In telling the North it should return to the negotiating table, Mr. Xi appeared to strike a stern tone, saying, “The Chinese position is very clear: no matter how the situation changes, relevant parties should all adhere to the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, persist in safeguarding its peace and stability, and stick to solving problems through dialogue and consultation.”

The Chinese leader called for resuming the so-called six-party talks, the diplomatic effort among six countries including China and the United States that collapsed in 2008 when North Korea walked out.

American experts on North Korea say it is unlikely that North Korea would agree to the talks, largely because the United States and South Korea would insist on preconditions like a pledge from North Korea that it would abandon its nuclear program.

The warning Friday from Mr. Xi follows a clear message the Chinese president delivered at a conference in April at Boao in southern China, when he said that “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.”

While the envoy, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae, agreed in principle to rejoining the talks, it is unclear if or how Pyongyang would follow through. Choe delivered a letter to Xi from Kim Jong-un, but the contents were not revealed. From AP:

The official China News Service said Choe delivered the handwritten letter from Kim to Xi at an afternoon meeting at the Great Hall of the People in central Beijing. It gave no details about the letter’s contents.

North Korea is willing to work with all sides to “appropriately resolve the relevant questions through the six-party talks and other forms,” Choe was quoted as saying by Chinese state broadcaster CCTV. He said Pyongyang was “willing to take active measures in this regard.”

Choe offered no details on how North Korea planned to resume talks. North Korea walked away from the six-party nuclear disarmament talks in 2009 over disagreements on how to verify steps the North was meant to take to end its nuclear programs. Foreign observers often claim that North Korea has a history of raising tensions in an attempt to push its adversaries to negotiations meant to win aid.

Since its third nuclear test, in February, North Korea has repeatedly said that any future diplomatic talks would have to recognize it as a nuclear power. That’s at odds with the basis of the six-party talks and puts Pyongyang at loggerheads with Washington, which says it won’t accept North Korea as an atomic power and demands that talks be based on past commitments by the North to abandon its nuclear programs.

Read more about China-North Korea relations and the six-party talks, via CDT.

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The envoy, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, who serves as director of the general political bureau of the North Korean People’s Army, met in Beijing with Wang Jiarui, the head of the international department of the Chinese Communist Party, said Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, in a report that gave no details of the talks.

His trip is North Korea’s first serious dabbling in diplomacy after months of bellicose pronouncements, including threats to launch nuclear strikes at the United States and its allies. It also comes as Japanese officials set off fears of a policy discord with allies by signaling a willingness to open a greater dialogue, including possible summit talks, with North Korea.

Marshal Choe, 63, is the first senior North Korean official to visit China since August and the first to go there in the capacity of special envoy. He is most likely the highest-profile envoy Mr. Kim could have chosen to visit China, having risen to the top military leadership under Mr. Kim, who has tried to consolidate his power at home while intensifying a standoff with Washington and its allies over his country’s nuclear and missile programs.

“The fact that Kim Jong-un sent a special envoy means that he has something quite urgent to discuss with China, and the fact that his special envoy was his top military officer suggests that China wants to talk about the North’s nuclear and missile programs,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. [Source]

Earlier this week, a group of Chinese fishermen were held for ransom in North Korea, further heightening tensions between the two countries, which have increased since Kim Jong-un took over power in 2011.The Guardian has more on the complicated relationship between the two neighbors:

China provides North Korea with the vast majority of its fuel and trade – reportedly accounting for almost nine-tenths of its imports and exports in 2011 – and its support has become even more important as Pyongyang’s relations with Seoul have deteriorated.

But it has shown increasing signs of frustration with the regime over its weapons programmes and angry rhetoric.

“Since North Korea had the third nuclear test [in February], the relationship between China and North Korea has been pretty tense. To ease the relationship, the visit is very normal and necessary. It helps to stop the bilateral relationship deteriorating,” said Cai Jian of the Centre for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “This visit shows China is also willing to improve the relationship with North Korea.”

China’s state news agency, Xinhua, said Choe, 63, met Wang Jiarui, head of the international department of the Communist party. It gave no further details. [Source]

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The vessel’s owner, Yu Xuejun, called the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on May 10 to seek help, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a brief statement issued through Sina Weibo, the country’s Twitter-like microblog service. Mr. Yu was not on the boat when it was seized.

“The embassy immediately made representations to the consular affairs bureau of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that North Korea release the vessel and the crew as soon as possible, and ensure the safety of the lives and property of the detained crew, as well as their legitimate rights,” the Chinese ministry statement said.

…

The Chinese media reports said the boat was seized on May 5, with 16 men onboard, and North Korean authorities demanded payment of 600,000 renminbi, equal to about $98,000, to release them and the vessel, apparently on the grounds that it was fishing in waters claimed by North Korea. The deadline for payment was Sunday, The Beijing Times newspaper said.

[Source]

China’s state-run Global Times reported on Monday that those responsible were “highly likely from the North Korean army,” with one expert speculating that North Korea may be retaliating for sanctions imposed by the United Nations in March after the rogue state’s third nuclear test. But the Guardian’s Tania Branigan speculates that local North Korean forces took on the heist to make money. The boat’s owner received a call from North Korea claiming that his boat had entered North Korean waters, she reports, though he insists the boat had not left Chinese territory:

“This is not the first time it has happened and it won’t be the last,” said Cheng Xiaohe, an expert on Sino-North Korean relations at Renmin University.

North Korean forces and Chinese fishermen often played a cat-and-mouse game, with incursions over the line by both sides, he said. Other cases had not become public because boat owners simply paid up but this time the ransom appeared to be much higher than usual.

“This issue will complicate an already troubled relationship between the two countries but I don’t think the impact will be significant or lasting. I think with the Chinese government intervention it will be settled quickly,” Cheng said.

But he added: “The Chinese side needs to rein in fishermen to make sure they stay in Chinese waters and the DPRK also needs to impose discipline on local military forces.”

[Source]

For Foreign Policy, Isaac Stone Fish doubts that the kidnappers acted with the full backing of the North Korean military command:

But if the “pirates” were actually members of the North Korean military acting in concert with Pyongyang, why the laughably small ransom? Yu told a Chinese journalist that he can’t pay the “sky-high price” of $100,000 — that may be true, but the sticker price for international incidents is usually higher than that of a luxury car. (By comparison, in 2010, the average ransom demand from Somali pirates was $5.4 million.)

It’s not the first time this has happened. A year ago almost to the day, North Koreans abducted 29 Chinese fishermen; the identity of the North Koreans, or whether they were authorities or autonomous kidnappers, remains unknown. The fishermen were returned and relieved of all their possessions, in some cases even including their clothes and the pencils in their pocket. Is the North Korean army so starved of resources that it would steal writing utensils from Chinese fishermen?

[Source]

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Bloomberg reports that, quite contrary to media speculation that China-North Korea relations would soon sour, a new bridge set to open next year is being built by China with hopes of deepening economic ties between the two countries:

Across the Yalu River dividing China and North Korea, towers that will support a sleek suspension bridge rise south of one that U.S. bombers targeted during the Korean War to prevent China from supplying its ally.

The bridge into the northeastern Chinese city of Dandong, set to open next year, is a bet that trade will swell even as the U.S. pressures Communist Party leaders to exert economic leverage on the North to abandon its nuclear program.[...]

[...]The three-kilometer bridge, which the official Xinhua News Agency said will cost 2.2 billion yuan ($356 million), will speed commerce through a city that now handles 70 percent of the two countries’ trade. The span illustrates how the North is binding itself even tighter with China as it limits economic ties with South Korea, including by temporarily suspending work at the jointly run Gaeseong industrial facility.

As new sanctions are placed on North Korea in response to its nuclear threats, the country becomes increasingly reliant on China for trade. China, for its part, wants stability on the Korean peninsula, and worries that cutting off economic ties with the country  would work against that desire. The Washington Post reports:

So why would China still support North Korea, despite all its recent misgivings? China’s policy for the Korean peninsula can be summed up in six little words: “No war, no instability, no nukes.” Those are Beijing’s priorities, and in that order. Chinese leaders don’t want nukes, which is why they’re upset about Pyongyang’s recent nuclear brinksmanship. But even more than that, they don’t want the North Korean state to collapse into chaos or devolve into war, and they know that economic support and cross-border trade are good ways to maintain the status quo. And it’s the status quo that China appears most interested in.

China also has a desire for North Korea to embrace economic reform, and sees an opportunity towards that goal in maintaining strong economic ties with the country. The problem is, business with North Korea is not what China wants it to be – many Chinese businesses are reluctant to invest in the Hermit Kingdom. Reuters reports on the recent history of China’s economic relations with North Korea, and explains that, while China may be frustrated with its geopolitical behavior, North Korea holds quite a few cards in the Sino-North Korean dialogue:

The problem for Beijing is twofold: getting Pyongyang to buy into the idea of economic reform and the reluctance of Chinese businessmen to venture into one of the world’s riskiest investment destinations.

While China is frustrated with Pyongyang over its threats to wage war on South Korea and the United States, its efforts to build economic links with North Korea from places like Jilin help explain why Beijing is unlikely to crack down hard on the reclusive state.

Since then-Premier Wen Jiabao went to North Korea in 2009 – just months after Pyongyang’s second nuclear test – China has sought to stabilize the Korean peninsula by stepping up its effort to steer the North toward economic reform. China is not about to give up that goal even though it’s under U.S. pressure to get tough after North Korea’s third nuclear test, on February 12.

“It’s not even shepherding anymore. It’s more of just inundating North Korea with all of these influences from the Chinese side where the idea is to essentially corrupt them, show them what it tastes like to make money,” said John Park, a North Korea expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Harvard Kennedy School.[...]

For more on China’s relationship with North Korea, see prior CDT coverage.

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As reporters gather in Seoul to await the latest hostile missive (or missile) from the North, Western governments have continued to press China to do more to rein in their putative ally. Like a pit pull chained in the front yard, North Korea does keep the neighbours on edge. Of course there is always the danger of what might happen if you neglect to feed the dog.

China’s involvement on the Korean peninsula in the period since the Korean war has been cited amply in recent press accounts. But Beijing’s interests there have historical roots which reach back far earlier than 1950. For more than two thousand years, successive Chinese dynasties have seen Korea as a tributary to be protected, a prize to be coveted, or as a dangerous land bridge which might convey “outer barbarians” into China. Unsurprising then that China should have a long history of mucking about in Korean politics, a history which has often brought it into conflict with that other great Eastern power, Japan. This has seldom worked out well for the Korean people. Nor has it led to much joy for China.

[…] The misgivings felt by Koreans watching outside forces—particularly China and Japan—intervening to solve problems on the peninsula is understandable, against the historical backdrop. As is China’s reluctance to commit itself to managing Pyongyang. Today’s deadlock is both a legacy of the cold war and the latest chapter in a long story of power shifts across East Asia.

At Tea Leaf Nation last week, Taylor Washburn focused on the disputed status of the first-millennium “proto-Korean” kingdom of Goguryeo:

In late January, 2013, South Korea’s Hankyoreh newspaper reported that an elite group of scholars in the northeastern Chinese province of Jilin was conducting “closed research” on a freshly discovered stele, an engraved memorial stone dating to the fifth century A.D. What interest could the examination of such an artifact hold for contemporary Korean readers? “Concerns are being raised,” the Hankyoreh piece noted vaguely, “that […] it is very likely that China will use the results of the study … to reinforce its argument that Goguryeo belongs to China.”

[…] Whatever defensive instincts may have inspired China’s Goguryeo revisionism, efforts to downplay the independence of Korean civilization cannot but appear menacing from across the Yellow Sea. In a 2012 poll, nearly three quarters of South Koreans indicated that they perceive China as a military threat. Although some of this growing fear undoubtedly stems from Beijing’s ongoing support for Pyongyang, it also reflects a deeper anxiety that a stronger China will seek to revive elements of the Sinocentric regional order that prevailed in East Asia before the arrival of Westerners and the ascent of Meiji Japan, under which Korea’s rulers paid tribute to the Manchu Qing.

If the current Chinese investigation of the Jilin stele continues to make news in Korea, it will certainly exacerbate such unease. What remains to be seen is whether Beijing, mindful of its own security imperatives, will determine this a price worth paying. For the moment, at least, the ghosts of Goguryeo can rest. But William Faulkner’s familiar observation is as true of Manchuria as Mississippi: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

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The definition of Sino-US diplomacy has become blurrier and more confusing. In the past we believed that it meant the leaders of both countries visited each other, talking about trade or military affairs. Now many have realized that “Sino-US diplomacy” has also been underlying in the frictions in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, as well as the Korean Peninsula. The role the US has been playing in these areas make China uneasy.

[...]

A large number of Chinese believe the ultimate goal of the US government is to overturn the current political system here, just as many believe it did with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the US has been sensitive about Chinese moves. The US is anxious over China’s economic growth as well as its military expenditure. China catching up to the US in terms of overall strength is also making leaders there uncomfortable.

Will this anxiety turn into real action to contain China? This remains uncertain. But many Chinese refer to the frictions between the US and China as signs of a US intent to move in that direction.

While Kerry aimed to receive a pledge from China to take a harder line on North Korea’s nuclear program, he left with few substantive changes in place. From the Guardian:

US secretary of state John Kerry met Chinese president Xi Jinping and other senior leaders in Beijing, saying afterwards: “We are able … to underscore our joint commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner.”

Standing alongside China’s top diplomat, state councillor Yang Jiechi, he added: “We agreed that this is critically important for the stability of the region and indeed for the world and for all of our nonproliferation efforts.”

Yang said: “We maintain that the issue should be handled and resolved peacefully through dialogue and consultation. To properly address the Korea nuclear issue serves the common interests of all parties. It is also the shared responsibility of all parties.”

Yang’s statements of support actually revealed few changes in China’s position, the Globe and Mail reports:

To American ears, something new was said Saturday in the Communist Party’s walled leadership compound in central Beijing: China agreed to join the rest of the international community in pressuring North Korea to give up its atomic weapons program.

But while that would be a welcome breakthrough as apprehension continues to grow in and around the two Koreas, it’s not quite the case, at least not yet.

Despite Mr. Kerry’s optimism, the language of the Chinese statements after the Saturday meetings was the same as it has been for years. The problem should be resolved through dialogue, Beijing insisted, preferably via the six-party talks that have been dormant since 2007.

McClatchy reports that American expectations may have been set too high for Kerry’s meetings, leaving only room for disappointment:

Kerry left Beijing with no joint statement from the Chinese warning North Korea to cease its threats; indeed, Chinese officials wouldn’t even mention the country by name as they alluded to “challenges we face on the Korean peninsula.” That’s a delicate way of putting that the entire region is bracing for yet another North Korean missile launch, perhaps as soon as Monday, as experts debate whether it’s months or years before Pyongyang has the capability of delivering a nuclear warhead atop a missile.

As for the “tough message” that State Department officials have said Kerry would urge Beijing to send to North Korea, there was no evidence of that happening, and analysts said they wouldn’t count on it – the Chinese are worried about pushing too hard on Kim Jong Un, an inexperienced and capricious young dictator whose only end game appears to be regime survival. The situation is just too precarious, analysts said, for China to leverage its huge aid and investments in exchange for, say, a return to multilateral negotiations with the goal of Kim scrapping his nuclear program.

“American expectations may be too high,” said Robert Ross, a professor of Chinese foreign policy at Boston College. “Here we’re asking for greater Chinese economic pressure from North Korea at the very time when China is most concerned about stability in North Korea.”

A report from the Economist looks at how the North Korean situation is impacting U.S.-China relations and how China’s short-term interests are determining the country’s response:

In fact, on North Korea, too, China is offering few signs of a fundamental shift in its stance. Short-term interests converge. Neither America nor China wants a war. Both seem to regard Kim Jong Un as an unhinged teenager who needs to be back on his meds. But in the long run, America worries more about a nuclear-armed North Korea. China worries about the country’s collapse. An article this month in Global Times, a Communist Party newspaper, by Zhu Zhangping, an “independent observer”, noted the danger North Korea’s nuclear tests—just over 100km (60 miles) from the Chinese border—pose to China’s water supply and the safety of its food. But, he argued, “North Korea still acts as a buffer.” Were it to collapse, American troops would be at China’s frontiers, and hordes of refugees might flood across the border. China has to “ensure the Kim regime’s survival.”

At the same time, the U.S. relies on China’s historically close relationship with North Korea to ease escalating tensions on the peninsula. From the New York Times:

North Korea has a clear choice available, Mr. Kerry said, according to The Associated Press, and will find “ready partners” in the United States if it follows through. The Japanese foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, was more specific, saying that Pyongyang must meet its commitment to earlier deals regarding its nuclear and missile programs and on returning kidnapped foreigners.

China’s cooperation is essential to the Obama administration’s strategy of holding a tough line on Pyongyang in an attempt to achieve the type of long-lasting solution on the nuclear program that has eluded a string of United States presidents. Previous administrations responded to North Korean provocations by eventually offering aid to tamp down tensions, only to see the North’s promises to relinquish its nuclear program evaporate once the aid had been delivered.

Yet while China has not yet taken concrete action that will significantly shift the dynamics between the three sides, it is widely acknowledged that, since Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping both came to office, relations between the China and North Korea have been strained. From the New York Times:

The relationship between North Korea and China, extolled in the past to be as close as “lips and teeth,” has faltered ever since as Mr. Kim, a political neophyte believed to be in his late 20s, has continued to defy Mr. Xi, a 59-year-old seasoned statesman.

How far the alliance between the powerhouse China and the impoverished North Korea has soured is now debated openly in the Chinese news media. Few call it a serious rift, though a spirited debate appears to be under way within the Chinese government over how to handle Mr. Kim.

But with Secretary of State John Kerry in China this weekend on his first visit as the United States’ chief diplomat, some things are clear.

The personal relationships among Mr. Kim and his Chinese counterparts appear to be less familiar than when his father, Kim Jong-il, was in charge. Analysts suggest that could be a result of the significant age differences between the inexperienced Mr. Kim and the much older Chinese leaders.

While it was the focus on the meetings and the media coverage of Kerry’s visit, North Korea was not the only topic discussed. Reuters reports on the discussion over cybersecurity:

Speaking to reporters in Beijing during a visit to China, Kerry said the United States and China had agreed on the need to speed up action on cyber security, an area that Washington says is its top national security concern.

Cyber security, Kerry said “affects the financial sector, banks, financial transactions, every aspect of nations in modern times are affected by the use of cyber networking and obviously all of us – every nation – has an interest in protecting its people, protecting its rights, protecting its infrastructure”.

Earlier, China’s official Xinhua news agency quoted Foreign Minister Wang Yi as telling Kerry in their meeting that China and the United States should make joint efforts to safeguard cyberspace.

Human rights, however, was not high enough on the agenda, according to an op-ed by Human Rights Watch’s Sophie Richardson.

Read more in a State Department press briefing and in Kerry’s full comments made after his meetings with Chinese officials.

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“The Daily Show” is not big in China. But when the popular Chinese Web portal Sina posted an eight-minute segment from the show discussing the latest North Korean provocations, it racked up an astounding 2.8 million views and counting, as well as tens of thousands of comments, many of them praising the show.[...]

[...W]hat explains the enormous popularity? The “Daily Show” segment, without meaning to, may have hit on growing frustration among Chinese citizens, particularly middle-class urbanites, with their misbehaving ally. Chinese state media, though it has allowed some measured disapproval of Kim’s latest threats, has held back from so roundly mocking the country and its supremely mockable regime. The voraciousness with which Chinese viewers are watching the segment suggests that their appetite for such coverage, for publicly criticizing an ally that has become something of an embarrassment, far exceeds what they’re getting.

While there has been suspicion that the Chinese government is growing uneasy with North Korea, there doesn’t appear to be evidence that the official stance will soon change as Chinese media isn’t providing the criticism that Jon Stewart did in early April. After noticing the popular reception of his clip in China, Jon Stewart put together a special segment for his newfound audience, which has also been garnering hits in China:

In a follow-up for the Washington Post, Max Fisher again asks what’s behind The Daily Show’s success in China, noting that it might prove wrong the widely-held assumption that China’s middle class is apolitical:

Maybe it has to do with China’s restrictive media, which tend not to venture into the kind of cutting political satire that has made the show so popular at home. The population of young, urban, middle-class, Web-savvy Chinese is growing rapidly. [...]It stands to reason that they’d also be interested in the sort of news coverage that so appeals to young, urban middle classes around the world. But they can’t get it from the Chinese media, so they have to go elsewhere.

Jon Stewart, in other words, seems to have stumbled upon one of the most underserved media markets in the world. He’s right: He, or someone, should be doing a China-focused “Daily Show.” Unfortunately, something as freely critical and openly mocking as “The Daily Show” is unlikely to get past China’s censors anytime soon.

The good news is that maybe, just maybe, the apparent popularity of “The Daily Show” in China undercuts the oft-repeated concern that young, middle-class Chinese aren’t interested in politics, that they’re preoccupied with consumerism and getting ahead. That’s a view I’ve heard far more from frustrated Chinese than from foreigners, so I’m in no position to challenge it, but it is important to note at least this possible sign of greater interest in politics and the world.

Also see prior CDT coverage of of China’s relationship with North Korea. For more political satire, see CDT’s Drawing the News series.

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The Honeymoon, by Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm for CDT:

Read more about Hexie Farm’s CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series.

[CDT owns the copyright for all cartoons in the Hexie Farm CDT series. Please do not reproduce without receiving prior permission from CDT.]

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Responding to regional worries over North Korea’s bellicose threats, China on Sunday expressed concern and what appeared to be veiled criticism of its longtime ally.

“No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains,” said Chinese President Xi Jinping at an economic forum in Hainan province. Avoiding mentioning North Korea by name, Xi said, “While pursuing its own interests, a country should accommodate the legitimate interests of others.”

[...]China — long seen as a key factor propping up the regime in Pyongyang — recently has shown signs of frustration after North Korea ignored its pleas not to carry out a recent nuclear test.

Bloomberg explains why Xi’s comments should be interpreted as directed at North Korea, despite the fact that he didn’t mention the country by name:

“While President Xi didn’t refer to North Korea, it is fair” to interpret his comments as directed toward the Korean situation, said Fang Xiuyu, a professor of Korean studies at Fudan University. “Xi’s remarks are the most decisive comments so far from the Chinese side of the issue.”

Xi’s speech was covered from a similar angle elsewhere in the western press. However, Xi’s indirect reference to North Korea appears to be a footnote in a larger discourse dealing more directly with China’s peaceful development and its role in maintaining rapport with its neighbors in the region. Coverage from the Global Times seems to show Xi’s emphasis on continuity in regional diplomacy:

President Xi Jinping said China will make contributions toward peace and development in Asia and the world at an international forum that opened on Sunday.

China will vigorously promote development and prosperity in both Asia and the world, Xi said when delivering a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2013 in Boao, a coastal town in south China’s Hainan Province.

“Countries, whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, should all contribute their share in maintaining and enhancing peace,” Xi said.

[...]Xi also said China will continue to properly handle differences and frictions with relevant nations.

While upholding its sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, China will maintain good relations with its neighbors, as well as maintain overall peace and stability in the region, he said.

A post from All Things Nuclear looks at recent foreign and domestic coverage of China’s stance on North Korea to argue that the U.S. media is exaggerating a possible shift in Chinese foreign policy:

There is no visible sense that China’s propaganda machinery is preparing the Chinese public for major events on the peninsula or for a change in Chinese policy. There is little sense of emergency or crisis. [...]

The main Chinese themes on North Korea have not changed as a result of the current situation. China would like to see a relaxation of tensions, renewed regional dialog and economic reform. They do not appear to believe there is a high risk of armed conflict. They argue sanctions are counterproductive and the United States should engage directly with the leaders of North Korea at a high level in order to provide the sense of security they now seek through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The one change repeated to me by several Chinese colleagues this week is China now believes North Korea is determined to build a functional nuclear deterrent. They blame the United States for that development. It is, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “regrettable.” But there is no apparent justification for assuming it will be a turning point for Chinese foreign policy.

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As rantings from North Korea become ever more belligerent and bizarre, there are signs that China, its only outside friend in the world, is beginning to distance itself, too.

Normally reluctant to voice any sign of despair whenever tensions deepen on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese are now talking about their “serious concern” over escalating developments there.

[...C]riticism of North Korea’s extreme behaviour is becoming relatively commonplace in the Chinese media, although one editor was suspended last month for calling on the People’s Republic to abandon Mr. Kim and his military cohorts.

If there is a shift in China’s policy toward North Korea, it follows years of growing frustration by Chinese leaders at the headaches caused by their strange, unpredictable ally. For China, it’s been all give and very little reward, and the country’s new helmsmen may have had it.

The Telegraph points to small changes in Chinese foreign policy as evidence that China, a country preoccupied with a domestic anti-corruptuption campaign and much tension in the South China Sea, is indeed losing patience with its old friend:

[...]Kurt Campbell, the former head of the State department in Asia, said there are signs that a relationship once described by Chairman Mao to be “as close as lips and teeth” is wearing thin.

“There is a subtle shift in Chinese foreign policy. Over the short to medium term, that has the potential to affect the calculus in north east Asia,” Mr Campbell said at a forum at John Hopkins university.

[...]“I do not think that subtle shift can be lost on Pyongyang,” he said. “They need a close relationship with China for every conceivable reason. It’s not in their strategic interest to alienate every country that surrounds them.

“The most important new ingredient has been a recognition in China that their previous approach to North Korea is not bearing fruit.”

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China’s “old friend” isn’t known for playing nice. (Pumpkin Brother)

After North Korea’s February 12 nuclear test, condemnation of the blast rained in from both China’s government and the general public. Netizens voiced anxiety that irradiated fallout from the blast might travel across the border into China.

But China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) issued a report that dismissed the possibility of nuclear radiation from the blast reaching the Chinese border. Quoting data from the National Meteorological Center, the MEP claimed, “Even if fallout had leaked out [from the North Korean nuclear test], the wind mainly blows towards the southeast, and China would therefore not be affected.”

Many netizens weren’t blown away by the MEP’s assurances:

@2ndGenerationSickJiuFuTian: It seems nuclear fallout is classist; it [only] drifts towards countries with different ideologies.

@二代症久富田：核爆污染有阶级性，向不同的意识形态国家飘。

@DontWorryAlmostDone: The Third Kim decided on the nuclear blast, while the resulting radiation is under the command of China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection.

@别急快完了：核爆金三儿说了算，辐射规中国环保部指挥。

@EcoProtectionDongLiangJie: Be good, dear wind. You’ve got to be patriotic. China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection is counting on you.

@环保董良杰:风儿，乖乖，你要爱国啊。中国环保就靠你了

@WangXianSen: Even if it did blow over here, would the Ministry of Environmental Protection tell the truth?

@Wang先森：就算真飘过来了，环保部会说实话吗？

@HisOpponentIsScary: Can our Ministry of Environmental Protection’s most advanced technology control the direction of the spread of radiation?

@他的对手很可怕：我环保部最新技术，控制核扩散方向？

@Oso_azul: For a nuclear test that wasn’t conducted above ground or outdoors, the direction of the wind isn’t such a big issue. But if it was an underground nuclear test, then what about underground water sources?

@Oso_azul：不是露天的、地面的核试验，主要不关心风向。地下核试验，那地下水源呢？

@Roookie: Even if you were talking about PM2.5 pollution, could just one gust of wind really blow it away?

@Roookie：你当是PM2.5啊，一阵风就能刮走？

@YiWeiBing: I peed myself laughing! The great General Kim has invented an intelligent form of radiation that avoids what is nearby in search of what is far away.

@毅卫兵：笑尿了，伟大的金将军发明的舍近求远的智能辐射

Translation by Liz Carter. Via CDT Chinese.

© Little Bluegill for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: environment, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Netizen Voices, North Korea, North Korea nuclear, North Korea relations, radiation
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Those old Cold War patterns of great power rivalry, existential fear and buffer states are re-emerging in more complex form today. Beijing is once again locked in a contest with Washington for regional influence, or domination, and Pyongyang is one of its only strategic friends. Xi, would like to demonstrate who has the upper hand in the relationship. He may even enjoy inflicting a modicum of pain. But the gentle tap on the wrist he gave his recalcitrant ally last night – “all sides” should respond “calmly, through talks” – shows the underlying strategic calculus remains unchanged.

In any case, Chinese analysts are convinced that North Korea will not give up its nuclear program, its sole source of leverage, deterrence and self esteem, no matter what threats and incentives China might attempt.

“I don’t think there will be much change in China’s policy towards North Korea,” says Cai Jian, Professor of Korean studies at Shanghai’s prestigious Fudan University.

“As China grows, the United States adjusts its strategy towards East Asia to deter and encircle China,” he says. “What China needs is the survival and existence of the North Korean regime to help China maintain the regional balance of power.”

An article in the New York Times argues that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are an early test of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy priorities:

…As impatient as China might be with North Korea, there is little chance that the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, will move quickly to change the nation’s long-held policy of propping up the walled-off government that has long served as a buffer against closer intrusion by the United States on the Korean Peninsula.

The Chinese military, and to a lesser extent the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, assert strong influence on China’s Korean policy, and both these powerful entities prefer to keep North Korea close at hand, Chinese and American analysts say.

While the People’s Liberation Army does not even conduct military exercises with the North Koreans — the government in the North forbids such contact with outsiders — Chinese military strategists adhere to the doctrine that they cannot afford to abandon their ally, no matter how bad its behavior, analysts here say.

At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party looks upon the North Korean Communist Party — led by Kim Jong-un, the grandson of the nation’s founder — as a fraternal brotherhood. Indeed, relations between the two countries are conducted largely between the two parties rather than through the more normal diplomatic channels between the two foreign ministries.

A post on the Washington Post blog argues that China’s continued support of North Korea comes down to six words: No war, no instability, no nukes.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Cold War, Korean War, North Korea, North Korea nuclear, North Korea relations, PRC history
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The authorities in Pyongyang said scientists had set off a “miniaturised” nuclear device with a greater explosive force than those used in two previous nuclear tests, in 2006 and 2009.

“It was confirmed that the nuclear test that was carried out at a high level in a safe and perfect manner using a miniaturised and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force than previously did not pose any negative impact on the surrounding ecological environment,” KCNA, the North’s official news agency, announced.

The agency said the test had been in response to “outrageous” US hostility that “violently” undermined the regime’s right to peacefully launch satellites – a reference to the condemnation and tighter sanctions that greeted Pyongyang’s successful rocket launch almost two months ago.

For the latest updates, see liveblogs at NKNews.org and Reuters.

After some initial confusion, China’s Foreign Ministry expressed “resolute” opposition to the test (Chinese), which has placed Beijing in an awkward position. From Jane Perlez at The New York Times:

The nuclear test by North Korea on Tuesday, in defiance of warnings by China, leaves the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, with a choice: Does he upset North Korea just a bit by agreeing to stepped up United Nations sanctions, or does he rattle the regime by pulling the plug on infusions of Chinese oil and investments that keep North Korea afloat?

[…] The Obama administration excoriated Mr. Hu [Jintao] after North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, accusing him of “willful blindness” to the country’s actions.

“With Hu out of the picture the administration is intent on determining whether Xi Jinping will prove more attentive to U.S. security concerns,” Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution said. “How Xi chooses to respond will be an important early signal of his foreign policy priorities and whether he is ready to cooperate much more openly and fully with Washington and Seoul than his predecessor.”

China’s patience with its wayward satellite had already been wearing thin: an editorial in the state-run Global Times early this month urged that North Korea “must pay a heavy price” for a third nuclear test. From Christopher Bodeen at The Associated Press:

“Perhaps Kim Jong Un thinks Xi Jinping will indulge him. Perhaps he’s in for a surprise,” said Richard Bush, Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C.

[…] “At the start, China gave him a warm welcome and, I think, some aid. But we got no gratitude. They take us for granted,” said Jin Canrong, an international affairs expert at Renmin University in Beijing. “China tried to get closer to him, but it was not successful. China has become very disappointed.”

Yet Beijing also sees Pyongyang as a crucial buffer against U.S. troops based in South Korea and Japan. It also deeply fears a regime collapse could send swarms of refugees across its border. For those reasons, Beijing is unlikely to cut Pyongyang adrift, even if it pushes North Korea harder to end its nuclear provocations and reform its broken-down economy.

The New York Time’s Perlez had also examined the debate prior to the test:

For all the concern in some quarters about North Korea’s wayward behavior, that dread of losing a buffer still prevails among China’s most influential policy makers, particularly in the military, according to Jia Qingguo, a professor at Beijing University’s School of International Studies who is a proponent of a new policy toward North Korea.

“It’s better than before, but it is still difficult to overcome” the mind-set, he said. “A lot of people are taking the very old-fashioned belief that North Korea is a strategic buffer, and they still believe American invaders would march over North Korea to come to China.”

[…] Despite the strains, many analysts are convinced that China remains a firm ally of North Korea. China was only blowing off steam by allowing news media criticism of Pyongyang, said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North East Asia director and China adviser for the International Crisis Group in Beijing.

“The traditionalists in the People’s Liberation Army and the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party control foreign policy [on North Korea],” she said. “The political relationship between China and North Korea right now is at a low point, but China’s longstanding priorities on the Korean Peninsula of no war, no instability and no nukes remain in that order of priority.”

Tuesday’s detonation may force China’s hand. Global Times’ Wang Zhang and Hao Zhou reported on February 5th that Beijing had been “diplomatically cornered” by the threat of the test:

[… A] South Korean embassy official told the Global Times that Seoul is well aware that North Korea rarely listens to Beijing’s advice. What South Korea expects is just pressure from China in line with the other participants of the Six-Party Talks to deliver a clear message before it attempts an audacious and defiant third nuclear test, the official said.

“This is a grave test of China’s diplomacy,” said Zhang Liangui, a professor on Korean Peninsula issues at the Party School of the Communist Party of China Central Committee.

If China fails to persuade North Korea to give up its plan for a fresh nuclear test or fails to deliver immediate and severe sanctions that could substantially hit North Korea after the test, China will forever lose the chance to play a dominant role on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and all the previous efforts to realize the denuclearization of the peninsula will have been in vain, Zhang said.

But the diplomatic mushroom cloud may have a silver lining. From The Economist, on February 2nd:

Now, more than ever, China might want to seem a contributor to regional peace. Its belligerence over the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands has brought relations with Japan to their worst level since 1945, with China now considering Japan’s proposal for a summit between its prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and the Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping. China’s assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea has soured relations there, too. The Philippines has been provoked into asking a UN tribunal to rule on whether part of China’s claim has a legal basis.

On both those issues China will find it hard to offer concessions. This week Mr Xi growled that “no country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the ‘bitter fruit’ of harming our sovereignty, security or development.”

North Korea offers a chance for China to seem flexible without jeopardising any “core interests” and, indeed, to enhance its own security at the same time. The new treatment of North Korea could also strengthen China’s relations with South Korea, which were damaged by the failure to join the widespread international condemnation of the North for attacks on the South in 2010. And it would offer what Zhu Feng, a scholar at Peking University, calls “a new platform for China and the United States to get closer”.

In any case, many Chinese netizens appear to have lost patience. From Liz Carter at Tea Leaf Nation:

Writer and critic Yao Bo took to Sina Weibo, China’s Twitter, asking, “Who can North Korea threaten with its nuke? It can’t reach America, and it doesn’t have any grievance with Japan. They share a language and culture with the South Koreans. What can they do besides threaten China? There are still people saying this is a good thing, and they must be mentally ill, beyond hope. Raising a mad dog to protect your house really is the logic of a patriotraitor [slang for a traitor who pretends to be a patriot].”

[…] Even Hu Xijin, editor of China’s party-line, state-run news organization the Global Times, remarked on Weibo, “North Korea just experienced a ‘man-made earthquake,’ which is likely a nuclear test. North Korea is headed down the wrong path. Its people will pay the price for the country’s mistakes. The legitimacy of North Korean rule should be reconsidered.”

Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, recently gave a detailed guide to what to expect from a North Korean nuclear test at Foreign Policy, based in part on his own observations from past visits to North Korean nuclear facilities. At The New York Times last month, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad discussed what the United States and Iran would hope to learn from the test and its aftermath. See more on North Korea and nuclear weapons via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: diaoyu islands, Hu xijin, Kim Jong-un, Korean War, North Korea, North Korea nuclear, North Korea relations, North Korea Six-way talk, nuclear testing, nuclear weapons, Pyongyang, Shinzo Abe, South China Sea, south korea, United States, Xi Jinping, Yao Bo, Zhu Feng
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“China maintains that the Security Council’s reaction should be prudent and moderate, and that it should work for the peace and stability of the (Korean) Peninsula and avoid the progressive escalation of tensions,” foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at a daily press briefing on Monday.

Hong said China has repeatedly expressed its position on the satellite launches, stressing regret over the issue. “Based on such a stance, China has constructively participated in the recent UNSC negotiations,” Hong said in response to reports that the UNSC is likely to pass a resolution on North Korea’s satellite launch.

“China and the US have many differences in principles over dealing with the satellite launch. That’s why the UN negotiations have lasted for more than a month,” said Shi Yuanhua, a researcher on Korean studies at the Shanghai-based Fudan University.

The US wanted to impose new sanctions against North Korea, while China wants to issue a statement to expand the existing UN sanctions, Reuters said.

While Chinese state media is calling for the UNSC to be prudent, diplomats at the UN say China and the US have reach a deal that would tighten sanctions on North Korea. The Voice of America reports:

The diplomats say the U.S. circulated a draft resolution to the 15-member U.N. Security Council. It could vote as early as Tuesday to punish North Korea for the launch.

They say the resolution would condemn the launch and expand existing sanctions. But it is not clear if it would add any new sanctions – a step that China, Pyongyang’s only major ally, has been reluctant to accept.

Washington has been pushing Beijing to accept strong measures following the rocket launch, which was widely condemned as a disguised missile test banned under U.N. Sanctions.

China, which has previously agreed to U.N. sanctions against North Korea, has said it wants the Security Council to take a “cautious” approach that will not further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Aside from the UNSC resolution, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said China does not support North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Yang made these remarks at a meeting with a delegation sent by South Korea’s President-elect, Park Geun-hye, from Yonhap News Agency:

According to Shim Yoon-joe, a member of the delegation, Yang praised Park’s so-called “Korean Peninsula trust process,” which states that if the North accepts denuclearization, large-scale international economic projects will be pursued in the communist country to help restore inter-Korean relations.

During the meeting, the delegation made clear that South Korea will not tolerate the North’s nuclear ambitions, but that they believe it is very important to build trust through dialogue with the communist nation.

Commenting on Beijing’s relations with Seoul, Yang said that China considers its relations with South Korea “very” important and that he expects bilateral ties to further grow under the new leaders in both countries, according to the delegation.

“I believe South Korea under Park’s leadership will achieve its growth targets of the new era,” Yang was quoted as saying during a meeting with the delegation. “South Korea is very important to China, and our strategic relations will develop into a new stage and take a big leap down the road.”

According to The Guardian, China may block Korean unification. The report was released by US senate Republican staff members that claimed Beijing would assert territorial claims over Pyongyang. This comes amid China’s claims over the South China Sea and Diaoyu islands:

The report was released last month with little fanfare, but North Korea watchers say it gives voice to an increasingly popular but still-sensitive sentiment: that China will ultimately try to prevent the South from absorbing the North, the long-assumed post-collapse scenario.

China might act with similar aggression in North Korea, the report argues, to “safeguard its own commercial assets, and to assert its right to preserve the northern part of the peninsula within China’s sphere of influence”.

The report was written primarily by Keith Luse, an east Asia specialist who worked as an aide for the recently defeated Republican senator Dick Lugar, who had been a member of the Senate committee on foreign relations with a long-standing interest in North Korea. The minority staff report, Luse said in an email, was written to inform committee members – including John Kerry, nominated by Barack Obama as the next secretary of state – “to not expect an East-West Germany repeat situation” regarding unification between the Koreas.

“Anybody who is a serious analyst can’t discount this as a plausible scenario,” said Victor Cha, the Korea chair at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, referring to the general argument of the report.

From a US perspective, Cha said, the greatest concern is how poorly prepared other countries are to deal with – and co-operate during – a crisis in North Korea. Beijing has no interest in planning with Washington and Seoul, thinking such talks too sensitive. And Seoul worries that such talks would cause tensions with Beijing to spike.

Read more about China’s relations with North Korea, via CDT.

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Post tags: North Korea, North Korea relations, south korea, U.S. relations, UN, UNSC
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A new report says North Korea’s trade with China accounted for more than 70 percent of its total commerce last year, as the isolated nation deepens its reliance on its only major ally.

South Korea’s national statistics office said Thursday that Pyongyang’s bilateral trade with Beijing totaled over $5.6 billion in 2011. That is an increase of over 60 percent from the previous year.

Seoul says it is the first time that North Korea’s trade with China has topped 70 percent of its global commerce since it began tracking trade figures in 2000.

Meanwhile, the economic gap between South Korea and North Korea continues to be large. The report found South Korea’s gross national income per capita ($1239) was nearly 19 times that of the North in 2011.

According to the Los Angeles Times, analysts predict 2012 will be another year of trade expansion:

The dramatic increase reflects a conscious decision by Beijing in 2011 to prop up its failing ally. Shortly before his death a year ago, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made three trips to China to secure support for rebuilding his ruling Workers’ Party, the equivalent of the Communist Party in China. The Chinese also have been keen to prop up Kim’s 29-year-old son and successor, Kim Jong Un.

“This is just the beginning of further big increases in Sino-North Korea trade,” explained John Park, an expert in China-Korean relations at MIT University. “The primary goal of the Communist Party of China is to more effective manage what is referred to as the North Korean instability variable.”

Park said that North Korean state trading companies are working in China, which enables the regime to generate new sources of revenue for its own ruling elite.

With Chinese help, the North Korean economy grew for the first time in three years, albeit a modest 0.83%. In the last year, Pyongyang has undergone its first significant facelift in decades, adding modern apartment blocks, a new airport terminal, stores and restaurants and a dolphinarium to the North Korean capital.

As trade increases, North Korea’s dependence on China also grows. The South China Morning post reports Beijing’s new politiburo may deal more firmly with Pyongyang:

Rising officials who hail from the northeastern provinces of Liaoning , Jilin and Heilongjiang understand the importance of perseverance to advance China’s agenda of North Korean economic reform. These officials, represented by Zhang Dejiang and Li Keqiang , now on the Politburo Standing Committee, and Sun Zhengcai in the larger Politburo, spent their formative years in close proximity to North Korea, and benefited from their time in local governments with long-term cross-border interactions with North Korean counterparts. They appreciate that patience and constant pressure are key to promoting reform in Pyongyang. This new generation of leaders is ostensibly better informed on North Korean issues and this fact may lead to some policy nuance – if not policy changes – from China.

Although the new leadership has made vague statements on North Korea (even after Pyongyang’s latest, controversial satellite launch), Chinese academics close to the matter are a useful gauge of the temperature in Beijing policy circles. These academics include Zhang Liangui of the Central Party School, Zhu Feng of Peking University, and Lu Chao of the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, among others. These Chinese experts who are allowed and encouraged to comment about North Korea in mainland news media have not been entirely favourable. Zhang Liangui publicly raised questions about reconsidering China’s policy towards Pyongyang just before North Korea’s missile launch in April. Even more telling, Zhang, another Kim Il-sung University alumnus, conducted this public debate in English.

Xi Jinping’s public comments suggest that the military elements of the alliance will remain strong, but within limits. China will reluctantly tolerate space rockets even though these launches enrage regional rivals, and will likely tolerate small-arms and weapons development within limits; it’s in China’s interest to keep the Korean People’s Army on its feet.

Although trade with North Korea has increased, China’s trade with South Korea has declined, from The Washington Post:

While Pyongyang’s economic exchange with Beijing has been on the rise since 2009, its trade with Seoul, North Korea’s second-biggest trade partner after China, has declined. About 20 percent of North Korea’s overall trade was with the South in 2011.

The national statistics office releases an annual report on North Korea’s economy, energy, trade, population and natural resources based on figures from various agencies at home and abroad. It releases the previous year’s data at the end of the following year. The figures for 2012 will become available toward the end of 2013.

North Korea’s trade data was gathered from official statistics figures in overseas countries through KOTRA, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, the office said.

The office said North Korea’s population is estimated at 24.3 million as of 2011, about half of South Korea’s 49.8 million. Its economy expanded 0.8 percent in 2011 over a year earlier, while South Korea’s economy grew 3.6 percent.

© Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: North Korea, North Korea relations, North Korea trade, south korea, trade
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