Leadership changes in China are thrashed out behind closed doors through horse-trading between new leaders and outgoing or retired leaders anxious to preserve their influence and protect family interests, but reshuffles must go through a choreographed selection process.

Two other sources, who declined to be identified because it is sensitive to discuss elite politics with foreign media, also confirmed that Xi had decided to make Li his vice president rather than Liu.

The National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament, will vote in Xi and Li as president and vice president respectively on March 14. Li Keqiang, the party’s new No.2 official, will succeed Wen Jiabao to become premier and oversee the economy and day-to-day running of the cabinet.

[...]

“It was Xi’s decision and a sign he is strong and able to say ‘no’ to Jiang,” the source told Reuters

Reuters adds that Li’s promotion may also indicate Xi’s willingness to pursue limited reforms. But while he has taken steps to increase the inefficiency and tone down the extravagance of the Chinese government, and even said that the government should tolerate “sharp criticism”, a leaked speech from December also dampened expectations of more substantive political reforms.

Noted political theorist Wu Jiaxiang, however, is keeping the faith that Xi can deliver on reform expectations. From an interview with Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan, via the China Media Project:

YZZK: Those internal speeches by Xi Jinping have created a lot of dissatisfaction. How do [you] view this?

Wu Jiaxiang: My guess is that this is about [addressing] a sense among some prominent old politicians that says basically, look, this Xi Jinping cares only about Deng Xiaoping, he has no use for us — he denies Mao Zedong, he doesn’t mention Jiang Zemin, he talks even less about Hu Jintao. I believe Xi Jinping’s speech at the Central Party School already marked a major compromise, a huge back-step in comparison to how much Deng Xiaoping was willing to give. Deng Xiaoping essentially yielded nothing to the Cultural Revolution faction. Xi Jinping made this [compromise] because he recognised the fact that the Cultural Revolution faction had already made a comeback, that, moreover, this comeback was quite substantial, like a bunch of walking dead if you will. Faced with this situation, how could a General Secretary who has just come to power declare war against these monsters?

A wise politician won’t declare war before they’ve even managed to accomplish something. [Xi Jinping] has a major strategic consideration, and that is to first ensure that this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proceed smoothly. If he didn’t compromise, this would instantly drive a major wedge in the Party. The ripples would run across the internet and through the Party ranks. So Xi Jinping must seek the greatest common denominator. He must find broad consensus — and that comes on the issue of the past thirty years of reform, which no side rejects outright.

[...] It might be that he talks about some things he won’t necessarily do. He may also do things he doesn’t necessarily talk about. There may also be things he’s thinking about that he can neither say nor do. This administration is like an iceberg, and right now we see maybe one-eighth. There are still seven-eighths we haven’t seen yet.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP 5th generation, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, NPC 2013, reform, Xi Jinping
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A source close to Guangdong’s provincial government said Wang Genghui, a deputy editor-in-chief of Nanfang Media Group, which owns the newspaper, had taken over from Huang Can, Southern Weekly’s editor-in-chief since 2009. Huang had been sidelined and was likely to be transferred to another post in the group.

“Wang has a rather popular image as he is more willing to listen to editors and journalists,” the source said. “But this is likely to be a transitional role to restore normal operation at the newspaper as soon as possible.”

This week’s newspaper included a veiled protest saying that editorial procedures should be respected and made corrections – a typographical error, the erroneous numbering of the edition and a factual flaw that said flood control work by “Yu the Great” happened 2,000 years ago, instead of 4,000 years ago.

A comment below the corrections, signed by editorial staff, read: “Newspaper mistakes are always in black and white. In every link of editing and publishing a newspaper, its standard processes should always be respected and followed. We have never been more keenly aware of this.”

A report at Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, meanwhile, described Xi Jinping’s alleged displeasure at propaganda chief Liu Yunshan’s handling of the affair. Though the account is based on information from unnamed sources, Bill Bishop commented in his Sinocism newsletter that “[I] hear from other reporters that this report could be credible, that this paper has had other scoops recently..if true then very interesting.” One sign of the report’s accuracy might come in or after March when, it predicts, Guangdong propaganda chief Tuo Zhen will be removed from his post.

At a meeting in Zhongnanhai in Beijing on the night of Jan. 9, Xi, visibly displeased, asked if the media control division was not adding to confusion, sources familiar with the discussions said.

[…] Liu had decided to impose penalties, including dismissals, against editors and reporters who disobeyed the order. But Xi gave instructions not to punish journalists who protested the propaganda department, according to a party source formerly involved in media control.

Xi has apparently attempted to contain the fallout even by accepting demands from Southern Weekly reporters.

He decided to remove the chief of the propaganda department of the Guangdong provincial party committee, who led prior screening of the Southern Weekly.

The official is not expected to leave the post until at least March, when the National People’s Congress is scheduled to convene, because an immediate removal would reveal confusion within the party.

In particular, Xi reportedly suggested, Liu’s order for other outlets to republish a Global Times editorial expressing the Party line had turned a local problem into a wider one. (The order was conveyed by a Central Propaganda Department directive obtained and published by CDT.) Certainly, it spread the stand-off as far as Southern Weekly’s half-sister, the Beijing News, which initially refused to republish the article at all, and eventually buried an abbreviated version under a non-committal headline deep within the paper. At Reuters, Sui-Lee Wee described what had threatened to become the Beijing News’ last stand:

“This is the first time in China’s history, with the exception of June 4th, that there’s been such a large-scale collective protest by Chinese journalists against the central government’s propaganda department’s restrictions and suppression,” said Cheng Yizhong, who co-founded the Beijing News with Dai [Zhigeng], referring to the Tiananmen Square protests.

But Cheng said he expected no improvement in freedoms, predicting authorities would try to pre-empt any direct challenges by strengthening controls over social media. Cheng was arrested in 2004 on embezzlement charges that his supporters said were politically motivated. He was later released.

The editor at the Beijing News said management had warned staff not to talk about the incident, especially to foreign reporters, who “could make the higher-ups lose face”.

“It’s possible that after this, they might settle scores.”

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Asahi Shimbun, Beijing News, Cheng Yizhong, Guangdong, June 4th, Liu Yunshan, media censorship, news media, newspapers, press freedom, Southern Media Group, Southern Weekly, southern weekly protest 2013, Tuo Zhen, Xi Jinping
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Yan Jingjing, daughter of PLA Song and Dance Troupe singer Yan Weiwen, is unsearchable on Sina Weibo.

Pinyin Spelling of Leaders’ Names:
- [Zhang] dejiang: Member of the newly elected Politburo Standing Committee (PSC).
- [Zhang] gaoli: New PSC member.
- jiaqinglin: One of the outgoing PSC members.
- [Xi] jinping: Incoming CCP president. Re-tested.
- [Li] keqiang: Incoming CCP prime minister.
- [Wang] qishan ([王] 岐山): New PSC member.
- wangyang (汪洋): Party Secretary of Guangdong Province. Wang’s absence from the new PSC troubles those who hope for reform in China’s new leadership.
- [Liu] yunshan ([刘] 云山): New PSC member.
- [Yu] zhengsheng ([俞] 正声): New PSC member.

Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan:
- XiJP (习JP): Xi Jinping
- Secretary Xi (习书记)
- Crown Prince/Emperor Xi (习皇（储/帝）)
- Xi Cannot-Comment (习禁评): re-tested
- Chairman Xi (习主席): re-tested
- Lady Xi (习夫人): Refers to Peng Liyuan.
- Lady Peng (彭夫人)
- Her Majesty the Empress (皇后娘娘)
- First Lady (第一夫人)
- Mother of the Nation (国母): re-tested

Other Post-18th-Party-Congress Terms:
- Seven Chiefs (七巨头): Refers to the seven new members of the PSC.
- Prime Minister Li (李总理): Li Keqiang
- Kim Il-sung + university (金日成+大学): Official documents reveal that PSC member Zhang Dejiang graduated with a degree in economics from North Korea’s Kim Il-sung University.
- join the PSC (入常): re-tested
- Liu Yongqing (刘永清): Hu Jintao’s wife.
- Prime Minister Wen (温总理): Wen Jiabao
- Bo Wen (薄温): Refers to Bo Xilai and Wen Jiabao.
- Yan Jingjing (阎晶晶): Yan Weiwen’s daughter, who is also Li Zhaoxing’s daughter-in-law. Yan Weiwen is a tenor in the People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Song and Dance Troupe. Li Zhaoxing served as ambassador to the U.S. from 1998 to 2001, and as a PSC member and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2007.
- Li Hehe (李禾禾): Li Zhaoxing’s son. Re-tested.

Note: All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search.  CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese’s latest sensitive words post.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, censorship, Hu Jintao, Internet censorship, Jia Qinglin, Li Hehe, Li Keqiang, li zhaoxing, Liu Yongqing, Liu Yunshan, Peng Liyuan, People's Liberation Army, Politburo Standing Committee, Sensitive Words Series, sina weibo, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, weibo, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, Yan Jingjing, Yan Weiwen, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang, Zhang Gaoli
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Xi Jinping was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee at the first plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on Thursday morning.

Other members of the newly elected Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee are Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli.

Xinhua’s announcements unexpectedly preceded the standing committee’s live unveiling at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, at which Xi began his address by apologising for the delay. From Malcolm Moore at The Telegraph:

Welcoming his six “comrades” onto the stage, Mr Xi said China’s new leaders would battle to improve people’s lives and not to lose touch with the population. China’s new leaders faced “severe” challenges, he admitted, including a difficult fight against rampant corruption.

“Ours is a political party that serves the people wholeheartedly. We have every reason to be proud,” he said. “Proud but not complacent. We will never rest on our laurels.”

“Our responsibility is weightier than Mount Tai,” China’s incoming leader added, referring to the giant mountain in China’s Shandong province. “The journey ahead is long and arduous.”

For more of Xi’s speech, see Xinhua’s translation at Global Times.

Bloomberg has posted a ‘Who’s Who’ guide to all the new top leaders, while a Reuters infographic shows their place in China’s broader power structure. Notably absent from the list were Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao, whose inclusion might have signalled a more reformist inclination. Jeremy Page discussed Wang and Li’s prospects prior to the announcement at The Wall Street Journal:

Mr. Li, who studied briefly at Harvard’s Kennedy School in 2002, has overseen pilots schemes to enhance democracy within the party. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Mr. Li told U.S. diplomats in 2007 that China could hold competitive elections for the Politburo and its Standing Committee in 20 to 30 years.

Mr. Wang has eased restrictions on nongovernmental organizations and he won plaudits last year for reaching a negotiated settlement, rather than using force, when a village in Guangdong rebelled against party rule over a land grab by local officials.

Mr. Li is thought to stand more of a chance than Mr. Wang, but if neither make it, it would be seen as a blow to those inside and outside China hoping that the party will expand even limited experiments to encourage greater democracy within its own ranks.

“If neither Li or Wang enter the Standing Committee, that would really show Hu’s weakness,” said a Chinese academic with close party contacts [….]

Xi was also named chairman of the Central Military Commission, ending speculation over whether Hu Jintao would hold on to the post for up to two more years, as his predecessors have done. The Financial Times’ Richard McGregor, author of The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers, summed up the combined implications:

@xhnews Terrible result for HJT. Shunted out unceremoniously and fails to get his allies promoted. Ignominious end fo rhim.

— Richard McGregor (@mcgregorrichard) November 15, 2012

McClatchy’s Tom Lasseter elaborated on the perceived factional divide within the new standing committee:

More than ideological lines, the committee introduced on Thursday seemed to be drawn along factional ties – specifically, an apparent victory for those close to former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin over the outgoing president and party secretary, Hu Jintao. The 86-year-old Jiang was last year rumored to have died or fallen into a vegetative state, but he recently made a series of public appearances that some speculated were a signal that he is still in the political game.

Xi Jinping himself was thought to be Jiang’s pick, versus Li Keqiang, who is closely affiliated with the same Communist Youth League that formed a power base for 69-year-old Hu.

Of the seven on the list, only Li and Liu Yunshan, a 65-year-old who’d been heading the party’s propaganda department, are viewed as being strongly allied with Hu.

Jiang was seen as having supported Xi and the other four committee members named on Thursday: 66-year-old Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, 67-year-old Shanghai party chief Yu Zhengsheng, 66-year-old Tianjin party chief Zhang Gaoli and 64-year-old Vice Premier Wang Qishan.

But the longer-term picture for Hu’s legacy may be somewhat brighter. From Mark MacKinnon at The Globe and Mail:

A key caveat to Mr. Jiang’s apparent tour de force is the age of his allies who were promoted Thursday: all the new Standing Committee members – except Mr. Xi and Mr. Li – are 64 years or older, meaning all are slated to retire in 2017, clearing the field for Mr. Hu’s younger allies to rise to the Standing Committee ahead of the next major power transfer in 2022, when Mr. Xi and Mr. Li are due to step aside.

[…] The signals from the week-long Communist Party congress were decidedly mixed. Delegates ended the meeting with a solemn singing of the socialist anthem, The Internationale. Then they filed out of the Great Hall of the People, to a waiting fleet of chauffeured Audis.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP, Communist Youth League, Great Hall of the People, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, Xi Jinping, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang, Zhang Gaoli
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In an essay published Friday, Vice President Xi urged fellow leaders not to “play to the crowd” or “seek fame and fortune” and to abide by a consensus-based decision-making system that has evolved since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976.

Mr. Xi’s remarks were seen as a clear rejection of the populist, autocratic and nakedly ambitious leadership style of Bo Xilai, who was dismissed as party chief of the southwestern megacity of Chongqing on Thursday amid a scandal involving his former police chief.

…

Wen Hai, an online commentator for the People’s Daily, another party mouthpiece, praised Mr. Xi’s essay as “timely” and said each leader should understand they were “just one member of the party organization” and preserve a culture of mutual respect and consensus-building.

“One person cannot have the final say in the national leadership, but that was what was happening in Chongqing,” said Chen Ziming, an independent political analyst in Beijing. “That is why Xi Jinping made this point in the essay.”

Xi originally gave the speech on March 1, at the opening ceremony for the spring semester of the Party School of the Central Committee, of which he is also president. Even though he didn’t mention Bo by name, Chinese politics expert David Goodman told The Telegraph that Xi still sent a telling message:

“What happened under Mao (Zedong) was that individual whim rather party organisation came to rule,” said Goodman, professor of Chinese politics at the University of Sydney.

“The Cultural Revolution smacks to many people of a lawlessness and the whims of a single ruler. How does that relate to Bo? He laid himself open to the criticism by going for an open, charismatic (style of) politics.”

Meanwhile, reactions to Bo’s sacking and speculation over his future continue to emerge. The Telegraph’s Tania Branigan joined the Sinica podcast team on Friday to review what happened to Bo. The Globe and Mail’s Mark MacKinnon reports that the news has delighted the country’s liberals, but The Wall Street Journal cautions that Bo’s exit does not guarantee ascension for a more liberal figure such as Guangdong provincial party chief Wang Yang:

It could in fact galvanize efforts by figures associated with Mr. Bo to secure seats on the new Politburo Standing Committee—which currently has nine members—alongside Vice President Xi Jinping, the man expected to take over as party chief in a once-a-decade succession process in the fall.

The leadership contest paints a picture of a party at a crossroads and increasingly divided between those, like Mr. Bo, who advocate a stronger state role in the economy and society, and others, like Mr. Wang, who champion the private sector, civil society and the rule of law.

…

Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington suggested that the big winners could be from the same faction as Mr. Bo. “It’s like the Republican primary—if one Republican loses, the other Republicans gain.”

Still, Reuters called Wang Yang the “obvious beneficiary” of Bo’s self-destruction on Friday when it highlighted nine leaders whose prospects for a seat on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee have now improved, such as Bo’s replacement Zhang Dejiang. Others mentioned in the piece include Wang Yang, vice premier Wang Qishan, propaganda minister Liu Yunshan, party organizational department head Li Yuanchao, Tianjin party chief Zhang Gaoli, and Shanghai party head Yu Zhengshan. Those seven would, in theory, fill out the new Standing Committee lineup alongside Xi and Li Keqiang, who is expected to take over for Premier Wen Jiabao when the next generation of leaders assumes power next year. A “bolder” candidate, according to Reuters, would be “princeling” Liu Yandong – she has ties to President Hu Jintao’s Youth League faction and, if chosen, would be the first woman on the Standing Committee since 1949.

In the Diplomat, David Cohen writes that Bo’s scandal-plagued descent started long-before top lieutenant Wang Lijun disappeared amid speculation of defection and a falling out in Chongqing last month, and claims that the move against Bo could not have been made lightly:

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao are likely organizers of Bo’s downfall as well – they have, unlike the majority of the Standing Committee, avoided visiting Chongqing during Bo’s tenure, echoing Hu’s pointed avoidance of Shanghai in the years before the Chen Liangyu incident, and Bo’s removal from the contest for elevation to the Standing Committee seems to clear the way for an important Hu ally, Guangdong party chief Wang Yang. Wen’s remarkably direct criticism of Bo Tuesday further suggested a strong personal animus.

But ditching Bo was clearly a consensus move, and everyone had good reason to support it. Peter Martin reported in this space in January on Bo’s success in forming an independent base of support in Chongqing and Dalian – if Bo had kept this intact into the Xi administration, he could easily have become a problematic rival. If he had succeeded in forcing his way onto the Standing Committee, he would have created an alternative route to power, permanently undermining the Party’s control of the government through its absolute power to make appointments.

The timing of Bo’s downfall suggests that China’s top leaders took these threats seriously – with the leadership transition in October and ongoing provincial appointments, Bo could have been quietly eased out if it hadn’t been necessary to make an example. The choice to fire Bo during the National People’s Congress catches him in Beijing and ensures that he won’t travel back to Chongqing – suggesting that Chinese leaders may have feared another Wang Lijun-style getaway.

Also in The Diplomat, Claremont McKenna College’s Minxin Pei writes that the frustrations that boosted Bo’s popularity could come back to haunt the party:

Obviously, the shortlist for the next Politburo Standing Committee has to be redrawn. In all likelihood, Bo’s elimination from the race should make the process less contentious and may help produce a more “harmonious” new leadership team. However, the damage to the party’s prestige by this episode is incalculable. Since the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, the party has worked hard to maintain a façade of unity within the top leadership. A key lesson drawn by the party from the Tiananmen catastrophe was that political infighting among top leaders emboldened pro-democracy protesters and paralyzed the party’s decision-making process. Splits within the leadership must be avoided at all cost. The Bo incident shows that the divisions within the party are real and deep. At the moment, it’s unclear what Bo’s friends and backers will do, but they surely must not have been very happy with this dramatic turn of events. An intriguing question is whether Bo and his supporters have enough staying power to make a comeback during a future political crisis and take on the Party. Could Bo turn into a Chinese Boris – Boris Yeltsin, that is?

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, CCP, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, liu yandong, Liu Yunshan, princelings, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, Yu Zhengshan, zhang dejiang, Zhang Gaoli
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