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China news tagged with: public intellectuals (59)

• Yu Jianrong (于建嵘): Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability (Part 4 )

  

  Dr. Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), chairman of the Social Issues Research Center of the Rural Development Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences, delivered a speech entitled “Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability” before the Beijing Lawyers Association on December 26, 2009. This is part 4 of the CDT translation, here are part 1. part 2 and part 3.

  I have made a simple conclusion about workers’ problems. Workers’ key problem in the restructuring of state owned work units will be conflicts between workers and management.

  As for problems concerning city residents, I have not conducted specialized research. I have a Ph.D. colleague who is now a teacher at a Party school. Her Ph.D. dissertation was written specifically about city residents’ rights defense. This year I attended the dissertation defense of four Ph.D. candidates at Renmin University who majored in international politics. Three of the Ph.D candidates all wrote about city residents’ rights defense. Now there are more and more scholars who are starting to care about city residents’ rights defense. According to their research, building demolitions are a key issue. The most serious conflict caused by building demolitions occurred in Longnan, Gansu Province. November 17th last year [2008], the municipal Party committee building was smashed in. We predict that mass incidents sparked by city residents’ rights defense activities will increase. Everyone should pay close attention to this. The most recent case was a relatively large mass incident near Kunming’s Luosi Bay that was sparked by demolitions. Not long ago I went to Kunming especially so that I could understand what happened near Luosi Bay.

  I have just spoken about situations where workers, rural farmers, and city residents are involved in rights defense. Now, I will make some simple generalizations about the characteristics of their activities. First, I believe that city residents’ rights defense activities are all about financial interest. Whether you are talking about workers, rural farmers, or city residents, the most notable characteristic of rights defense activities is that they are battles over financial interests, and are not battles over power. Said more simply, it’s all about the money and not about life or death. They just want money. They don’t want your political power, nor do they want your position as an official. This all-about-the-money approach is not about starting a revolution; it’s about getting money. No one is going out in the streets saying that the Communist Party must hand over its political power or that local officials must hand over their political power. No one is proposing that people should revolt and seize power like during the Cultural Revolution. Even if the government is destroyed, it would be about financial interests and [people] would not want [the government’s] power. No one is proposing to destroy the government and build a new government. A struggle over financial interests is the main characteristic of the rights defense activities of workers, rural farmers and city residents.
  　　
  I’ll tell a story. In 2007, a huge problem occurred in China’s Guangdong province. A group of farmers in Shanwei organized a search and confiscation team. To whose home did they go to search and confiscate? They went to the homes of village and township cadres. They said, “You’ve sold our land, so we’re coming to search your home and confiscate your property.” This scared a lot of township and village cadres so much that they ran away. On May 7th of the year, I accompanied a national leader to Guangdong to conduct an investigation. On May 8th Zhang Dejiang, Secretary of the Guangdong Party Committee at the time, and member of the Central Politburo of the Communist Party, gave a report to the national leader. He said that in Guangdong Province these last few years there had been many problems; however, the provincial Party Committee after investigation and research came to the conclusion that these were all “contradictions among the people.” What are “contradictions among the people?” These are problems that can all be solved by using renminbi—the people’s currency. (Laughter) This is funny, but I think he was right. That night I met with editorialists from Southern Weekend and Southern Daily. I said that in my view, Zhang Dejiang, this kind of high ranking leader within the Communist Party, is familiar with the problems China currently faces. The biggest problem is a struggle over financial interests. The fact that struggles are about financial interests and are not about power is a key reason why, in our judgment, China is currently experiencing so many mass incidents. This is the first characteristic.

  The second characteristic [of rights defense activities] is that “rule awareness” is greater than “rights awareness” (PowerPoint slide) This is what this person said. Her name is Elizabeth Perry. She is a world famous political scientist. In 2007, she published an important article entitled, “The Rights Awareness of Chinese People.” She said that since 1989, Westerners all thought that China would collapse. However it has almost been twenty years and the Chinese Communist Party has still not collapsed. When Westerners see Chinese people take to the streets they are ecstatic, they say once again that the Communist Party is going to collapse. But after a few days [the Chinese people] go back. Why? She says that “we Western scholars have all misjudged the situation and there is a key reason why; we don’t understand what ordinary Chinese people are thinking. Actually, ordinary Chinese people take to the streets for different reasons than us Westerners. When Westerners take to the streets they are talking about rights; however when Chinese people take to the streets they are talking about rules.”
  　　
  This sentence is hard to understand so let me give an example and you’ll understand. Why do Chinese people take to the streets? Ordinary Chinese people will say, “You promised to give me ten Yuan, why are you now only giving me five Yuan? You’re not honoring your word. Your law says that rural people should be having elections and that land takings should only occur if the villagers approve. So why aren’t there elections? Why are you selling our land without gaining our approval? You local governments are not doing things according to the nation’s laws.” In summary the issue is about the [government] not honoring its word. So what do Westerners say when they take to the streets? They say, “Why are you only giving us ten Yuan? According to human rights, according to natural rights, you should be giving us one hundred Yuan. Your rules [providing ten Yuan] are wrong.
  　　
  The vast amount of ordinary Chinese people’s behavior, I classify as legal resistance. They’ll use your own laws to resist you, and won’t say the law itself is wrong. It’s very rare that an ordinary person will say that the law is wrong. The only people that say this is are us [lawyers]. If you go to the “petitioning village” in Beijing, you will discover petitioners often copy large numbers of documents. These documents most often say that local government rules contravene central government rules. No one dares challenge the central government’s rules. Elizabeth Perry thinks that this is the key to why China has not collapsed. She says that supposing there comes a day when the Chinese masses universally think that the rules are wrong, then [the government’s] political power will be in serious danger. Therefore, Elizabeth Perry says that the Communist Party should count its blessings. [China’s] people are so reasonable! [China’s] people are just saying you haven’t followed the rules; if you follow the rules, then we’ll support you. In July 2008 Elizabeth Perry invited me to Harvard University. We had discussions that lasted for one week. We wrote an article, if you’re interested you can take a look. It’s called, “China’s Political Tradition and Development—Yu Jianrong in Dialogue With Elizabeth Perry,” published in Nanfeng Chuang. Yesterday’s Southern Weekend published another exchange between myself and Elizabeth Perry. The title is called “The Vitality and Predicaments of Chinese Politics.” It discusses: where does the vitality of the Chinese Communist Party lie? How much longer can it live?

  The third characteristic [of rights defense activities] is that they are more about reactions [to events] and less about moving [a cause] forward. What does this mean? It means that for problems involving ordinary Chinese people; if [the government] doesn’t mess with them, then they usually won’t dare to mess with [the government]. For example, regarding demolition, people will say: “Why are you tearing down my house; how can you tear down my house and not pay compensation?” Supposing someone clearly knew that a house demolition would have benefits, they definitely wouldn’t dare go and find [the government] and say “Why don’t you tear down my house?” This is an illustration of the principle: if [the government] doesn’t mess with them, then they won’t mess with [the government].

  [To be continued]

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  • March 10, 2010 10:13 AM

• Yu Jianrong (于建嵘): Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability (Part 3 )

  

  Dr. Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), chairman of the Social Issues Research Center of the Rural Development Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences, delivered a speech entitled “Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability” before the Beijing Lawyers Association on December 26, 2009. This is the 3rd part of the CDT translation, Part 1 is here. Part 2 is here.

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  • March 8, 2010 12:23 PM

• Yu Jianrong (于建嵘): Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability (Part 2 )

  

  Dr. Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), chairman of the Social Issues Research Center of the Rural Development Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences, delivered a speech entitled “Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability” before the Beijing Lawyers Association on December 26, 2009. This is the 2nd part of the CDT translation, Part I is here.

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  • March 8, 2010 12:22 AM

• Yu Jianrong: Maintaining a Baseline of Social Stability (Part I )

  

  Speech before the Beijing Lawyers Association, translated by CDT:

  Author: Yu Jianrong
  Source: NewSMTH.Net
  Date posted by source: February 17, 2010
  Date posted by this website: February 20, 2010, 7:50 PM
  Number of hits: 13,033

  Time: December 26, 2009
  Location: Beijing Ministry of Finance, Assembly Hall

  Host: Hello, everybody. In recent years because society’s resources have been allocated in an irrational manner, because of inequities in income distribution, because of the wide gap and the polarization between rich and poor, and because of a flood of corruption, etc., contradictions within society have been aggravated, conflicts have intensified, and an anti-government, anti-rich mindset has become a serious problem. Mass incidents are sparked now and then by invasions of citizens’ basic rights, such as environmental pollution, land confiscation, building demolition, business restructuring, illegal administrative acts, and unfair judicial decisions. Unfortunate incidents occurring on a large scale are happening more and more often, such as the Weng’an incident* and the Gansu Longnan incident**. These incidents have affected national security and social stability. Lawyers have also undertaken representation for many legal issues related to mass incidents. So currently, what are the characteristics of mass incidents in our nation? How should lawyers handle these mass incident cases? What issues does one have to pay attention to in the process of handling these mass incident cases? How does one protect oneself and avoid legal danger? Today we are very honored to invite Professor Yu Jianrong to give a speech entitled “Social Conflict and the Constructive Role of Lawyers.” Everyone, please welcome Professor Yu!

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  • March 6, 2010 1:35 AM

• Xu Youyu (徐友渔): From 1989 to 2009: 20 Years of Evolution in Chinese Thought (2/2)

  

  During Mother’s Day weekend on May 10th, a number of intellectuals in Beijing organized a seminar discussing 20 years of the democracy movement in China. The seminar started with a moment of silence, paying tribute to the Tiananmen Mothers.

  Xu Youyu (徐友渔), professor and researcher at Philosophy Institute of The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), presented the following text at the seminar, from peacehall.com, translated by E. Shih. This is Part II of his talk. Part I is here:

  Ideological Fantasy is Shattered by the Sound of Guns

  In order to explain the severity and deep ramifications of the June 4th gunning, I would like to say that the old ideology has such a long history and such a strong, tough hold that the people would never have been free of it without the fresh blood of June Fourth. In order to demonstrate the ideology’s insidious, barely perceptible powers of osmosis, I will add boldly an observation of 1989 that will most certainly be controversial: In fact, a significant portion of the spiritual resources supporting the 1989 student movement came from the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology. The effectiveness of this ideology was destroyed in its self-massacre.

  It’s not that the students did not know how serious the consequences could be for rushing out of the school gates into the streets and squares for a mass protest under Communist Party rule. That’s only one side of the story. The other side of the story is that the CCP has been indoctrinating students on campus with teachings on “May Fourth,” “January 29th,” and “the Patriotic Students Movement,” and these movements became a mobilizing spiritual force. They seeded a deep belief in the students of their own legitimacy and of justice, so that they truly believed that the connection between the values of “patriotism, democracy” and the movement was natural.

  As a revolutionary party, the CCP knows well how to wield the resources of ethnic history. It incorporated “May Fourth” and “January 29th” into its own ideological system, but it did not fully understand the double-edged nature of these resources. In reality, students in the “August Ninth People’s Movement” thought of themselves as the successors of the “May Fourth” and “January 29th” spirit. During that time, I heard directly and indirectly of CCP officials passing on their past revolutionary experiences to the students. The spiritual resonance on both sides was very natural. I should also mention that, out of ideological habit, the regime for the most part endorsed the students’ “passionate patriotism” in abstract terms. This, no doubt, made the students feel that their actions were continuous with and not rebelling against the heritage of recent Chinese revolutionism. Not until the guns sounded were they shocked by the regime’s sudden about-face.

  After the June Fourth suppression, the regime fabricated a theory of “liberalized intellectuals” being the grand “puppet master” behind the students’ actions: the black threads ran from Fang Lizhi to his wife Li Shuxian to student leader Wang Dan to regular students. Even if we put aside the fact that this theory is extremely far-fetched, and assume for a moment that there was such a black thread in addition to the influence of the general intellectual atmosphere of the time upon students, we could not explain why tens of thousands of students—who had passed through political background checks in order to enter college in the first place—would become “anti-party and anti-socialism.”

  I remember clearly going to Tiananmen Square in May of 1989 and trying to persuade the Beijing Steel and Iron Institute (now the University of Science and Technology Beijing) students who were meditating there in protest to go back to school. I said the troops were about to enter the city, and the suppression was about to start. Two doctoral students said without a second thought, “Why would the people’s army suppress us?” The students’ naiveté and earnestness make me sigh even today.

  The students were as such, and civilians were generally not far off. Beijing citizens blocked military vehicles and martial officers from entering the city, while simultaneously bringing food and drink to the troops in support of their men. When the guns were fired, the people’s first reaction was shock and hurt, followed by rage.

  During the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, a student movement leader said, just before the violent suppression began, that they would use fresh blood to awaken the Chinese people. These words were unfortunately prescient. Using such methods and paying such a price to obtain an understanding of Chinese history and political reality is particularly unfortunate; but the kind-hearted Chinese people could not have woken up with a jolt if not for this cruel blow.

  From Democracy to Human Rights and Legalization
  
  The heart of the 1989 student movement’s demands was democracy, and it brought with it a strong sense of justice-seeking within the system. We can see this from the seven demands of the April 18 petition that the students sent to the standing committee of the People’s Congress. The first demand was a fair evaluation of Hu Yaobang. The second was a disavowal of the “spiritual purge” and “anti-liberalization” movements. The third was the disclosure of property records for leaders and their children. The fourth asked for the end of media censorship and a new media law. The fifth asked for increased educational funds and a salary raise for intellectuals. The sixth asked for the annulment of Beijing’s anti-demonstration rules. The seventh asked for unrestricted reporting on student activities.

  This is a clear reflection of the demands for human rights and legalization that came 20 years later. We could say that “Charter 08” has distilled the demands for human rights and legalization.

  To start with fundamentals, democracy and human rights are universal values that are sought after by peoples across the world. However, in China’s specific situation, democracy has actually become a familiar mainstream ideological concept. The Chinese Communist Party is a bad match for democracy, whether in terms of structural principles or in executed action; yet it has inherited the May Fourth concept of “democracy” in name. Furthermore, it successfully wielded this concept in the battle for legitimacy with the Kuomintang, using the slogan “We Want Democracy.”

  To the current regime, “human rights” is a more sensitive term than “democracy,” and to Chinese people who are fighting for democracy, it is also a bolder concept. Only with that meaning in mind can we understand the scene described by Bao Zunxin in his memoire, June Fourth Behind the Scenes: an Incomplete Nirvana: On January 28, 1989, a group of intellectuals gathered at the Doule Bookstore in Beijing. Fang Lizhi made a speech calling for human rights, and the response was so quiet you could have heard a pin drop. The whole gathering fell into an awkward silence.

  After 20 years, the clearest change and contrast in thought is that 20 years ago, everyone was focused on culture; and now, the focal point is on political system. The atmosphere that dominated society in the 80s was “culture fever,” and at the heart of it was “aesthetics fever.” Other hot topics—such as humanism, alienation, subjectivity and an East-West dialectic—all had metaphysical abstractness. As for the sensational political debate television series, “River Elegy,” that was even more clearly using a discourse of civilizational and cultural type—the so-called yellow civilization in contrast with the blue civilization—to analyze China’s practical choices in the real world. This situation has shown itself to have limits, and refracted the frustration. Because of censorship, the people had no choice but to turn their practical anti-authoritarian criticism into a criticism of feudalistic culture. The limitation of this approach was that the intellectual circles were stuck in a rut, discussing problems of “ultimate compassion,” and had no interest or psychological strategies for facing the large-scale changes in society. It is very clear that the intellectuals were at a total loss for strategy in 1989, whether it was in terms of thought or in terms of knowledge.

  20 years later the situation is fundamentally different, because for these 20 years the core of Chinese thought has had a momentous turn: from abstraction to the concrete, from ultimate compassion to scrutiny of policy arrangements. The core of knowledge has also had a momentous turn: from a humanities spirit towards social science, from philosophy and aesthetics towards economics, law, sociology, political science, etc. The legislative demands embody the thinking of current Chinese thought apropos of future nation-building principles and policy arrangement for China. Recently, the emergence of various events in support of rights shows that the demand for human rights has deepened and become more concrete in the past 20 years.

  Persisting in Logical and Gradual Change

  In the 20 years from 1989 to 2009, the Chinese people have had something continuous and stubbornly unchanging: a non-violent, logical, and gradual mode of change.

  Non-violent protest was the unchanging principle of the 1989 democracy movement. The identification with, advocacy of and loyalty to this principle was a special characteristic of that movement, and it was not easy to come by. In several thousand years of Chinese history, the unchanging rule was that of one tyranny replacing another. Among civilians, the idea of taking “the justice of heaven” into ones own hands was very deeply rooted, as well. As for this generation of young people, the influence of “classics” such as Mao Zedong’s “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” taught them that it took brains and courage to abandon their arms, to seek dialogue, and to consider compromise. This “89” generation achieved this stance as a result of the ideological tradition of self-examination and critique.

  In the past 20 years, the people’s understanding of the principle of non-violence has continued to become clearer and deeper. The generation that has experienced the christening of “89” have advocated and remained loyal to this principle as they aided the base level of human rights activism. Combined with the methods of legalizing human rights, this has in recent years had a positive effect on the development and success of human rights activism, as well as China’s legalization.

  After “89,” the outstanding change in China’s thought has been an abandonment of zealous revolutionary ideology. This kind of change has far-reaching ramifications for China as it moves towards modern political civilization. However, in the development of thought, another tendency has also been spawning, and that is a growing cynicism.

  On top of the suppression of mass movement and the purge that quickly followed in the wake of a mass social movement, there was an encroaching get-rich-quick opportunism and trend of going private in the 1990s. This environment led many people to quickly change their mindset from one of grief and anger to one of obedience. Others, in defense of their current way of life, began advocating a certain kind of historical and life philosophy on the level of thought. Their concepts implied that a definitive rupture with the old radical ideology entailed writing off all mass protest. Some even advocated a “paycheck philosophy” in the name of “saying farewell to the revolution,” which was a philosophy of obedience and cynicism.

  Clearly, abandoning radicalism is not equal to not demanding any sort of change; insisting upon a logical and gradual method is not equal to accepting the present situation in a total absence of critique and resistance. Rejecting a totalistic philosophy does not equal not taking no responsibility for society. Currently, the regime relies entirely upon lies and terror to maintain a status quo; today’s Chinese society exists in an atmosphere and ethical situation of no truth-telling and no justice-seeking. The Chinese people who experienced and inherited the spirit of “89” are strongly advocating a kind of assertive civil society consciousness, civic ethics and civic duty. They insist that everyone should say what they really think, and work diligently to change the status quo; that no one can simply accept a life of terror and alienation, and be satisfied in self-preservation and personal benefit.

  From 1989 to 2009, the face and social psychology of China’s society has undergone an enormous change. Yet the standard of thought and knowledge capability of the leaders who took the political stage after “89” did not change. They did not absorb any lessons from the “89” incident; they took no direction from the process of democratization in Taiwan. By contrast, the Chinese people who experienced and inherited the spirit of “89” never stopped learning, thinking and probing. They become more mature by the day. They use their strong will to suffer through the darkness, and use the light of their thought to welcome the future.

  Posted： Friday, May 15, 2009

  Please also read Cui Weiping: Why Do We Need to Talk About June 4th? on CDT.

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  • May 27, 2009 6:27 AM

• Sun Liping (孙立平): The Biggest Threat to China is not Social Turmoil but Social Decay (Part II)

  

  Sun Liping (孙立平) is a professor in the Sociology Department of Tsinghua University. He was also the PhD superviser of Xi Jinping, the current vice-president of the People’s Republic of China and probable successor to President Hu Jintao. Professor Sun’s main research area is modernization and transitional sociology. He wrote the following post on his sociology blog on Feb. 28. It is being widely read in the Chinese blogosphere, and has appeared in major news websites such as Netease and Southern Net.

  The entire post has been translated by CDT’s Linjun Fan. Please click here to read Part I. Here is the second section:

  7. People’s sense of social belonging and cohesion are declining rapidly. The State lost several billions in the CCTV fire accident. However, many people gloated over it on the Internet. There was no sadness or sorrow. This gloating sentiment reflects an unspoken pleasure. Some said that it reflects people’s indifference. Some said that our nation has fallen beyond rescue. Some asked those who gloated over the accident whether it ever came to their mind that they have a share in the billions of assets destroyed in the fire, since CCTV is owned by the state. I remembered that many people wept on street after a large fire accident took place in Shenyang in the 80s. So the reason is not that the Chinese people are ill-natured. What is the real problem? It is that people have lost their sense of belonging in the society. They cried in the Shenyang Fire because they felt that what was destroyed was “ours.” However, in the CCTV fire incident, some people said, let the billions of assets be burned, since it will be eaten away by officials anyway. Some even said that they felt bad that lots of water was used to put out the fire, since we are suffering from drought. These opinions reflect a sense of alienation among many in the public. They feel that the assets belong to “them,” instead of “us”. The psychological alienation reflects a structural alienation [in our society.]

  7、社会认同和社会向心力在急剧流失。正月元宵节央视一场大火，损失达几十个亿。然而，网络上一片幸灾乐祸之声。没有悲伤，没有痛心。幸灾乐祸中透露的是某种难以言表的快意。有人说，这表明了人们的冷漠；有人说，我们这个民族没救了；还有人问，那些幸灾乐祸的人就没想想烧掉的几十亿当中也有你的一份啊（央视毕竟是国有资产啊）？这让我想起大约是80年代沈阳（？）的一场大火，当时许多人站在大街上痛哭失声。用国民性来解释说不过去吧？！问题在哪里？在对我们这个社会还认同不认同上。在沈阳大火中的痛哭失声，是他们感觉被烧掉的是“我们的”；而在这场央视大火中，有人这样说，几十个亿烧掉就烧掉吧，不被烧掉也会被吃掉。这里的吃喝当然是指公款吃喝。还有人说，心疼的是救火要用掉多少水啊，现在天旱啊。在这些议论的背后，实际上是一种心理上的疏离感，即那些“东西”是“他们的”，而不是“我们的”。心理的疏离是结构性疏离的反射。

  8. The society has lost the ability to think ahead to the long-term. The interest group that formed from the combination of power and money just focused on the present. They don’t have either a sense of responsibility that ancient emperors felt towards future generations, or an aristocratic spirit of detachment and transcendence. In our society, there is a tendency to exaggerate short-term problems and ignore long-term ones. We are extremely nervous about the problems in front of our eyes, but have no sight on the issues that will impact our offspring and our long-term development. Getting drunk when there is some liquor available, this is our institutional behavior. We exhaust our reproductive capacity in resources and the environment. We procrastinate systematic reform again and again. Handan [a small city in Hebei provonce] has changed seven mayors in ten years. A mayor’s average term nationwide is 1.7 years. The new administration needs to have a transitional period from the previous one and then needs to look for successors… Officials only care about power and the immediate distribution of interests. They don’t have much time for real business.

  8、社会失去进行长远思维的能力。在权贵资本主义上形成的既得利益集团又过于注重眼前，既无古代帝王对子孙后代的责任，有无贵族的超脱和超越精神。在我们的社会中，有一种倾向，即短期问题夸大症与长期行为麻木症并存。对于所有眼前遇到的问题，无一不草木皆兵；而对于关乎子孙后代、社会长远发展的问题，则一概视而不见。今朝有酒今朝醉，成为一种体制性行为。在资源和环境问题上的竭泽而渔，在体制的弊病上能拖就拖。邯郸十年换了七任市长，全国市长任期平均1.7年。新班子上马前半段是被“扶上马，送一程”，后半段则是寻找培养接班人。眼前的权力与利益分配就是一切，真正做事情的时间没有多少。

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  • March 12, 2009 9:54 PM

• Chinese Intellectuals and the Problem of Xinjiang

  

  China Beat reviews Wang Lixiong’s 2007 book on Xinjiang, “Wo de Xiyu, Ni de Dongtu” (My Far West, Your East Turkestan):

  Wang Lixiong first began to study Xinjiang in 1999, when he travelled there to prepare research for a book along the lines of Sky Burial. He was arrested for photocopying an internal publication, stamped as “secret,” on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (the notorious bingtuan), and attempted suicide in a high-security prison in Miquan before recanting and promising to collaborate in order to obtain his release. He recorded the incident in a short essay entitled Memories of Xinjiang (Xinjiang zhuiji), published in 2001 and reprinted as an introduction to the present volume. In prison, he shared a cell with a Han prisoner accused of economic crimes (“Uncle Chen”), and a Uyghur prisoner arrested in Beijing for organizing a demonstration protesting discrimination (Mokhtar), with whom he entered into a long and ongoing discussion on Xinjiang that forms the backbone of the book.

  In the form of memories of prison conversations with Mokhtar, Wang Lixiong sketches out a preliminary analysis of the “Xinjiang problem,” which he believes has entered a phase of “Palestinization.” He begins with some anecdotal examples of what he calls the Han “colonial attitude,” citing the resistance to “Urumchi time”[1] among local Hans, and their worship of Wang Zhen (1908-1993), Party secretary of Xinjiang from 1949 to 1955

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  • March 10, 2009 2:23 PM

• Mao Yushi: I’m an Optimist

  

  From Economic Observer Online:

  The EO continues its special focus series on Mao Yushi, prominent reformist, economist, and social critic. For more on Mao’s background, see our earlier report.

  Guo Yukuan: Like many intellectuals of the time, you started as a railway engineer. How did you turn to study economics later on?

  Mao Yushi: It was very late when I began to come into contact with economic theory. That said, since the early 1950s, I had already taken a deep interest in operations analysis. At that time, I had found an English book relating how the British used operations analysis to detect German submarines. From that book, I learned how to reduce coal-consumption and improve efficiency in the railway system. That was probably the first time I dealt with the economics.

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  • February 7, 2009 7:20 PM

• Mao Yushi: An Intellectual Recounts China’s Turbulent Past

  

  From Economic Observer Online:

  When word came that Chairman Mao Zedong had passed away, Mao Yushi was hand-copying a file in his office at the Ministry of Railways. He heard the sound of hurrying footsteps and people weeping outside his door.

  Mao put down his pen and went home immediately. “This was the biggest news I’d heard. I knew China would have a big change,” he recalled. At the same time, he said, he felt “a mixture of hollowness and sadness.”

  An era had ended. A country had a new opportunity to start over. It was a turning point for Mao Yushi, too. From the emotional darkness that had enveloped him for many years, he began to walk out to find a new fate.

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  • January 21, 2009 6:05 AM

• China TV Faces Propaganda Charge

  

  From BBC News:

  Chinese intellectuals have signed an open letter calling for a boycott of state television news programmes.

  The letter says China’s Central Television (CCTV) has turned its news and historical drama series into propaganda to brainwash its audience.

  The author of the damning letter told the BBC that the action should at least serve as a health warning to the susceptible public.

  The authorities have been alarmed by the latest development.

  
  An AP report includes a response from CCTV:

  In a lengthy response faxed to The Associated Press, Wang Jianhong, deputy director of the CCTV general editing department, defended the broadcaster’s record, saying that CCTV had done “timely and sufficient reports” including last year’s Sichuan earthquake, the Tibetan riots and the ongoing tainted milk scandal.

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  • January 13, 2009 8:29 AM

• Zhou Guoping: “What a Dull Era We Are Living In!”

  

  Author and philosopher Zhou Guoping (周国平) is a researcher at the Philosophy Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is well-known in Chinese intellectual circles as the translator of Nietzsche. The following quote from his blog, has been frequently cited in many Chinese online forums. Translated by CDT’s Linjun Fan:

  “What a dull era we are living in!

  I look around and find everybody is busy, with weariness, greed and helplessness on their faces. There is no sparkle of excitement in their eyes. Seniors get together in parks and enjoy themselves in dancing, but kids are confined in classrooms all day bent over endless school work.

  I see scholars hectically attend various meetings and forums and laud each other as great masters, creating an unprecedentedly boisterous atmosphere in an era without real academic masters.

  I see publishers collaborate with mass media to produce one cluster of bestsellers after another, successfully turning reading from a personal interest into a mass revelry.

  I see real estate developers work closely with officials, resolutely sweeping away historical architecture and ancient streets, and replacing them with monotonous large squares and columns of skyscrapers.

  I see many things interesting are being destroyed, and the phenomenon of no-fun is spreading.

  I can’t help but lament that what a dull era I am living in.”

  “这是一个多么无趣的时代。

  我朝四周看，看见人人都在忙碌，脸上挂着疲惫、贪婪或无奈，眼中没有兴趣的光芒。我看见老人们一脸天真，聚集在公园里做儿童操和跳集体舞，孩子们却满脸沧桑，从早到黑被关在校内外的教室里做无穷的功课。

  我看见学者们繁忙地出席各种名目的论坛和会议，在会上互选为大师，使这个没有大师的时代有了空前热闹的学术气氛。

  我看见出版商和媒体亲密联盟，适时制造出一批又一批畅销书，成功地把阅读由个人的爱好转变为大众的狂欢。

  我看见开发商和官员紧密合作，果断地将历史悠久的古建筑和老街区夷为平地，随后建造起千篇一律的大广场和高楼群。

  我看见许多有趣的事物正在毁灭，许多无趣的现象正在蔓延。

  我不得不说，我生活在一个多么无趣的时代。”

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  • October 3, 2008 9:51 PM

• Cui Weiping: My Humanity is Frozen and Numb

  

  Professor Cui Weiping (崔卫平) teaches at the Beijing Film Academy. A literary and film critic and scholar, she is also known in Chinese intellectual circles for translating Václav Havel’s works into Chinese. She writes about her moral struggle over the Milk Powder Scandal in her blog, translated by CDT’s Linjun Fan:

  “I need to write down slowly how I feel about the Baby Milk Powder Scandal. How horrible it is that more than ten thousand babies were hospitalized and many more harmed (by contaminated milk power)!

  What can I say? What can we say? Am I waiting for other people to say what has not been said? Looking around, I find that many friends are as trapped in silence as I am. They are also tormented by speechlessness.

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  • September 25, 2008 12:01 PM

• Video: “What Does China Think?” – Mark Leonard

  

  From UC Berkeley’s “Conversations With History”:

  Mark Leonard, Executive Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations

  Conversations host Harry Kreisler welcomes Mark Leonard, Executive Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, for a discussion of the ideas that are influencing the domestic and foreign policy debates in China. Through a careful examination of what Chinese intellectuals have to say on topics such as democracy, economy, and international relations, Leonard finds distinctive Chinese worldviews. The West must understand the contours of these debates to effectively address China’s rise because they offer important insights into how China will use its enormous power to shape world order in the twenty-first century.

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  • August 23, 2008 10:13 PM

• BOCOG: “I Do Not Think There Was Any Wrongdoing”

  

  Beijing-based legal scholar Xu Zhiyong (许志永) writes on his blog, translated by CDT:

  Seven-year-old Yang Peiyi sang a lovely song for the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. However, audiences all over the world thought that the song was sung by another girl, Lin Miaoke, whose picture was published on the New York Times and who became a household name after the ceremony. Lin replaced Yang to appear on stage because she was better-looking. Nobody knew that the lovely voice actually was Yang’s until a music director revealed the truth accidentally. Many Chinese people became outraged at the lie. Why did they cheat? How could the appearance of a seven year old affect China’s national interest?

  However, Wang Wei, Executive Vice President of Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee said, “This is a collective decision. It was done to achieve the best dramatic effect. I do not think there was any wrongdoing.”

  They covered up this typical cheating behavior as “cooperation,” and thought that it was quite normal! If it was cooperation between Yang and Lin, why didn’t they announce that the voice was Yang’s? Intellectual property rights have been emphasized a lot for the Olympics, how come they forgot about it? In fact, such a cover-up didn’t make much sense, because we know that they were lying. It’s such a great pity that they have never learned how shameful it is to lie in the civilized world.

  Fireworks were forged at Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, and Pavarotti’s singing was actually a recorded audio. However, those who cheated then were not as unscrupulous as officials of the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee. They admitted that the fireworks shown on TV were to create a festive atmosphere, and Pavarotti didn’t sing because he was suffering from cancer. They asked for forgiveness. However, the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee just said “Oh, it’s nothing.”

  BOCOG may feel wronged, or even feel that anti-China media are again making trouble out of the blue. Actually the media’s reaction was quite normal. Reporters are normal people, and all normal people would be angry if they knew the truth after they cheered for Lin. The world was acting in a normal way. It’s the BOCOG bureaucrats who were abnormal. Although they’ve tried very hard, they still are not used to an open and civilized modern society, and they are not used to public criticism, which an official in a democratic society often encounters…

  Also, they made a grand announcement of opening three parks for demonstrations, which I had thought to be a sign of openness. However, several petitioners who I am familiar with have disappeared after they applied for demonstrations. It has become a trap. The whole world knows what has happened, but the BOCOG still says that all applications for demonstrations have been “properly handled.” They might think that all mankind are idiots.

  China’s image is being ruined by these people who tell lies shamelessly to the world. They should just admit when they do something wrong. What can be lost if they sincerely make an apology? If they take a little bit of responsibility for China’s international image, they should have realized that it’s better to boost China’s image through telling fewer lies than staging an extravagant opening ceremony.

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  • August 18, 2008 2:41 PM

• How China Is Read

  

  In Democracy Journal, exiled dissident Hu Ping reviews Mark Leonard’s book What Does China Think?:

  Like others, Leonard posits that China’s rise “is the big story of our age and its after-effects could echo down generations to come.” The task he assigns himself is daunting. One should look skeptically at any book that promises to explain how a country as large as China thinks, particularly when it only has 224 pages.

  Leonard’s approach is to economize. He doesn’t tell the reader what China as a whole thinks; rather, he acquaints the reader with the ideas of a small group of individuals he describes as the “intellectuals” who are shaping their country’s future. But the dozens of figures discussed at length in the book are all “insiders,” friends, if not members, of the political establishment–figures like economist Zhang Weiying, the first associate dean of the Guanghua School of Management at Beijing University; Wang Hui, a research professor at Tsinghua University; and Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University. The author interviewed none of the many influential dissident Chinese intellectuals based in China and overseas.

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  • June 11, 2008 1:51 PM

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