photos of the president and other officials, Chinese netizens suspect Xi Jinping’s Facebook page is a government project.

• Xi+facebook (习+facebook): Xi Jinping’s Facebook page looks suspiciously professional to discerning Chinese netizens. Could it be an official account? Over 16,000 users “like” his page, while the new president “likes” Li Keqiang, the People’s Liberation Army, and “Chinese Military Power.”
• Xi+facebook (习+脸谱)
• Chairman xi (xi主席)

• one party holds power (一党执政)
• Domestic Security Department (国保)
• martial law (戒严)

• Toady (蛤蛤): A pejorative nickname for Jiang Zemin.
• Toad thread (蛤丝)
• Chairman Toad (蛤主席)

• general election (普选): Retested.

All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

Browse all of CDT’s collected sensitive words in this bilingual Google spreadsheet.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese’s latest sensitive words post.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: censorship, Facebook, Internet censorship, Jiang Zemin, Ministry of Truth, Sensitive Words Series, weibo, Xi Jinping
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Kunming PX Plant: A p-Xylene (PX) and purified terephthalic acid (PTA) processing plant is planned for the Anning Industrial Park [zh]. Anning County is located within Kunming Prefecture, Yunnan Province. Plans to build PX plants have been thwarted by concerned citizens throughout China over the past few years, notably in 2007 in Wuxi and last fall in Ningbo.

Clockwise from top right: Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. (artist unknown)

• Anning+PX (安宁+PX)
• Kunming+PX (昆明+PX)
• boycott PX (抵制PX)

Xi Jinping:
• boss Xi (习boss)
• Xi+Peng (习+彭): Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan
• Xi+first lady (习+国母)
• Xi+fake (习+假): We are unsure why this is blocked. Reader tips welcome.
• Xi+king (习+王): As in “Crown Prince Xi” (习王储), etc.
• Xi+Jiang (习+江): Xi Jinping and Jiang Zemin
• Xi+Li (习+李): Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang
• Xi+chief (习+总)

Other:
• hu+wen: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.
• nine presidents (九总统): Refers to the nine members of the outgoing Politburo Standing Committee (PSC); the number of PSC members has been reduced to seven.

In addition, the terms below have been blocked from Sina Weibo search results as of March 22:

• Huangpu River+dead pigs (黄浦江+死猪): Over 15,000 pig carcasses have been fished out of the Huangpu, the source of more than 20% of Shanghai’s water.
• Peng Liyuan+similar items (彭丽媛+同款): Netizens chatted eagerly about the overcoat Peng wore on her first trip as first lady. “Similar terms” is a search term on the shopping site Taobao; sellers listed her coat, complete with photos of her on the tarmac in Moscow [zh].
• first lady+similar items (第一夫人+同款)
• Auntie Peng (彭阿姨)
• Mrs. Xi (习夫人): retested
• Xi+old (习+老): As in Elder Brother Xi (习老大) Boss Xi (习老板), etc.
• Jiang faction (江派): Party leaders with allegiance to Jiang Zemin, such as Xi.

All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

Browse all of CDT’s collected sensitive words in this bilingual Google spreadsheet.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese’s latest sensitive words posts (March 24 and March 22).

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Anning, censorship, Hu Jintao, Internet censorship, Jiang Zemin, Kunming, Kunming PX, Li Keqiang, Ministry of Truth, Peng Liyuan, PX, Sensitive Words Series, weibo, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, Yunnan
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What does this all mean?

On the one hand, like past top leaders in the post-Deng era, Xi is seeking to build a strong relationship with China’s armed forces, which is key to cementing his status as both CMC chair and CCP general secretary. He’s moved more quickly than either Jiang or Hu because he has been able to assume the CMC chairmanship without a senior party figure looking over his shoulder. Jiang became CMC chair while Deng was still very active in Chinese politics, while Hu had to two wait two years before Jiang relinquished that post. Ironically, the relatively smooth transition has enabled Xi to move more quickly in consolidating his position as commander-in-chief.

On the other hand, China’s basic approach to military modernization remains unchanged. It is premised on ensuring the loyalty of the military to the party and not the state. The long-term goal is to recapitalize China’s armed forces to achieve mechanization and partial informatization by 2020 – a goal set by Jiang Zemin in the late 1990s – and to complete its military modernization by mid-century, 2049. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Xi has set 2049 for the fulfillment of the “China dream.” Xi is the new leader of China’s armed forces, but he is not yet pursuing new policies.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, military power, People's Liberation Army, Xi Jinping
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Leadership changes in China are thrashed out behind closed doors through horse-trading between new leaders and outgoing or retired leaders anxious to preserve their influence and protect family interests, but reshuffles must go through a choreographed selection process.

Two other sources, who declined to be identified because it is sensitive to discuss elite politics with foreign media, also confirmed that Xi had decided to make Li his vice president rather than Liu.

The National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament, will vote in Xi and Li as president and vice president respectively on March 14. Li Keqiang, the party’s new No.2 official, will succeed Wen Jiabao to become premier and oversee the economy and day-to-day running of the cabinet.

[...]

“It was Xi’s decision and a sign he is strong and able to say ‘no’ to Jiang,” the source told Reuters

Reuters adds that Li’s promotion may also indicate Xi’s willingness to pursue limited reforms. But while he has taken steps to increase the inefficiency and tone down the extravagance of the Chinese government, and even said that the government should tolerate “sharp criticism”, a leaked speech from December also dampened expectations of more substantive political reforms.

Noted political theorist Wu Jiaxiang, however, is keeping the faith that Xi can deliver on reform expectations. From an interview with Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan, via the China Media Project:

YZZK: Those internal speeches by Xi Jinping have created a lot of dissatisfaction. How do [you] view this?

Wu Jiaxiang: My guess is that this is about [addressing] a sense among some prominent old politicians that says basically, look, this Xi Jinping cares only about Deng Xiaoping, he has no use for us — he denies Mao Zedong, he doesn’t mention Jiang Zemin, he talks even less about Hu Jintao. I believe Xi Jinping’s speech at the Central Party School already marked a major compromise, a huge back-step in comparison to how much Deng Xiaoping was willing to give. Deng Xiaoping essentially yielded nothing to the Cultural Revolution faction. Xi Jinping made this [compromise] because he recognised the fact that the Cultural Revolution faction had already made a comeback, that, moreover, this comeback was quite substantial, like a bunch of walking dead if you will. Faced with this situation, how could a General Secretary who has just come to power declare war against these monsters?

A wise politician won’t declare war before they’ve even managed to accomplish something. [Xi Jinping] has a major strategic consideration, and that is to first ensure that this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proceed smoothly. If he didn’t compromise, this would instantly drive a major wedge in the Party. The ripples would run across the internet and through the Party ranks. So Xi Jinping must seek the greatest common denominator. He must find broad consensus — and that comes on the issue of the past thirty years of reform, which no side rejects outright.

[...] It might be that he talks about some things he won’t necessarily do. He may also do things he doesn’t necessarily talk about. There may also be things he’s thinking about that he can neither say nor do. This administration is like an iceberg, and right now we see maybe one-eighth. There are still seven-eighths we haven’t seen yet.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP 5th generation, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, NPC 2013, reform, Xi Jinping
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The Parliament meeting will be an early gauge of the new leaders’ commitment to carrying out broad changes in China’s economy that Messrs. Hu and Wen talked about for years, but did little to accomplish—remaking the economy so it relies more on domestic demand and less on investment in capital-intensive industries at home and demand for Chinese exports abroad.

[...] One major change that Parliament is expected to approve is a plan to streamline the State Council—or cabinet—by, among other things, merging the Railways Ministry into the Ministry of Transport, a move that many analysts believe is linked to a high-speed train crash in 2011, and the dismissal the same year of the railways minister, Liu Zhijun, on corruption charges.

Agencies monitoring food safety—another issue of huge public concern following a string of scandals in recent years—may also be merged, and greater powers given to the State Oceanic Administration, the agency responsible for maritime patrols around disputed islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea, according to Chinese academics familiar with the plans.

Chinese experts say the restructuring is designed to cut down red tape, enhance interdepartmental coordination and break apart vested interests in the bureaucracy. But many analysts are skeptical, arguing that more fundamental changes are needed, such as forcing all officials to declare their financial assets publicly, to enhance government transparency and accountability.

The meetings will also announce key personnel postings, and some insiders are anticipating that more liberal members of the Communist Party elite, including Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, who were not nominated to the current Politburo Standing Committee, may be named to top government posts, according to the WSJ report. Reuters looks at the factional battles taking place behind the scenes to decide who will take over the Standing Committee in 2017, when five of the current members will retire:

Two main factions are competing for power within the Standing Committee. Members of the “Shanghai Gang”, headed by former Party chief Jiang Zemin, have connections to China’s commercial capital. The other main faction, the “Tuanpai,” is led by outgoing President Hu Jintao. Its members, like him, cultivated their careers in the Communist Youth League.

Most of the Politburo members and provincial Party secretaries eligible for promotion in the next term in 2017 have experience in the Communist Youth League, according to data from “Connected China”(connectedchina.reuters.com), a Reuters site that tracks the careers and connections of China’s top leaders.

Although the Politburo appointed in November shows strong ties to Jiang Zemin, analysts say outgoing President Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League faction will gain the upper hand over the longer term.

A third group has also ascended rapidly – the princelings, or privileged children of revolutionary leaders. Key princelings include Xi and Politburo Standing Committee members Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan and Zhang Dejiang.

For more on the agenda of the NPC meetings, see, “What to Expect at the 12th National People’s Congress” from CDT.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Communist Youth League, food safety, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, NPC 2013, political reform, Wang Yang, Xi Jinping
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Jiang asked the party’s new Central Committee to put his name among those of other retired leaders, and behind incumbent party and state leaders, after the party’s national congress in November, Xinhua reported.

It praised Jiang’s move as “reflecting the noble character and sterling integrity and open-mindedness of a Communist”.

At the funeral of General Yang Baibing on Monday, Jiang’s name appeared after those of members of the party’s Politburo Standing Committee and state leaders for the first time since his full retirement in 2004.

Jiang had previously ranked second only to President Hu Jintao at official occasions following his retirement.

The South China Morning Post had reported Jiang’s tumble in the pecking order on Tuesday, before state media claimed the change came at the former leader’s own request. Still, one Beijing-based political analyst told the South China Morning Post on Thursday that Jiang “had most likely been forced to take a step back.” Chris Buckley of The New York Times noted that Jiang was listed third in a similar mourning announcement just two months ago:

For some political analysts seeking to fathom the undercurrents of power in China’s elite, Mr. Jiang’s reduced protocol ranking suggested something more: that he may finally curb any impulses to exert influence in Zhongnanhai, the party leadership’s compound in Beijing.

“In China, the saying goes that you must live up to your title to give your words sway, so if Jiang Zemin meddles in politics again after making this step, his reputation will be badly damaged,” said Yao Jianfu, a retired party official and researcher in Beijing.

“It’s a change in protocol, but now he’ll be expected to live up to it and stop being such a political busybody,” Mr. Yao said.

One observer, however, told NPR’s Louisa Lim that it’s too soon to say whether Jiang had really relinquished his behind-the scenes influence on party affairs:

“In terms of the symbolism, this is a step forward to mitigate and to guard against the so-called geriatric politics: the old men interfering, retired old cadres who have no position still having a big say in party affairs,” said Willy Lam, a China politics expert at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

“But on a practical level, it’s difficult to prevent Jiang Zemin from still trying to do whatever he can to interfere in party affairs,” Lam said. “In the Chinese context, tradition dies hard and you have a long record of retired party elders still interfering in party politics.”

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, CCP Central Committee, Jiang Zemin, party elders, Politburo Standing Committee
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The translations are by Rogier Creemers of China Copyright and Media.

23 May 2007, 13:46:45

Third level: Please search for and delete audiovisual content and related discussions on the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” in interactive segments; set up search keywords.

Please search for and delete audiovisual content and related discussion on the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” in interactive segments, the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” includes audiovisual sections on “mouthpiece and responsibility,” “the wealthy and migrant workers”, etc.; all search engines are requested to ensure that there are no search results for “Dynamic China Documentary Series,” “Dynamic China Documentary,” “mouthpiece and responsibility,” “the wealthy and migrant workers.”

22 May 2007, 11:12:50

Third level: A new batch of “17th Party Congress” keywords, please ensure that there are no search results.

“CCP’s 5th generation takes over,” “5th generation takes over,” “CCP takeover group,” “17th Party Congress + balance of power,” “17th Party Congress + number change,” “17th Party Congress + resignation,” “17th Party Congress + stepping down,” “17th Party Congress + being forced,” “17th Party Congress + returning home,” “the situation before the 17th Party Congress,” “17th Party Congress + political situation,” “17th Party Congress + complete withdrawal of report,” “Hu Jintao – causing great tumult,” “Hu Jintao + unpredictable Yellow Sea,” “Jiang Zemin + exposure of his high-sounding words,” “Shanghai clique + fresh troops,” “Shanghai Clique + successors,” “Zhou Yongkang replaces Huang Ju,” “Wu Yi replaces Huang Ju,” “princeling party,” “princeling group,” “princeling Party + local political circles,” “princeling group + local political circles,” “children of high-ranking cadres march into local political circles,” “children of high officials + march in,” “CCP appointments + political blood ties,” “Liu Yandong replaces Wu Yi,” “Jiang-Hu discussions,” “Beijing Municipal political circles evoke shock,” “Jiang Zemin’s power weakened,” “Jia Qinglin’s relationship with Jiang Zemin,” “Jia Qinglin’s improper comings and goings,” “Jia Qinglin’s court contains Jiang Zemin,” “Jiang Zemin + Beijing Clique,” “Jia Qinglin + Jiang Zemin + old friends,” “Wang Qishan replaces Zhang Dejiang,” “Beijing Clique + Olympics,” “Beijing Clique + kidnapping,” “kidnapping + Olympics,” “Liu Qi leaves Beijing Municipal Committee,” “Jia Qinglin withdraws from political circles,” “Wu Yi in charge of China’s economy,” “Liu Qi removed from position,” “Wang Qishan removed from positions,” “Liu Qi instigates own clique to send anonymous letters attacking Wang Qishan,” “Liu Qi’s clique,” “Liu Qi + anonymous letters,” “anonymous letters attacking Wang Qishan,” “Liu Qi + envy,” “Zeng Qinghong blows with the wind,” “Zeng Qinghong + night owl,” “17th Party Congress + closed door decision,” “Jiang brand,” “CCP orthodoxy teachers,” “great change in CCP personnel affairs,” “17th Party Congress + successor team,” “descendants of CCP elders,” “Zeng Qinghong + general manager in the imperial palace,” “Zeng Qinghong finishes class at 17th Party Congress,” “Zeng Qinghong + spy boss,” “scientific development view + tiny bit of land,” “Jiang Zemin + half-retirement,” “Zeng Qinghong forced to write letter on resigning at the 17th Party Congress,” “looking to Jiang Zemin for ideas,” “Jia Qinglin + divorce,” “Huang Ju – self-knowledge,” “Huang Ju + stubborn followers,” “Jiang Zemin + trusted followers,” “Jiang Zeng + assassination,” “Zeng Qinghong resigns,” “Chu Bo + Jiang Zemin’s coolie,” “Chu Bo + Jiang Family,” “Zeng Qinghong in the footsteps of Jiang.”

24 May 2007, 16:44:16

First level: Today’s information in the Beijing Evening Post or the Legal Evening Post concerning Beijing Municipality stockpiling pork may not be issued without exception, delete it immediately, forums and other interactive segments are not to discuss this. Do this quickly.

24 May 2007, 16:50:23

Secrecy of China’s death targets uncovered: where those hurt in car accidents do not die within seven days, they do not enter into the statistics http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-05-24/110113065712.shtml

Those from non-standard copy sources are to be pushed to the back stage without exception, portals are to check whether this is on their websites or not.

24 May 2007, 17:39:29

Second level: On reports concerning the suppression of the mass encirclement incident of a village government in Bobai County, Guangxi, close news trackers, forums, blogs, and other interactive segments are not to recommend this.

24 May 2007, 18:05:23

(Third level) all websites: Please make “Chu Bo” into a keyword and ensure that search results are directed at focus central news websites, do not set up related searches.

24 May 2007, 18:07:19

The article “Census Register Reform Documents Reported to State Council + Lawful Fixed Place Becomes Condition for Move” of 23 May is inaccurate, websites that have already reprinted it must immediately remove it. This article may also not be posted in forums and blogs. Official Xinhua copy is to be taken as standard when reporting census register reform.

24 May 2007, 20:18:01

All websites, please ensure that search engines screen the following keywords:

- Beijing + meat stockpile + investigation

- Ministry of Commerce + meat stockpile

- Beijing + meat stockpile

- Beijing + investigation + application for meat stockpile

25 May 2007, 09:50:28

All websites: Please immediately reprint the following audiovisual link in the middle or lower part of the important news section: http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-05/21/content_6130531.htm. Leave it there until 12:00 noon on 26 May.

Supplementary notice: All websites are requested to cut out and post the latter half when reprinting the said video, and publish it with the following title: “Mobile Phone Income Immorality, Network Companies Send Out ‘Yellow Card.’”

25 May 2007, 10:04:00

First level: Information that Beijing Municipality will stockpile pork may not be issued without exception, delete it speedily, forums and other interactive segments are not to discuss this. Deal with this speedily.

Everyone, notices have already been sent out yesterday that Beijing’s meat stockpiling is to be deleted without exception, implement this rapidly, examine yourself and delete this yourself, inspect whole websites and all channels. Deal with this speedily, otherwise consequences will be grave!!

25 May 2007, 16:55:00

First level: Concerning the matter that on 23 May, more than 100 Uyghurs from Xinjiang were duped after participating in a pyramid scheme in Guangxi and assembled in front of the gates of the post office on the North Square of Beijing West Railway Station, no reports are to be made without exception, interactive segments are not to transmit or discuss this. Please delete existing information.

25 May 2007, 17:39:51

All websites are requested to reprint the content of the communiqué of the network news and information advisory council from this afternoon, http://baom.sina.com.cn/3/2007/0523/1273.html

The title is: “Network Advisory Council Gravely Criticizes Friend-Making-Type Websites”

Position: Main page of websites and middle or lower part of important news section

25 May 2007, 15:55:41

Please push the “New Bulletin” text “Chinese Social Mentality Survey Displays that Masses Have Most Confidence in Central Government,” interactive segments must not set up discussions around this information.

 2007年5月北京网管办发出的禁令（二）

2007-05-23 13:46:45

三级：请在互动环节查找、删除“激流中国系列纪录片”视频内容及相关评论；搜索设关键词

请在互动环节查找和删除“激流中国系列纪录片”的视频内容及相关评论,“激流中国系列纪录片”包括“喉舌与责任”、“富人与农民工”等视频章节；请各搜索引擎将“激流中国系列纪录片”、“激流中国纪录片”、“喉舌与责任”、“富人与农民工”设为搜索无结果。
2007-05-22 11:12:58

三级：新一批“十七大”关键词，请设为搜索无结果。

“中共第五代接班群”、“第五代接班群”、中共接班群”、“十七大 权力平衡”、“十七大 变数”、“十七大 辞职”、“十七大 下台”、“十七大 被迫”、“十七大 回家”、“十七大前的格局”、“十七大 政治格局”、“十七大 全退报告”、“胡锦涛 倒海翻江”、“胡锦涛 黄海不测”、“江泽民 高调曝光”、“上海帮 生力军”、“上海帮 接班人”、“周永康取代黄菊”、“吴仪取代黄菊”、“公子党”、“公子族”、“公子党 地方政坛”、“公子族 地方政坛”、“高干子弟走红地方政坛”、“高干子弟 走红”、““中共任用 政治血缘”、“刘延东 取代吴仪”、“江胡商议”、“北京市政界引发震动”、“江泽民势力被削弱”、“贾庆林与江泽民的关系”、“贾庆林 不正当往来”、“贾庆林朝中有江泽民”、“江泽民 北京帮”、“贾庆林 江泽民 故交”、“王歧山接替张德江”、“北京帮 奥运”、“北京帮 绑架”、“绑架 奥运”、“刘淇离开北京市委”、“贾庆林退出政坛”、“吴仪掌管中国经济”、“刘淇 挪位”、“王歧山 挪位”、“刘淇发动嫡系匿名信打王岐山”、“刘淇嫡系”、“刘淇 匿名信”、“匿名信打王岐山”、“刘淇 妒忌心”、“曾庆红见风使舵”、“曾庆红 夜猫子”、“十七大 内定”、“江牌”、“中共正统传人”、“中共人事大变动”、“十七大 接班团队”、“中共元老的儿孙”、“曾庆红 大内总管”、“曾庆红十七大下课”、“曾庆红 特务头子”、“科学发展观 立锥之地”、“江泽民 半退”、“曾庆红被迫写信十七大退”、“找江泽民讨主意”、“贾庆林 离婚”、“黄菊 自知之明”、“黄菊 铁杆亲信”、“江泽民 亲信”、“江曾 暗杀”、“曾庆红 辞职”、“储波 江泽民人马”、“储波 江系”、“曾庆红步江后尘”。
2007-05-24 16:44:16

一级：今天北京晚报或法制晚报有条北京市要储备猪肉的消息，一律不要发速删除，论坛等互动环节不讨论。速办。
2007-05-24 16:50:23

中国死亡指标揭秘：车祸伤者7天后死亡不占指标http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-05-24/110113065712.shtml

非规范稿源的一律压后台，门户看看自己的网站有没有
2007-05-24 17:39:29

二级：有关广西博白县群众围堵乡政府事件平息的相关报道，关闭新闻跟贴，论坛、博客等互动环节不推荐。
2007-05-24 18:05:23

(三级)各网:请将”储波”一关键词的搜索结果设置为指向中央重点新闻网站,不设相关搜索.
2007-05-24 18:07:19

5月23日，”户籍改革文件报国务院，合法固定场所成迁移条件”一文失实，已经转载的网站要立即撤除。论坛和博客中也不贴发此类稿件。户籍改革有关报道以新华社正式发稿为准。
2007-05-24 20:18:01

各网，请用搜索引擎将以下关键词屏蔽

北京 储备肉 调研

商务部 储备肉

北京 储备肉

北京 调研 申请储备肉
2007-05-25 09:50:28

各网:请立即在要闻区中下部转载如下视频链接:http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-05/21/content_6130531.htm,放到5月26日中午12:00.
补充通知:请各网站在转载该视频的时候截取后半段:手机创收走邪道 网络公司发送”黄片”并且以此为标题发布.
2007-05-25 10:04:00

一级：北京市要储备猪肉的消息，一律不要发，速删除，论坛等互动环节不讨论。速办。

各位，昨天已经发过通知，北京储备肉的，一律删除，速执行，自查自删，全站检查，所有频道。速办，否则后果很严重！！
2007-05-25 16:55:00

一级：关于5月23日100余名新疆维吾尔族人在广西参加传销活动被骗，在北京西站北广场邮局门前聚集一事，一律不做报道，互动环节不传播不讨论。已有消息请速删。
2007-05-25 17:39:51

请各网转载今天下午网络新闻信息评议会公报内容，http://baom.sina.com.cn/3/2007/0523/1273.html

题目为“网络评议会严厉批评交友类网站”

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2007-05-25 15:55:41

请将“新快报”《中国社会心态调查显示民众最信任中央政府》一文压到后台，互动环节不要围绕此消息设置讨论。

These translated directives were first posted by Rogier Creemers on China Copyright and Media on January 2, 2013 (here). This post is the 47th in the series.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 17th Party Congress, Beijing Internet Instructions, censorship, Censorship Vault, Chu Bo, Directives from the Ministry of Truth, Hu Jintao, Huang Ju, Internet censorship, Jia Qinglin, Jiang Zemin, Liu Qi, liu yandong, Ministry of Truth, princelings, propaganda, Wang Qishan, Wu Yi, zeng qinghong, zhang dejiang, Zhou Yongkang
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China’s departing president, Hu Jintao, entered the summer in an apparently strong position after the disgrace of Bo Xilai, previously a rising member of a rival political network who was brought down when his wife was accused of murdering a British businessman. But Mr. Hu suffered a debilitating reversal of his own when party elders — led by his predecessor, Jiang Zemin — confronted him with allegations that Ling Jihua, his closest protégé and political fixer, had engineered the cover-up of his son’s death.

According to current and former officials, party elites, and others, the exposure helped tip the balance of difficult negotiations, hastening Mr. Hu’s decline; spurring the ascent of China’s new leader, Xi Jinping; and playing into the hands of Mr. Jiang, whose associates dominate the new seven-man leadership at the expense of candidates from Mr. Hu’s clique.

The case also shows how the profligate lifestyles of leaders’ relatives and friends can weigh heavily in backstage power tussles, especially as party skulduggery plays out under the intensifying glare of media.

Beyond the police and government officials reportedly enlisted by Ling Jihua to suppress details about his son’s death, The South China Morning Post also reported last month that the government had questioned the head of China’s biggest oil and gas producer about alleged hush payments made to the families of the two female passengers injured in the crash.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: bribery, corruption, cover-up, Ferrari, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, Ling Jihua
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Two years ago, on June 4 — the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and the most sensitive date in the Chinese political calendar — Ji Pomin received a text message from a high-placed friend: It said that former president Jiang Zemin had been taken to a military hospital in a critical condition. Ji fired off a coded message to hundreds of people in his address book to seek confirmation, asking: “The Supreme Old Master ascended to heaven?” Many of Ji’s politically connected friends forwarded the text to their friends, who misinterpreted the cryptic question as a statement. By June 6, overseas Chinese websites were reporting that former president Jiang Zemin was dead.

[...] A few days after Ji’s text message, he received a phone call from someone claiming to be from a parcel delivery service. They said the package was too big to fit down the lane in which he lived, so he walked to nearby Dongdan, one of Beijing’s busiest shopping areas, to collect it. Standing there, he said, in the blind spot between two security cameras outside an upmarket wedding photography store, were two burly men. They pulled a cloth hood over Ji’s head and bundled him into a car.

[...] The daylight abduction of a princeling like Ji, in downtown Beijing, shows just how delicate the subject of elite politics has become. That Ji wasn’t tortured, that he felt emboldened to speak his mind, and that his captors politely drove him back to where they found him two days later, shows the privileges afforded by his status. The secret police had originally lured him out on to the street, says Ji, so they would not disturb his then 86 year-old mother, who had joined the revolutionary struggle with his father at the age of 14 in 1938. By contrast, Ji says they ransacked the homes of several people who received his message. And a historian whose work had influenced Ji’s negative views on Jiang was reportedly arrested and convicted of subversion in May 2011.

See more on “princelings“ and illegal detentions via CDT.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: illegal detentions, Jiang Zemin, kidnapping, princelings, rumors, stability maintenance, state security
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The party held a meeting of leading cadres in Beijing in May and “democratically recommended” members of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and the 25-seat Politburo, state news agency Xinhua said late on Thursday, hours after new line-ups for both councils were unveiled.

[...] Xinhua said the cadres took into consideration the “party spirit” of candidates, jargon for their loyalty to the party.

They also took into account whether the candidates were “just and honest”, their abilities and integrity, their age as well as portfolios. Politicians 68 or older are not qualified to join the Standing Committee.

The “democratic recommendation” process involved informal discussions while the views of unspecified people were fully solicited, Xinhua said. It did not elaborate.

Now, Reuters is reporting that in the course of the straw poll, Party elders including Jiang Zemin and Li Peng effectively ruled out the advancement of Wang and Liu:

Two sources said the influential retirees flexed their muscles in landmark informal polls taken before last week’s 18th party congress, where the seven–member standing committee, the apex of China’s power structure, was unveiled.

The clout of the elder statesmen, who include former party chief Jiang Zemin and ex-parliament head Li Peng, underscores the obstacles to even limited reform within senior levels of the party, which has held continuous power since 1949.

The informal polls are the first time the party has flirted with “intra-party democracy” to settle factional fighting over the line-up of the standing committee. It held informal polls in 2007 to decide the larger Politburo.

The report also explains that Wang Yang was left off the Standing Committee after the fall of former Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai in order to avoid further antagonizing Bo’s supporters:

The two sources said party seniors decided to drop Wang, who has favored private enterprise in Guangdong and was seen as a rival of Bo, to avoid further upsetting pro-Mao factions in the party, government and military.

“Wang Yang was ousted to avoid Bo supporters creating trouble,” one of the two sources said.

Yet it is not clear how the poll was held or if this will become a standard method to choose new leadership within the Party. Some journalists remain skeptical:

Would like to see evidence of CPC voting. “Informal straw-polling” means asking people for their opinions.

— Edward Wong (@comradewong) November 21, 2012

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Post tags: Bo Xilai, intra-Party democracy, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Peng, Li Yuanchao, Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Yang
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Xi Jinping was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee at the first plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on Thursday morning.

Other members of the newly elected Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee are Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli.

Xinhua’s announcements unexpectedly preceded the standing committee’s live unveiling at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, at which Xi began his address by apologising for the delay. From Malcolm Moore at The Telegraph:

Welcoming his six “comrades” onto the stage, Mr Xi said China’s new leaders would battle to improve people’s lives and not to lose touch with the population. China’s new leaders faced “severe” challenges, he admitted, including a difficult fight against rampant corruption.

“Ours is a political party that serves the people wholeheartedly. We have every reason to be proud,” he said. “Proud but not complacent. We will never rest on our laurels.”

“Our responsibility is weightier than Mount Tai,” China’s incoming leader added, referring to the giant mountain in China’s Shandong province. “The journey ahead is long and arduous.”

For more of Xi’s speech, see Xinhua’s translation at Global Times.

Bloomberg has posted a ‘Who’s Who’ guide to all the new top leaders, while a Reuters infographic shows their place in China’s broader power structure. Notably absent from the list were Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao, whose inclusion might have signalled a more reformist inclination. Jeremy Page discussed Wang and Li’s prospects prior to the announcement at The Wall Street Journal:

Mr. Li, who studied briefly at Harvard’s Kennedy School in 2002, has overseen pilots schemes to enhance democracy within the party. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Mr. Li told U.S. diplomats in 2007 that China could hold competitive elections for the Politburo and its Standing Committee in 20 to 30 years.

Mr. Wang has eased restrictions on nongovernmental organizations and he won plaudits last year for reaching a negotiated settlement, rather than using force, when a village in Guangdong rebelled against party rule over a land grab by local officials.

Mr. Li is thought to stand more of a chance than Mr. Wang, but if neither make it, it would be seen as a blow to those inside and outside China hoping that the party will expand even limited experiments to encourage greater democracy within its own ranks.

“If neither Li or Wang enter the Standing Committee, that would really show Hu’s weakness,” said a Chinese academic with close party contacts [….]

Xi was also named chairman of the Central Military Commission, ending speculation over whether Hu Jintao would hold on to the post for up to two more years, as his predecessors have done. The Financial Times’ Richard McGregor, author of The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers, summed up the combined implications:

@xhnews Terrible result for HJT. Shunted out unceremoniously and fails to get his allies promoted. Ignominious end fo rhim.

— Richard McGregor (@mcgregorrichard) November 15, 2012

McClatchy’s Tom Lasseter elaborated on the perceived factional divide within the new standing committee:

More than ideological lines, the committee introduced on Thursday seemed to be drawn along factional ties – specifically, an apparent victory for those close to former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin over the outgoing president and party secretary, Hu Jintao. The 86-year-old Jiang was last year rumored to have died or fallen into a vegetative state, but he recently made a series of public appearances that some speculated were a signal that he is still in the political game.

Xi Jinping himself was thought to be Jiang’s pick, versus Li Keqiang, who is closely affiliated with the same Communist Youth League that formed a power base for 69-year-old Hu.

Of the seven on the list, only Li and Liu Yunshan, a 65-year-old who’d been heading the party’s propaganda department, are viewed as being strongly allied with Hu.

Jiang was seen as having supported Xi and the other four committee members named on Thursday: 66-year-old Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, 67-year-old Shanghai party chief Yu Zhengsheng, 66-year-old Tianjin party chief Zhang Gaoli and 64-year-old Vice Premier Wang Qishan.

But the longer-term picture for Hu’s legacy may be somewhat brighter. From Mark MacKinnon at The Globe and Mail:

A key caveat to Mr. Jiang’s apparent tour de force is the age of his allies who were promoted Thursday: all the new Standing Committee members – except Mr. Xi and Mr. Li – are 64 years or older, meaning all are slated to retire in 2017, clearing the field for Mr. Hu’s younger allies to rise to the Standing Committee ahead of the next major power transfer in 2022, when Mr. Xi and Mr. Li are due to step aside.

[…] The signals from the week-long Communist Party congress were decidedly mixed. Delegates ended the meeting with a solemn singing of the socialist anthem, The Internationale. Then they filed out of the Great Hall of the People, to a waiting fleet of chauffeured Audis.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP, Communist Youth League, Great Hall of the People, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, Xi Jinping, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang, Zhang Gaoli
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Competing possibilities have been floated in recent days, with the preponderant view being that Mr. Hu, unlike his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping, will completely retire rather than stay on as the top overseer of military affairs. That would give Mr. Xi greater influence over the military and a firmer grip on power from the start.

But some insiders still suggest that Mr. Hu, who appears to have lost out to Mr. Jiang, 86, in shaping the new lineup for the top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee, will nonetheless still hold on to the military post for two more years.

Whatever the outcome, the position, known as chairman of the Central Military Commission, is likely to be the last piece of leverage for Mr. Hu as top party officials tussle down to the wire over promotions of protégés and protection of long-held interests. The bargaining over whether Mr. Hu stays or goes is almost certainly fierce, party insiders said Monday.

The South China Morning post reported yesterday that Hu would step down as military chief this week, which if true would run counter to analyst expectations and mark the first clean transfer of power at the top of the Communist Party in more than two decades. Bloomberg News details the implications of Hu’s decision:

Hu could complicate Xi’s efforts to consolidate power and create new room for political jockeying after China’s leadership transition was roiled by the downfall of former Politburo member Bo Xilai. A confused chain of command may muddle China’s handling of territorial disputes with Japan, at a time when the U.S. is concerned that Chinese leaders are using nationalism to paper over domestic tensions.

“When the party leadership is united, it’s obvious the party controls the gun,” Huang Jing, a political science professor at the National University of Singapore who expects Hu will stay on as military chief, said in a phone interview. “But when the party is divided or weak, whoever has the gun has the last say.”

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Post tags: 18th party congress, Central Military Commission, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, People's Liberation Army, Xi Jinping
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In media commentaries, think-tank position papers and the less censored blogosphere, Hu’s reign is being portrayed as a missed opportunity to tackle longstanding problems grown more deep-seated, from a yawning rich-poor gulf and worsening environmental degradation to stiffly authoritarian politics. One commentary has referred to the period as a “lost decade.”

“We didn’t realize Hu would turn out to be so conservative,” said Wu Jiaxiang, a former party researcher-turned-businessman and avid blogger, summing up the disappointment of many in China’s chattering classes. He dates his own disappointment with Hu to the closing of liberal-minded websites in 2005.

Some of the criticisms are designed to influence Xi Jinping, who will begin taking over from the technocratic, ultra-reserved 69-year-old Hu at a party congress that opens Thursday.

Mainstream state media, which answer to the party and dominate what most Chinese see, read and hear, have been praising the Hu era, calling it a “Glorious Decade.”

It’s clear that Hu will hand Xi the reins to a China very different from the one he inherited from Jiang Zemin in 2002. He spent the better part of his first two years tightening his grip on power and freeing himself from Jiang’s shadow, taking control of the military in early 2005 and steadily gaining influence via a balance of savvy maneuvering and compromise.

But while Jiang’s departure yielded fresh calls for political liberalization, Hu rejected such pursuits from an early stage. He insisted on tightening the government’s control over public opinion and ensuring discipline in the state media, while reinvigorating socialist ideology and reasserting the party’s position in society. He also redoubled efforts to crack down on political dissent and other threats to stability. Within his first three years atop the Party, Hu had rebranded himself from a potentially liberal reformer into a conservative authoritarian who was, as one critic claimed, ideologically more conservative than his predecessor.

Shunning political reform, Hu staked the legitimacy of the party on economic growth instead. He set ambitious goals for the expansion of China’s economy, and briefly stressed the need for social harmony before re-pivoting to focus on the economy as the West began its slide into financial peril in 2007. Hu’s priorities were a “massive gamble,” the University of Sydney’s Kerry Brown claims in Foreign Policy:

Perhaps Hu had no choice but to make this gamble. Perhaps the only way to fend off the public’s rising expectations toward government and paper over growing imbalances between wealthy coastal regions and poorer western ones was to keep his foot on the gas. Whatever the case, the country Hu presides over remains as unequal, if not more, than it was the day he ascended to the top in 2002. China may boast more than 96 dollar billionaires now, but 150 million Chinese still live in poverty. The country may have become the second richest in the world on aggregate, but per capita income hovers near 90th, similar to per capita income in Cuba and Namibia. Shanghainese enjoy a per capita income of more than $12,000 a year. Residents of Guizhou, China’s poorest province, earn a mere $2,500 a year. Hu, of course, is likely quite aware of all this. The party is nothing if not mindful of how social instability pulled down the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the Republican government in 1949.

If Hu is successful in transferring power to Xi and his colleagues over the next six months, then the first plank of his legacy will be complete: He will have cemented the institutionalization of party processes and rules, improving China’s political stability. If everything works smoothly over the next few weeks and months, at the National People’s Congress in March, Hu will follow the constitution and retire as president, having served the maximum of two five-year terms. But the bar for success is high: If China’s new leaders are seen as weak and illegitimate, then their ability to push through continuing economic and political reforms will be limited.

After the succession itself, things get trickier. Chinese leaders no longer pretend the current system is optimal. Even Hu talks of the need for reform beyond just fixing the economy. This is, of course, reform with Chinese characteristics — the question is how the party can modernize and run itself more efficiently so that it can maintain a monopoly on power. But if Hu’s successors manage in the next decade to strengthen the rule of law and empower civil society while introducing greater accountability and transparency for the party — all while managing inequality and other structural challenges — then Hu’s gamble will have proven to be the right one.

China “badly needs political and social reform,” writes Ezra Vogel, who insists that “China has lost its way” as Hu Jintao has not embraced the strategy of bold experimentation that Deng Xiaoping once championed. Even Hu’s remarks at The Great Hall of the People this morning reaffirmed the importance of economic growth as the main prescription for China’s problems, observed Charles Hutzler of The Associated Press. It’s true that China’s economic miracle has been unprecedented. But rapid economic growth has also led to a number of the social and political ills that plague China today, from immense income inequality to environmental destruction, for example, and shrinking credibility with a population increasingly frustrated by corruption at the top. In addition, signs have emerged that the economic formula which fueled China’s rise is no longer viable as it enters its next phase of growth.

For Foreign Affairs, Damien Ma judges that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao will leave behind “an economic legacy that is far from stellar and a society that is shakier than the one they inherited:”

It is little wonder that bottom-up social pressures are building in China and that such pressures risk destabilizing the entire political system. Indeed, the most remarkable transformation that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has undergone in the past decade is not its shift toward market capitalism but rather its evolution into an elitist political organization that enjoys preferential access to economic opportunities at the expense of the average member of the Chinese middle class. A recent flurry of reports from Western journalists exposed that top Chinese officials have accumulated immense wealth with little transparency. Even Wen’s avuncular and humble public image has been shaken by revelations that he may have amassed as much as $2.7 billion. Consequently, achieving greater equality and economic fairness — and therefore mitigating instability — has become as much a political concern for Beijing as an economic one.

Rarely has the Hu administration viewed further political liberalization as the answer to growing economic and social ills. If the incoming Xi administration fails to recognize that political changes are necessary to untangle the complexity of China’s mounting challenges, the CCP could well find its own political resilience seriously tested over the course of the next decade. Tolerating more transparency and accommodating the rule of law are among the key reforms that could mitigate the pressures on the political system. But if Beijing continues to resist, when the next major transition comes in 2021, rather than celebrating its 100th birthday, the CCP could be pondering how it let its power slip away.

Hu will likely retain a reasonable degree of influence within the party after he steps down, as have the leaders who came before him, if for any reason because he is expected to keep control of the military for the time being. If rumors circling at the party congress about the new revamped Politburo Standing Committee lineup are any indication, however, Yanzhong Huang suggests that Hu’s grip on power has already loosened. From the Council on Foreign Relations’ Asia Unbound blog:

Compared to the ordinary Chinese, intellectuals, professionals, and government officials care about the Party Congress – they are generally more informed about the Congress. At the banquet table these officials and intellectuals were open in discussing candidates for the new Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and patron client ties in China’s officialdom. An updated list of PBSC members is circulating on the eve of the political meeting. To my surprise, many different people talked about the same list. From the list it is clear that President Hu has suffered a huge political setback and former President Jiang Zemin has emerged as a clear winner in the game of power redistribution. Reform minded leaders such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang are not included in this list. All of this ultimately might not bode well for the prospect of political reform in China.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP, Deng Xiaoping, dissent, economic growth, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, legitimacy, Politburo Standing Committee, political reform, Xi Jinping
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It’s remarkable that so little is known about what will actually happen during the upcoming conclave. A Service Guide for Journalists notes helpfully that Western-style snacks will be served in the Press Center but there is no real detail about actual events. As of Monday afternoon, an online guide to the upcoming Party Congress had listed only two events directly related to the Communist gathering: a cocktail party for journalists on Nov. 6 and a press conference the day after. Like most press conferences in China, it’s certain Wednesday’s event will be a scripted one in which random journalists won’t be allowed to fling questions at the 18th Party Congress’ spokesperson.

Even the date when the Congress will end is not clear, although many people suspect it will be Nov. 15. “We have no detailed information of the schedule of the 18th Party Congress,” Yue Xiaosong, an official at the 18th Party Congress Press Center, told TIME on Monday. “I don’t know the date when the Congress will finish.” Yue’s only suggestion to TIME was that we should look at previous Party Congress schedules as a general guideline. But he quickly cautioned that we shouldn’t draw too many conclusions from the past. “It will depend on how well the 18th Party Congress goes,” he said, when pressed on just when the confab will end. No details were provided on what he meant by the meeting going “well.” A TIME colleague suggests the wording on the cap in the press swag bag should be changed to: “Somebody I know went to the 18th Party Congress, and all I got was this stupid hat.”

Despite the heightened restrictions in Beijing, The South China Morning Post’s Keith Zhai notes that ordinary mainlanders are “gripped by an overwhelming sense of apathy” and feel little connection to politics. The Telegraph’s Malcolm Moore reports that in contrast with American voters, the Chinese public “remains utterly cut off from the political process,” and those that do care are left to sift through official speeches and state media coverage for hints of what will happen and who will comprise the Politburo Standing Committee:

Indeed, while we know that the leadership change will happen at the 18th Party Congress, which opens on Thursday, we do not know exactly when the new leaders will be unveiled or when the congress will end. Those in China cannot even search for the phrase “18th party congress” on the internet: it has been removed by the censors.

All we can be sure of is that, at some point in the near future, a group of men – and they are all likely to be men – will walk on to a dais in the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square. These will be the seven members of the politburo standing committee, the Chinese equivalent of the Cabinet, selected (by an essentially mysterious process) from among the 25 politburo members originally elected by the party’s 300-strong central committee.

The lack of any real information, however, hasn’t stopped the rumor mill from churning about last-minute horse trading at the top of the party. Sources have told Reuters that ten finalists are vying for seven seats on the Standing Committee, and The New York Times reports that China’s “beleaguered liberals” have their fingers crossed in hope that the reform-minded Guangdong party chief Wang Yang is one of them. Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution provides more details on the “tussle” taking place between the “populist” and “princeling” factions, and what it might mean for regime stability going forward.

Peter Ford of the Christian Science Monitor, meanwhile, spoke to several China analysts who think that closed-door power-broking may give way to a succession protocol based more on consensus under future leadership transitions. Reuters echoed that sentiment in a Tuesday article as well, and went even further, quoting sources who hinted that the Communist Party may not wait until the next generation to adopt a more democratic process for choosing its leadership:

Under their proposal, there would be up to 20 percent more candidates than seats in the new Politburo in an election to be held next week, the sources said. It was unclear if competitive voting would also be extended to the Standing Committee.

“Hu wants expanding intra-party democracy to be one of his legacies,” one source said, requesting anonymity to avoid repercussions for discussing secretive elite politics.

“It would also be good for Xi’s image,” the source added.

Orville Schell writes that the incoming generation of Chinese leaders will not have the rubber stamp of legitimacy that Deng Xiaoping bestowed on Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, nor the mandate typically provided by democratic elections. Instead, he says China “finds itself floating terrifyingly in a gravity-less political world” that continues to spin. From the Asia Society’s China File:

The problem is compounded by the fact that, having relieved through its own reform process of the kind of Big Leader rule which allowed megalomaniacal visions to so often wreak havoc on the country—paradoxically just as the West tirelessly challenged it to—China now finds itself without precisely that kind of bold decision-making power at the top that characterized Deng Xiaoping’s quite extraordinary tenure (June 1989 not withstanding) and enabled him to be such a bold reformer.

With no entitled big leader, no confirmed political system capable of conferring legitimacy on new leaders, and no set plan for the future, China nonetheless still finds itself forced somehow to choose a new leadership team. This has left “the people,” who have no real role to play in this process, feeling quite shut out and nervous about what the future holds for them.

Although it is impossible to know what is actually going inside the black box where China’s leaders wrangle over their future, people hear that the process has been intense, even acrimonious. And, since they do not even know what each leader or faction actually stands for, a climate of uncertainty and anxiety has been increasing. Such feelings are hardly surprising, for here in China everything is veiled, hidden, and opaque. And yet, this whole amazingly dynamic proposition continues to hurtle down the tracks, just as I am doing now, even as everyone knows that somewhere ahead, the tracks end. Nobody, especially the present leadership, seems to quite know how to resolve this crisis in confidence, how to pick those who will follow them and write the script for the next act that will set China’s future course.

The information vacuum also hasn’t stopped the Chinese press from saturating the newspapers and airwaves with stories about the congress. Danwei’s Barry van Wyk surveyed the front pages on Monday and found predictable yet “utterly uniform” coverage, though some papers broke ranks to report on Bo Xilai’s expulsion from the CCP and other news. Elsewhere, David Bandurski of The China Media Project has made “fruitless” searches for “18th Party Congress” within the realms of Chinese social media. Today, he highlighted a post on Sina Weibo which speculated about the lineup of the congress and was deleted by censors.

Reform remains the key buzzword in the press as the opening of the congress draws closer, but McClatchy Newspapers’ Tom Lasseter spoke to several academics who suggested that the West should temper its expectations of major political changes. The biggest policy developments, they say, will likely come in the economic arena. Caixin has published a list of 18 recommended economic reforms that the incoming leadership should pursue, a list that includes SOE reforms, environmental protection and tax cuts among other more ambitious requests such as downsizing the government itself.

Finally, beneath the pomp and circumstance that is sure to blanket the congress, The Guardian’s Tania Branigan reminds readers that the Communist Party does have a bit of governing to do as well:

The Chinese leadership “knows the legitimacy of the party now depends on performance, in terms of delivering services and improvements in living standards”, said Steve Tsang, an expert on Chinese politics at the University of Nottingham.

The result is what he calls “a consultative Leninist system … They want to know what people think so they can take away the causes of discontent and potential challenges to the party. That’s not the same as the accountability we would talk about and expect in Europe or North America; it’s more of a safety valve and has an element of [the Maoist injunction] ‘from the masses, to the masses’.”

See also a Reuters’ primer on the congress, which details the likely agenda and ponders potential new policy initiatives that the delegates may introduce, and previous CDT coverage of the 18th Party Congress.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, Beijing, Bo Xilai, CCP 5th generation, censorship, Deng Xiaoping, economic reform, Great Hall of the People, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, legitimacy, Politburo Standing Committee, political reform, princelings, sina weibo, Wang Yang
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The Chinese Communist Party is broadly divided between informal “elitist” and “populist” coalitions, according to China expert and Brookings Institution analyst Cheng Li. Other analysts conceive of the split in different terms, such as between liberal-minded reformist and conservative hard-liner camps.

[...] Hu’s heir apparent, Xi, is a princeling, whereas Wen’s likely successor, Li Keqiang, represents the tuanpai.

[...] Their factional inclinations are reflected in their policy priorities, says Li of the Brookings Institution. Xi is focused on the private sector, market liberation in foreign investment, and Shanghai’s role as a financial and shipping center. In contrast, Li Keqiang emphasizes affordable housing, basic health care and clean energy.

This equilibrium extends within the upper echelons of the leadership, which is about evenly split between the elitists and populists, according to Li. Most analysts concur that the era of charismatic, paramount leaders ended after Deng Xiaoping, replaced by relatively colorless technocrats who governed through collective leadership.

John Garnaut at the Sydney Morning Herald offers more details about the effects of the political jockeying for the 18th Party Congress personnel lineup:

Earlier, President Hu Jintao’s key powerbroker, Ling Jihua, was removed as head of the party’s General Office after being implicated in a cover-up of his son’s death in a high-speed Ferrari accident.

[...] ”It is a state of extreme chaos,” said political watcher Li Weidong. ”There is no absolute authority, otherwise two sides won’t bite each other like this.”

[...] Mr Hu appears to have won crucial appointments in the People’s Liberation Army, particularly the new Chief of the General Staff, Fang Fenghui, as first reported by the Age last Tuesday.

This would suggest Mr Hu is gaining strength in the military while losing it at party central.

See more on the 18th Party Congress via CDT.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP 5th generation, factions, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Ling Jihua, princelings, Youth League faction
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