Tang said she went to search for her daughter herself after police efforts failed. Nearly three months later, she spotted the underground brothel where her daughter was held. But when she called one district police officer, he declined to help. Tang eventually called the emergency number 110 several times, and police responders helped her save her daughter. When she asked that the kidnappers be arrested, the local police office did not immediately file the case or conduct further investigations.

That is how Tang began a long process of petitioning for justice, first at the provincial level, then in Beijing. Slowly, local authorities started to act. In June last year, her daughter’s two main kidnappers were sentenced to death, four accomplices received life sentences and one was jailed for 15 years.

But Tang wants more.

[…] The determined Tang continues to campaign for death sentences for the other five kidnappers despite her spell in a labour camp. Tang was sentenced to 18 months of re-education at the Zhuzhou Baimalong labour camp, about two hours by bus north of her hometown. The reason given was that her protests “seriously disturbed the social order and exerted a negative impact on society”, Xinhua reported.

Tang’s case has become a symbol of growing opposition to reeducation through labor, but law professor Wang Lin argued at Oriental Morning News earlier this month that abolishing the system would not dig out the underlying problem. From a translation at Dui Hua Foundation’s Human Rights Journal:

With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu [another "petitioning mother"] cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

[…] Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

The Dui Hua Foundation also highlights a near mirror-image of Tang Hui’s case, in which parents’ petitioning seems to have secured a death sentence for the man accused of their daughter’s rape and murder. This too reveals a serious dysfunction in the judicial process, according to Geng Shuang at Southern Metropolis Daily, translated at Dui Hua:

[…] No matter what explanation is given by the court involved, the answer is all too clear: this is a guarantee against petitioning demanded by the court of the victim’s relatives. What sort of mindset did the court have in demanding that the victim’s relatives make this kind of guarantee? Actually, the court is truly helpless, because if it doesn’t prevent victims’ families from petitioning, court officials will have a hard time keeping their jobs.

In this case, the court has been kidnapped—and, at a deeper level, that means the judicial system has been kidnapped—by the petitioning system. And once the judicial system has been kidnapped, the natural balance of the law inevitably becomes imbalanced. In this case, specifically, this sort of kidnapping resulted in two clear errors by the Pingdingshan intermediate court [….]

[…] In fact, more than two months after the relative signed the letter of guarantee, the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court did, in fact, sentence the suspect to death. Considering that a higher court subsequently annulled the death sentence based on insufficient evidence, it is clear that the death sentence in this case was imposed without enough evidence and that the primary factor of consideration at the time of sentencing was not only “taking facts as the basis and the law as criterion” but, rather, preventing the victim’s relatives from further petitioning.

Geng notes that the accused has now been imprisoned for nearly 11 years despite the flimsiness of the case against him, and that “the moment he is acquitted, huge amounts of state compensation will be involved, and this case could become the ‘sequel to the Zhao Zuohai case.’” Zhao served 11 years in prison for the murder of a man later found alive, and said that he had been tortured into making a false confession. He received compensation of 650,000 yuan in 2010 (almost US$100,000).

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Post tags: justice, legal system, petitioners, rape, re-education through labor, Tang Hui
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Only 21 of the world’s countries were recorded as having carried out executions in 2012 – the same number as in 2011, but down from 28 countries a decade earlier in 2003.

In 2012, at least 682 executions were known to have been carried out worldwide, two more than in 2011. At least 1,722 newly imposed death sentences in 58 countries could be confirmed, compared to 1,923 in 63 countries the year before.

But these figures do not include the thousands of executions that Amnesty International believes were carried out in China, where the numbers are kept secret.

China aside, the Amnesty International report notes that the Asia Pacific region as a whole saw “disappointing setbacks” towards their goal of global abolishment: India saw its first execution since 2004, Japan executed seven people after a nearly two-year hiatus, and Pakistan also resumed use of  the death penalty. From The Guardian:

[...A] number of countries in Asia Pacific that had not carried executions for a number of years did so in 2012, such as India, which executed one person, Japan seven, Pakistan one and Gambia nine.

“The regression we saw in some countries this year was disappointing, but it does not reverse the worldwide trend against using the death penalty. In many parts of the world, executions are becoming a thing of the past,” said Salil Shetty, Amnesty’s secretary general.

The Supreme People’s Court claims that use of the death penalty in China has significantly decreased since a regulation was enacted in 2007 requiring each case to be reviewed individually, and human rights advocacy group Dui Hua’s estimates support that assertion, showing 6,500 in 2007 and 4,000 in 2011. While enforced regulation may continue to reduce the use of capital punishment in China, The South China Morning Post quotes a criminal law expert who believes that shifting public support will be more difficult:

Hao Xingwang, a criminal law expert at Beijing’s Renmin University, believed that the number of executions would likely continue to fall as Beijing tightens its regulations. Public support for the death penalty, however, would remain strong for some years, he said.

“Most Chinese people believe the death penalty is necessary, but don’t really understand the risks and drawbacks. The concept of an eye-for-an-eye has been well established since ancient times and will take a long time to change,” Hao said.

Also see infographics and a concise data summary of the Amnesty International report, via The Guardian. For more on the death penalty in China, see prior CDT coverage.

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Post tags: Amnesty International, death penalty, execution, legal system
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Naw Kham’s wry smile belied his macabre circumstances. “I haven’t been able to sleep for two days. I have been thinking too much. I miss my mum. I don’t want my children to be like me,” the 44-year-old Burmese druglord, chained to a chair, told a Chinese TV interviewer.

On Friday – two days after the interview – the Burmese freshwater pirate was executed for allegedly murdering a crew of Chinese sailors on the Mekong river in October, 2011. His last moments were aired on state television.

In the two-hour live broadcast, black-clad police officers hauled Naw Kham from a detention centre in southern China, bound him with ropes and chains, and bundled him on to a bus bound for the execution site. Three of his alleged henchmen followed in similar fashion. They were each killed – off camera – by lethal injection.

Though a rumored live broadcast of the actual executions failed to materialize, the TV coverage attracted heavy criticism. “It’s hard to see how that spectacle doesn’t violate [the] prohibition on parading condemned in the streets,” tweeted human rights researcher Joshua Rosenzweig, referring to a 1984 ban introduced to avoid unfavorable foreign media coverage. Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin commented that China had “just wiped away any perception that it was making progress on the death penalty issue.” Within China, reactions to the broadcast were deeply polarized. From Andrew Jacobs at The New York Times:

“Rather than showcasing rule of law, the program displayed state control over human life in a manner designed to attract gawkers,” Han Youyi, a criminal law professor, wrote via microblog. “State-administered violence is no loftier than criminal violence.”

[…] In one segment, Liu Yuejin, director general of the central government’s Narcotics Control Bureau, cast the executions as a pivotal moment for a newly confident China and for ethnic Chinese across the globe. “In the past, overseas Chinese dared not say they were of Chinese origin,” said Mr. Liu, who led the task force that spent six months hunting the culprits. “Now they can hold their heads high and be themselves.”

Supporters of the program were many, and enthusiastic. One blogger suggested that death by lethal injection was too lenient, adding “These beasts should be pulled apart by vehicles.”

Some critics said the broadcast, and the subsequent public gloating, displayed an ugly side of China and would hurt its image abroad. To Murong Xuecun, a well-known Chinese author, the program revealed a national psyche, fed by decades of Communist Party propaganda, that craves vengeance for the years of humiliation by foreigners. “It proves that hatred-education still has a market in China,” he said in an interview.

At Bloomberg World View, Adam Minter described the spectacle as a “graphic extension” of a broader political strategy:

[…] Over the last two years the Chinese government has found itself embroiled in increasingly dangerous sovereignty disputes with its Southeast Asian and Japanese neighbors. So far, diplomacy has been the preferred course of action. Yet on China’s decidedly nationalistic and highly influential microblogging platforms, diplomacy — especially on sovereignty issues — is unpopular and viewed as a sign of weakness.

In response, the Chinese government and its official media tribunals have carefully ratcheted up the aggressive rhetoric, especially toward Japan, since the fall of 2012, reminding Chinese that they will not be bullied by outside forces. Rather, if there will be any bullying, China will be doing it.

A 2012 Reuters investigation into the Mekong murders described the web of trafficking in drugs, humans and endangered animals in Southeast Asia’s “Golden Triangle”, and Naw Kham’s legendary or perhaps mythical place in it. The report also highlighted the possible involvement of an elite Thai anti-drugs unit in the killings.

China’s Global Times recently revealed that authorities had considered killing Naw Kham with a drone strike instead of capturing him. See more on China’s drone programs, and more on the death penalty in China, via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCTV, death penalty, diplomacy, drug trafficking, execution, Golden Triangle, human rights watch, Japan, legal system, Mao era, Mekong river, murders, Murong Xuecun, Myanmar, Southeast Asia, territorial disputes, thailand
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As China’s new generation of leaders surveys the work ahead of them, one of the most difficult questions they face is how to narrow the wide chasm between rhetoric and reality when it comes to rule of law. Few people have pushed for the narrowing of that gap as persuasively or courageously as He Weifang, an outspoken and well-known legal scholar at the Beijing University Law School who has been urging legal reform for almost 15 years through journals, the media and public lectures. Now, for the first time, English speakers have the pleasure of being able to access He’s work in a single, carefully translated volume.

[…] In the face of the current authoritarianism of the CCP’s rule, He may seem to be an optimistic visionary. But both in his writing and in person, he is temperate while asserting powerful ideas and deeply insightful views about the cultural and political barriers to meaningful legal reform. As He pursues his personal crusade with determination, he exudes a remarkable cheerfulness and presents an inspiration to his students and the public at large. His book provides a persuasive and clearly written guide for foreigners who are willing to try to understand China through the lens of Chinese law.

He discussed the book in a 90-minute video available at C-SPAN, also featuring Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and former U.S. ambassador to China Jon Huntsman. See also a short biography of He Weifang at The China Story.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: constitution, free speech, He Weifang, Jon Huntsman, judicial system, legal reform, legal system, rule of law
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While [Sina] Weibo can on occasion help incite real change, even on the streets, the sheer number of injustices that flash almost daily across Chinese Web users’ respective feeds means that citizens, armed with social media alone, simply do not have the power to combat even a small portion of them. As a result, some measure of ennui and resignation has begun to set in. In late October, online personality Zuoye Ben (@作业本), a pseudonymous Weibo user known for original and often critical views, gave voice to a growing feeling of fatigue among social media users. In a post commemorating three years of using the Weibo service, Zuoye Ben concluded that “Weibo has not changed China, it has just changed you and me: I have gradually got used to being cold and indifferent, just like you have slowly got tired of Weibo.” These words have been re-posted over [30,000] times and have garnered over [10,000] comments.

[…] Taken alone, Weibo is inadequate as a tool for delivering social justice because the service is not an open forum for comment — the Chinese government maintains firm control over how wide this window of free discussion is allowed to open. When debate grows too ferocious, authorities have the power to choke it off, banning keyword terms and strategically disabling functions to tamp down discussion. […]

As a result the service finds itself in a position similar to that of the country’s legal system. In theory, Weibo is a platform for citizens to give feedback and raise complaints, but ultimately the Party has the final say on whether anyone can open their mouth or not. When authorities do on occasion respond to pressure online, they do so unilaterally after the fact; web users never gain the satisfying sense they have engaged in a true dialogue with their government, or have enjoyed the benefit of due process.

Underlining the point, TLN notes elsewhere that during the 18th Party Congress that concluded this week, Zuoyeben’s posting was limited to pictures of food.

Online communications can be not only ineffective but actively harmful. In July, police warned that various criminals had exploited location data optionally broadcast by Tencent’s popular Weixin messaging service, known in English as WeChat and increasingly seen as a key rival to Sina Weibo. In other cases, security forces are the ones turning service against user. At the South China Morning Post, John Kennedy discussed activist Hu Jia’s suspicions about Weixin’s use as a surveillance tool:

Citing things he was told after being sentenced to prison for “inciting subversion of state power” in 2008 as well as numerous experiences resembling the ones above, Hu has come to the conclusion that:

The Guobao [Domestic Security Department] have become more efficient in their jobs by eliminating the need for cooperation from China Mobile or Tencent in many surveillance tasks. What they have now is direct backdoor access to China Mobile and Tencent systems. The Guobao are now able, in real-time, to both eavesdrop on or block your SMSs or WeChat from their technical investigation department offices.

[…] One QQ.com department head based in Beijing who was willing to speak off the record would only say:

As far as I understand, there is no full backdoor surveillance access given to the PSB. When QQ [was still Tencent's flagship product], there was a department set up in Tencent’s office in Shenzhen tasked with dealing with PSB inquiries and providing assistance with cases. With regard to surveillance of dissidents, if the PSB provided an administrative order Tencent would provide the requested information…Each separate case required [that the PSB provide] a new order.

See more on corporate cooperation in online controls via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, Hu Jia, legal system, QQ, sina weibo, social media, surveillance, tencent, weibo
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In July 2011, a Hong Kong newsmagazine published the story of a Chinese vice mayor desperate enough to petition the Chinese central government for justice after his daughter said she was raped by a mining magnate in January 2009. The daughter had initially pursued redress through official channels, responding to the alleged assault with the confidence that came from being raised in a family of senior officials in a country where political power and connections frequently trump all else. But when her rape complaint vanished into the vortex of the city’s opaque and highly politicized legal system, the family found that they had been outplayed.

Unsurprisingly, the story caused a sensation — but it did nothing to change the outcome. And so in September of last year, I received a call from a woman who introduced herself as “Long Meiyi, the daughter of the ‘petitioning mayor.’” In a sign of increasing helplessness, she had decided to reach out to a foreign journalist to publicize her case. Over a series of conversations across many months, the now 22-year-old Long told me the story of how the system stopped working to her advantage.

[…] Long’s ordeal is extraordinary and deeply ironic, in large part because her stepfather was responsible for Liupanshui’s “stability preservation” apparatus. Tian was one of the top officials overseeing the city’s police and courts — as well as the notorious “Letters and Complaints” system, which ostensibly provides an outlet for disgruntled citizens by allowing them to petition the central government but also collects intelligence against them. In China, where there is no independent judicial system, citizens appeal to Beijing in the hope that even if local officials are corrupt, the central government might deliver justice. It’s a slim hope. Most petitioners are physically prevented from reaching the designated offices and have to settle for displaying their documents at prominent locations, in symbolic acts of protest and desperation. Tian’s role was to quiet complaints against the powerful and the state — until the person complaining was his daughter, and he found that the stability-preservation machine that he helped run was more powerful than he was.

The case was previously the subject of a 2011 Caixin op-ed by lawyer Ding Jinkun (via CDT—original now deleted), who concluded:

Local business tycoons are in cahoots with the local authorities to a stupefying degree. The moneyed class is in fact so ingratiated with local government that the wealthy have become the de factor political rulers. What has emerged is a despotism where citizens are sacrificed on the altar of the powerful, where legal rulings are constantly harming the people they are meant to help. Citizens looking to protect their rights will simply never win versus officials or versus the rich. Their only choice is to perish together, pitiable and powerless.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Guizhou, judiciary, legal system, local officials, petitioners, rape, stability preservation
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Under the new law, there should be no infringements upon the dignity, personal safety or the property of mentally ill people.

The law also stipulates that institutions and individuals should protect the privacy of mentally ill people by preventing leaks of private information, such as their names, addresses and employment status, unless the sharing of such data is necessary for institutions and individuals while exercising their lawful duties.

China currently has about 16 million people suffering from severe mental disorders, according to the Ministry of Health.

[…] The law is expected to curb abuses regarding compulsory mental health treatment and protect citizens from undergoing unnecessary treatment or illegal hospitalization.

Xinhua notes the 2011 case of Chen Guoming, held in an asylum for 56 days at his wife’s instructions after he refused to lend money to her family. But forced psychiatric incarceration has also been used as a political weapon against activists, petitioners and whistleblowers. From Reuters’ Sui-Lee Wee:

“We welcome it because having a law is better than not having one,” Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, a New York-based advocacy group, told Reuters.

“The most important thing that this law does is it will allow civil society to step in to monitor and press for improvement in the management of mental health in China, including … pushing for greater transparency and progressive curtailment of police rights.”

[…] But Bequelin said he was still concerned about China’s police-run psychiatric hospitals, which confine people the authorities consider troublemakers.

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Post tags: human rights watch, illegal detentions, laws, legal system, mental health, mental hospitals, mental illness, psychiatry
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Xinhua late Friday said the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has decided to put Mr. Bo under investigation for alleged criminal offenses, as well as impose what it said were “coercive measures” on him in accordance with the law. It didn’t elaborate. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate investigates cases at the national level and prosecutes serious criminal cases.

The Bo case still requires a formal indictment before it moves to trial, making it increasingly unlikely that Mr. Bo’s fate will be decided before the Nov. 8 beginning of the 18th Party Congress, which kicks off the leadership change. Chinese leaders are thought to have been anxious to conclude the scandal surrounding Mr. Bo ahead of the congress, in part because his case raises uncomfortable questions about power and corruption.

Prior to the two announcements, Reuters spoke to Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin, who said of the ongoing proceedings: “It’s theatre. The judiciary grinds into action only when the outcome has been determined. There is no indication we will see a genuine trial because Bo knows too much.”

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Post tags: 18th party congress, Bo Xilai, legal system, trials
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Bo’s immediate family has been warned not to hire any lawyers, according to two people close to his wife’s family. And two lawyers retained by his mother-in-law on his behalf have been unable to visit the formerly powerful party chief, they said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of government reprisal.

[…] According to others involved, the lawyers plan to go to Bo’s prison in coming days in a last-ditch effort to see him if authorities do not respond to their request for access to him.

Rejecting such face-to-face meetings has become a standard way for the Chinese government to thwart independent representation in politically sensitive cases that could embarrass the party.

Wan adds that Bo’s wife Gu Kailai, who has already received a suspended death sentence, has also been kept in a secret location and denied family visits.

See more on Bo Xilai via CDT.

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Post tags: Bo Xilai, Chongqing, gu kailai, lawyers, legal defense, legal system, political scandal, trials
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On June 30, 2003, the deputy chair of the Wuxi New District Court burst through the door of Wu Xingyuan’s family home. Following the court official were police officers, demolition workers and other men Wu couldn’t identify. They began carrying Wu’s possessions out of the house. Within just three hours, the building had been razed to the ground, and most of the Wu family’s possessions had disappeared. But that was just the beginning. Nearly a decade later, Wu’s case remains unresolved. His family, which had been operating a highly profitable business out of Wu’s sizable home, is now significantly poorer. And Wu himself has grown tired and more than a little paranoid after waging a decade-long battle for justice with authorities.

Wu’s troubles began in the spring of 2003, when local authorities decided to demolish his house. Wu claims that the decision to demolish his home was an act of revenge because he had previously reported a local Party official for corruption. This claim proved impossible to confirm — we were unable to get in touch with the specific officials Wu named and the Wuxi police declined to comment — but whatever the reason for the demolition, it’s clear Wu was offered very unfavorable terms. In compensation for his 537 square meter house, he was told he could have one 120 square meter apartment. “Even Hu Jintao wouldn’t make that deal,” Wu told us. “No one would agree to that.”

During the actual demolition, Wu and his family were physically restrained, but as soon as they got free they went to court. The first case opened in July, and even though the demolition had been illegal (officials had failed to obtain the proper permits) and Wu had proof that many of his possessions had mysteriously gone missing the day of the family’s forced relocation, the court found against him.

Well-known singer Zuoxiao Zuzhou, meanwhile, is fighting to stop the demolition of his home in Changzhou. China Media Project’s Comic China series includes a cartoon posted to Sina Weibo in support, showing the singer brandishing a megaphone and a clenched fist on the roof of a building marked for destruction.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: black jail, compensation, forced demolitions, forced evictions, land disputes, land seizure, legal system, self-immolations
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Bo’s only known communication with his family since his ouster was an emotional letter sent in April to his mother-in-law, Fan Chengxiu, written with a traditional Chinese brush. Bo said he hoped to quietly read books while waiting for his case to be resolved, according to a family associate who saw the letter.

[…T]he separate trials of Gu, Wang and four other police officers charged in the coverup left unanswered the crucial question of what Bo knew about the murder and when he knew it. Bo in April was stripped of his positions in the Politburo and the Party Central Committee, but he has not been charged with any crime.

He is thought to have been moved several times among government residences in Hebei province, Inner Mongolia and the outer suburbs of Beijing. Those reports could not be independently confirmed.

Choi Chi-yuk at South China Morning Post gives a detailed account of how Wang and Bo’s closely linked careers:

Wang probably came to Bo’s attention some time in 2003, when he was the secretary in the public security department of the Communist Party in Jinzhou City, in Liaoning, of which Bo had been appointed governor in 2001. Bo was appointed party secretary of Chongqing, a megacity of 33 million people in 2007.

[...] After his apparent success against organised crime in Chongqing on Bo’s behalf, Wang was fêted as a gangbuster by the common people, and took centre stage in public life. This celebrity came despite accusations by lawyers that he extracted confessions through torture and sacrificed due process in the pursuit of the so-called triad groups.

[...] In May last year, Bo promoted Wang to vice-mayor with responsibility for overseeing security while retaining his role as chief of police. As a result, Wang became seen as a rising political star who some day might play a key role in the national Public Security Ministry, when his mentor Bo assumed the high office to which he had seemed destined. The apparent improvement in law and order under Wang’s iron-fisted crackdown had, in turn, boosted Bo’s chances of winning a place on the party’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, to be decided at the 18th national congress later this year.

Although Wang’s sentencing was relatively lenient, some observers feel that he has become Bo’s human shield. From Shi Jingtao and Choi Chi-yuk at South China Morning Post:

A source close to Wang’s family told the South China Morning Post they believed Wang had been made a scapegoat for Bo.

The source commented: “Wang has apparently become a political victim because the government wants to protect the guy above him and avoid further humiliation.”

[...] Wang’s lawyer Wang Yuncai – not related to her client – confirmed to the Post that Bo was explicitly named during Wang’s trial when the court heard how Bo slapped Wang. But the fact Bo’s name was not mentioned at all by state media throughout the trials of Wang and Gu was seen by many, including Hong Kong analyst Johnny Lau Yui-siu, as a sure sign Bo will be treated leniently to avoid any repercussions on the imminent leadership transition.

Others link Bo’s case to the behind-the-scenes political jockeying between the factions of Hu Jintao and former leader Jiang Zemin. From Mark Mackinnon at The Globe and Mail:

Mr. Bo – a “princeling” whose father was a hero of the 1949 Communist Revolution – was once seen as a near-certainty to join the Standing Committee, and his downfall has exposed deep rifts in a party that normally excels at presenting at least a façade of unity. Mr. Bo’s fellow princelings, and their chief patron, former president Jiang Zemin, are battling to limit damage from the scandal and to check the gains made by a rival faction of Communist Youth League alumni, a grouping headed by President Hu Jintao.

The Youth League faction is broadly considered more reform-minded, while the princelings are seen as more conservative about further opening the economy or any changes to China’s one-party political system.

“It would show that Jiang Zemin and the conservatives still have substantial clout, if they can spare Bo Xilai,” Prof. Lam said.

Yet amid the public debate over the leniency of Wang’s sentencing, his family sees the conviction itself as showing a lack of justice in China. From Edward Wong at The New York Times:

“I feel desperate,” his younger sister, Wang Fengying, said in a telephone interview. “It’s too unfair.”

Mr. Wang’s lawyer, Wang Yuncai, who is not related to him, said in a telephone interview that the 15-year sentence was about what she expected. She said that Mr. Wang’s wife, though, was stunned. “She was utterly shocked and unwilling to accept such a result,” she said.

See more about Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai via CDT, and a chronicle of censorship of the case at Fei Chang Dao.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: abuse of power, Bo Xilai, Chongqing, corruption, gu kailai, justice, legal system, rule of law, Wang Lijun
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Wang, the former vice mayor and police chief of southwest China’s Chongqing municipality, was charged with several crimes and received a combined punishment for all offenses, according to a verdict announced by the Chengdu City Intermediate People’s Court in southwest China’s Sichuan Province.

Wang received seven years in prison for the charge of bending the law for selfish ends, two years in prison and deprivation of his political rights for one year for the charge of defection, two years in prison for the power abuse charge and nine years in prison for the charge of bribe-taking. He received a combined punishment of 15 years in prison and deprivation of his political rights for one year.

Wang stated to the court that he would not appeal the sentence.

Defence lawyer Wang Yuncai suggested to The Telegraph’s Malcolm Moore, however, that there is some possibility of Wang’s early release on medical grounds:

“I cannot say how many years he will serve,” she said. “If he gets the chance to go to a hospital for a serious illness then there is no minimum sentence that he will have to serve.” She declined to comment further.

Mr Wang appeared in rosy health at his trial, and clips of him giving evidence, dressed not in the standard orange boiler suit of Chinese prisoners but in a crisp white shirt, were broadcast on national television.

However, one diplomatic source suggested in the run-up to his trial that he was in poor physical and mental health.

A psychiatrist who knew Mr Wang in Chongqing also said he exhibited “clear signs of mental disturbance” in the days before he fled to the US consulate in February.

Wang’s sentence is the latest omen of the fate of his former superior, Bo Xilai, for whom its relative lightness—Wang could have faced the death penalty—may be a bad sign. A nine-page Xinhua account of Wang’s trial explained last week that the defence had sought a reduced sentence in recognition of his “meritorious reporting” of others’ crimes. The account also implied that Bo had been aware of his wife Gu Kailai’s killing of Neil Heywood for over a week before Wang finally brought it to light, suggesting his complicity in the cover-up for which Wang, Gu and several others have already been prosecuted.

Caixin editor-in-chief Hu Shuli alluded to the possibility of a Bo trial in an editorial on Friday:

The magnitude of power Wang had at his disposal during the famous Chongqing “anti-mafia” campaign and the cover-up of Heywood’s death was a public outrage. But even more egregious was just how quickly local political and police forces moved to smother Wang when he fell out of favor with the Bo family.

The rule of law is written in China’s constitution, and states that consensus between the ruling party and the public is a goal. The trials of Bogu and Wang, and the shards of truth that have since emerged, were an important exercise in the rule of law.

According to the prosecutor, Wang “revealed important information of others’ legal activities” and “played an important role in the investigation of relevant cases.” Perhaps this represents only a prelude to another trial, which can serve as the final installment to the saga and open the door to legal reforms. While nothing has been a foregone conclusion with regard to the handling of the cases, it is clear that the establishment of a judicial system that can make horizontal and vertical checks on power must be implemented with greater urgency than ever.

In the wake of Wang’s trial and sentencing, the South China Morning Post examined how Bo’s criminal prosecution might come about:

So far, Bo has only been accused of breaching internal party discipline. But experts say the public citing of Bo’s angry rebuke of Wang has raised the likelihood that he too will face criminal charges, probably after the party congress.

Before then, party leaders could first expel Bo from the party and hand him over for criminal investigation.

“The prosecutors said Wang exposed leaders to major crimes by others,” said Li Zhuang, a Beijing lawyer who opposed Wang and Bo for mounting a sweeping crackdown on foes in the name of fighting organised crime. Bo was the likely target of Wang’s allegations, said Li.

“That was a slap around the ears that changed history,” Li said of Bo’s alleged actions against Wang. “Otherwise, Bo might still be in power and hoping to rise higher.”

Li himself faced charges, later dropped, of “fabricating evidence” in defence of a client during one of Bo’s signature anti-Mafia campaigns. AFP’s account today of Wang’s rise and fall describes how he personally “confronted Li at the airport, in front of dozens of police cars, their lights flashing, greeting him with the words ‘Li Zhuang, we meet again!’ before taking him into custody, the lawyer said.”

Another profile by The Guardian’s Tania Branigan also describes Wang’s expansive flamboyant side, as well as his extreme dedication to police work:

He claimed to have wrestled a suicide bomber to the floor just seconds before the man detonated his explosives. He boasted about love letters from awed young women and that his classmates at police academy had nicknamed him “tiger general”. But for all the self-mythologising, he succeeded in winning popular acclaim.

[…] Now 52, Wang, grew up in north-eastern Liaoning province and served in the army – where he met his wife – before joining the police, initially as a traffic policeman.

His devotion to duty was such that he chose to holiday in Beijing, where – rather than sightseeing – he spent hours standing at major road junctions, watching the traffic officers work.

Once back home, he used the photographs he had taken to practise his gestures and hand signals.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: abuse of power, Bo Xilai, bribery, Chengdu, Chongqing, corruption, defection, gu kailai, Hu Shuli, legal system, Li Zhuang, Neil Heywood, trials, Wang Lijun
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“I acknowledge and confess the guilt accused by the prosecuting body and show my repentance,” Wang said in his final statement at court.

“My acts were crimes, and I hope the serious impacts (caused by my acts) both at home and abroad would be eliminated through the trial. Meanwhile, I hope the trial will issue a warning to society and let more people draw lessons from me,” he said.

“For the Party organizations, people and relatives that have cared for me, I want to say here, sincerely, ‘I’m very, very sorry, I’ve let you down,’” Wang said.

Speaking to The New York Times, Wang’s lawyer endorsed the Xinhua account as, for the most part, a faithful record of the proceedings. It offers some explanation for the unannounced early start of what, it was initially reported, would be an “open” trial:

The Chengdu Municipal Intermediate People’s Court held a closed-door trial on Monday for Wang on the charges of defection and abuse of power and an open trial on the charges of bribe-taking and bending the law for selfish ends on Tuesday.

Despite the gravity of these crimes, Xinhua explained, Wang’s sentence is likely to be somewhat reduced because of his “meritorious reporting” of others’ criminal acts. These others may include his former superior, fallen Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai, who for the first time was officially linked to the events surrounding his wife’s murder of Neil Heywood. The Xinhua account describes what would turn out to be a pivotal moment, soon after which Wang fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu; Bo is not named, but his identity is clear.

Relevant testimonies from witnesses showed that on Jan. 28, Wang Lijun reported to the then leading official of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Chongqing Committee that Bogu Kailai was highly suspected in the Nov. 15, 2011 Case. On the morning of Jan. 29, Wang Lijun was angrily rebuked and slapped in the face by the official.

Guo Weiguo, who was present when Wang Lijun was slapped, said in the interrogation record that “the conflict was made public after Wang Lijun was slapped.”

That Bo was told of his wife’s crime and failed to bring it to light appears to implicate him in the cover-up for which Wang and four other police officers have already stood trial. Observers disagree, however, over what the episode’s inclusion in the official record means for Bo’s fate. From The Guardian:

[…] Kerry Brown, an expert on Chinese politics at the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy, said the party could still deal with Bo’s case internally, adding: “It seems to have been very rigorous in keeping Bo’s malfeasance apart from Gu’s.

“That kind of story [about the confrontation] was so well known that it was hard not to try to address it.”

He added: “I can’t see any big gains from totally trashing Bo now. Not going for the jugular might be more sensible, particularly at the moment.”

But others have read it as a sign of possible criminal proceedings. June Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami told Bloomberg, for example, that “the nuggets are the clues which could lead to a Bo Xilai indictment later on. They have very cleverly left the door open with several phrases.” The Financial Times’ Kathrin Hille wrote that this interpretation is consistent “with information recently given to senior party members. Lin Zhe, a professor at the Central Party School, said the main point that the internal investigation had found Mr Bo guilty of was helping to cover up for his wife.”

The Wall Street Journal’s Deborah Kan discussed the issue with Jeremy Page, who concluded that an announcement on Bo’s fate is likely “in the next couple of weeks, or immediately after [the] National Day holiday”.

The final section of the Xinhua account is devoted to emphasising the investigation and trial’s thoroughness, fairness and strict adherence to procedure:

Gu Mingan, a professor with the Law School of the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics as well as an observer at the trials, said the two sides made full efforts to raise and cross-examine evidence during the trials, and the court scrupulously heard the opinions of the prosecutors as well as the defense counsel, fully reflecting the judicial concept of the equality of the prosecution and the defense, and safeguarded the sanctity of law.

After the trials, Wu Qunfang, a resident from the Taoyuan community in the Chenghua District of Chengdu, said that after the trials they have fully understood the beginning and subsequent development of Wang Lijun’s case.

“We believe that all is equal before the law and expect a fair verdict from the people’s court,” Wu said.

Global Times elaborated, stressing the inevitability of justice in China and invoking a favourite recent theme, the awesome “moral whip” of online scrutiny.

Those who commit crimes, regardless of the power or position they hold, will not escape punishment. Wang’s case has strengthened this faith among the public and served as a serious deterrent in the country.

Wang’s trial will drive forward China’s political system, as it has highlighted the urgency of checks and balance of power.

Confusion still exists over the case, but people are gradually believing more that justice will eventually trump over any privilege.

Confidence is built on more criminal officials being firmly punished, on the influential emergence of online supervision and the rising voice of individuals via Weibo.

But the Xinhua account leaves some questions unanswered. Siweiluozi wondered, for example, what evidence exists that Wang had applied to the U.S. for asylum, justifying the charge of defection.

[… W]hat I really, really want to know now, though, is what is the prosecution’s evidence for this? Do they have the application for asylum? If so, how did they get it? Or is their evidence of this fact Wang’s confession?

If the evidence for Wang’s asylum application is based solely on his confession, then this should be insufficient grounds to convict under Chinese law, since Article 46 of the Criminal Procedure Law states, in relevant part:

A defendant cannot be found guilty and sentenced to a criminal punishment if there is only his statement but no evidence.

To be clear, I am not saying that Wang will (or even necessarily should, within the terms of Chinese criminal justice) be acquitted of defection. I’m merely pointing to what I think is an interesting question regarding evidence. Put simply: what is the evidence to back up this charge? Unfortunately, I’m not optimistic that I will ever see either the verdict in this trial or, through some other means, the evidence disclosed in sufficient detail.

Xinhua’s description of Wang’s actions after he was drawn into Gu’s conspiracy, such as secretly keeping hold of evidence against her, shows his acute awareness of being on treacherous ground. But according to a profile of Wang’s earlier career by The Telegraph’s Malcolm Moore, he had known for many years that his position was precarious:

As early as the late 1990s, when Mr Wang was a star policeman in the city of Tieling, in Liaoning province, he spilled his fears to Zhou Lijun, the script writer of “Iron Blooded Police Spirits”, a television drama series based on his career. “I was in a bath house with Wang Lijun in Fushun, Liaoning, and we were both sitting naked in the hot tub,” Mr Zhou recalled on his blog.

“And he said: ‘I know exactly what I am, I am just a piece of chewing gum in the officials’ mouths. They will chew me up and when they find there is no taste anymore they will spit me out onto the ground, and God knows whose shoes I will be sticking to by that time.’”

[…] “Everybody has some sort of mental problem,” Mr Wang told Mr Chen, his biographer. “I dream about a normal life, but it is not possible. I am struggling between glory and confusion, but I will not let myself collapse. I may be wiped out by certain powers, or die when I am still young, but history will remember me.”

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Post tags: abuse of power, Bo Guagua, Bo Xilai, Chengdu, Chongqing, corrupt officials, corruption, defection, Global Times, gu kailai, justice, legal system, Neil Heywood, rule of law, Wang Lijun, Xinhua
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A once powerful Chongqing police official at the center of the scandal that felled the senior Communist leader Bo Xilai was charged with defection, abuse of power and corruption, the official Xinhua news agency reported on Wednesday.

[...]Mr. Bo was not mentioned in the Xinhua report, suggesting the possibility that he will not be formally linked to Mr. Wang’s crimes. Instead, the report said that Mr. Wang helped Ms. Gu, although it did not specify how.

The report did say, however, that Mr. Wang abused power by illegally snooping on people as part of a campaign against organized crime in Chongqing. Human rights groups say the crackdown was arbitrary and many innocent people were convicted. If Mr. Wang is charged with this, however, it could be hard to shield Mr. Bo, who took credit for the crime sweep.

Reuters has more on the Xinhua report. After further detailing the charges of illegal surveillance, the article speculates what Wang might be looking at if these charges stick:

[...]the Xinhua announcement said Wang had abused investigation techniques, an accusation that may reflect rumors that he had bugged other officials, including central officials visiting Chongqing.

“Wang illegally used technical surveillance measures, either without the approval of authorities or by forging approval documents,” said Xinhua.

Wang could face a sentence of up to life in jail on the defection charge, and serious bribery charges can attract the death penalty.

An AP article reports that, while Wang is looking at a menacing list of charges, his cooperation with state security officials may have shielded him from the more serious crime of treason, which had been widely speculated as Wang’s fate. The article also asks why Bo Xilai’s name was conspicuously absent from the Xinhua report:

Xinhua’s report also did not mention Bo, though Wang’s indictment would seem to clear the way for an announcement about Bo’s fate, something that had been expected well before the party meeting that is believed to be scheduled for mid-October.

However, University of Miami China expert June Teufel Dreyer said authorities might be holding back in the face of a lack of consensus or uncertainty how to proceed within such a tight time frame.

“The door’s still open to prosecute Bo at a future time, and it is possible that Wang’s trial will attempt to draw Bo into the murder-cover up intrigue,” Dreyer said.

“The more attention can be diverted from so high-level, and reputedly fairly popular, personage, the better,” she said.

Wang has been charged by authorities in Chengdu, and Global Times reports that his trial will begin “at a later date” in the city where he sought US protection earlier this year.

Also see a BBC News profile of the fallen supercop. For more on Wang Lijun, including the once-proposed but presumably forgotten Hong Kong crime film chronicling his career in police work, see prior CDT coverage.

© josh rudolph for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, Chengdu, Chongqing, legal system, scandal, Wang Lijun
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Chen’s prospective Taiwan visit offers a challenge to Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, who has built his administration around better relations with China, from which Taiwan split amid civil war in 1949.

[…] Chen’s good friend and a prominent rights lawyer in Beijing, Jiang Tianyong, said he welcomed the news that Chen would visit Taiwan next year, saying China has much to learn from the island in terms of lessons in democracy and rule of law.

“We are in general interested in its legal system and democracy of course is something that every Chinese citizen wants. Taiwan may not be exactly the path China will follow in the future but it has areas that we especially could learn from,” Jiang said by phone.

For more on Chen Guangcheng’s activities since leaving China, see ‘Chen Guangcheng’s Next Steps‘ on CDT.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: activists, Beijing and Taiwan, Chen Guangcheng, human rights activists, legal system
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