Liu He, who leads the party’s Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, has been given the task of preparing a seven-point blueprint for the Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party Congress, which is due in about October, according to a source with close ties to several members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

If executed as intended, the new reform program would go some way to answering doubts about whether China can continue underwriting the Australian economy, including huge gas and other resource investment plans over the next decade.

Advertisement

Some hedge fund managers say China’s has reached a “zugzwang” moment, referring to the predicament when a chess player must make a move but prefers to pass.

“In China policy is made when the pain of inaction is higher than the pain of action, and we’ve reached that point,” said David Hoffman, managing director of the Conference Board China Centre for Economics and Business.

[Source]

China reported disappointing first quarter GDP growth of 7.7 percent last month, as slumping factory output and soft consumption pulled the economy back from the 7.9% growth figure posted in the final quarter of 2012. But while TIME’s Michael Schuman wrote that “China’s growth model is broken and can’t be so easily fixed,” emerging markets investor Mark Mobius told the Vancouver Sun last week that concerns over China’s economic slowdown are overblown:

Q. The most recent news we’ve seen from China has focused on lower inflation and a slowdown in their economy. How much does what goes on in China weigh on the overall emerging markets sector?

A. It has an impact in Asia, of course, because you’ve seen more and more trade and investment between China and the rest of Asia. (But) China is just one part of the whole equation. Because you’ve got a huge Indian economy, you’ve got a very big Brazilian economy, a big Russian economy, the so-called BRICS. Then you’ve got Indonesia, you’ve got Thailand, many other countries that are doing quite well, and are having an impact on what’s happening around the world.

Q. What are we missing (in Canada) by focusing so much on China and the appearance of their slowdown?

A. First of all, the slowdown is kind of a misnomer because if somebody goes from 12-per-cent growth to eight-per-cent growth and they are the second largest economy in the world, that’s not a big, big problem, because they’re growing at a rapid rate. At eight per cent, in a huge economy, the actual dollar amount of increment is greater than it was five years ago.

[Source]

BBC’s chief business correspondent Linda Yueh wrote this weekend that while the services sector has grown more rapidly than other parts of the Chinese economy this year, concerns still linger:

One worry expressed to me about rebalancing towards services and focusing on consumers came from one of China’s best-known economists and the former World Bank chief economist, Justin Yifu Lin of Peking University.

He stresses that consumption should not be pursued for its own sake. The bursting of the credit bubble in America makes that point vividly. Instead, he says, consumption supported by income growth, not borrowing, is key.

He also points out that it’s not exports which are the important factor for future growth, but more government spending and investment for productive uses.

It’s all about finding the right balance. China’s economy is now fairly equally driven by services and industry, while maintaining its position as the world’s largest exporter of goods. Manufacturing is growing and not declining. China is not giving up on exports, it’s simply becoming more balanced.

[Source]

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, economic growth, economic reform, emerging markets, GDP, Politburo Standing Committee
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

The Candy House, by Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm for CDT:

Read more about Hexie Farm’s CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series.

[CDT owns the copyright for all cartoons in the Hexie Farm CDT series. Please do not reproduce without receiving prior permission from CDT.]

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: hexie farm, NPC 2013, Politburo Standing Committee, political cartoons
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Jiang asked the party’s new Central Committee to put his name among those of other retired leaders, and behind incumbent party and state leaders, after the party’s national congress in November, Xinhua reported.

It praised Jiang’s move as “reflecting the noble character and sterling integrity and open-mindedness of a Communist”.

At the funeral of General Yang Baibing on Monday, Jiang’s name appeared after those of members of the party’s Politburo Standing Committee and state leaders for the first time since his full retirement in 2004.

Jiang had previously ranked second only to President Hu Jintao at official occasions following his retirement.

The South China Morning Post had reported Jiang’s tumble in the pecking order on Tuesday, before state media claimed the change came at the former leader’s own request. Still, one Beijing-based political analyst told the South China Morning Post on Thursday that Jiang “had most likely been forced to take a step back.” Chris Buckley of The New York Times noted that Jiang was listed third in a similar mourning announcement just two months ago:

For some political analysts seeking to fathom the undercurrents of power in China’s elite, Mr. Jiang’s reduced protocol ranking suggested something more: that he may finally curb any impulses to exert influence in Zhongnanhai, the party leadership’s compound in Beijing.

“In China, the saying goes that you must live up to your title to give your words sway, so if Jiang Zemin meddles in politics again after making this step, his reputation will be badly damaged,” said Yao Jianfu, a retired party official and researcher in Beijing.

“It’s a change in protocol, but now he’ll be expected to live up to it and stop being such a political busybody,” Mr. Yao said.

One observer, however, told NPR’s Louisa Lim that it’s too soon to say whether Jiang had really relinquished his behind-the scenes influence on party affairs:

“In terms of the symbolism, this is a step forward to mitigate and to guard against the so-called geriatric politics: the old men interfering, retired old cadres who have no position still having a big say in party affairs,” said Willy Lam, a China politics expert at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

“But on a practical level, it’s difficult to prevent Jiang Zemin from still trying to do whatever he can to interfere in party affairs,” Lam said. “In the Chinese context, tradition dies hard and you have a long record of retired party elders still interfering in party politics.”

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, CCP Central Committee, Jiang Zemin, party elders, Politburo Standing Committee
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Pictionary Curse: Fish (鱼 yú) plus veggie chicken (素鸡 sùjī) plus 7-Up (七喜 Qīxǐ) may sound like it equals a delicious meal, but in Shanghai dialect, it spells “Go die, Secretary Yu.” This and many images like it have been pulled off the Internet.

As of December 25, the following search terms are blocked on Sina Weibo (not including the “search for user” function):

Studies in Leadership: Xinhua launched a profile series of China’s new central leadership this Sunday, showcasing the human side of incoming president Xi Jinping and Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, and Yu Zhengsheng. Netizens are going after the egregious Photoshopping of Li Keqiang, glaring omissions from Yu Zhengsheng’s story, and an outlandish statement attributed to Zhang.

- Li Keqiang + PS (李克强+PS): “PS” can mean “Photoshop” or “to Photoshop.” A 2004 image of Li accompanying his profile is clearly Photoshopped.
- Xinhua + PS (新华社+PS)
- Yu Zhengsheng + older brother (俞正声+哥哥): Yu Qiangsheng’s defection to the United States in 1986 has become a hot topic following the release of the Yu Zhengsheng profile.
- Yu Zhengsheng + family (俞正声+家族)
- Veggie chicken (素鸡): “Fish Veggie Chicken” emerged as a nickname for Yu Zhengsheng during his tenure as Party secretary of Shanghai. The nickname alludes to “Secretary Yu” (俞书记) pronounced in a Shanghai accent. “Fish Veggie Chicken” was first blocked in early September, when word that Yu could be nominated to the PSC began to circulate.
- Zhang Dejiang + power car (张德江+动车): Power cars are used in high-speed trains. The Xinhua profile of Zhang states that after the July 2011 high-speed rail crash in Wenzhou, Zhang “gave a clear instruction that no one should bury the wreckage.”

Church of Almighty God: Authorities continue the crackdown on this cult, which saw a resurgence of activity around Mayan “Doomsday” predictions.
- Almighty God (全能神)
- Real God (实际神)
- Eastern Lightening (东方闪电)

Other:
- seven Standing Committee members (七常委)
- often atrophy (常萎 cháng wěi): Sounds the same as “Standing Committee members” (常委)
- long atophy (长萎): Same as above.
- elders (长老): Refers to the PSC.
- River Elegy (河殇): The groundbreaking 1988 CCTV documentary about the decline of Chinese civilization.

All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese’s latest sensitive words post. 

You can see all of CDT’s collected sensitive words in this bilingual Google spreadsheet.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: censorship, church of almighty god, filtered keywords, high-speed rail crash, Internet censorship, leadership transition, Li Keqiang, Ministry of Truth, Photoshop, Politburo Standing Committee, River Elegy, Sensitive Words Series, sina weibo, weibo, Xinhua, Yu Qiangsheng, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

The profiles seemed to be a well-intentioned nod to lift the veil of secrecy long surrounding party leaders. The articles’ obsequiousness, however, was a reminder how far Mr. Xi and other newly anointed leaders have to go if they’re serious about following through on pledges to reconnect the party to the people.

“From the Loess Plateau to the southeast coast, from localities to central leadership, Xi has had a well-rounded political career and has developed a deep understanding of the conditions of his country and people,” gushed the Xinhua profile of Mr. Xi. The article’s English version, published Sunday, sprawled some 3,000 words.

The profiles’ thrusts are all roughly the same: China’s newest generation of leaders rose through individual hard work and sacrifice, but never lost their affinity for China’s laobaixing, or common folks.

To underscore the point, Xinhua published more than a dozen photos of Mr. Xi in his younger – and slightly trimmer – days that have been widely reposted on Chinese news websites. One photo shows Mr. Xi smiling with villagers in the northern province of Hebei, where he served as a young cadre. Another photo shows Mr. Xi bicycling with daughter Xi Mingze seated on the back, clutching at her father’s waist.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP 5th generation, Politburo Standing Committee, transparency, Xi Jinping, XInhua News
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Hu Chunhua has been appointed secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), replacing Wang Yang, the CPC Central Committee announced Tuesday.

Wang Jun will replace Hu as secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC, according to the announcement.

Hu, born in April 1963, is currently a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Wang Yang is also a Political Bureau member.

Hu previously served as deputy secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC, first secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Youth League of China Central Committee and governor of north China’s Hebei Province.

At the South China Morning Post, Mimi Lau described a range of views on Hu’s appointment and prospects:

Liu Kaiming, director of the Institute of Contemporary Observation, a labour rights NGO in Shenzhen, said Hu lacked the track record of outstanding political achievements necessary to impress Guangdong officials.

“After spending extensive time in remote inland areas, Hu might find it hard to fit in at first in Guangdong, especially when dealing with vested interests,” Liu said. “I’m not very sure about officials from remote regions because they often appear very conservative and arrogant, but Hu might be different because he’s young.”

[…] Dr Peng Peng, a researcher with the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, said Hu would have to hunker down after arriving in Guangdong because it was unlike any other mainland region.

“The press here is outspoken and the public can often complain directly to leaders,” Peng said. “In order to do a good job in Guangdong, Hu needs to be even more open-minded than Wang Yang.

“Wang Yang laid a solid foundation. Hu is much younger than Wang. I’m guessing Hu is more likely to flow with the open atmosphere in Guangdong.”

But at The Diplomat, David Cohen sounded a cautious note on the prospects for bold reform:

A Guangdong posting will give “Little Hu” a chance to burnish his reformist credentials, like Wang Yang before him. If Xi follows through on his talk of reform, that may prove to be a valuable skill. Guangdong is China’s most liberal province and frequently given to experimentation — if Xi is looking for models for national reform the leader of Guangdong may get some chances to influence the direction of national policy with some inventive provincial initiatives, such as Wang Yang’s much-ballyhooed “Wukan model.”

This trend should also give us some pause before rooting for Wang or Hu as reformers — neither of their records shows particularly bold action before traveling to Guangdong, so to some extent Wang’s liberal policies in the southern province may simply reflect institutional momentum. In fact, besides his time in Tibet, Little Hu initiated a harsh crackdown at the first signs of protests in Inner Mongolia in the spring of 2011. Some felt Hu had overreacted but he did not shirk from his decision, recently telling the Financial Times, “When we deal with mass incidents, there is no question we will take compulsory measures . . . We will be tough when we need to be tough, and we will be soft when we need to be soft.”

Reuters’ Sui-Lee Wee outlined Hu’s earlier career:

In Inner Mongolia, Hu Chunhua, also known as “Little Hu”, has been referred to as a future president. While there, Hu Chunhua oversaw rapid economic growth and dealt successfully with protests last year by ethnic Mongols.

Hu Chunhua came to Inner Mongolia following a brief stint in Hebei, the arid province which surrounds Beijing, where he was rapidly moved after a scandal over tainted milk in which at least six children died and thousands became ill.

Hu Chunhua remains something of an enigma, even in China. He has given few clues about his deeper policy beliefs. One of the best known things about him is that he does not appear to dye his hair jet black like many politicians.

In meetings with the public, Hu Chunhua comes across as low key and self effacing, in line with an image of a loyal, humble Communist Party member. People who have met him describe him as relaxed, easy-going and spontaneous, unlike stiffer party leaders.

Hu and newly appointed Chongqing Party chief Sun Zhengcai were both elevated to the Politburo last month, and are likely to rise further to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017 and the presidency and premiership in 2022. (See Cheng Li’s profiles of the two men at the Brookings Institution.) None of this can be taken for granted, however: neither of their predecessors, Wang Yang and Bo Xilai, has followed the trajectory widely anticipated even at the start of this year. The Associated Press’ Didi Tang focused on Wang Yang, Guangdong’s previous Party chief, whose next assignment has not yet been revealed:

Xinhua gave no indication of Wang’s next job, but China watchers said he is likely to be named a vice premier when China’s legislature meets in the spring.

Wang, 57, is seen as a politically liberal figure. He failed to win a seat on the party’s ruling seven-member Standing Committee when new leaders were installed last month but was named to the lower-ranking Politburo.

[…] Wang was seen at Xi’s side when the general secretary visited Guangdong in early December. Li Cheng, an expert on China’s elite politics at Washington-based think tank Brookings Institute, said the appearance of the two together was to show the solidarity of the party leadership, because Wang is not considered to be in Xi’s camp in China’s factional politics.

“It’s a symbol of unity,” Li said.

Hu’s replacement in Inner Mongolia, Wang Jun, has extensive experience related to the autonomous region’s heavy mining industry. Wang was appointed governor of coal-rich Shanxi province following an accident which claimed more than 270 lives at an iron mine in 2008, and had previously headed the national work safety agency. His acting replacement in Shanxi is Li Xiaopeng, son of former premier Li Peng. New Party chiefs for Zhejiang, Shaanxi and Jilin were also announced on Tuesday, with appointments for Fujian and Guangxi following the next day. The blizzard of new posts sent a “subtle message”, according to a Global Times editorial, which hailed the new provincial leaders as offering the public a fresh start.

The Party secretary is the very top leader in a province. The prominence of this position differs from Western systems and is the key to ensuring that the Party rules the country’s political system.

[…] The population and economic scale of many provinces exceed those of middle-sized countries. As China is undergoing rapid development and social conflicts, the difficulties in managing a province can be much greater than managing a global power.

[…] Party secretaries should make efforts to improve communication with the public. We are looking forward to those who are outspoken and can interact with the public.

A new political style has been showcased by the Party’s top leadership. These new provincial leaders are expected to emulate it in solving local problems.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, Chongqing, Communist Youth League, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, hebei, Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao, Inner Mongolia, jilin, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, Shaanxi, Shanxi, tainted food, Tibet, Wang Yang, Wukan, Xi Jinping, Zhejiang
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

The trend even came to the attention of the U.S. Naval Air Forces, who seized the chance to take a jab at China’s novice status in the aircraft carrier club:

Interesting trend taking hold of “Shootering” ow.ly/fGwUx, Funny we’ve had people striking that pose for ~100 yrs@b_fung

— flynavy (@flynavy) November 29, 2012

Chinese political cartoonists have caught on, too, tackling more serious issues with this lighthearted meme:

Artist: Dashix

“Soar!” a corrupt official exhorts a hungry student, clinging to his “nutritious lunch” as he pads down the runway. The Yangcheng Evening News reported on Monday that the school system in Fenghuang County, Hunan saves about six million yuan per year by spending only two yuan per student on lunches of the allocated three. Children get only a box of milk and a palm-sized piece of bread [zh]. The school system claims it is following government regulation on expenditures. In Dashix’s illustration, the tear in a boy’s eye gets an official drooling.

Artist: Gouben

A victorious mistress lets a government seal fly as she stands on top of Chongqing official Lei Zhengfu while training a tape recorder on him. Screenshots of sex tapes surfaced this week, costing Lei his job and possibly implicating former city police chief Wang Lijun. Peering over his mistress’ bra, Lei is horrified to find his own government seal is now impotent.

Artist: so7os

China’s conscience was rattled this month by the death of five boys in Guizhou. Missing for weeks, their bodies were found in a dumpster, where they had died of carbon monoxide poisoning from the fire they lit inside. “Brothers, it’s nice and warm in here!” says a younger boy, in a tragic flight of fancy. “Let’s sleep–I’m closing the cabin door. This is our spaceship!” The “Guizhou Five” remind many Chinese of the Hans Christian Andersen story “The Little Match Girl,” once taught to schoolchildren as an example of the evils of capitalist society. The dumpster displays the slogan, “Everyone pitch in and fight to be civilized” (人人动手参 个个争当文明).

Artist: Pearl Forest

Politicians “speak south and head north.”

Artist: Lao Jue

In his opening remarks at the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao stressed that China should “not walk the old path of the closed and rigid, nor the evil path of changing flags and allegiances” (既不走封闭僵化的老路、也不走改旗易帜的邪路) “We Are Walking on the Correct Path” (我们走在正路上) shows seven naked men march proudly across a narrow bridge. They are the new seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, which debuted at the end of the Congress. Chinese cartoonists typically cannot depict political leaders in print, but Lao Jue is afforded a wider latitude by the Internet.

Artist: Kuang Biao

Lao Jue makes China’s journey across the river seem like a lark, but in Kuang Biao’s depiction, Xi Jinping is struggling with the hammer and sickle over one shoulder and the burden of the economy over the other while “groping for stones to cross the river” (摸着石头过河).

Artist: Jiu’an

Xi Jinping prays before jailed tweeter Zhai Xiaobing (aka @stariver), his Standing Committee zombies in tow. Zhai was detained on November 7 for a tweet comparing Final Destination 6 to the 18th Party Congress. “Dear Lord, we beg you to free Star River… Boo hoo… Black humor, this cartoon is just kidding!”

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, aircraft carrier, aircraft carrier style, Chongqing, Drawing the News, Gangnam style, Guizhou, Hu Jintao, Hunan, lei zhengfu, official corruption, Politburo Standing Committee, political cartoons, political humor, Wang Lijun, Xi Jinping, Zhai Xiaobing
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

This new regime will govern a China that is increasingly two different countries. On the coast, the country is developed, with the amenities of a post-industrialized society. In the countryside, China is still a developing country, with hundreds of millions of people living in poverty. In 2010, according to Bloomberg Businessweek, there was a nearly threefold difference in per capita incomes between coastal China and inland China. Likewise, China now has more income inequality than the United States, making China 27th in the world overall.

Those Chinas want different things from their leaders. People making $20,000 a year in prosperous cities don’t need 8 percent growth. They need product safety, government accountability, transparency, clean air and water ‑ good government, in other words, without all the lies and the secret wealth. People in the interior, on the other hand, need growth and goods. Government transparency means less to those who live hand to mouth.

This is what the 21st century economy has wrought, but China clings to its 20th century political system. Ten years ‑ the expected stint of the current Politburo members (though there will be room for halftime adjustments) ‑ is a long time to live with so fundamental a contradiction. Pressures will mount from within and without for China to modernize its political approach to match the economic reforms it must undertake. But those hoping for political reform are sure to be disappointed, no matter how much they pine for them on Weibo or in the halls of the United Nations. The leadership change, remember, was all about solidarity, both for the Communist Party and with the party’s past efforts. Citizens on both ends of the spectrum may grumble, but the Chinese leadership will continue its slow and cautious approach ‑ and its focus, first and foremost, will be on consolidating power and eliminating threats to the party’s hold on power. On the Politburo’s list of priorities, political innovations will run a distant second.

Meanwhile, though little evidence remains of the 18th Party Congress which took place earlier this month, The New York Times’ Amy Qin reports that nostalgia still lingers for some residents of Beijing:

Liu Ji, 63, was one of the many sprightly retirees called upon by security officials this month to work as informal traffic cops, taking to the streets to keep unruly pedestrians and drivers in line. In a city with more than five million registered cars, it was not the most relaxing task. But Ms. Liu, a longtime Communist Party member, said it was an honor to play a role during the weeklong event, even if it meant tackling the city’s nightmarish congestion equipped with only a red armband and a flag.

“To help out even just a little is a glorious feeling,” she said.

But now, the heart of this ancient capital has returned to what passes for normal these days: hazy gray skies above the granite expanse; crowds of tourists, both Chinese and foreign, milling around and posing for photographs; and uniformed security officers watching them carefully in front of the Forbidden City. (Less familiar was the sight of some of those officers zipping around the square on two-wheeled, Segway-like vehicles as the ageless Mao Zedong gazed down from his portrait.)

Elsewhere, pirated DVDs and English-language books on China have reappeared on shelves after having been relegated to storerooms in some shops. Several prominent activists who were asked to leave Beijing during the conclave have slowly found their way back to their homes.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, Beijing, inequality, leadership transition, Politburo Standing Committee, reform
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Of the seven men who now comprise the Communist Party’s new politburo standing committee, the apex of political power in China, four are members of “the red aristocracy”, led by the new general secretary of the party, Xi Jinping.

The thriving of the princelings should not be a surprise, analysts and party insiders say. Rarely in its six decades in power has the party been under more stress. Public anger over widespread corruption, widening income inequality and vast environmental degradation have chipped away at its legitimacy.

The party’s over-arching goal is to maintain its grip on the nation, and moving so many princelings into top positions is akin to taking out a political insurance policy.

“Fundamentally, princelings advocate maintaining one-party dictatorship,” said Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based political commentator. “This is (their) bottom line.”

With five Standing Committee members expected to retire in 2017 due to an age limit, it remains to be seen whether the “princelings” can hold their slight edge on the Party’s top ruling body. The New York Times’ Edward Wong calls out recently-promoted Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, neither “princelings,” who may have an inside  edge on an open Standing Committee seat in five years:

Mr. Hu’s rising star got brighter this month when he was named one of 15 new members on the party’s 25-seat Politburo. Political analysts say he could be on track to ascend to the Politburo’s elite Standing Committee at the next party congress, in 2017. That would put him in the running for the top party job — and the mantle of leader of China — when Xi Jinping, the new party chief, steps down after his expected two five-year terms.

Mr. Hu is the most prominent of a clutch of political stars known as China’s “sixth generation.” They were handpicked by party leaders and elders years ago to succeed Mr. Xi’s fifth generation (the first generation was that of Mao Zedong). Now, those politicians are being slotted into some of the most important posts across China.

Political insiders say Mr. Hu will probably be sent soon to Guangdong, a coastal province that is central to China’s export economy. His closest rival, Sun Zhengcai, whom Mr. Locke also met this year, was posted earlier this month to Chongqing, the booming southwest municipality of 31 million once run by Bo Xilai, the disgraced party aristocrat.

If Mr. Hu and Mr. Sun both make it onto the Standing Committee in 2017, they would be in position to vie for the top two party posts in 2022, which would confer on them the state titles of president or premier.

For more on Sun and Hu’s prospects, see ‘Chongqing, a Slippery Stepping Stone‘ on CDT.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, CCP 6th generation, Hu Chunhua, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Sun, 49, was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee after the 18th CPC National Congress last week. Born in Shandong Province, he served as Minister of [agri]Culture for three years before being transferred to Northeast China in 2009 as secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee.

Zhang Dejiang, vice premier and former member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, covered Bo’s position from March as secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee, after Bo’s wife Bogu Kailai was found to have been involved in the murder of British citizen Neil Heywood.

[…] According to media reports, Zhang had been trying to differ from Bo’s tenure by redirecting Chongqing’s economic and social development in a low-profile manner. Bo’s red song campaign was also discontinued. Zhang urged Party officials to draw lessons from the Bo scandal, take better care of their spouses, children and staff and ensure they are held to the highest standards.

With the transition to a new generation of leadership still underway, Sun’s assignment will prepare and test him for an anticipated key role in the next. From Brian Spegele at The Wall Street Journal:

The appointment of Mr. Sun, a former agriculture minister and party chief of northeast Jilin province, is an early indication that rising party leaders will be given reins of some of the country’s most important—and most problematic—areas, analysts say. In Chongqing, for example, Mr. Sun will face deeply vested business interests, continuing concerns over organized crime and still-strong support for the ousted Mr. Bo.

The appointment—and a number of others that are expected to follow in the coming days and weeks—points to a major shuffling at the top ranks of China’s ruling party following last week’s Communist Party Congress, where Xi Jinping succeeded President Hu Jintao as party chief. That shuffle will provide important insight into a generation of rising cadres—known as the sixth generation, following the Xi-led fifth generation—who are expected to lead the party when Mr. Xi and other newly appointed leaders likely retire a decade from now.

The outlook of the new generation could be significantly different from the previous. Unlike Mr. Xi’s generation, which came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Mr. Sun and his contemporaries grew up during the period of relative openness following economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

Cheng Li’s biographical entry on Sun at The Brookings Institution highlights his PhD, a year spent studying in the U.K., and a “humble” family background, another difference between him and princelings like Bo and Xi.

[…] There have been different explanations for the quick rise of Sun Zhengcai and his relationships with senior leaders. Some believe that Sun has been Jia Qinglin’s protégé, as he advanced his career largely in Beijing, where Jia served as mayor and party secretary from 1996 through 2002. It also has been speculated that Sun is a protégé of Wen Jiabao, who played a direct role in Sun’s promotion to minister of agriculture and then party secretary of Jilin Province. Both explanations, however, may be correct.

Modest background is shared by Hu Chunhua, or “Little Hu”. Both men have just received seats on the “outer” Politburo, are relatively young at 49, and are strongly tipped for future leadership. From Cheng Li at Brookings:

Hu Chunhua established his patron-mentor relationship with Hu Jintao in Tibet when the latter served as party secretary there (1988–1992). Hu Chunhua has been widely regarded as “a carbon copy of Hu Jintao” [to whom he is not related]. Both come from humble family backgrounds, both were student leaders in their college years, both advanced their political careers primarily through the CCYL, both worked in arduous work environments such as Tibet, both served as provincial party secretaries at a relatively young age, and both have low-profile personalities. Hu Chunhua’s parents were farmers in a poor village and he has six siblings. Hu got married in Tibet and the couple have one daughter.

Hu the Younger’s current role is as Party secretary for Inner Mongolia: see ‘Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands‘ on CDT. He is now widely expected to take over as Guangdong Party head, though it was rumoured last month that he was also a contender for the Chongqing position. Both he and Sun may then rise to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017, when five of the seven current members are due to retire. Last week, Bloomberg traced their likely trajectories.

If the two do assume top leadership posts 10 years from now, their advancement within the party’s top echelons may follow the path of Hu Jintao, whose grooming began when he was named to the Politburo’s Standing Committee at age 49 in 1992, said Bo Zhiyue, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asia Institute who has written a research paper on Hu Chunhua and Sun.

By contrast, Xi Jinping, who was named Communist Party general secretary […], and Li Keqiang, who is forecast to take over from Premier Wen Jiabao in March, were elevated into the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 without serving in the broader Politburo. Communist Party leaders may have decided the next generation will need more time to prepare, Bo said.

“I think this time around they are doing a better job of bringing younger people into the Politburo so they can start this grooming process,” Bo said in a phone interview. “In the case of Hu Jintao it was 10 years, but in the case of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang it was only five years. In Chinese politics five years seems a little bit rushed.”

Nothing about future leadership transitions can be taken for granted, however, as the current Party secretary in Guangdong and Sun’s predecessor in Chongqing might attest.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, Bo Xilai, CCP 6th generation, Chongqing, Cultural Revolution, gu kailai, Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao, Inner Mongolia, jilin, leadership transition, Neil Heywood, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings, Sun Zhengcai, Tibet, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, zhang dejiang
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

A member of the first group of students admitted to university after late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping ordered the resumption of the university entrance exam in 1977, following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Li studied law under Professor Gong Xiangrui , an expert on Western constitutional law who had studied in Britain in the 1930s. Li followed that with a PhD in economics under Li Yining, the mainland’s market reform guru.

[...] Li reportedly plunged into campus politics as reformist ideas galvanised students, befriending freethinkers who went on to become dissidents in exile, and helping to translate The Due Process of Law by famed English jurist Lord Denning.

[...] Former classmate and prominent dissident Wang Jintao [sic], who has lived in exile in the United States since 1994 after being sentenced to 13 years in jail for supporting the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy movement, said Li was outspoken and quick-witted on campus.

[...] ”On campus, Li Keqiang was a student with an active mind and sharp words,” Wang wrote in a memoir. “He has his own independent thinking and preferences. But he will not challenge authority on major issues. He is also a person who wants to have big personal accomplishments.”

In his discussion with delegates from Shandong Province during the 18th Party Congress, Li made his intention to push through reforms clear. From People’s Daily:

Li Keqiang said on Thursday that China should lose no time in deepening reform in key sectors and resolutely discard all notions and systems that hinder efforts to pursue development in a scientific way.

[...] Li noted China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, the period that is full of unprecedented risks and challenges.

Under such circumstances, he said, China should accelerate improvement of the socialist market economy and facilitate the change of growth model to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects as well as deepen reform and opening up in an all-round way.

The Party needs to properly handle the relations between the regulators and the market and implement a more proactive opening up strategy to boost the momentum and vitality of development, he said.

Several of his classmates have expressed their hope that Li has not abandoned his early political beliefs. One of his classmates tells Jeremy Page at the Wall Street Journal that Li is believed to have ”a clear understanding of the weakness of China’s legal system as many of his close friends are lawyers, judges and law professors”. Given his relatively vague political reform agenda, more believe Li will tackle economic reform as job number one. From Simon Rabinovitch at Financial Times:

He is also believed to have played a role in the China 2030 report authored by the World Bank and the Development Research Center, a think-tank under the Chinese cabinet, that recommended limiting the power of state-owned companies.

[...] “Li Keqiang will be more effective than Wen Jiabao,” said Bo Zhiyue, an expert on Chinese politics at the National University of Singapore. “Wen Jiabao tried to promote too many things – political reform, social reform as well as economic reform. Li Keqiang will be more focused.”

Some analysts, however, see Li Keqiang’s grassroots background as an obstacle for him to implement his reformist ambitions. From Keith B. Richburg at the Washington Post:

Li’s father was a mid-level county official — “a small potato,” said one classmate — in Anhui province, one of China’s poorest areas. And unlike Xi and the other princelings, whose upward path was eased by family connections, Li was admitted to Peking University on the basis of his scores on the national entrance exam, or “gaokao,” when it was first reinstated in 1977 after being suspended during the Cultural Revolution.

[...] Li Datong, who was fired as an editor of a China Youth Daily supplement for pushing the boundaries of official censorship, met Li Keqiang in the ’90s and considers him a reformer — even though, like others, he said the incoming premier’s hands may be tied by the system.

[...] “If we can expect any democracy, it will be democracy within the system, and Li will help Xi in doing this,” said Yan Huai, a former official with the Communists’ now-disbanded Young Cadres Bureau, who joined the 1989 protests and then left for the United States. “How far Xi walks will determine how far Li can go. He won’t walk in front of Xi. And neither will he lag behind him.”

As some analysts see his early liberal education and his fluent self-taught English as hints of his western-leaning political beliefs, other more skeptical observers are questioning his political integrity based on his dealing with the AIDS crisis in Henan. Christopher Bodeen at Associated Press wrote last week:

Li, to be promoted within the leadership’s top council after a pivotal party congress closes later this week and expected to take the economy-focused post of premier from outgoing Wen Jiabao next spring, was governor of the agricultural province of Henan in 1998 during an unusual explosion of AIDS cases.

Tens of thousands of people had contracted HIV from illegal blood-buying rings that pooled plasma and re-injected it into donors after removing the blood products. But Beijing hadn’t acknowledged the problem yet, and Li oversaw a campaign to squelch reporting about it, harass activists and isolate affected villages.

[...] ”He just tried to escape from this crisis” at first, said Wan Yanhai, a prominent Chinese AIDS activist who fled to the United States with his family in 2010 following increasing police harassment. “He’s probably not a bad guy, but he’s not shown himself to be very capable of managing crises in a strong and responsible way.”

Andrew Jacobs at the New York Times also questions Li’s administrative capacity based on his unremarkable achievements as vice premier for the last five years:

As vice premier in charge of economic development, food safety and health care, Mr. Li has overseen an expansion of the medical insurance program. But his other signature project, which seeks to build 36 million low-cost apartments, has been criticized by some for poor planning and shoddy construction. And some analysts say his commitment to the commonweal has been tested by his brother’s role as the top official in China’s State Tobacco Monopoly Administration.

[...O]ne former official turned businessman thought it would probably take a crisis to compel Mr. Li and other leaders to embrace a substantial loosening of political and economic controls.

“I think in the end, events will force them to change, even if they don’t want to,” the businessman said. “Smart leaders will reform because they want to. Idiots will reform because they have to.”

See also a video on Li Keqiang, China’s “effective second fiddle?”, via CNN. See more on Li Keqiang via CDT.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP, CCP 5th generation, Communist Youth League, economic reform, leadership transition, Li Keqiang, Peking University, Politburo Standing Committee, political reform, reformers
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

The party held a meeting of leading cadres in Beijing in May and “democratically recommended” members of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and the 25-seat Politburo, state news agency Xinhua said late on Thursday, hours after new line-ups for both councils were unveiled.

[...] Xinhua said the cadres took into consideration the “party spirit” of candidates, jargon for their loyalty to the party.

They also took into account whether the candidates were “just and honest”, their abilities and integrity, their age as well as portfolios. Politicians 68 or older are not qualified to join the Standing Committee.

The “democratic recommendation” process involved informal discussions while the views of unspecified people were fully solicited, Xinhua said. It did not elaborate.

Now, Reuters is reporting that in the course of the straw poll, Party elders including Jiang Zemin and Li Peng effectively ruled out the advancement of Wang and Liu:

Two sources said the influential retirees flexed their muscles in landmark informal polls taken before last week’s 18th party congress, where the seven–member standing committee, the apex of China’s power structure, was unveiled.

The clout of the elder statesmen, who include former party chief Jiang Zemin and ex-parliament head Li Peng, underscores the obstacles to even limited reform within senior levels of the party, which has held continuous power since 1949.

The informal polls are the first time the party has flirted with “intra-party democracy” to settle factional fighting over the line-up of the standing committee. It held informal polls in 2007 to decide the larger Politburo.

The report also explains that Wang Yang was left off the Standing Committee after the fall of former Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai in order to avoid further antagonizing Bo’s supporters:

The two sources said party seniors decided to drop Wang, who has favored private enterprise in Guangdong and was seen as a rival of Bo, to avoid further upsetting pro-Mao factions in the party, government and military.

“Wang Yang was ousted to avoid Bo supporters creating trouble,” one of the two sources said.

Yet it is not clear how the poll was held or if this will become a standard method to choose new leadership within the Party. Some journalists remain skeptical:

Would like to see evidence of CPC voting. “Informal straw-polling” means asking people for their opinions.

— Edward Wong (@comradewong) November 21, 2012

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, intra-Party democracy, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Peng, Li Yuanchao, Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Yang
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Meritocratic governance is deeply-rooted in China’s Confucian political tradition, which among other things allowed the country to develop and sustain for well over a millennium the Keju system, the world’s first public exam process for selecting officials.

Consistent with this tradition, Beijing practices — not always successfully — meritocracy across the whole political stratum. Criteria such as performance in poverty eradication, job creation, local economic and social development, and, increasingly, cleaner environment are key factors in the promotion of local officials. China’s dramatic rise over the past three decades is inseparable from this meritocratic system.

Sensational scandals of official corruption and other social woes aside, China’s governance, like the Chinese economy, remains resilient and robust.

Other observers believe that “official corruption and other social woes” are enough to discredit the argument that China is a meritocracy, especially with this year’s scandal involving disgraced Chongqing Party Chief Bo Xilai. The Economist argues that people who laud China’s meritocracy are missing the point:

…To believe virtue always floats to the top in a system such as China’s is fantasy. Chinese government and society are shot through with corruption. Even official media report about cadres gaining promotion through connections, not merit, and despite the occasional execution of corrupt officials, the government can do little about it. The Confucian ideal of self-cultivation is admirable, but it neglects the crucial detail known as human nature.

Regardless of what term is used, it is clear from looking at the line-up of the new Standing Committee that the members drew on deep-seated networks of family and professional ties to advance up the rings of power. Just before the Standing Committee was announced, Ian Johnson wrote in the New York Times about the newfound power of China’s “princeling” class, or the sons and daughters of China’s revolutionary leaders:

Despite rising controversy over their prominent role in government and business — highlighted by recent corruption cases, as well as the fall of Bo Xilai, whose wife was found guilty of murder — China’s princelings, who number in the hundreds, are emerging as an aristocratic class with an increasingly important say in ruling the country.

While they feud and fight among themselves, many have already made their mark in the established order, playing important roles in businesses, especially state-owned enterprises. Others are heavily involved in finance or lobbying, where personal connections are important.

“Many countries have powerful families, but in China, they are becoming the dominant force in politics and business,” said Lü Xiaobo, a political science professor at Columbia University. “In this system, they have good bloodlines.”

And another article from the New York Times from this weekend examines the wider networks of ties that helped launch and develop the current crop of leaders, resulting only in the “meritocracy of mediocrity”:

The seven men on the Politburo Standing Committee have forged close relations to previous party leaders, either through their families or institutional networks. They have exhibited little in the way of vision or initiative during their careers. And most have been allies or protégés of Jiang Zemin, the octogenarian former party chief.

The Communist Party and its acolytes like to brag that the party promotion system is a meritocracy, producing leaders better suited to run a country than those who emerge from the cacophony of elections and partisan bickering in full-blown democracies. But critics, including a number of party insiders, say that China’s secretive selection process, rooted in personal networks, has actually created a meritocracy of mediocrity.

Those who do less in the way of bold policy during their political rise — and expend their energies instead hobnobbing with senior officials over rice wine at banquets or wooing them with vanity-stroking projects — appear to have a greater chance of reaching the ranks of the top 400 or so party officials, the ones with seats on the Central Committee, the Politburo or its standing committee. Instead of pure talent, political patronage and family connections are the critical factors in ascending to the top, according to recent academic studies and analyses of the backgrounds of the leaders.

There are growing doubts, even among party elites, over whether such a system brings out those best equipped to deal with the challenges facing this nation of 1.3 billion people, with its slowing economic growth, environmental degradation and rising social instability. A series of recent scandals and revelations that the families of top officials can hold billions of dollars’ worth of investments have also led to greater scrutiny over the role of patronage.

Read more on the debate over meritocracy in China:

- Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, by Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu in American Political Science Review (PDF)
- The unintended consequence of the “China-as-meritocracy” debates, from Peking Duck
- Economic Observer podcast: China: A Meritocracy? with Daniel Bell
- The Real China Model, by Mark Elliot in the New York Times

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Confucianism, Daniel Bell, meritocracy, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings, Xi Jinping
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Yan Jingjing, daughter of PLA Song and Dance Troupe singer Yan Weiwen, is unsearchable on Sina Weibo.

Pinyin Spelling of Leaders’ Names:
- [Zhang] dejiang: Member of the newly elected Politburo Standing Committee (PSC).
- [Zhang] gaoli: New PSC member.
- jiaqinglin: One of the outgoing PSC members.
- [Xi] jinping: Incoming CCP president. Re-tested.
- [Li] keqiang: Incoming CCP prime minister.
- [Wang] qishan ([王] 岐山): New PSC member.
- wangyang (汪洋): Party Secretary of Guangdong Province. Wang’s absence from the new PSC troubles those who hope for reform in China’s new leadership.
- [Liu] yunshan ([刘] 云山): New PSC member.
- [Yu] zhengsheng ([俞] 正声): New PSC member.

Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan:
- XiJP (习JP): Xi Jinping
- Secretary Xi (习书记)
- Crown Prince/Emperor Xi (习皇（储/帝）)
- Xi Cannot-Comment (习禁评): re-tested
- Chairman Xi (习主席): re-tested
- Lady Xi (习夫人): Refers to Peng Liyuan.
- Lady Peng (彭夫人)
- Her Majesty the Empress (皇后娘娘)
- First Lady (第一夫人)
- Mother of the Nation (国母): re-tested

Other Post-18th-Party-Congress Terms:
- Seven Chiefs (七巨头): Refers to the seven new members of the PSC.
- Prime Minister Li (李总理): Li Keqiang
- Kim Il-sung + university (金日成+大学): Official documents reveal that PSC member Zhang Dejiang graduated with a degree in economics from North Korea’s Kim Il-sung University.
- join the PSC (入常): re-tested
- Liu Yongqing (刘永清): Hu Jintao’s wife.
- Prime Minister Wen (温总理): Wen Jiabao
- Bo Wen (薄温): Refers to Bo Xilai and Wen Jiabao.
- Yan Jingjing (阎晶晶): Yan Weiwen’s daughter, who is also Li Zhaoxing’s daughter-in-law. Yan Weiwen is a tenor in the People’s Liberation Army General Political Department Song and Dance Troupe. Li Zhaoxing served as ambassador to the U.S. from 1998 to 2001, and as a PSC member and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2007.
- Li Hehe (李禾禾): Li Zhaoxing’s son. Re-tested.

Note: All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search.  CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese’s latest sensitive words post.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, censorship, Hu Jintao, Internet censorship, Jia Qinglin, Li Hehe, Li Keqiang, li zhaoxing, Liu Yongqing, Liu Yunshan, Peng Liyuan, People's Liberation Army, Politburo Standing Committee, Sensitive Words Series, sina weibo, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, weibo, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, Yan Jingjing, Yan Weiwen, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang, Zhang Gaoli
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Despite scenes of Hu Jintao and other outgoing leaders casting their ballots for the CCP Central Committee, it’s hard to convince Chinese netizens that these were free and fair Party elections. Weibo chatter about internal wrangling and even brawling drew enough of a crowd for Sina to filter search results for related terms. This cartoon exudes the air of Mad Men. For all the promises of greater transparency, this past week is shrouded in fog.

Artist: Mengchenshang
Source: SneezeBloid

521 female delegates attended the congress, two with infants in tow. Women have come a long way in China, from cutting their hair and leaving home in the early 20th century, to marching alongside their male comrades as Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. But the cadre weeping with joy for her Party as she votes “yes” with one arm and holds her child in another may not have been the future her forebears imagined.

Artist: Asahi Shimbun
Source: SneezeBloid

The Beijing bureau of the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun has a reputation for “acting cute” on Weibo. The mysterious staffer with the witty ballpoint pen lets netizens know how the paper views the hammer and sickle: mightier than homes, cars, money, and even happiness.

Artist: Wu Junyong
Souce: Weibo

“There’s no suspense” (没有悬念) about the identity of the person whose veil is about to be lifted. Those hopeful that political change would follow greater economic openness were disappointed by the new Politburo Standing Committee. And while Xi may offer some hope for reform, the exclusion of Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao sent the signal to expect more of the same from China’s new leaders.

Artist: Torval Lokison
Source: Beijing Cream

Lokison’s expat-oriented comic speaks for itself.

Read more about the leadership transition from CDT.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, Asahi Shimbun, CCP Central Committee, Cultural Revolution, Drawing the News, Hu Jintao, leadership transition, Li Yuanchao, netizens, Politburo Standing Committee, political cartoons, political humor, Red Guards, Wang Yang, weibo, Xi Jinping
Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall