”At least 200 thugs, armed with sticks, guns, chains and other tools of violence” forced their way through the gates of the Lakeside Villas at 8.30am on Sunday, August 2, 2009, according to a complaint Mr Hu has prepared to send to a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Mr Hu alleges the armed occupation enabled his rival’s company to complete a discounted purchase of property from Mr Hu’s company and on-sell at an enormous profit. He estimates the raid and other illegal dealings have cost his company more than 600 million yuan (about $90 million). He believes his adversaries were backed by senior party figures and says police chiefs have told him they had no power to intervene.

Collusion between officials, developers and mafia-style ”black society” thugs has become common in China, where the law is explicitly subordinate to politics and politics is shaped by money.

[...] Mr Hu has levelled his accusations at a subsidiary of SOCAM Development, a member of the Shui On Group, which is chaired and controlled by Hong Kong billionaire Vincent Lo. Mr Lo, the son of a Hong Kong property tycoon, graduated from the University of NSW in 1969 and secured his foothold on mainland China in Shanghai in the 1980s.

[...] Mr Lo enjoys close ties with members of the ”Shanghai faction” that rose to power following the purge of Mr Hu’s father and other reformers in the late 1980s.

Garnaut’s report includes footage of the raid and interviews with witnesses:

Mr. Hu has previously spoken out in favor of rule of law and an end to entrenched corruption at the highest levels of the government.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: factions, hu dehua, hu yaobang, princelings
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In the heady days of the early post-Mao years, as China began opening to the world, a youthful Xi Jinping attended a fortnightly study group with other top leaders’ children to network, enjoy friendship and make sense of the change around them.

Mr Xi, now general secretary of the Communist Party, stayed close with the group as they worked the long and sometimes treacherous path towards the apex of the party, as their fathers had before them, and came to identify as Hongerdai, or “Second Generation Red”.

[…] The Mao faithful are hoping, and liberal intellectuals and private entrepreneurs are worried, that Mr Xi will symbolically foreclose any short-term possibility of political reform by holding a big celebration of Mao’s 120th birthday at the end of this year.

“This is a big test,” said He Weifang, a lawyer who was involved in building the political case against Bo Xilai. “This is an important occasion and requires Xi to deliver a speech or make some decision.”

At Foreign Policy, Garnaut shows a 2006 photo including the reunited study group which, he writes, “illustrates their dominance over the government and the economy”:

In the middle row in a tan jacket stands businessman Hu Shiying, who runs a plethora of official and quasi-official organisations ranging from martial arts to green technology. The convenor of the close-knit study group, Hu is the son of Hu Qiaomu, Chairman Mao Zedong’s main secretary. […]

[…] Standing next to him is Xi, the son of a vice premier; then Wang Qishan, the son-in-law of a vice premier and a member of China’s top decision making body, the Politburo Standing Committee, where he’s in charge of fighting corruption. Wang stands next to Liu Xiaojiang, who as Navy Commissar is one of the most important officials in the PLA Navy; Liu is also the son of a general and the son-in-law of former Party boss Hu Yaobang.

[…] On Saturday, at the fellowship’s reunion during China’s annual Spring Festival holiday, [Hu Shiying's sister, Hu] Muying urged her fellow princelings to get involved in “affairs of state” — and that they are, continuing the tradition of their ancestors. When the photo appeared on the website, the princelings were described as “brothers and sisters.” At a December speech commemorating Mao’s 119th birthday, Hu described his “eyes welling with tears” when singing revolutionary songs. “We are Mao’s family members,” he said.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bo Xilai, He Weifang, hu yaobang, Mao Zedong, maoism, princelings, Wang Qishan, Xi Jinping
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At the largest reunion, held on Saturday at the People’s Liberation Army’s August 1 film studio in West Beijing, children of revolutionary leaders lauded the Xi administration for “correcting” the Party’s course at its “critical moment of life and death”, when it was in danger of abandoning socialism altogether.

“There is hope in the snake year now the Party leadership has shown us the content and direction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Hu Muying, the daughter of former Politburo member Hu Qiaomu, told the gathering of about a thousand descendants of revolutionary veterans.

“We shall prove by our own actions that we, the children of veterans, are indeed worthy of the name ‘Second Generation Red’,” said Ms Hu. “Let’s strive together towards The China Dream,” she said, endorsing Mr Xi’s political motto.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP 5th generation, CCP history, Hu Jintao, princelings, Xi Jinping
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In the wake of the recent Bo Xilai scandal and the resulting crisis of CPC rule, many had anticipated that party leaders would adopt certain election mechanisms—what the Chinese authorities call “intra-party democracy”—to restore the party’s much-damaged legitimacy and to generate a sense that the new top leaders do indeed have an election-based new mandate to rule. For example, some analysts had anticipated that the CPC Central Committee might use competitive (though limited) multiple-candidate elections to select members of its leadership bodies, such as the twenty-five-member politburo or even the PSC. Such high-level elections, however, did not take place. The selection of elites at this congress continued to be done the old fashioned way—through the “black box” of manipulation, deal-cutting, and trade-offs that occur behind the scenes among a handful of politicians (e.g., outgoing PSC members and retired heavyweight figures—most noticeably the 86-year old Jiang).

What is even more troubling is the fact that four out of the seven PSC members are princelings—leaders who come from families of either veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials. It has been widely noted that large numbers of prominent party leaders and families have used their political power to convert state assets into their own private wealth. The unprecedentedly strong presence of princelings in the new PSC is likely to reinforce public resentment of how power and wealth continue to converge in China.

Chinese politics thus seem to be entering a new era characterized by the concentration of princeling power at the top. This gives rise to important questions regarding the nature and implications of the new leadership. What caused the dramatic defeat of the Hu camp in this political succession? Does the six-to-one split of the PSC mean a shift from factional power-sharing to a new “winner takes all” mode of Chinese elite politics? Will the factional imbalance at the top seriously undermine leadership unity and elite cohesion, thus potentially threatening the sociopolitical stability of the country at large? What are the main characteristics of this new princeling elite? What should we expect in terms of economic policies, political reforms, and foreign relations under the Xi Jinping administration? And can the identities of newly promoted leaders help us understand where China is headed?

The issue also includes a Pico Iyer essay about the Dalai Lama, an article about the South China Sea disputes, and interview with Orville Schell, and a review of two recent e-books about the fall of Bo Xilai, written by CDT’s Translation Coordinator, Anne Henochowicz.

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP 5th generation, Dalai Lama, Orville Schell, princelings, South China Sea, Xi Jinping
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The translations are by Rogier Creemers of China Copyright and Media.

23 May 2007, 13:46:45

Third level: Please search for and delete audiovisual content and related discussions on the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” in interactive segments; set up search keywords.

Please search for and delete audiovisual content and related discussion on the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” in interactive segments, the “Dynamic China Documentary Series” includes audiovisual sections on “mouthpiece and responsibility,” “the wealthy and migrant workers”, etc.; all search engines are requested to ensure that there are no search results for “Dynamic China Documentary Series,” “Dynamic China Documentary,” “mouthpiece and responsibility,” “the wealthy and migrant workers.”

22 May 2007, 11:12:50

Third level: A new batch of “17th Party Congress” keywords, please ensure that there are no search results.

“CCP’s 5th generation takes over,” “5th generation takes over,” “CCP takeover group,” “17th Party Congress + balance of power,” “17th Party Congress + number change,” “17th Party Congress + resignation,” “17th Party Congress + stepping down,” “17th Party Congress + being forced,” “17th Party Congress + returning home,” “the situation before the 17th Party Congress,” “17th Party Congress + political situation,” “17th Party Congress + complete withdrawal of report,” “Hu Jintao – causing great tumult,” “Hu Jintao + unpredictable Yellow Sea,” “Jiang Zemin + exposure of his high-sounding words,” “Shanghai clique + fresh troops,” “Shanghai Clique + successors,” “Zhou Yongkang replaces Huang Ju,” “Wu Yi replaces Huang Ju,” “princeling party,” “princeling group,” “princeling Party + local political circles,” “princeling group + local political circles,” “children of high-ranking cadres march into local political circles,” “children of high officials + march in,” “CCP appointments + political blood ties,” “Liu Yandong replaces Wu Yi,” “Jiang-Hu discussions,” “Beijing Municipal political circles evoke shock,” “Jiang Zemin’s power weakened,” “Jia Qinglin’s relationship with Jiang Zemin,” “Jia Qinglin’s improper comings and goings,” “Jia Qinglin’s court contains Jiang Zemin,” “Jiang Zemin + Beijing Clique,” “Jia Qinglin + Jiang Zemin + old friends,” “Wang Qishan replaces Zhang Dejiang,” “Beijing Clique + Olympics,” “Beijing Clique + kidnapping,” “kidnapping + Olympics,” “Liu Qi leaves Beijing Municipal Committee,” “Jia Qinglin withdraws from political circles,” “Wu Yi in charge of China’s economy,” “Liu Qi removed from position,” “Wang Qishan removed from positions,” “Liu Qi instigates own clique to send anonymous letters attacking Wang Qishan,” “Liu Qi’s clique,” “Liu Qi + anonymous letters,” “anonymous letters attacking Wang Qishan,” “Liu Qi + envy,” “Zeng Qinghong blows with the wind,” “Zeng Qinghong + night owl,” “17th Party Congress + closed door decision,” “Jiang brand,” “CCP orthodoxy teachers,” “great change in CCP personnel affairs,” “17th Party Congress + successor team,” “descendants of CCP elders,” “Zeng Qinghong + general manager in the imperial palace,” “Zeng Qinghong finishes class at 17th Party Congress,” “Zeng Qinghong + spy boss,” “scientific development view + tiny bit of land,” “Jiang Zemin + half-retirement,” “Zeng Qinghong forced to write letter on resigning at the 17th Party Congress,” “looking to Jiang Zemin for ideas,” “Jia Qinglin + divorce,” “Huang Ju – self-knowledge,” “Huang Ju + stubborn followers,” “Jiang Zemin + trusted followers,” “Jiang Zeng + assassination,” “Zeng Qinghong resigns,” “Chu Bo + Jiang Zemin’s coolie,” “Chu Bo + Jiang Family,” “Zeng Qinghong in the footsteps of Jiang.”

24 May 2007, 16:44:16

First level: Today’s information in the Beijing Evening Post or the Legal Evening Post concerning Beijing Municipality stockpiling pork may not be issued without exception, delete it immediately, forums and other interactive segments are not to discuss this. Do this quickly.

24 May 2007, 16:50:23

Secrecy of China’s death targets uncovered: where those hurt in car accidents do not die within seven days, they do not enter into the statistics http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-05-24/110113065712.shtml

Those from non-standard copy sources are to be pushed to the back stage without exception, portals are to check whether this is on their websites or not.

24 May 2007, 17:39:29

Second level: On reports concerning the suppression of the mass encirclement incident of a village government in Bobai County, Guangxi, close news trackers, forums, blogs, and other interactive segments are not to recommend this.

24 May 2007, 18:05:23

(Third level) all websites: Please make “Chu Bo” into a keyword and ensure that search results are directed at focus central news websites, do not set up related searches.

24 May 2007, 18:07:19

The article “Census Register Reform Documents Reported to State Council + Lawful Fixed Place Becomes Condition for Move” of 23 May is inaccurate, websites that have already reprinted it must immediately remove it. This article may also not be posted in forums and blogs. Official Xinhua copy is to be taken as standard when reporting census register reform.

24 May 2007, 20:18:01

All websites, please ensure that search engines screen the following keywords:

- Beijing + meat stockpile + investigation

- Ministry of Commerce + meat stockpile

- Beijing + meat stockpile

- Beijing + investigation + application for meat stockpile

25 May 2007, 09:50:28

All websites: Please immediately reprint the following audiovisual link in the middle or lower part of the important news section: http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-05/21/content_6130531.htm. Leave it there until 12:00 noon on 26 May.

Supplementary notice: All websites are requested to cut out and post the latter half when reprinting the said video, and publish it with the following title: “Mobile Phone Income Immorality, Network Companies Send Out ‘Yellow Card.’”

25 May 2007, 10:04:00

First level: Information that Beijing Municipality will stockpile pork may not be issued without exception, delete it speedily, forums and other interactive segments are not to discuss this. Deal with this speedily.

Everyone, notices have already been sent out yesterday that Beijing’s meat stockpiling is to be deleted without exception, implement this rapidly, examine yourself and delete this yourself, inspect whole websites and all channels. Deal with this speedily, otherwise consequences will be grave!!

25 May 2007, 16:55:00

First level: Concerning the matter that on 23 May, more than 100 Uyghurs from Xinjiang were duped after participating in a pyramid scheme in Guangxi and assembled in front of the gates of the post office on the North Square of Beijing West Railway Station, no reports are to be made without exception, interactive segments are not to transmit or discuss this. Please delete existing information.

25 May 2007, 17:39:51

All websites are requested to reprint the content of the communiqué of the network news and information advisory council from this afternoon, http://baom.sina.com.cn/3/2007/0523/1273.html

The title is: “Network Advisory Council Gravely Criticizes Friend-Making-Type Websites”

Position: Main page of websites and middle or lower part of important news section

25 May 2007, 15:55:41

Please push the “New Bulletin” text “Chinese Social Mentality Survey Displays that Masses Have Most Confidence in Central Government,” interactive segments must not set up discussions around this information.

 2007年5月北京网管办发出的禁令（二）

2007-05-23 13:46:45

三级：请在互动环节查找、删除“激流中国系列纪录片”视频内容及相关评论；搜索设关键词

请在互动环节查找和删除“激流中国系列纪录片”的视频内容及相关评论,“激流中国系列纪录片”包括“喉舌与责任”、“富人与农民工”等视频章节；请各搜索引擎将“激流中国系列纪录片”、“激流中国纪录片”、“喉舌与责任”、“富人与农民工”设为搜索无结果。
2007-05-22 11:12:58

三级：新一批“十七大”关键词，请设为搜索无结果。

“中共第五代接班群”、“第五代接班群”、中共接班群”、“十七大 权力平衡”、“十七大 变数”、“十七大 辞职”、“十七大 下台”、“十七大 被迫”、“十七大 回家”、“十七大前的格局”、“十七大 政治格局”、“十七大 全退报告”、“胡锦涛 倒海翻江”、“胡锦涛 黄海不测”、“江泽民 高调曝光”、“上海帮 生力军”、“上海帮 接班人”、“周永康取代黄菊”、“吴仪取代黄菊”、“公子党”、“公子族”、“公子党 地方政坛”、“公子族 地方政坛”、“高干子弟走红地方政坛”、“高干子弟 走红”、““中共任用 政治血缘”、“刘延东 取代吴仪”、“江胡商议”、“北京市政界引发震动”、“江泽民势力被削弱”、“贾庆林与江泽民的关系”、“贾庆林 不正当往来”、“贾庆林朝中有江泽民”、“江泽民 北京帮”、“贾庆林 江泽民 故交”、“王歧山接替张德江”、“北京帮 奥运”、“北京帮 绑架”、“绑架 奥运”、“刘淇离开北京市委”、“贾庆林退出政坛”、“吴仪掌管中国经济”、“刘淇 挪位”、“王歧山 挪位”、“刘淇发动嫡系匿名信打王岐山”、“刘淇嫡系”、“刘淇 匿名信”、“匿名信打王岐山”、“刘淇 妒忌心”、“曾庆红见风使舵”、“曾庆红 夜猫子”、“十七大 内定”、“江牌”、“中共正统传人”、“中共人事大变动”、“十七大 接班团队”、“中共元老的儿孙”、“曾庆红 大内总管”、“曾庆红十七大下课”、“曾庆红 特务头子”、“科学发展观 立锥之地”、“江泽民 半退”、“曾庆红被迫写信十七大退”、“找江泽民讨主意”、“贾庆林 离婚”、“黄菊 自知之明”、“黄菊 铁杆亲信”、“江泽民 亲信”、“江曾 暗杀”、“曾庆红 辞职”、“储波 江泽民人马”、“储波 江系”、“曾庆红步江后尘”。
2007-05-24 16:44:16

一级：今天北京晚报或法制晚报有条北京市要储备猪肉的消息，一律不要发速删除，论坛等互动环节不讨论。速办。
2007-05-24 16:50:23

中国死亡指标揭秘：车祸伤者7天后死亡不占指标http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-05-24/110113065712.shtml

非规范稿源的一律压后台，门户看看自己的网站有没有
2007-05-24 17:39:29

二级：有关广西博白县群众围堵乡政府事件平息的相关报道，关闭新闻跟贴，论坛、博客等互动环节不推荐。
2007-05-24 18:05:23

(三级)各网:请将”储波”一关键词的搜索结果设置为指向中央重点新闻网站,不设相关搜索.
2007-05-24 18:07:19

5月23日，”户籍改革文件报国务院，合法固定场所成迁移条件”一文失实，已经转载的网站要立即撤除。论坛和博客中也不贴发此类稿件。户籍改革有关报道以新华社正式发稿为准。
2007-05-24 20:18:01

各网，请用搜索引擎将以下关键词屏蔽

北京 储备肉 调研

商务部 储备肉

北京 储备肉

北京 调研 申请储备肉
2007-05-25 09:50:28

各网:请立即在要闻区中下部转载如下视频链接:http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-05/21/content_6130531.htm,放到5月26日中午12:00.
补充通知:请各网站在转载该视频的时候截取后半段:手机创收走邪道 网络公司发送”黄片”并且以此为标题发布.
2007-05-25 10:04:00

一级：北京市要储备猪肉的消息，一律不要发，速删除，论坛等互动环节不讨论。速办。

各位，昨天已经发过通知，北京储备肉的，一律删除，速执行，自查自删，全站检查，所有频道。速办，否则后果很严重！！
2007-05-25 16:55:00

一级：关于5月23日100余名新疆维吾尔族人在广西参加传销活动被骗，在北京西站北广场邮局门前聚集一事，一律不做报道，互动环节不传播不讨论。已有消息请速删。
2007-05-25 17:39:51

请各网转载今天下午网络新闻信息评议会公报内容，http://baom.sina.com.cn/3/2007/0523/1273.html

题目为“网络评议会严厉批评交友类网站”

位置：网站首页和要闻区中下部
2007-05-25 15:55:41

请将“新快报”《中国社会心态调查显示民众最信任中央政府》一文压到后台，互动环节不要围绕此消息设置讨论。

These translated directives were first posted by Rogier Creemers on China Copyright and Media on January 2, 2013 (here). This post is the 47th in the series.

© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 17th Party Congress, Beijing Internet Instructions, censorship, Censorship Vault, Chu Bo, Directives from the Ministry of Truth, Hu Jintao, Huang Ju, Internet censorship, Jia Qinglin, Jiang Zemin, Liu Qi, liu yandong, Ministry of Truth, princelings, propaganda, Wang Qishan, Wu Yi, zeng qinghong, zhang dejiang, Zhou Yongkang
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CHINA IS shakily authoritarian while India is a stable democracy—indeed, the world’s largest. So goes the cliché, and it is true, up to a point. But there is a growing resemblance between the two countries. A decade after we were told that China and India were “flattening” the world, expediting a historically inevitable shift of power from West to East, their political institutions and original nation-building ideologies face a profound crisis of legitimacy. Both countries, encumbered with dynastic elites and crony capitalists, are struggling to persuasively reaffirm their founding commitments to mass welfare. Protests against corruption and widening inequality rage across their vast territories, while their economies slow dramatically.

If anything, public anger against India’s political class appears more intense, and disaffection there assumes more militant forms, as in the civil war in the center of the country, where indigenous, Maoist militants in commodities-rich forests are battling security forces. India, where political dynasties have been the rule for decades, also has many more “princelings” than China—nearly 30 percent of the members of parliament come from political families. As the country intensifies its crackdown on intellectual dissent and falls behind on global health goals, it is mimicking China’s authoritarian tendencies and corruption without making comparable strides in relieving the hardships faced by its citizens. The “New India” risks becoming an ersatz China.

For more on the global princeling epidemic, see The Hindu’s Hasan Suroor on Britain’s several budding political dynasties, and Isaac Stone Fish at Foreign Policy and Katherine Moon at the South China Morning Post on the several Asian countries which have elected or selected current leaders with political pedigrees. These include Japan, both Koreas, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: authoritarianism, china and india, democracy, India, India comparison, princelings
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Bloomberg News series “Revolution to Riches” lifts the veil of secrecy on China’s princelings, an elite class that has been able to amass wealth and influence because of their bloodline. Mapping the family trees of China’s “Eight Immortals,” founding fathers of Communist China who later led the country’s economic opening, Bloomberg tracked 103 descendants and spouses — from the powerful leaders of state-owned conglomerates to their jet-setting, Prada-accessorized grandchildren. The extended family of another princeling, China’s new leader Xi Jinping, amassed a fortune in assets and real state, reporting by Bloomberg shows. The identities and business dealings of this red nobility are often hidden behind state censorship and complex corporate webs. To document them, Bloomberg scoured thousands of pages of corporate filings, property records, official websites and archives, and conducted dozens of interviews from China to the United States.

The first article in the Bloomberg series highlights the ideological dissonance between the PRC’s revolutionary forefathers and their affluent offspring, walking us through changes in China’s economy and introducing prominent princelings:

Lying in a Beijing military hospital in 1990, General Wang Zhen told a visitor he felt betrayed. Decades after he risked his life fighting for an egalitarian utopia, the ideals he held as one of Communist China’s founding fathers were being undermined by the capitalist ways of his children — business leaders in finance, aviation and computers.

“Turtle eggs,” he said to the visiting well-wisher, using a slang term for bastards. “I don’t acknowledge them as my sons.”[...]

In the next article, we meet the U.S. assimilated children of PLA general Song Renqiong:

At least five of the general’s eight children have lived in the U.S., with three daughters becoming citizens and a son obtaining his green card. Their family is the most extreme example of the pull that the U.S. — “beautiful country” in Chinese — has on the Immortals’ descendants.[...]

The siblings found opportunity in the U.S., not just to educate their children and themselves, they say, but to start businesses and leave behind the chaos and trauma of the Cultural Revolution. In the country held up as the antithesis of China’s ideals, they could lead anonymous and simple lives that adhered, ironically, more closely to the values of public service and egalitarianism espoused by their Communist parents. Their choices in many cases contrast with those of some other Immortal families, who pursued lives of privilege after Ivy-League educations and Wall Street training.

[...]Song Kehuang, who spends time in the U.S. twice a year at his family home in Irvine,California, says he regrets the fact that the wealth and power of the princeling class made some of his counterparts forget their roots.[...]

Elsewhere in recent western coverage of princelings, the contrasting experiences of Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping – both sons of “immortal” revolutionary heroes – have been in focus. At the Atlantic, Damien Ma recalls Bo’s fall and Xi’s rise, and the Financial Times’ Jamil Anderlini has dubbed 2012 the “year of the princeling”. Also see prior CDT coverage of China’s princeling generation.

© josh rudolph for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Bloomberg, Bo Xilai, guanxi, investigative journalism, princelings, wealth gap, Xi Jinping
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Two years ago, on June 4 — the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and the most sensitive date in the Chinese political calendar — Ji Pomin received a text message from a high-placed friend: It said that former president Jiang Zemin had been taken to a military hospital in a critical condition. Ji fired off a coded message to hundreds of people in his address book to seek confirmation, asking: “The Supreme Old Master ascended to heaven?” Many of Ji’s politically connected friends forwarded the text to their friends, who misinterpreted the cryptic question as a statement. By June 6, overseas Chinese websites were reporting that former president Jiang Zemin was dead.

[...] A few days after Ji’s text message, he received a phone call from someone claiming to be from a parcel delivery service. They said the package was too big to fit down the lane in which he lived, so he walked to nearby Dongdan, one of Beijing’s busiest shopping areas, to collect it. Standing there, he said, in the blind spot between two security cameras outside an upmarket wedding photography store, were two burly men. They pulled a cloth hood over Ji’s head and bundled him into a car.

[...] The daylight abduction of a princeling like Ji, in downtown Beijing, shows just how delicate the subject of elite politics has become. That Ji wasn’t tortured, that he felt emboldened to speak his mind, and that his captors politely drove him back to where they found him two days later, shows the privileges afforded by his status. The secret police had originally lured him out on to the street, says Ji, so they would not disturb his then 86 year-old mother, who had joined the revolutionary struggle with his father at the age of 14 in 1938. By contrast, Ji says they ransacked the homes of several people who received his message. And a historian whose work had influenced Ji’s negative views on Jiang was reportedly arrested and convicted of subversion in May 2011.

See more on “princelings“ and illegal detentions via CDT.

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Post tags: illegal detentions, Jiang Zemin, kidnapping, princelings, rumors, stability maintenance, state security
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Of the seven men who now comprise the Communist Party’s new politburo standing committee, the apex of political power in China, four are members of “the red aristocracy”, led by the new general secretary of the party, Xi Jinping.

The thriving of the princelings should not be a surprise, analysts and party insiders say. Rarely in its six decades in power has the party been under more stress. Public anger over widespread corruption, widening income inequality and vast environmental degradation have chipped away at its legitimacy.

The party’s over-arching goal is to maintain its grip on the nation, and moving so many princelings into top positions is akin to taking out a political insurance policy.

“Fundamentally, princelings advocate maintaining one-party dictatorship,” said Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based political commentator. “This is (their) bottom line.”

With five Standing Committee members expected to retire in 2017 due to an age limit, it remains to be seen whether the “princelings” can hold their slight edge on the Party’s top ruling body. The New York Times’ Edward Wong calls out recently-promoted Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, neither “princelings,” who may have an inside  edge on an open Standing Committee seat in five years:

Mr. Hu’s rising star got brighter this month when he was named one of 15 new members on the party’s 25-seat Politburo. Political analysts say he could be on track to ascend to the Politburo’s elite Standing Committee at the next party congress, in 2017. That would put him in the running for the top party job — and the mantle of leader of China — when Xi Jinping, the new party chief, steps down after his expected two five-year terms.

Mr. Hu is the most prominent of a clutch of political stars known as China’s “sixth generation.” They were handpicked by party leaders and elders years ago to succeed Mr. Xi’s fifth generation (the first generation was that of Mao Zedong). Now, those politicians are being slotted into some of the most important posts across China.

Political insiders say Mr. Hu will probably be sent soon to Guangdong, a coastal province that is central to China’s export economy. His closest rival, Sun Zhengcai, whom Mr. Locke also met this year, was posted earlier this month to Chongqing, the booming southwest municipality of 31 million once run by Bo Xilai, the disgraced party aristocrat.

If Mr. Hu and Mr. Sun both make it onto the Standing Committee in 2017, they would be in position to vie for the top two party posts in 2022, which would confer on them the state titles of president or premier.

For more on Sun and Hu’s prospects, see ‘Chongqing, a Slippery Stepping Stone‘ on CDT.

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Post tags: CCP, CCP 5th generation, CCP 6th generation, Hu Chunhua, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings
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Sun, 49, was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee after the 18th CPC National Congress last week. Born in Shandong Province, he served as Minister of [agri]Culture for three years before being transferred to Northeast China in 2009 as secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee.

Zhang Dejiang, vice premier and former member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, covered Bo’s position from March as secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee, after Bo’s wife Bogu Kailai was found to have been involved in the murder of British citizen Neil Heywood.

[…] According to media reports, Zhang had been trying to differ from Bo’s tenure by redirecting Chongqing’s economic and social development in a low-profile manner. Bo’s red song campaign was also discontinued. Zhang urged Party officials to draw lessons from the Bo scandal, take better care of their spouses, children and staff and ensure they are held to the highest standards.

With the transition to a new generation of leadership still underway, Sun’s assignment will prepare and test him for an anticipated key role in the next. From Brian Spegele at The Wall Street Journal:

The appointment of Mr. Sun, a former agriculture minister and party chief of northeast Jilin province, is an early indication that rising party leaders will be given reins of some of the country’s most important—and most problematic—areas, analysts say. In Chongqing, for example, Mr. Sun will face deeply vested business interests, continuing concerns over organized crime and still-strong support for the ousted Mr. Bo.

The appointment—and a number of others that are expected to follow in the coming days and weeks—points to a major shuffling at the top ranks of China’s ruling party following last week’s Communist Party Congress, where Xi Jinping succeeded President Hu Jintao as party chief. That shuffle will provide important insight into a generation of rising cadres—known as the sixth generation, following the Xi-led fifth generation—who are expected to lead the party when Mr. Xi and other newly appointed leaders likely retire a decade from now.

The outlook of the new generation could be significantly different from the previous. Unlike Mr. Xi’s generation, which came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Mr. Sun and his contemporaries grew up during the period of relative openness following economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

Cheng Li’s biographical entry on Sun at The Brookings Institution highlights his PhD, a year spent studying in the U.K., and a “humble” family background, another difference between him and princelings like Bo and Xi.

[…] There have been different explanations for the quick rise of Sun Zhengcai and his relationships with senior leaders. Some believe that Sun has been Jia Qinglin’s protégé, as he advanced his career largely in Beijing, where Jia served as mayor and party secretary from 1996 through 2002. It also has been speculated that Sun is a protégé of Wen Jiabao, who played a direct role in Sun’s promotion to minister of agriculture and then party secretary of Jilin Province. Both explanations, however, may be correct.

Modest background is shared by Hu Chunhua, or “Little Hu”. Both men have just received seats on the “outer” Politburo, are relatively young at 49, and are strongly tipped for future leadership. From Cheng Li at Brookings:

Hu Chunhua established his patron-mentor relationship with Hu Jintao in Tibet when the latter served as party secretary there (1988–1992). Hu Chunhua has been widely regarded as “a carbon copy of Hu Jintao” [to whom he is not related]. Both come from humble family backgrounds, both were student leaders in their college years, both advanced their political careers primarily through the CCYL, both worked in arduous work environments such as Tibet, both served as provincial party secretaries at a relatively young age, and both have low-profile personalities. Hu Chunhua’s parents were farmers in a poor village and he has six siblings. Hu got married in Tibet and the couple have one daughter.

Hu the Younger’s current role is as Party secretary for Inner Mongolia: see ‘Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands‘ on CDT. He is now widely expected to take over as Guangdong Party head, though it was rumoured last month that he was also a contender for the Chongqing position. Both he and Sun may then rise to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2017, when five of the seven current members are due to retire. Last week, Bloomberg traced their likely trajectories.

If the two do assume top leadership posts 10 years from now, their advancement within the party’s top echelons may follow the path of Hu Jintao, whose grooming began when he was named to the Politburo’s Standing Committee at age 49 in 1992, said Bo Zhiyue, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asia Institute who has written a research paper on Hu Chunhua and Sun.

By contrast, Xi Jinping, who was named Communist Party general secretary […], and Li Keqiang, who is forecast to take over from Premier Wen Jiabao in March, were elevated into the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 without serving in the broader Politburo. Communist Party leaders may have decided the next generation will need more time to prepare, Bo said.

“I think this time around they are doing a better job of bringing younger people into the Politburo so they can start this grooming process,” Bo said in a phone interview. “In the case of Hu Jintao it was 10 years, but in the case of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang it was only five years. In Chinese politics five years seems a little bit rushed.”

Nothing about future leadership transitions can be taken for granted, however, as the current Party secretary in Guangdong and Sun’s predecessor in Chongqing might attest.

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Post tags: 18th party congress, Bo Xilai, CCP 6th generation, Chongqing, Cultural Revolution, gu kailai, Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao, Inner Mongolia, jilin, leadership transition, Neil Heywood, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings, Sun Zhengcai, Tibet, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, zhang dejiang
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Meritocratic governance is deeply-rooted in China’s Confucian political tradition, which among other things allowed the country to develop and sustain for well over a millennium the Keju system, the world’s first public exam process for selecting officials.

Consistent with this tradition, Beijing practices — not always successfully — meritocracy across the whole political stratum. Criteria such as performance in poverty eradication, job creation, local economic and social development, and, increasingly, cleaner environment are key factors in the promotion of local officials. China’s dramatic rise over the past three decades is inseparable from this meritocratic system.

Sensational scandals of official corruption and other social woes aside, China’s governance, like the Chinese economy, remains resilient and robust.

Other observers believe that “official corruption and other social woes” are enough to discredit the argument that China is a meritocracy, especially with this year’s scandal involving disgraced Chongqing Party Chief Bo Xilai. The Economist argues that people who laud China’s meritocracy are missing the point:

…To believe virtue always floats to the top in a system such as China’s is fantasy. Chinese government and society are shot through with corruption. Even official media report about cadres gaining promotion through connections, not merit, and despite the occasional execution of corrupt officials, the government can do little about it. The Confucian ideal of self-cultivation is admirable, but it neglects the crucial detail known as human nature.

Regardless of what term is used, it is clear from looking at the line-up of the new Standing Committee that the members drew on deep-seated networks of family and professional ties to advance up the rings of power. Just before the Standing Committee was announced, Ian Johnson wrote in the New York Times about the newfound power of China’s “princeling” class, or the sons and daughters of China’s revolutionary leaders:

Despite rising controversy over their prominent role in government and business — highlighted by recent corruption cases, as well as the fall of Bo Xilai, whose wife was found guilty of murder — China’s princelings, who number in the hundreds, are emerging as an aristocratic class with an increasingly important say in ruling the country.

While they feud and fight among themselves, many have already made their mark in the established order, playing important roles in businesses, especially state-owned enterprises. Others are heavily involved in finance or lobbying, where personal connections are important.

“Many countries have powerful families, but in China, they are becoming the dominant force in politics and business,” said Lü Xiaobo, a political science professor at Columbia University. “In this system, they have good bloodlines.”

And another article from the New York Times from this weekend examines the wider networks of ties that helped launch and develop the current crop of leaders, resulting only in the “meritocracy of mediocrity”:

The seven men on the Politburo Standing Committee have forged close relations to previous party leaders, either through their families or institutional networks. They have exhibited little in the way of vision or initiative during their careers. And most have been allies or protégés of Jiang Zemin, the octogenarian former party chief.

The Communist Party and its acolytes like to brag that the party promotion system is a meritocracy, producing leaders better suited to run a country than those who emerge from the cacophony of elections and partisan bickering in full-blown democracies. But critics, including a number of party insiders, say that China’s secretive selection process, rooted in personal networks, has actually created a meritocracy of mediocrity.

Those who do less in the way of bold policy during their political rise — and expend their energies instead hobnobbing with senior officials over rice wine at banquets or wooing them with vanity-stroking projects — appear to have a greater chance of reaching the ranks of the top 400 or so party officials, the ones with seats on the Central Committee, the Politburo or its standing committee. Instead of pure talent, political patronage and family connections are the critical factors in ascending to the top, according to recent academic studies and analyses of the backgrounds of the leaders.

There are growing doubts, even among party elites, over whether such a system brings out those best equipped to deal with the challenges facing this nation of 1.3 billion people, with its slowing economic growth, environmental degradation and rising social instability. A series of recent scandals and revelations that the families of top officials can hold billions of dollars’ worth of investments have also led to greater scrutiny over the role of patronage.

Read more on the debate over meritocracy in China:

- Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, by Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu in American Political Science Review (PDF)
- The unintended consequence of the “China-as-meritocracy” debates, from Peking Duck
- Economic Observer podcast: China: A Meritocracy? with Daniel Bell
- The Real China Model, by Mark Elliot in the New York Times

© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Confucianism, Daniel Bell, meritocracy, Politburo Standing Committee, princelings, Xi Jinping
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The Arab Spring that swept away dictatorships across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 unnerved many in the Chinese leadership. Liu Yuan, one of the boldest and most ambitious generals in China’s People’s Liberation Army, was particularly shaken by what he identified as a fatal weakness of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi: his son. Until the revolution, Qaddafi’s second-oldest son, Saif al-Islam, was seen as a Western-leaning reformer, a voice for modernization and democracy. And he was educated in the same class of prestigious overseas universities attended by dozens of princelings (the sons and daughters of high-ranking Chinese officials).

[...] The downfall of Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai presents the best-known case of a princeling who has been what Liu might call “infiltrated.” Family members of Bo, another of Liu’s close princeling friends, have paid an enormous price for not being as guarded as their elite peers. If Saif Qaddafi exposed himself to what Liu calls Western spies at the London School of Economics, then Bo’s son, Bo Guagua did so while studying at Oxford and Harvard, where he grew dangerously entwined with a British businessman and casual intelligence informant, Neil Heywood. (Bo Xilai’s career exploded in March; it emerged soon after that his wife, Gu Kailai, had murdered Heywood last November.)

[...] Liu’s speech built upon an internal report by one of the Party’s senior ideological warriors, Zhu Jidong, who holds a position China’s propaganda system (which he asked me not to identify).

[...] ”When employing those with experience of studying or working in the West we must first examine their political stance,” wrote Zhu. “Those who have a question or problem of politics should be strictly banned from service no matter how talented and capable they are.” Zhu wrote that all returnees need to be urgently “investigated … as soon as possible to check whether they have been ‘peacefully evolved’ by the West.” Only with such vigilance, Zhu insists — to the point of treating the children of the Party as potential traitors — can China avoid the disastrous road of privatization and Westernization dressed up as “reform.” (Chinese who have studied abroad, including princelings, are screened before taking significant government positions, but Zhu recommends the process be far more rigorous.)

See more on Chinese students studying abroad via CDT.

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Post tags: Arab Spring, Bo Guagua, Bo Xilai, Chinese students, Liu Yuan, overseas Chinese students, princelings, Qaddafi, study abroad, universal values
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It’s remarkable that so little is known about what will actually happen during the upcoming conclave. A Service Guide for Journalists notes helpfully that Western-style snacks will be served in the Press Center but there is no real detail about actual events. As of Monday afternoon, an online guide to the upcoming Party Congress had listed only two events directly related to the Communist gathering: a cocktail party for journalists on Nov. 6 and a press conference the day after. Like most press conferences in China, it’s certain Wednesday’s event will be a scripted one in which random journalists won’t be allowed to fling questions at the 18th Party Congress’ spokesperson.

Even the date when the Congress will end is not clear, although many people suspect it will be Nov. 15. “We have no detailed information of the schedule of the 18th Party Congress,” Yue Xiaosong, an official at the 18th Party Congress Press Center, told TIME on Monday. “I don’t know the date when the Congress will finish.” Yue’s only suggestion to TIME was that we should look at previous Party Congress schedules as a general guideline. But he quickly cautioned that we shouldn’t draw too many conclusions from the past. “It will depend on how well the 18th Party Congress goes,” he said, when pressed on just when the confab will end. No details were provided on what he meant by the meeting going “well.” A TIME colleague suggests the wording on the cap in the press swag bag should be changed to: “Somebody I know went to the 18th Party Congress, and all I got was this stupid hat.”

Despite the heightened restrictions in Beijing, The South China Morning Post’s Keith Zhai notes that ordinary mainlanders are “gripped by an overwhelming sense of apathy” and feel little connection to politics. The Telegraph’s Malcolm Moore reports that in contrast with American voters, the Chinese public “remains utterly cut off from the political process,” and those that do care are left to sift through official speeches and state media coverage for hints of what will happen and who will comprise the Politburo Standing Committee:

Indeed, while we know that the leadership change will happen at the 18th Party Congress, which opens on Thursday, we do not know exactly when the new leaders will be unveiled or when the congress will end. Those in China cannot even search for the phrase “18th party congress” on the internet: it has been removed by the censors.

All we can be sure of is that, at some point in the near future, a group of men – and they are all likely to be men – will walk on to a dais in the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square. These will be the seven members of the politburo standing committee, the Chinese equivalent of the Cabinet, selected (by an essentially mysterious process) from among the 25 politburo members originally elected by the party’s 300-strong central committee.

The lack of any real information, however, hasn’t stopped the rumor mill from churning about last-minute horse trading at the top of the party. Sources have told Reuters that ten finalists are vying for seven seats on the Standing Committee, and The New York Times reports that China’s “beleaguered liberals” have their fingers crossed in hope that the reform-minded Guangdong party chief Wang Yang is one of them. Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution provides more details on the “tussle” taking place between the “populist” and “princeling” factions, and what it might mean for regime stability going forward.

Peter Ford of the Christian Science Monitor, meanwhile, spoke to several China analysts who think that closed-door power-broking may give way to a succession protocol based more on consensus under future leadership transitions. Reuters echoed that sentiment in a Tuesday article as well, and went even further, quoting sources who hinted that the Communist Party may not wait until the next generation to adopt a more democratic process for choosing its leadership:

Under their proposal, there would be up to 20 percent more candidates than seats in the new Politburo in an election to be held next week, the sources said. It was unclear if competitive voting would also be extended to the Standing Committee.

“Hu wants expanding intra-party democracy to be one of his legacies,” one source said, requesting anonymity to avoid repercussions for discussing secretive elite politics.

“It would also be good for Xi’s image,” the source added.

Orville Schell writes that the incoming generation of Chinese leaders will not have the rubber stamp of legitimacy that Deng Xiaoping bestowed on Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, nor the mandate typically provided by democratic elections. Instead, he says China “finds itself floating terrifyingly in a gravity-less political world” that continues to spin. From the Asia Society’s China File:

The problem is compounded by the fact that, having relieved through its own reform process of the kind of Big Leader rule which allowed megalomaniacal visions to so often wreak havoc on the country—paradoxically just as the West tirelessly challenged it to—China now finds itself without precisely that kind of bold decision-making power at the top that characterized Deng Xiaoping’s quite extraordinary tenure (June 1989 not withstanding) and enabled him to be such a bold reformer.

With no entitled big leader, no confirmed political system capable of conferring legitimacy on new leaders, and no set plan for the future, China nonetheless still finds itself forced somehow to choose a new leadership team. This has left “the people,” who have no real role to play in this process, feeling quite shut out and nervous about what the future holds for them.

Although it is impossible to know what is actually going inside the black box where China’s leaders wrangle over their future, people hear that the process has been intense, even acrimonious. And, since they do not even know what each leader or faction actually stands for, a climate of uncertainty and anxiety has been increasing. Such feelings are hardly surprising, for here in China everything is veiled, hidden, and opaque. And yet, this whole amazingly dynamic proposition continues to hurtle down the tracks, just as I am doing now, even as everyone knows that somewhere ahead, the tracks end. Nobody, especially the present leadership, seems to quite know how to resolve this crisis in confidence, how to pick those who will follow them and write the script for the next act that will set China’s future course.

The information vacuum also hasn’t stopped the Chinese press from saturating the newspapers and airwaves with stories about the congress. Danwei’s Barry van Wyk surveyed the front pages on Monday and found predictable yet “utterly uniform” coverage, though some papers broke ranks to report on Bo Xilai’s expulsion from the CCP and other news. Elsewhere, David Bandurski of The China Media Project has made “fruitless” searches for “18th Party Congress” within the realms of Chinese social media. Today, he highlighted a post on Sina Weibo which speculated about the lineup of the congress and was deleted by censors.

Reform remains the key buzzword in the press as the opening of the congress draws closer, but McClatchy Newspapers’ Tom Lasseter spoke to several academics who suggested that the West should temper its expectations of major political changes. The biggest policy developments, they say, will likely come in the economic arena. Caixin has published a list of 18 recommended economic reforms that the incoming leadership should pursue, a list that includes SOE reforms, environmental protection and tax cuts among other more ambitious requests such as downsizing the government itself.

Finally, beneath the pomp and circumstance that is sure to blanket the congress, The Guardian’s Tania Branigan reminds readers that the Communist Party does have a bit of governing to do as well:

The Chinese leadership “knows the legitimacy of the party now depends on performance, in terms of delivering services and improvements in living standards”, said Steve Tsang, an expert on Chinese politics at the University of Nottingham.

The result is what he calls “a consultative Leninist system … They want to know what people think so they can take away the causes of discontent and potential challenges to the party. That’s not the same as the accountability we would talk about and expect in Europe or North America; it’s more of a safety valve and has an element of [the Maoist injunction] ‘from the masses, to the masses’.”

See also a Reuters’ primer on the congress, which details the likely agenda and ponders potential new policy initiatives that the delegates may introduce, and previous CDT coverage of the 18th Party Congress.

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Post tags: 18th party congress, Beijing, Bo Xilai, CCP 5th generation, censorship, Deng Xiaoping, economic reform, Great Hall of the People, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, legitimacy, Politburo Standing Committee, political reform, princelings, sina weibo, Wang Yang
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The Chinese Communist Party is broadly divided between informal “elitist” and “populist” coalitions, according to China expert and Brookings Institution analyst Cheng Li. Other analysts conceive of the split in different terms, such as between liberal-minded reformist and conservative hard-liner camps.

[...] Hu’s heir apparent, Xi, is a princeling, whereas Wen’s likely successor, Li Keqiang, represents the tuanpai.

[...] Their factional inclinations are reflected in their policy priorities, says Li of the Brookings Institution. Xi is focused on the private sector, market liberation in foreign investment, and Shanghai’s role as a financial and shipping center. In contrast, Li Keqiang emphasizes affordable housing, basic health care and clean energy.

This equilibrium extends within the upper echelons of the leadership, which is about evenly split between the elitists and populists, according to Li. Most analysts concur that the era of charismatic, paramount leaders ended after Deng Xiaoping, replaced by relatively colorless technocrats who governed through collective leadership.

John Garnaut at the Sydney Morning Herald offers more details about the effects of the political jockeying for the 18th Party Congress personnel lineup:

Earlier, President Hu Jintao’s key powerbroker, Ling Jihua, was removed as head of the party’s General Office after being implicated in a cover-up of his son’s death in a high-speed Ferrari accident.

[...] ”It is a state of extreme chaos,” said political watcher Li Weidong. ”There is no absolute authority, otherwise two sides won’t bite each other like this.”

[...] Mr Hu appears to have won crucial appointments in the People’s Liberation Army, particularly the new Chief of the General Staff, Fang Fenghui, as first reported by the Age last Tuesday.

This would suggest Mr Hu is gaining strength in the military while losing it at party central.

See more on the 18th Party Congress via CDT.

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP 5th generation, factions, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Ling Jihua, princelings, Youth League faction
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Those close to Mr. Xi who are urging reform go well beyond the usual liberal intellectual voices. They include active and retired officials, childhood friends from China’s “red nobility,” army generals and even a half-sister, Xi Qianping. Mr. Xi and his allies have dropped a few hints recently that Mr. Xi is at least open to hearing new ideas.

[…] Analysts say that Mr. Xi faces great political risks in taking on the nation’s many vested interests and possibly repudiating Mr. Hu’s policies. Moreover, the authority of the top office has become more diffuse with each generation, and Mr. Xi would need to marshal powerful alliances to push through changes. Another obstacle to change is the way that Mr. Xi’s own circle has profited from the current system: Bloomberg News reported in June that some members of Mr. Xi’s family had amassed fortunes totaling at least several hundred million dollars.

[…] And even among his supporters, there are some who question whether any adopted reform mantle would be more show than substance. “No matter whether Xi actually reforms China or not,” said a member of a prominent military family, “he has to entertain reforms, for the sake of the reformists and the public.”

Calls for reform and the extent of Xi’s inclination and ability to answer them were also discussed recently by Chris Buckley at Reuters (via CDT).

© Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: 18th party congress, CCP 5th generation, China model, Hu Deping, leadership transition, political reform, princelings, reform, reformers, Xi Jinping
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