This of course isn’t just one media outlet’s personal history. We’re in a period of transition. The reality of China’s reform is that there are ups and downs and countless missteps. And the hardest part of reform is breaking old patterns, because no one is willing to give up their vested interests.

[…] In the past, many reforms have been unsuccessful because reformers romanticized them. They thought that with courage and planning, complex reforms could be carried out relatively quickly.

There are many people who call for reform and discuss policies, but there are very few who dare take responsibility, suffer and bear the trials involved in the reform process.

There’s nothing romantic about reform. It’s like dripping water wearing down stone. It takes long-term persistence and the tenacity to never give up, even when it seems like a hopeless cause.

A media outlet that’s willing to take responsibility will certainly share the same fate and breathe the same air as the era it lives in. We always believe that this is the era that can decide the future. All the dreams that China has for the future depend on what you and I do today.

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Post tags: economic observer, news media, newspapers, reform
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“Political reforms didn’t stop under Hu [Jintao] and Wen [Jiabao] – they went backwards. So just like when people started talking about the Hu-Wen ‘new deal’ in 2003, now we start to talk about the Xi-Li ‘new deal’, it’s just wishful thinking.”

[…] Asked what he would say to Mr Obama, if he ever got the chance, Mr Chen said that ignoring China’s record on human rights was undermining America’s standing in the world.

“I would tell Mr Obama there is no small matter in international diplomacy. If an agreement between the US and China can’t be fulfilled, then US credibility as the standard bearer of universal values, freedom and democracy will be jeopardised.”

In op-ed at The Washington Post, Chen and Geng He, wife of vanished rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, urge the White House to push for an end to persecution of activists, lawyers and their families in China:

Our stories are flip sides of the same coin. Geng He sought asylum in the United States after Chinese authorities detained and brutally tortured her husband, the rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. Chen Guangcheng, a legal activist, was a prisoner of conscience for many years before escaping house arrest last spring. Now in America, he is studying at New York University and advocating on behalf of his relatives, who continue to endure persecution in China because of his activism.

While our stories are different, the theme is the same: The Chinese government targets rights advocates and their families.

[…] Our stories are just two examples of Chinese authorities acting with impunity and complete disregard for the rule of law. But the attacks on our families are especially worrisome because they show that the government targets not only activists and their families but also the lawyers who have an ethical obligation to defend their clients’ rights against government abuses. Gao once said that you cannot be a rights lawyer in China without becoming a rights case yourself. And when these essential advocates and their families are targeted by the government, the international community must speak out on their behalf.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: asylum, Barack Obama, Chen Guangcheng, Gao Zhisheng, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, reform, rights lawyers, rule of law, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping
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The data on which the analysis is based was first presented in the ambitious 2010 Global Burden of Disease Study, which was published in December in The Lancet, a British medical journal. The authors decided to break out numbers for specific countries and present the findings at international conferences. The China statistics were offered at a forum in Beijing on Sunday.

“We have been rolling out the India- and China-specific numbers, as they speak more directly to national leaders than regional numbers,” said Robert O’Keefe, the vice president of the Health Effects Institute, a research organization that is helping to present the study. The organization is partly financed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the global motor vehicle industry.

What the researchers called “ambient particulate matter pollution” was the fourth-leading risk factor for deaths in China in 2010, behind dietary risks, high blood pressure and smoking. Air pollution ranked seventh on the worldwide list of risk factors, contributing to 3.2 million deaths in 2010.

Wong adds that premature death calculations are “politically threatening in the eyes of Chinese officials,” who have redacted related sections from previous reports. However the reports continue to add up. Several recent studies have also firmed up the link between pollution and birth defects in China.

Indeed, pollution has loomed larger as a threat to Communist Party legitimacy this year – air pollution in Beijing reached record levels in January and thousands of dead pigs were found floating in rivers near Shanghai in March, prompting concerns over water pollution. An aniline spill in Shanxi province in January also caused the contamination of the water supply in a handful of cities, underscoring the growing dangers of China’s polluted rivers.

While bureaucratic infighting may complicate the government’s push to address the problem, Beijing’s government announced last week that it would spend $16 billion over three years to improve sewage disposal, garbage treatment and air quality in the capital city. Still, structural roadblocks exist that may hamper the chances for serious reform. With state-owned enterprises among China’s biggest polluters, and local governments hesitant to do anything that would threaten growth, environmental protection continues to take a backseat to profits. Citing the case of Fujian-based state-owned mining giant Zijin Mining, Reuters details China’s “losing battle” against powerful state-owned polluters:

China has the laws, but its ability to enforce them is weak, especially in the face of giant firms that pour millions into otherwise bereft local government coffers. Critics say Beijing also lacks the will to tackle the problem.

…

Like many state-owned firms, Zijin is more than just an enterprise, and has benefited from a vast state support system giving it access to cheap credit and a blind eye when it comes to pollution. Its dominance of the local economy also means that many officials think that what’s good for Zijin is generally good for the community at large.

The situation is made worse by the fact that state firms like Zijin were carved out of mining bureaus and never quite lost their role as arms of the government, maintaining old relationships and channels of communication as well as running hospitals, schools or retirement homes. For many residents seeking to complain about pollution, it is often difficult to see where the company ends and the state begins.

“The problem tends to involve the capture of the government by various interests – these problems are exacerbated when the company actually is the government,” said Alex Wang, professor at Berkeley and an expert in China’s environmental legislation.

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Post tags: air pollution, CCP legitimacy, death, environmental degradation, pollution, reform, state-owned enterprises, water pollution
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Caijing learned it is likely the new government will gradually implement a policy over the next few years in which couples are allowed to have two children if either spouse is an only child. The nation has already implemented a countrywide two-child policy in which couples can have two children if both spouses are only children.

An official from the National Population and Family Planning Commission who asked not to be named said the most likely scenario after the government restarts population policy adjustment will be for the newly-established national health and family planning commission to come up with an adjustment proposal. Upon approval by the State Council, the proposal will be voluntarily implemented step-by-step in various provinces. Due to concerns about population imbalances in rural areas, policy adjustments will focus first on areas with lower population pressure. Meanwhile, it is likely that the adjustment policy will be implemented last in mega cities like Beijing and Shanghai due to the immense population resources pressure in these areas as well as local authorities’ cautious approach towards population growth.

Bloomberg Businessweek’s Christina Larson writes that talk of reform is gaining momentum in Beijing even if official comments remain:

When asked point-blank what to expect next, the deputy head of China’s State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform told reporters not to anticipate immediate policy changes. Yet as Wang Feng, a sociologist and demography expert at the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy in Beijing, points out in an e-mail interview, that rhetoric may be “purely political.” “The government wants to change but does not want to see total chaos,” he writes. “Insisting no change in policy [is forthcoming] is just lip service for now.”

Wang, however, believes change won’t be long in coming. “As much as the government would like to see a gradual process, the collapse of the policy will be swift,” he predicts. “This is so largely for two reasons: People in the bureaucratic organization of implementing the one-child policy all can see the writing on the wall and have to worry about their career and future, and the cost of implementing any transitional measure [such as the costs of tracking, identifying, and exempting more couples from the policy] would be prohibitive if not impossible with China’s migrating population and the unpopularity of the policy.”

See more on the one-child policy and China’s demographics via CDT.

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Post tags: bureaucracy, demographics, family planning, one-child policy, reform
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Leadership changes in China are thrashed out behind closed doors through horse-trading between new leaders and outgoing or retired leaders anxious to preserve their influence and protect family interests, but reshuffles must go through a choreographed selection process.

Two other sources, who declined to be identified because it is sensitive to discuss elite politics with foreign media, also confirmed that Xi had decided to make Li his vice president rather than Liu.

The National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament, will vote in Xi and Li as president and vice president respectively on March 14. Li Keqiang, the party’s new No.2 official, will succeed Wen Jiabao to become premier and oversee the economy and day-to-day running of the cabinet.

[...]

“It was Xi’s decision and a sign he is strong and able to say ‘no’ to Jiang,” the source told Reuters

Reuters adds that Li’s promotion may also indicate Xi’s willingness to pursue limited reforms. But while he has taken steps to increase the inefficiency and tone down the extravagance of the Chinese government, and even said that the government should tolerate “sharp criticism”, a leaked speech from December also dampened expectations of more substantive political reforms.

Noted political theorist Wu Jiaxiang, however, is keeping the faith that Xi can deliver on reform expectations. From an interview with Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan, via the China Media Project:

YZZK: Those internal speeches by Xi Jinping have created a lot of dissatisfaction. How do [you] view this?

Wu Jiaxiang: My guess is that this is about [addressing] a sense among some prominent old politicians that says basically, look, this Xi Jinping cares only about Deng Xiaoping, he has no use for us — he denies Mao Zedong, he doesn’t mention Jiang Zemin, he talks even less about Hu Jintao. I believe Xi Jinping’s speech at the Central Party School already marked a major compromise, a huge back-step in comparison to how much Deng Xiaoping was willing to give. Deng Xiaoping essentially yielded nothing to the Cultural Revolution faction. Xi Jinping made this [compromise] because he recognised the fact that the Cultural Revolution faction had already made a comeback, that, moreover, this comeback was quite substantial, like a bunch of walking dead if you will. Faced with this situation, how could a General Secretary who has just come to power declare war against these monsters?

A wise politician won’t declare war before they’ve even managed to accomplish something. [Xi Jinping] has a major strategic consideration, and that is to first ensure that this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proceed smoothly. If he didn’t compromise, this would instantly drive a major wedge in the Party. The ripples would run across the internet and through the Party ranks. So Xi Jinping must seek the greatest common denominator. He must find broad consensus — and that comes on the issue of the past thirty years of reform, which no side rejects outright.

[...] It might be that he talks about some things he won’t necessarily do. He may also do things he doesn’t necessarily talk about. There may also be things he’s thinking about that he can neither say nor do. This administration is like an iceberg, and right now we see maybe one-eighth. There are still seven-eighths we haven’t seen yet.

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Post tags: CCP 5th generation, Jiang Zemin, leadership transition, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, NPC 2013, reform, Xi Jinping
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The debate was unusually broad, ranging from the need for property taxes and agricultural support prices to the role of the state in influencing returns to firms and labor. Given the lack of details and firm targets, it’s not clear whether this plan will effectively tackle the sources of inequality that are most harmful to development.

Rapidly growing economies tend to experience widening disparities. China’s growth has lifted some 600 million out of poverty even as its Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, has soared to 0.47 today from 0.25 in the mid-1980s. Although high, China’s Gini is comparable to that of the U.S. and other relatively successfully Asian economies such as Singapore and Malaysia.

The Gini number is less important than the reasons behind it. Inequality is positive when it emanates from productivity increases, entrepreneurial risk-taking and structural changes that produce sustained growth. Harmful inequality comes from distortions that ultimately undermine the development process.

It is the latter kind of inequality that Beijing has been slow to address. First, policy distortions have exaggerated geographical disparities. Second, the government budget has failed to provide equal access to social services. And finally, links between government-party officials and commercial activities have led to excessive rent-seeking.

For The Diplomat, Eve Cary writes that time will tell if the Communist Party can execute on its plan and preserve its legitimacy:

Indeed, the plan, in development for several years, is quite ambitious. It is the specific points–such as garnishing more profits from SOEs and spending more on social services–that have a better chance of success, though at first they may face considerable political pushback. It will be interesting to see how far these reforms go, considering that the new Politburo Standing Committee is dominated by the Jiang faction, with 6 of the 7 protégés of the former president, according to Brookings Institution scholar Cheng Li. Of those 6, 4 are princelings, or sons of Chinese Communist Party revolutionary heroes. In general, Jiang’s faction- sometimes referred to as the Shanghai gang- and the princelings promote the interests of the middle class, entrepreneurs, and the coast, as opposed to the populists, who tend to promote the interests of the common people.

There are other reforms in the pipeline, as well. Last November the State Council backed policy changes that aim to strengthen the property rights of farmers, including such measures as identifying and registering land, and issuing land ownership certificates to farmers. This policy was pushed through by outgoing populist premier Wen Jiabao. Affordable housing has also been a hot issue: in 2012, the central government allocated 37.1 billion dollars (233.26 billion yuan) for subsidized housing projects, up almost 40% from the previous year.

Of all the problems that China faces in the next 25 years, the income gap–and all of the associated issues–is perhaps the most dangerous for the Communist Party and future social stability. For example, in its 2013 Social Development Blue Book, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes that there have been 100,000 “mass incidents” (large protests) every year for several years, and that half of these protests are related to land grabs.

It has become a commonly-held belief among China watchers that the CCP has remained in power through a Faustian bargain with its people–it retains power as long as it maintains economic growth. With so many left behind, there is a growing contingent who are left out of this deal, and they are become increasingly vocal. Despite the elitist bent of the new Standing Committee, one hopes that they have the foresight to continue to focus on this critical issue, and develop effective solutions to it.

See also previous CDT coverage of China’s income inequality.

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Post tags: CCP, economic reform, inequality, political reform, reform, wealth gap
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He […] criticised the intelligentsia – including last year’s Nobel literature prize-winner Mo Yan – for failing to speak out on important issues. “Chinese intellectuals haven’t taken enough responsibility. They always have an excuse, saying they don’t have a reason to talk or don’t have the environment … If they could all stand up, they would have a loud voice,” he told the Guardian.

[…] He said he had also fallen short, noting: “I understand the Chinese political and cultural environment well. I understand people who don’t use their voice. As an intellectual and author I should require myself to do it first. If I don’t do enough, I can’t require other authors to do so. There’s always a reason. There’s always one book or another; timing. But I think as an author I could have taken more responsibility and I didn’t.”

Yan’s novel Lenin’s Kisses, published in the United States last October, sees its British release this week. The book, together with several others, is reviewed by Eric Hayot at Public Books.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: censorship, mo yan, Nobel Prize, reform, writers, writers and literature, yan lianke
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Why does it seem like censorship is getting worse?

You are correct. Over the past decade, the rapid development of the Internet has led people to believe there will be more space for speech. But the constraints [on the press] have actually gotten tighter. Fortunately, journalists are resisting. Otherwise, it would be worse. Now, the government’s domestic strategy is to maintain stability. Hu Jintao once said China should learn from North Korea, and sent people to investigate the Eastern European system. Although this trend began in the Jiang Zemin era, the Hu and Wen administration furthered it, regardless of the cost. For example, they bought the most advanced Internet surveillance technology, say, from CISCO. Internet companies like Sina and Tencent have struck a deal with the authorities—or you might call it collusion. In order to secure their business interests, they spend huge amounts monitoring social media. The […] space society has carved out for free expression is being constricted. Moreover, the “stability maintenance” system is making social management crueler. For example, the way law enforcement handles petitioners and property demolition is becoming ever more gangster-like. Although the media tries to fight, it can’t be a counterweight to the giant “stability maintenance” machine.

[…] Do you think new media, such as social media, can further China’s freedom of speech?

New media by itself is a tool. What is more important is how it is used. The government definitely wants to use it to control and steer public opinion. And, indeed, they are spending hugely on it. People in society hope social media will expand the space for expression. It’s not clear how things will turn out. New media might become society’s tool if society uses it more aggressively. For instance, in the current Southern Weekend and Yanhuang Chunqiu cases, new media played an important role. Without new media, it would have been unimaginable for the propaganda department’s work to have been exposed.

See also Yu Jianrong’s recent critique of China’s rigid “stability maintenance” system via CDT.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Chang Ping, cisco, freedom of information, freedom of speech, Hu Jintao, Internet surveillance, journalists, media censorship, news media, petitioners, reform, sina, social media, Southern Weekly, southern weekly protest 2013, stability maintenance, tencent, Xi Jinping, Yanhuang Chunqiu
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Abstract: China’s particular form of social stability is one of ‘rigid stability’ that is intimately connected with its authoritarian regime. This form of ‘rigid stability’ is maintained via a mechanism of ‘stability preservation through pressure’. In practice, ‘stability preservation through pressure’ is confronted by many challenges, including intensified conflicts of interest, various policy flaws related stability preservation, the development of information technology and increasing rights consciousness among citizens. A new line of thinking is currently needed in regard to stability preservation, with rights protection as its precursor and foundation. ‘Rigid stability’ must give way to ‘resilient stability’, ‘static stability’ must yield to ‘dynamic stability’, and ‘stability preservation’ must become ‘stability creation’.

In an increasingly open and democratic nation, true stability is unattainable through reliance upon the coercive and heavy-handed measures of the Mao era. Stability preservation during sensitive times of social conflict demands more than wise governance; it also requires that stability be rethought to fit the present stage of social development.

Yu’s vision for reform earned him a place on Foreign Policy magazine’s 2012 list of “Great Global Thinkers”, behind Chen Guangcheng and Ai Weiwei. At the South China Morning Post, The University of Nottingham’s Andreas Fulda described the marked contrast between Yu and Ai, concluding that “establishment intellectuals like Yu are the people the West must learn to work with if it wishes to encourage political reform in China.”

Yu, an establishment intellectual, is an unlikely poster boy for the Chinese democracy movement. He is a patriot first, a democrat second. His position on the East China Sea islands territorial dispute between China and Japan is emphatically nationalistic, much to the frustration of his liberal supporters within China, and in his 10-year plan he does not advocate civilian control of the Chinese military, as most other liberals in China do.

In contrast, outspoken libertarian activists like Liu Xiaobo and artist Ai Weiwei are clear-cut reformers, railing at government control from outside the system. Their cause offers a compelling narrative to the West. But the strong focus on activists outside the system comes at the expense of people like Yu, who are prepared to straddle both sides. Establishment intellectuals need to walk a fine line between their reformist aspirations and the existing political realities in China.

[…] Due to the repression of reformers outside the system, policymakers dealing with China should recognise that more people like Yu will grow in influence in the years to come. This may be challenging. These patriots will first and foremost stand up for China’s interests, yet the reality is that this is fairly representative of popular thinking in modern China.

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Post tags: Ai Weiwei, diaoyu islands, information technology, Liu Xiaobo, reform, rights protection, social stability, stability maintenance, stability preservation, territorial disputes, Yu Jianrong
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The MSS supposedly would become the State Security Administration (guojia anquan zongju), reporting directly to the State Council and presumably not to the Political-Legal Committee, now officially headed by Meng Jianzhu. If true, these rumors present a significant change to China’s domestic intelligence and preserving stability apparatus. Not only would this reform dilute the power of the Central Political-Legal Committee by cutting out the MSS, but it also would give the senior-most leaders an alternate source of domestic intelligence.

…

Although the rumors fit with the narrative of reform of the preserving stability apparatus (weihu wending, abbreviated as weiwen) and demotion of the Central Political-Legal Committee’s chairmanship from the Standing Committee to the Politburo, they are still only rumors on a subject that perennially disappoints. As Carl Minzner recently pointed out, reform of the political-apparatus is a real possibility but observers probably will have to wait for personnel changes at the National People’s Congress in March and the bureaucratic profile of other players outside of the public security apparatus to see if reform is in the offing.

Specifically for a “State Security Administration,” analysts should look for a change in the lines of authority associated with the MSS. Although political-legal affairs at the center are difficult to observe, one national-level change would be the shift of the state councilor overseeing state security, currently Meng Jianzhu. At lower levels, local newspapers and government websites would provide changes to whether local state security officials continued participating in normal political-legal committee processes as well as the joint work of the 610 Office (anti-Falungong work) and the Preserving Stability Office.

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Post tags: bureaucracy, intelligence, Li Keqiang, Ministry of State Security, reform, Xi Jinping
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Established in 1957 under Mao, the system (known as laojiao) has been used as an easy way for police, on their own authority, to imprison people. Official statistics from the endof 2008 show that 160,000 people were imprisoned in 350 laojiao facilities nationwide. (Laojiao camps are different from other camps formerly known as laogai, whose inmates have been through the judicial system.) Foreign pressure groups say there are more.

Dissidents have been among those imprisoned this way, but only as a very small proportion of the total. Many more are suspected drug addicts, prostitutes or petitioners. House-church Christians and adherents to officially banned spiritual groups, such as Falun Gong, have also been dealt with through laojiao camps. The lack of oversight has left the police and camp operators free to abuse the system to settle personal vendettas or profit from the work of prisoners.

After Meng’s statement, some expressed excitement while others aired their doubts. Microblog coverage of and commentary on the declaration quickly began disappearing, and Xinhua issued a story “watering down” Meng’s sweeping statement, fanning skepticism of the abolishment that Meng had seemingly outlined. CNN reports:

After media outlets confirmed the news with officials who attended the meeting Meng spoke at, the original articles reporting the decision vanished from the Internet. A subsequent Xinhua news story watered down Meng’s statement, committing the government only to “advancing reforms” of RTL — which is old news — a long-stated but never-implemented goal.

[...]The tepid Xinhua announcement promising to “reform” RTL suggests that instead of abolition, the government will merely tinker at the margins of the existing system. Fears this might be the case derive from the August 2012 announcement of a pilot scheme in four cities. Few details are available, except that the name of the system was revised from Re-education to “Education and Correction,” and minor constraints on the police’s ability to impose these punishments were established.

Click through to see CNN’s accompanying video interview with RTL-reform activists.

The South China Morning Post ran an opinion piece from NYU professor Jerome Cohen, in which the seasoned scholar of Chinese law probes the true meaning of Meng’s statement, determining that the RTL as we know will not be disappearing by the year’s end:

What did Meng mean? There are many possibilities. Did he simply mean that, in the exercise of its discretion, the police would at least temporarily suspend sending a couple of hundred thousand defenceless people to labour camps each year? Did he also mean that, in the coming months, the more than 300 existing re-education through labour sites would be emptied of their current occupants.

Or did he mean even less – that the government would only change the name of this notorious punishment but keep it in substance? Ever since its formal establishment in 1957, the police have lobbied tenaciously to retain this instrument of control, which subjects individuals to long-term detention in the name of social “harmony” without bothering to seek their indictment by prosecutors and trial, conviction, sentencing and appellate review by courts.

One thing Meng’s statement plainly did not foreshadow is the end of labour camps. Contrary to some media reports, he dealt solely with the “non-criminal” or “administrative” punishment known as “re-education through labour” dispensed by the police alone, not with the criminal punishment to which many offenders are sentenced by courts. Many convicted criminals will continue to be sent to labour camps or conventional prisons.

An article from The Atlantic echoes Cohen’s sentiment – that despite Meng’s assertion, labor camps will not be abolished anytime soon. What may instead be on the immediate agenda is the institution of a substitute system, one that may not encompass the hopes of the many who want to see the current system abolished:

For those who support reforming the system, the truly knotty question is “how.” Some argue that all criminal justice can and thus should be meted out within the framework of the Criminal Law (for felonies) and the Security Administration Punishment Law (for misdemeanors). Others insist that a reformed version of the laojiao system is still needed to fill the gaps between the Criminal Law and the Security Administration Punishment Law. According to China Radio International (CRI) Online (@国际在线), the National People’s Congress and its standing committee prefer the latter. It is already on the legislative agenda to institute a new system to replace laojiao, tentatively titled the “Rehabilitation Act for Illegal Activities.”

In an interview with CRI, Hong Daode, professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, explained the People’s Congress’ reasoning. “There are criminals in our society who, if handled by the Security Administration Punishment Law, cannot be fully educated and rehabilitated, yet the Criminal Law is overly harsh for them. Drug users are an example. So we need something in between. ”

It follows that the oft-discussed question of whether authorities are calling for laojiao to be “reformed” or “ended” makes no substantive difference. Intead, the key is ensuring that the Rehabilitation Act, once implemented, will not leave loopholes for abuse as the laojiao system has done. Lawyer Si Weijiang (@斯伟江) pointed out that the new Act must integrate sufficient checks and balances: “If the law, no matter in what form, still gives police the final say, or makes no room for powerful checks and balances from the judiciary, it will still share the essence of the laojiao system.” Mr. Si adds that it must also be clear to whom the Rehabilitation law applies.

Caixin’s Hu Shuli also says that to effectively address overarching concerns about the LTR system, police power must be reined in:

Unchecked police power is one reason the labor re-education system has persisted to this day. The case of Sun Zhigang is instructive. Outrage over the death of the migrant worker in 2003 led to the end of the administrative measure of detaining and repatriating people without a household registration in the city. Yet it did not weaken police power.

Thus, today, it is not enough to demand a stop to re-education through labor; the police’s wings must be clipped and the rule of law must function effectively.

Opinion is divided on how to end the system and what better system could replace it. Some scholars have suggested the introduction of a rehabilitation bill or a communal corrections bill. Yet others say such bills should not be linked with the labor re-education system.

[...]As with the move 10 years ago to end the illegal detention of migrants, the effort today to end re-education through labor is intended to rein in police power. Thus, we must be alert to how police officials might reassert their power in other ways. This means imposing more effective checks on them.

For more on the re-education through labor system, see prior CDT coverage.

© josh rudolph for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Hu Shuli, Jerome cohen, judicial reform, labor camps, re-education through labor, reform
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Measures to keep the national birth rate low are going to be around “for a long time”, according to the top family planning official. She dismissed speculation the one-child policy would be scrapped this year.

However, Wang Xia said that authorities would gradually ease restrictions for certain people.

“The policy should be a long-term one, and its primary goal is to maintain a low birth rate and be gradually perfected,” Wang, minister of the National Population and Family Planning Commission, said at a national conference, Xinhua reported.

Tea Leaf Nation’s Liz Carter looks at how Wang’s recent statement has catapulted the topic back into the realm of debate. Her post describes the most recent open letter drafted by Chinese intellectuals, and comments on recent Weibo responses to Wang Xia’s statement:

The most recent letter calls the One Child Policy “outdated” and demands that the government scrap it. “Despite a 40% increase in population since 1976,” the letter notes, “The number of primary school students has gone down by 33%, from 150 million to 100 million, and there were half as many primary schools in 2010 as there were in 2000.” The letter warns that even if the policy were scrapped immediately, China’s population would begin to shrink in ten years. It further argues that only three years from now, China will begin to feel the effects of the gender imbalance, with its “bachelor crisis” becoming more and more serious until 2023, when tens of millions of Chinese men will face a lifetime of involuntary singlehood.

The letter objecting to the One Child Policy was signed by academics from China’s top institutions of higher learning, including Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Fudan University. Reactions to the letter ran the gamut from outright support to party-line opposition. One person commented on Mao Yushi’s blog, “Reproductive rights are God-given. Only the most evil of societies would forcibly restrict reproduction.” Some argued that China’s population problem has made the restrictions a necessity. Another wrote, “It’s almost too expensive to raise even one kid these days. Who would dare to raise several?”

Much of the chatter on Sina Weibo, China’s Twitter — where Wang Xia’s comment became the #1 trending topic yesterday — centered on the sociological implications of the One Child Policy. Wrote one Weibo user, “We should let the next generation experience what it’s like to have brothers and sisters. It will help them develop active, healthy personalities.” As an entire generation of Chinese have grown up only children, studies suggest that the so-called “Little Emperor Syndrome” has led to an unprecedented spoiling of the nation’s young. It has also meant that an entire generation will face unprecedented pressure to care for their parents and two sets of grandparents – put another way, each of China’s only children will eventually be expected to care and provide for six elderly adults.

In her Tea Leaf Nation post, Carter notes that the focal point of pro-reform arguments in this most recent wave of debate has shifted. In the past, the reproductive rights of the individual were put front-and-center in arguments against the policy, while recently criticism has revolved around the broader implications on Chinese society as a whole. The open letter shows this shift, and an English translation of the entire document can be seen at Carter’s A Big Enough Forest blog:

[...] the One Child Policy has led to an extreme twisting of society’s structure and ethical framework. The One Child Policy has created a 4-2-1 family structure, with each family being comprised of 4 grandparents, 2 parents, and one child. Today’s young people must care for six middle-aged and elderly people, and each of these young people lacks brother and sisters, uncles and aunts. The entire society is lacking in horizontal blood relations, leaving only vertical, linear relations. This flat structure significantly weakens interpersonal relations. If one person becomes ill, or encounters other problems, besides his or her immediate family, there are no other people who would be able to help him or her. Even if friends can help, they would not help as naturally and closely as if they were blood relatives. Everyone’s position in their family line means that they must be responsible for the safety and security of their relatives, and that no one else is able to truly help. Excessive burden on children his highly unbeneficial to the safety and security of society. [...]

A recent study published in Science attempts to prove how the one-child policy is breeding mistrust and pessimism in China, though some experts have expressed their reservations, pointing to other trust-eroding factors (via CDT).

For more on demographics and the one-child policy, see “Fallout From the One-Child Policy,” “Catchy Family Planning Slogans,” or “Demography: China’s Achilles Heel“.

© josh rudolph for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: demographics, demography, family planning, one-child policy, reform, State Family Planning Commission, Wang Xia
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Secretary of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee Meng Jianzhu told the conference that the CPC Central Committee has deliberated over (the reform) and “the system of re-education through labor is expected to come to a stop this year once the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) approves the proposal,” the Xinhua News Agency reported Monday.

According to caixin.com, Meng also said that before approval by the NPC Standing Committee, the use of re-education penalties should be strictly controlled, and the system shouldn’t be applied to petitioners.

However, Meng’s statement on the “stopping” of the system disappeared on major news portals within hours.

Responding to a question about the brief appearance of the news, Qu Xinjiu, a criminal law professor with the China University of Political Science and Law, told the Global Times that “The government has been very careful when dealing with the re-education through labor problem.”

“There are loopholes in China’s current legal system where people who threaten the safety of others are not necessarily subject to punishment by the law,” Qu said. “China may not be fully ready to abolish the re-education policy until we have figured out a way to close the loopholes.”

China’s RTL system, or “Laodong Jiaoyang” (劳动教养), was established in the 1950s and allows public security officials to detain criminals and dissidents in labor camps without the benefit of a judicial hearing. The Ministry of Justice’s Bureau of Re-education Through Labor Administration estimated that there were 160,000 people in 350 camps as of the end of 2008, though a United Nations Human Rights Council working group put the tally at 190,000 in an early 2009 report. Prominent voices within China have come out against the RTL system, most recently when police sent the mother of a rape victim in Hunan Province to a labor camp in August 2012 for “disruption of social order.”

The Global Times added that Monday’s news “sparked widespread celebration among the public,” with one former village official calling it “a major step forward in judicial reform.” Chen Dongsheng, a bureau chief of the Justice Ministry’s Legal Daily, attended the conference and relayed Meng’s statement to The Associated Press:

The proposal must first be sent to China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, for approval, Chen quoted Meng as saying.

Chen said he heard Meng make the pledge at a conference carried on closed-circuit television. China’s supreme court and other government offices declined to comment, although the respected independent magazine Caixin said it had confirmed Chen’s report with an unidentified conference participant.

“Meng said the reeducation system had played a useful role in the past but conditions had now changed,” Chen told The Associated Press in a telephone interview.

NPR’s Louisa Lim spoke with former village official and outspoken RTL critic Ren Jianyu, who spent time in a labor camp as a young adult and “had a mixed reaction” to the news:

“When I first saw the news, I was very happy. At least it’s a small step toward reform. It shows a trend in the top leadership,” he says. “But the road is still very long.”

A propaganda film about one labor camp shows blue-suited inmates bent over their work making electrical wiring. The inmates make computer cables and headphones for MP3 players.

Ren says he worked for about 10 hours a day, during which he was not allowed to speak to fellow inmates. He seldom had a day off.

It was unclear, however, what shape any reforms would take as the official announcement contained few details. In addition, some microblog posts touting the news did not stay up for long. Voice of America posted a screen shot of a CCTV post that was later removed:

Andrew Jacobs of The New York Times noted that the way in which the news emerged, with statements by Cheng and others appearing briefly before being deleted, may have quelled any optimism that the system may go away completely. And human rights researcher Joshua Rosenzweig expressed skepticism while tweeting in real-time as news of the reforms began to vanish from Chinese social media:

Official media outlets’ posts on RTL starting to disappear from Weibo h/t @chinanalyst
— Joshua Rosenzweig (@siweiluozi) January 7, 2013

Xinhua: China to reform re-education through labor systembit.ly/117uCBV // this tells me nothing
— Joshua Rosenzweig (@siweiluozi) January 7, 2013

“劳教” doesn’t appear anywhere in Legal Daily front-page coverage of CCPL work conference
— Joshua Rosenzweig (@siweiluozi) January 7, 2013

Similarly, in a Monday press release, Amnesty International’s Roseann Rife cautioned that more detail was needed on the reforms:

“If these reports are true, clearly this is a step in the right direction, but the proposed reforms are unclear and need to be spelled out in detail and subject to open public debate.

“The danger is the authorities’ rhetoric creates a veneer of reform without the reality changing for the hundreds of thousands of people detained in such facilities nor is it clear that any new system will meet international standards.”

China has “been debating how to change its labor camp system for much of the past decade,” according to The Telegraph’s Malcom Moore, who reported that four major Chinese cities debuted an alternative pilot system last year. But Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch tweeted that while the announcement itself is a step in the right direction, anything short of completely ending the program will be disappointing:

Meng Jianzhu’s annoucement that China is to “stop” using Reeducation-through-labor is big news. But what will replace it?
— Nicholas Bequelin 林伟 (@Bequelin) January 7, 2013

Xi Jinping is sending a strong signal with the RTL announcement. The Gong’an has lost some of the political clout it had under Hu.
— Nicholas Bequelin 林伟 (@Bequelin) January 7, 2013

What the int. community should say now is “No ‘RTL-light’ system to replace Reeducation-Through-Labor please! Only abolition will do.”
— Nicholas Bequelin 林伟 (@Bequelin) January 7, 2013

In a Tuesday press release, Human Rights Watched echoed Bequelin’s sentiment that China should abolish the RTL system entirely:

“This decision, if it truly put an end to Re-Education Through Labor, would be an indisputable step towards establishing rule of law in China,” said Sophie Richardson, China director. “Courageous activists and ordinary citizens have long fought to end this system of arbitrary detention.”

…

Human Rights Watch urged the Chinese government to abolish the RTL system entirely and determine new laws that establish a system to punish minor crimes, one that is consistent with the Chinese Constitution as well as its international human rights obligations. The judiciary – not the police –should be responsible for considering charges, determining guilt, and assigning appropriate punishment. Individuals accused must have access to court proceedings, the right to assistance of counsel of choice, and all other fair trial guarantees. The Chinese government should also explore alternative measures other than detention for minor offenses, such as compulsory community service. In addition, the Chinese government should take measures to eradicate torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment in its detention facilities and prosecute those responsible.

“Cosmetic changes to the system or cutting down the amount of time served in administrative detention will do nothing to end RTL’s notorious abuses, and might only further entrench the system,” said Richardson. “Only abolition will suffice, and it is time that the new administration of Xi Jinping takes steps towards ensuring due process.”

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Amnesty International, Beijing, CPC Central Committee, human rights watch, Internet censorship, judicial reform, Justice System, Labor Camp, microblogs, Ministry of Justice, National People's Congress, online public opinion, re-education through labor, reform, Ren Jianyu, Ren Jiayu, sina weibo, Tang Hui, Xi Jinping
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Political reform is about building a system in place than can check power, and that means conscientiously protecting the rights of citizens. There is much language within our Constitution that preserves human rights, and that limits the power of the state. If we compare and contrast our Constitution and our reality, we discover that the system, policies and laws currently in force create a massive gap between the Constitution and the conduct of our government. Our Constitution is essentially void.

Any nation governed by rule of law must take its constitution as the basis for the design of its political system. Making the Constitution void is not only a breach of the promise made to the Chinese people, it is also a breach of the promise made to the international community.

Without trust a nation cannot stand, and the situation must be changed with regard to this breach of promise over the Constitution. Ever since the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP Charter has read: “The Party must operate within the scope of the Constitution and the law.” This is what is meant by “the Party under the law” (党在法下) . . . Achieving a “Party under the law” would avoid the occurrence of various abuses resulting from conflict between the nominal system in effect and the actual system.

The Constitution is the most basic and most important of our country’s laws (根本大法). There is no higher authority than the Constitution, and there will not, nor should there be, any controversy about promoting political reform according to the Constitution.

Just last week, on Christmas Day, a group of academics released an open letter urging the new Communist Party leadership to pursue political reform. See also recent CDT coverage of a piece in The Wall Street Journal from Russell Leigh Moses, who explores whether a new political struggle is emerging between new Communist Party chief Xi Jinping, who has indicated a desire to push through reform, and the anti-reform allies of former leader Hu Jintao.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: constitution, political reform, reform
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He could try to force a showdown with Hu and his allies on major issues. Or Xi and his colleagues might risk a bit of radical reform of some sort, to find support in the street, and try to capitalize on those parts of the society and the party that clamor for change, and are weary of waiting.

Or Xi could wait a bit, hibernate until the spring, when Hu is scheduled to step down as president in March and the political path for the summer then a bit clearer. Xi could initiate some small change in the interim – perhaps speeding up the restructuring of the hukou system.

But can reform wait even that long? Can the economy?

Or Xi could move to find an accommodation now, working from the common ground that surely must exist–even after Xi’s early sniping at the state of the party that he’s had to inherit. It’s not entirely clear if it’s Xi’s program that opponents object to, or more the speed at which Xi seems to be pursuing reforms.

This much seems already true: that the handover to a new leadership was the easy part—a mere transition. The hopes—and the hazards — of a far greater transformation beckon.

See also CDT coverage of an open letter released on Christmas Day urging the new leadership to pursue political reform.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: CCP 5th generation, Hu Jintao, political struggle, reform, Xi Jinping
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