The People’s Daily newspaper on page nine of Wednesday’s edition ran a lengthy and winding commentary by scholars at a prominent state-run think tank that called for a “reconsideration” of the historical status of Japan’s southernmost Ryukyu island chain, which includes Okinawa. The researchers argued foreign aggression toward China during its final Qing dynasty (1644-1911) weakened it to the point where it couldn’t sufficiently oppose aggressive Japanese inroads in the broader region.

“History’s unresolved questions relating to the Ryukyu have reached a time for reconsideration,” the commentary read.

[...]The Japanese government dismissed the commentary. “There’s no doubt that [Okinawa] belongs to Japan historically and internationally,” said Japanese government spokesman Yoshihide Suga, describing the views expressed in the commentary as “completely out of the question.”

[Source]

Japan protested the suggestion that Okinawa may rightfully be Beijing’s territory, an act that was chastised in reiterative English-language commentary from the Global Times on May 11:

The article stirred strong protest from Japan, with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe saying Tokyo “must voice its position to the world” by rejecting China’s “inappropriate claim.” The US Department of State expressed support for Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa.

Japan’s overreaction toward the suggestion made by two Chinese scholars in State media mirrors its lack of confidence. In 1971, the US unilaterally handed over control of the Ryukyu Islands to Tokyo. There has always been a legal basis to challenge this illegal act.

[...]If Japan ultimately chooses antagonism with China, Beijing should consider changing its current stance and revisit the Ryukyu issue as an unsolved historical problem.

[Source]

As Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng, the scholars who penned the People’s Daily article, were studying historical documents to strengthen the case against Japan’s soveriengty over the Ryukyu chain, Japanese politicians enraged many in China by defending certain Japanese war atrocities, and evoking the occurrence of others. Malcolm Moore reports for The Telegraph:

[...O]n Monday, a regional Japanese politician [Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto] reignited a long-running dispute by suggesting that the hundreds of thousands of women abducted from China, Korea and the Philippines and forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese army - known as “comfort” women – was a “necessary” measure during the Second World War.

Subsequently, footage emerged on Tuesday of Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, posing with his thumbs up inside the cockpit of a T4 training jet used by the Blue Impulse flying squad, Japan’s equivalent of the Red Arrows.

On the outside of the jet, however, the number 731 was painted prominently. Largely forgotten in Japan, the number still stirs painful memories in China.

Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army was the covert chemical and biological weapons team that gathered Chinese men, women and subjected them to vivisection without anaesthesia.

[Source]

Twenty-five Okinawan women’s groups issued a joint statement demanding an apology for Hashimoto’s comments on the necessity of “comfort women”.

Following the galling comments from Japan, a hawkish Chinese military official weighed in on Okinawa’s sovereignty, echoing the view earlier expressed in the People’s Daily. The South China Morning Post reports:

Luo Yuan, a People’s Liberation Army two-star general, has said that Japan could not rightfully claim sovereignty over the islands, because they had started paying tribute to China half a millenium before they had done so to Japan.

The islands had started paying tribute to China in 1372, the general said in an interview with China News Service on Tuesday. Only in 1872, 500 years later, did Japan exploit China’s weakness to force the Ryukuyu Islands into submission, he said.

[...] The general, known for his outspoken nationalism, reasoned that the Ryukyuan people had closer ethnic and cultural ties to coastal China than they had to Japan. Their rulers were vassals of the Chinese court, he argued.

[Source]

An article on this most recent flare in Sino-Japanese diplomacy from The Guardian notes that China’s move to dispute the sovereignty of Okinawa may work against any desire to hold formal talks on the Diaoyu/Senkakus:

Analysts said China was mistaken if it believed that provoking Japan over Okinawa would add momentum to its claims to the Senkaku islands. “If China’s goal is to hold talks with Japan over the Senkakus, articles like these are counterproductive,” M Taylor Fravel, a Chinese foreign policy expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told Associated Press.

“As a result, Japan has an even stronger incentive now to stand firm with China and not hold talks.”

[Source]

For more on China’s relationship with Japan, the recent re-ignition of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, or other territorial and maritime disputes, see prior CDT coverage.

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Post tags: comfort women, diaoyu islands, diplomacy, east china sea, Japan relations, maritime disputes, Shinzo Abe, territorial disputes
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China will this month start allowing tourists to visit the Paracel Islands, one of a group of disputed islets and reefs in the South China Sea, state news agency Xinhua said, a move likely to irk rival claimant Vietnam.

A cruise ship that can accommodate 1,965 passengers is ready for sailing to the Paracels, known in Chinese as Xisha, Xinhua reported, citing ship owner Haihang Group Corp.

[...]“Tourists will eat and sleep on the cruise ships and can land on the islands for sightseeing” ahead of Labor Day on May 1, Tan Li, vice governor of China’s southernmost island province of Hainan, told Xinhua late on Saturday.

[...]“Prices will be relatively high due to the high costs of tourism infrastructure construction,” Huang Huaru, general manager of a tourism agency in Hainan, told Xinhua.

Sovereignty of the Xisha Islands, also known as the Paracels, is disputed by Taiwan and Vietnam, but China has been in control of the island group since a military dispute with South Vietnam in 1974. Last year, China approved the establishment of Sansha City on Yongxing Island (aka Woody Island), now the administrative seat of the Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands (aka Macclesfield Bank), and Nansha Islands (aka Spratly Islands) – China’s sovereignty claims on all three island groups are contested.

In a report covering the soon-to-open travel destination, the Global Times mentions the islands’ ecological vulnerability and upcoming development plans for Sansha:

[...E]xperts said Sansha could only receive a small number of visitors provided the fragile environment there.

The founding of Sansha City will improve China’s management of the region and help coordinate efforts to develop the islands and protect the marine environment, said Zhao Zhongshe, director of the Hainan Provincial Department of Ocean and Fisheries.

Tan said local authorities will build more supply ships, ports as well as water supply and sewage treatment facilities to improve infrastructure in Sansha.

Meanwhile, authorities will also beef up ecological protection to protect island and marine resources and preserve the local biodiversity, he said.

As China’s middle class grows, they are spending more on travel. Last year, Chinese tourists were the world’s biggest spenders on trips abroad.

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Post tags: Chinese tourists, maritime disputes, paracel islands, sansha, South China Sea, South China Sea Islands, sovereignty, Spratly islands, territorial disputes, tourism
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A statement posted on the Vietnamese government’s website said the trawler was chased away and came under attack from Chinese ships near the Paracel islands on March 20, calling the incident a breach of international maritime law.

Vietnam’s state-controlled newspapers showed photographs on Tuesday of what they said were the charred remains of the ship’s cabin.

“This is a very serious case, violating Vietnam’s sovereignty,” the Foreign Ministry said in the statement posted late on Monday.

“Vietnam resolutely opposes this and demands China investigates and strictly deals with the above inhumane wrongdoing and compensates for the damages carried by Vietnamese fishermen.”

While Hanoi demanded China punish those responsible, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, said China has taken unspecified but “legitimate and reasonable” actions against Vietnamese boats fishing illegally in Chinese waters. Meanwhile, Chinese state media report China is urging Vietnam to stop illegal fishing in Xisha Island. From Xinhua:

The Xisha Islands are Chinese territory, said Hong, adding that China’s sovereignty over the islands is indisputable.

China’s actions toward the Vietnamese fishing boat were necessary and justified, as the boat had operated illegally in waters off China’s Xisha Islands, according to the spokesman.

He said that checks with relevant authorities had verified that China’s action cause no damage to the Vietnamese boat.

China urges Vietnam to take effective measures to strengthen education and management of its fishermen, and stop them from illegal activities, said.

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Shigeru Iwasaki, head of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces’ joint staff, and Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific, are expected to agree that the allies will accelerate the drafting of the plans when they meet in Hawaii on Thursday and Friday, Kyodo news agency said.

They will likely review several scenarios including one under which Japanese and U.S. armed forces conduct joint operations in case China invades the islands, Kyodo said. The Nikkei business daily carried a similar report on Wednesday.

“China is extremely concerned by these reports … The Chinese government has the determination and ability to maintain the nation’s territorial sovereignty,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said.

“No outside pressure will affect the resolve and determination of the Chinese government and people to maintain territorial sovereignty.”

Tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands, spiked last September when Japan’s central government agreed to purchase three of the islets from their private Japanese owners. A string of anti-Japanese demonstrations ensued across China, even turning violent as angry protesters targeted Japanese-owned businesses and products. Both sides have continued to run sea and air patrols near the territory, with Japan even scrambling fighter jets on two occasions after claiming that Chinese surveillance planes violated its airspace. Reuters reported earlier this month that China’s goal in the area is to overwhelm or wear out the Japanese forces tasked with monitoring their movements.

One U.S. defense official claimed that the plans between Japan and the United States are routine and consistent with the U.S. policy of finding a peaceful resolution to the issue, according to The Wall Street Journal:

U.S. defense officials noted that the Pentagon routinely updates its military plans for a variety of potential conflicts. The official declined to give details of the plan, or say how it was being changed. But such plans generally include a variety of scenarios, from trying to repel an enemy force from taking an island to retaking islands after a conflict.

“It shouldn’t be a surprise we have a plan to defend our ally against aggression in a tense situation,” said a U.S. defense official.

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Post tags: diaoyu islands, east china sea, Japan, territorial disputes, United States
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The most serious conflict involves Japan. While China’s actions in Southeast Asia cause many angry statements, most countries there lack the capacity to prevent Chinese ships from patrolling waters they claim as their own. But in Japan, China faces one of the world’s most capable maritime powers. Unlike the Philippines, which hasn’t been able to stop Chinese ships from encroaching on its territorial waters and even dropping markers onto disputed reefs, Japan has actively defended claims to several disputed islands known as the Senkaku in Japanese, Diaoyu in Chinese, and Tiaoyutai by nearby Taiwan (which also claims them, largely based on the same historical arguments used by China).

While other disputes have ended after a few days or weeks, this one has continued now for months. In February, Japan claimed that a Chinese frigate had locked weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter. Almost every few days, Japanese media report on Chinese ships—especially China Marine Surveillance survey ships—sailing without permission inside Japan’s territorial waters around the islands. (At least twenty-eight such violations have been reported since the issue heated up last autumn.) Last year, these tensions helped prepare the way for the election of a nationalistic Japanese prime minister.

It would be easy to blame China’s current leaders for all these problems, but their origins predate the People’s Republic of China and unite many ethnic Chinese from around the world. Although historical records are sketchy, many Chinese are convinced that old maps and mentions of the islands in imperial records imply historical Chinese control. In 1895, China and Japan fought a war and Japan annexed the islands, having declared them uninhabited and belonging to no one. Part of the Ryukyu chain, the islands were administered by the United States after World War II. In 1972, Washington returned the Ryukyus to Tokyo, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.

[...]

How all this has come to pass is drawn out in several important new books. They come at the Chinese puzzle from very different perspectives and at times are in sharp disagreement. But at heart they share a common idea: China is burdened with historical baggage that makes its rise less linear than many imagine. By extension the authors imply that the current troubles aren’t inevitable and may be more manageable than some would believe.

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Post tags: China's rise, diaoyu islands, territorial disputes
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Mr. Yang is likely to succeed Dai Bingguo as state councilor responsible for foreign affairs—the country’s top diplomatic position—according to Chinese foreign-policy scholars and diplomats in Beijing. Among his most pressing challenges will be managing relations with Washington and coordinating the behavior of interest groups such as the military and state-owned enterprises, which have become important foreign-policy actors but at times drive conflicting agendas.

Mr. Yang’s expected appointment suggests to many analysts and diplomats a continuation of recent trends in China’s diplomacy, characterized by a more assertive approach, especially to territorial issues, that has raised tensions with several of its neighbors and the U.S. That approach has been attributed partly to the lack of a foreign policy specialist on the Party’s Politburo—the country’s top 25 leaders—for the last decade. That body includes two generals, several local government leaders, and many people from state industry backgrounds, all of whom have vested interests in foreign policy.

…

Mr. Yang is likely to be replaced as foreign minister by Wang Yi, a former ambassador to Japan, according to diplomats and Chinese foreign-policy experts.

While the promoted officials include former ambassadors to the U.S. and Japan, do the appointments signal a change in Beijing’s approach to relations with its key rivals? For Foreign Policy, Willy Lam ponders what we can expect from Xi Jinping’s personnel changes:

In China, major policies on diplomacy and national security are made not by the Foreign Ministry but by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, which General Secretary Xi Jinping heads. Members of this top-level interdepartmental organ include representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the army, and the Ministry of State Security, as well as departments handling energy and foreign trade. But two Beijing sources close to the foreign-policy establishment say that Xi, who doubles as commander-in-chief of the military, has given the generals — many of them fellow princelings, the offspring of party elders — a bigger say in national-security issues than his predecessor Hu Jintao.

At least in terms of symbolism and atmospherics, however, the new diplomatic trio could take a more flexible approach to tackling the most worrying flashpoint in Asia: China and Japan’s ferocious wrangling over the sovereignty of a group of islets called the Diaoyu in China and the Senkakus in Japan.

Given widespread perception within the party leadership that the intensification of the U.S.-Japan defense alliance — which applies to the Senkakus — is a centerpiece of Washington’s pivot to Asia, the personnel changes in Beijing could also affect the style, if not the substance, of how the party will pursue relations with the United States.

…

It is important to note, however, that whatever changes in style and orientation the trio’s appointment may portend do not necessarily signal a de-escalation of Beijing’s increasingly ferocious saber rattling. The generals appear to overwhelmingly favor bellicosity — they have enthusiastically echoed Xi’s repeated calls over the past two months for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “get ready to fight well and to win wars.” Gen. Wei Fenghe, who is commander of China’s missile forces, said in February that the PLA must “improve its war-fighting skills” and “it must fulfill the task of winning wars.” And recent commentary in People’s Liberation Army Daily, a military newspaper, argued that the Chinese military must rid itself of “peacetime inertia and other [bad] habits accumulated over a prolonged period of peace.” Popular military commentator Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, who in April 2012 called for a limited war to “punish” the Philippines for allegedly occupying Chinese territories in the South China Sea, even suggested in a January 2013 interview with Chinese state media that China “must raise its guard against stealthy [military] attacks launched by other countries.” Even as diplomats such as Fu Ying, the vice foreign minister in charge of Asia, have reiterated Beijing’s commitment to “peaceful development” in global affairs, China has increased the frequency of its “patrol” of the Diaoyu-Senkakus by marine surveillance and other quasi-military vessels.

In a contribution to CNN, Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt dismisses the notion that “the new team will ease up” in its approach to foreign policy and regional territorial disputes:

As the National People’s Congress opened in Beijing, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu Ying warned that the country had sent an “important signal” to the region that it would respond “decisively” to provocations on territorial disputes.

That means we can expect Beijing to continue with its “reactive assertiveness” foreign policy tactic. China has perfected this approach in its ongoing maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas.

The approach allows Beijing to use perceived provocations as a chance to change the status quo in its favor — all the while insisting the other party started the trouble.

In Beijing’s eyes, it is a means of satisfying domestic pressure for a tougher foreign policy to match its economic might, all while trying to cling to the mantra of peaceful development. But this juggling act does not always work, and a number of countries in the region are giving up on the notion of a peacefully rising China.

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Post tags: diplomacy, Japan, leadership transition, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, territorial disputes, United States, wang yi, Xi Jinping, Yang Jiechi
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A daily stream of bulletins announce ship deployments into the East China Sea, naval combat exercises, the launch of new warships and commentaries calling for resolute defense of Chinese territory.

“The operational goal in the East China Sea is to wear out the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force and the Japan Coast Guard,” said James Holmes, a maritime strategy expert at the Newport, Rhode Island U.S. Naval War College.

It wasn’t until China became embroiled in the high stakes territorial dispute with Japan late last year that its secretive military opened up.

Now, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is routinely telegraphing its moves around the disputed islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

Earlier this week, a former Chinese defense ministry official sought to dampen speculation that a war would break out over the disputed islands, while China’s current ambassador to Japan cautioned that a high-level summit on the issue was still “unlikely.” See also previous CDT coverage of the Diaoyu Islands and other territorial disputes.

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Tension behind China and Japan may currently be high amid some speculation of armed conflict between the nations, but Qian Lihua, a member of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, said in an interview with Xinhua, “It is not rational or true that China and Japan are doomed to fight a war.

“A military solution is the last resort to settle problems. We should not talk about war and military actions in such a careless way when the two countries just have problems.”

China values its relations with Japan and has always targeted settling disputes peacefully through dialogue, said Qian, who used to head the foreign affairs office under the Ministry of National Defense.

“Once we sit down and talk, there will always be a way out,” the official added.

Despite these claims, tensions continue as Japanese automakers post lower sales in China. Another Xinhua article reports that National People’s Congress spokesperson, Fu Ying, blames Japan for the current dispute:

However, “one hand alone can’t clap,” Fu said, quoting a Chinese proverb to indicate that Japan has failed to engage in negotiations.
She said the Japanese government’s move to “purchase” part of the Diaoyu Islands last year went against the consensus reached by the two countries, which in turn shook China’s basis for maintaining restraint.

“If the other party chooses to take tougher measures and abandon consensus, ‘it is impolite not to reciprocate,’ as another Chinese proverb says,” she said.

“We wish Japanese society and all sides could listen attentively to the voice of the Chinese people and put what happened in the past and what is happening now in perspective, so the two countries find a basis for the dialogue,” said Fu.

While the dispute remains unsolved, China’s envoy to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, said that a high-level summit between the top leaders of the two nations is unlikely. From The South China Morning Post:

“The atmosphere facing bilateral ties between the two countries is at a very critical point now,” Cheng said on the sidelines of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference annual session on Sunday.

“There are no plans now to hold a high-level bilateral summit between leaders of the two nations.”

Mainland observers said the island dispute’s impact on bilateral exchanges was wide-ranging, so a high-level summit was unlikely in the coming months. “Some academics have also refused to attend conferences hosted by Japan,” said Professor Da Zhigang , an expert in Japanese affairs at the Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences.

“There is no official order banning us from participating in the events, but the atmosphere between the two nations has made it difficult for us. It is embarrassing if we criticise Japan, but it is also out of the question for us to support Japan.”

Anti-Japanese sentiment has also escalated due to the territorial dispute. According to the China Policy Institute Blog, China has handled these outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment through appeasement and repression:

Based on its foreign policy and domestic considerations, Beijing has adopted three different types of approach to public expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment and opinion: 1) tolerance or leniency, 2) tight control or suppression and 3) a two-pronged approach. When the political leadership had more incentive to burnish its nationalist credentials and appeared to lack internal consensus concerning the conduct of its relations with Japan, the authorities displayed a greater tolerance of or a more lenient attitude towards public anti-Japanese outbursts. However, when the leadership pursued a moderate and cooperative approach to Japan and had greater concerns about social stability, it sought to suppress or control anti-Japan public sentiment, voices and actions to avoid jeopardizing its efforts to maintain good relations with Japan as well as social stability. By contrast, when the leadership sought a tougher stance in the handling of dispute with Japan, it adopted a two-pronged approach to nationalist outpourings by selectively allowing (or tolerating) some mass anti-Japanese protests to increase pressure on Japan whilst simultaneously making efforts to avoid such outbursts from spiraling out of control.

The authorities’ suppression and tight control of nationalist sentiment has led to a narrowing of political opportunity for the nationalistic public to make their voices heard. However, Beijing’s tolerance or selective allowance of anti-Japanese popular protests for its domestic and/or international gains caused the Chinese government itself to face a dilemma by leading to a widening of political opportunity for the public to affect the government’s policy towards Japan. Anti-Japanese popular nationalism was able to play a greater role in China’s approach towards Japan when the public took advantage of the political opportunity created by the authorities’ tolerance to express their nationalist feelings and opinions in a collective way and to push Beijing into displaying a more assertive stance in the handling of relations with Japan.

Dispite efforts by the Chinese authorities to ease them, anti-Japanese sentiment in China still remains quite strong, which significantly limits Beijing’s available options to ease tensions over the territorial row. By appearing too keen to re-engage with Japan, Beijing may suffer a backlash from an angry public. There are few signs of the mounting tensions being defused so far. The diplomatic tit-for-tat between Beijing and Tokyo seems likely to continue until the two sides find a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute which would save their faces in front of their peoples.

Read more about the Diaoyu Islands dispute, via CDT.

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Post tags: cheng yonghua, diaoyu islands, Fu Ying, Japan, maritime disputes, territorial disputes
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It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing’s two most fundamental national interests — economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China’s new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater.

But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China’s “national core interests” during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China’s commitment to “never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country’s interests” and to never “benefit ourselves at others’ expense or do harm to any neighbor.”

Of course, wars do happen — and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century.

However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn’t. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora’s box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

Chinese state media reports China’s ambassador to Japan is still ‘optimistic’ about ties, Xinhua reports:

 Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua said Sunday that he is optimistic for the future of China-Japan relations, despite the lingering tension between the two nations.

“What the two countries need to do now is to improve crisis control and avoid accidents getting out of hand,” said Cheng, who is in Beijing for the annual session of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the country’s top political advisory body.

He said the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands, which were triggered by Japan last year and have not been well handled by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration, “is the biggest challenge in improving China-Japan relations.”

“As the saying goes, whoever started the trouble should end it,” the ambassador said.

Despite attempts to cool down the Diaoyu Islands dispute, AP reports China has issued another attack on Japan over the disputed region. This statement comes days ahead of the opening of the Chinese national legislature’s annual session:

The spokesman for the legislature’s chief advisory body, Lu Xinhua, told reporters at a Saturday news conference that if any unintended clash occurred as a result of their patrol boats and planes operating close to one another, Japan would “be held solely responsible for all consequences.”

Read more about Diaoyu Islands dispute, via CDT.

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Naw Kham’s wry smile belied his macabre circumstances. “I haven’t been able to sleep for two days. I have been thinking too much. I miss my mum. I don’t want my children to be like me,” the 44-year-old Burmese druglord, chained to a chair, told a Chinese TV interviewer.

On Friday – two days after the interview – the Burmese freshwater pirate was executed for allegedly murdering a crew of Chinese sailors on the Mekong river in October, 2011. His last moments were aired on state television.

In the two-hour live broadcast, black-clad police officers hauled Naw Kham from a detention centre in southern China, bound him with ropes and chains, and bundled him on to a bus bound for the execution site. Three of his alleged henchmen followed in similar fashion. They were each killed – off camera – by lethal injection.

Though a rumored live broadcast of the actual executions failed to materialize, the TV coverage attracted heavy criticism. “It’s hard to see how that spectacle doesn’t violate [the] prohibition on parading condemned in the streets,” tweeted human rights researcher Joshua Rosenzweig, referring to a 1984 ban introduced to avoid unfavorable foreign media coverage. Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin commented that China had “just wiped away any perception that it was making progress on the death penalty issue.” Within China, reactions to the broadcast were deeply polarized. From Andrew Jacobs at The New York Times:

“Rather than showcasing rule of law, the program displayed state control over human life in a manner designed to attract gawkers,” Han Youyi, a criminal law professor, wrote via microblog. “State-administered violence is no loftier than criminal violence.”

[…] In one segment, Liu Yuejin, director general of the central government’s Narcotics Control Bureau, cast the executions as a pivotal moment for a newly confident China and for ethnic Chinese across the globe. “In the past, overseas Chinese dared not say they were of Chinese origin,” said Mr. Liu, who led the task force that spent six months hunting the culprits. “Now they can hold their heads high and be themselves.”

Supporters of the program were many, and enthusiastic. One blogger suggested that death by lethal injection was too lenient, adding “These beasts should be pulled apart by vehicles.”

Some critics said the broadcast, and the subsequent public gloating, displayed an ugly side of China and would hurt its image abroad. To Murong Xuecun, a well-known Chinese author, the program revealed a national psyche, fed by decades of Communist Party propaganda, that craves vengeance for the years of humiliation by foreigners. “It proves that hatred-education still has a market in China,” he said in an interview.

At Bloomberg World View, Adam Minter described the spectacle as a “graphic extension” of a broader political strategy:

[…] Over the last two years the Chinese government has found itself embroiled in increasingly dangerous sovereignty disputes with its Southeast Asian and Japanese neighbors. So far, diplomacy has been the preferred course of action. Yet on China’s decidedly nationalistic and highly influential microblogging platforms, diplomacy — especially on sovereignty issues — is unpopular and viewed as a sign of weakness.

In response, the Chinese government and its official media tribunals have carefully ratcheted up the aggressive rhetoric, especially toward Japan, since the fall of 2012, reminding Chinese that they will not be bullied by outside forces. Rather, if there will be any bullying, China will be doing it.

A 2012 Reuters investigation into the Mekong murders described the web of trafficking in drugs, humans and endangered animals in Southeast Asia’s “Golden Triangle”, and Naw Kham’s legendary or perhaps mythical place in it. The report also highlighted the possible involvement of an elite Thai anti-drugs unit in the killings.

China’s Global Times recently revealed that authorities had considered killing Naw Kham with a drone strike instead of capturing him. See more on China’s drone programs, and more on the death penalty in China, via CDT.

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Post tags: CCTV, death penalty, diplomacy, drug trafficking, execution, Golden Triangle, human rights watch, Japan, legal system, Mao era, Mekong river, murders, Murong Xuecun, Myanmar, Southeast Asia, territorial disputes, thailand
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At around 4pm on January 19, a Chinese naval frigate, while conducting routine training in relevant waters in the East China Sea, spotted an approaching ship-borne helicopter of JSDF. The frigate kept normal observation and alert, and fire control radar was not used.

At around 9am on January 30, a Chinese naval ship found itself closely followed and monitored by JSDF destroyer Yudachi while conducting routine training in relevant waters in the East China Sea. The radars on the Chinese naval ship kept normal observation and alert, and fire control radar was not used. Therefore, the Japanese side’s remarks were against the facts, said the statement.

What needs to be pointed out is that in recent years, Japanese warships and airplanes often conduct long time and close-in monitoring and surveillance of China’s naval ships and airplanes. This is the root cause to air and maritime safety issues between China and Japan. China has lodged representations to the Japanese side on a lot of occasions, said the statement.

Shang Jun summed up Chinese reactions at Xinhua:

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made another attempt on Friday to mislead the international community by demanding China apologize for the recent radar incident.

If there is an apology to be made for the latest unease in China-Japan relations, it should be from the Japanese side.

[…] By spreading false accusation and posing as a poor victim, Japan had intended to tarnish China’s image so as to gain sympathy and support, but a lie does not help.

A Chinese saying goes that “it is better for the doer to undo what he has done.” It is time for Japan to make sincere efforts to rectify its wrongdoing and mend relations with China, rather than playing petty tricks and stirring up tension.

Japan insisted that its own account was accurate, however, with the government reportedly “considering the extent of what can be disclosed” in terms of supporting evidence. From the AFP:

In reply, Kawai told the ambassador Japan expected Beijing to “sincerely fulfil its responsibility for an explanation” and take measures to prevent similar incidents, a statement said.

“We have made a cautious and elaborate analysis of this incident at the defence ministry and we have confirmed it,” Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said earlier.

“We told the Chinese side we cannot accept their argument and asked them for a sincere response,” he said.

Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said on Friday the public announcements had been made “after a special unit analysed data on the radar contact and confirmed it. There is no mistake about it”.

Still, one analyst found China’s denial encouraging, if not convincing. From Chris Buckley at The New York Times:

For all China’s vehemence, the statement by its Defense Ministry suggested that senior officials in Beijing wanted to avoid an escalating quarrel, said Denny Roy, a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu who researches security issues.

“I think it’s a positive development that the Chinese would deny doing this, as opposed to saying, ‘Yes we did it, and we’ll do it again,’ ” Mr. Roy said. “For the Chinese to not want to be portrayed as an aggressor, I think, is a good sign.”

Many have wondered, particularly after it emerged that Abe was not informed of the incident for almost a week, exactly who is in charge of events around the islands. The Economist considered two possible answers:

Oddly, the January 30th incident came just as tensions seemed to be easing. There was talk of a fence-mending summit between Mr Abe, who took office in December, and Xi Jinping, China’s new leader. China has been using mainly civilian agencies rather than the navy to patrol the islands. And the Chinese press has not been uniformly bellicose. In Global Times, a Communist Party newspaper whose default mode is tub-thumping nationalism, two commentators this week separately urged caution, recalling China’s history of being set back in its development by Japanese aggression—in the 1890s and again in the 1930s and 1940s.

As a result, some Japanese politicians believe the provocation must have been a low-level decision by a commander on the ship. Katsuyuki Kawai, a foreign-affairs spokesman for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, thinks the incident would have embarrassed China, since “it gives the impression that China is a rogue state”. He says that the idea that China’s forces are out of control is the Japanese government’s “biggest fear”.

The alternative, however—that this is a deliberate policy sanctioned at the highest level—may be even scarier. And a new study of China’s foreign policy by Linda Jakobson of the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank, argues that Chinese treatment of the islands is in fact tightly co-ordinated, with Mr Xi in direct charge as the head of a new office set up to deal with the crisis. She cites an anonymous official involved in the decision-making, who suggests that Mr Xi knows the dangers but is being given “exaggerated assessments” by underlings keen that he should take a tough stance.

From Jakobson herself at The Diplomat:

From Beijing’s perspective, the decision by the Japanese government last September to purchase the islands from their private owner signaled the nationalization of the islands, an unacceptable change in the status quo. According to my sources, a step-by-step plan was devised by the new Diaoyu task force and then approved by Xi to deal with each possible contingency. The plan’s goal is to force the Japanese government to at a minimum acknowledge that the sovereignty of the islands is disputed. Japan’s current stance is that there is no dispute – the islands belong to Japan. A change in Japan’s stance would open up the possibility for both sides to use diplomatic channels to agree that vessels of each respective nation would patrol the disputed waters on alternate days to assert sovereignty. More importantly, it could facilitate discussions on sharing fishing rights in the disputed waters. Fishermen have been at the center of several disputes which have led to an escalation of tensions between the two countries.

The chain of events since Tokyo’s purchase of the islands would appear to confirm that a plan of this nature was drawn up. Beijing began sending civilian law enforcement vessels to patrol the area around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, crossing into the 12- nautical-mile territorial zone around the islands, with the intention of “protecting” China’s sovereignty. Next, aircraft of these law enforcement agencies were sent to patrol the islands, prompting Japan to send fighter jets to intercept what Tokyo views as intruders. It wasn’t long before Chinese and Japanese jets were both engaging one another over the islands. It is not known whether the most recent action by China, the locking of radar onto a Japanese vessel, was the next step in the task force’s plan, but it seems plausible.

The episode has prompted renewed calls for emergency communication protocols between governments in the region. From Michael Martina at Reuters:

“What we need in the South China Sea is a mechanism that prevents us turning our diplomacy over to young majors and young (naval) commanders … to make decisions at sea that cause a problem (that escalates) into a military conflict that we might not be able to control,” Admiral Samuel Locklear [commander of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific] told a conference in the Indonesian capital.

[…] Locklear said governments and their leaders had to understand the potential for things to get out of hand.

“In this case, I think that point has been made pretty clear,” he said in reference to international reaction to the dispute between China and Japan.

According to the Asahi Shimbun, plans for such protocols between China and Japan ran aground on the Diaoyu issue itself:

Plans included establishing communication links between high-level officials, including those at the Cabinet level, and agreeing which language and radio frequencies to use when aircraft pilots or warship commanders need to contact those on the other side.

In June, China and Japan agreed to try to put initial measures in place by the end of 2012. But the agreement was never signed because relations soured following Tokyo’s decision in September to put in state ownership three of the Senkaku Islands, five islets held by Japan but claimed by China.

[…] A senior official at the Defense Ministry said Beijing has dodged all requests for negotiations since September. The Chinese side typically cites “scheduling complications,” the official said.

“Beijing will not respond to our calls,” said a senior Foreign Ministry official.

Even before the alleged radar incident was made public, The Financial Times’ Gideon Rachman warned of the risk that a minor incident might spiral out of control: “The obvious danger” given America’s security guarantees to Japan “is that, as in 1914, a small incident could invoke alliance commitments that lead to a wider war.” Responding at Foreign Policy, Stephen M. Walt argued that Rachman’s account of World War I’s origins exaggerated the danger, but raised a different fear of his own.

[… T]he key point is that the European powers did not go to war in 1914 because a minor incident suddenly and uncontrollably escalated into a hegemonic war. The real lesson of 1914 for the present day, therefore, is to ask whether any Asian powers are interested in deliberately launching a preventive war intended to establish regional hegemony, as Germany sought to do a century ago.

The good news is that this seems most unlikely. […]

There is one feature of the East Asian security environment that is worrisome, however, though it bears little resemblance to pre-war conditions in 1914. Today, conflict in East Asia might be encouraged by the belief that it could be confined to a naval or air clash over distant (and not very valuable) territories and thus not touch any state’s home territory or domestic population. All Asian countries would be exceedingly leery of attacking each other’s homelands, but naval and air battles over distant islands are precisely the sort of military exchange one might use to demonstrate resolve and capability but at little or no risk of escalation. That’s the scenario that I worry about, but that is not what happened back in July 1914.

At least one source of potential trouble has reportedly been eliminated. Authorities in Beijing had ‘Tokyo Big Explosion’-branded fireworks removed from store shelves ahead of the New Year celebrations. From Keiko Yoshioka at the Asahi Shimbun:

“The Chinese are on a path of peaceful development,” the official quoted authorities as saying. “The Japanese could allege otherwise if they exploit this firework.”

[…] The official said the company has no political intentions and chooses names for its fireworks purely with a view to sales.

A firework named “I Love Diaoyu” remains on sale. Other options include “Ultraman,” “Aircraft Carrier that Boosts National Prestige,” and “Beijing Style,” a play on the title of a popular South Korean music track named “Gangnam Style,” by singer Psy.

Moreover, the official said the firework was a good thing because it gave purchasers a way to express their “rational nationalism” by venting feelings “without actually setting Tokyo on fire.”

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: aircraft carrier, diaoyu islands, east china sea, fireworks, Japan relations, lunar new year, Ministry of Defense, nationalism, navy, Shinzo Abe, South China Sea, territorial disputes, World War I, Xi Jinping, Xinhua
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Abstract: China’s particular form of social stability is one of ‘rigid stability’ that is intimately connected with its authoritarian regime. This form of ‘rigid stability’ is maintained via a mechanism of ‘stability preservation through pressure’. In practice, ‘stability preservation through pressure’ is confronted by many challenges, including intensified conflicts of interest, various policy flaws related stability preservation, the development of information technology and increasing rights consciousness among citizens. A new line of thinking is currently needed in regard to stability preservation, with rights protection as its precursor and foundation. ‘Rigid stability’ must give way to ‘resilient stability’, ‘static stability’ must yield to ‘dynamic stability’, and ‘stability preservation’ must become ‘stability creation’.

In an increasingly open and democratic nation, true stability is unattainable through reliance upon the coercive and heavy-handed measures of the Mao era. Stability preservation during sensitive times of social conflict demands more than wise governance; it also requires that stability be rethought to fit the present stage of social development.

Yu’s vision for reform earned him a place on Foreign Policy magazine’s 2012 list of “Great Global Thinkers”, behind Chen Guangcheng and Ai Weiwei. At the South China Morning Post, The University of Nottingham’s Andreas Fulda described the marked contrast between Yu and Ai, concluding that “establishment intellectuals like Yu are the people the West must learn to work with if it wishes to encourage political reform in China.”

Yu, an establishment intellectual, is an unlikely poster boy for the Chinese democracy movement. He is a patriot first, a democrat second. His position on the East China Sea islands territorial dispute between China and Japan is emphatically nationalistic, much to the frustration of his liberal supporters within China, and in his 10-year plan he does not advocate civilian control of the Chinese military, as most other liberals in China do.

In contrast, outspoken libertarian activists like Liu Xiaobo and artist Ai Weiwei are clear-cut reformers, railing at government control from outside the system. Their cause offers a compelling narrative to the West. But the strong focus on activists outside the system comes at the expense of people like Yu, who are prepared to straddle both sides. Establishment intellectuals need to walk a fine line between their reformist aspirations and the existing political realities in China.

[…] Due to the repression of reformers outside the system, policymakers dealing with China should recognise that more people like Yu will grow in influence in the years to come. This may be challenging. These patriots will first and foremost stand up for China’s interests, yet the reality is that this is fairly representative of popular thinking in modern China.

© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: Ai Weiwei, diaoyu islands, information technology, Liu Xiaobo, reform, rights protection, social stability, stability maintenance, stability preservation, territorial disputes, Yu Jianrong
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Xi Jinping on Friday said China and Japan should address “sensitive” issues between the two countries effectively and in a timely manner.

Xi, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, made the remarks as he met with Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the New Komeito party, on Friday morning. The New Komeito party is the smaller of Japan’s two ruling parties.

Yamaguchi, who arrived in Beijing on Tuesday, is the first senior member of Japan’s ruling bloc to travel to China since the Japanese government announced it would “purchase” part of the Diaoyu Islands in September, a move that soured bilateral relations.

“China’s stance on the Diaoyu Islands is consistent and clear,” Xi said, urging the Japanese side to respect history as well as reality and make joint efforts with China to seek effective methods for appropriately controlling and resolving problems through dialogue and consultation.

While the China Daily report chose to quote Xi emphasizing consistency in China’s stance on the islands, New York Times coverage notes that the leader’s comments were soft when compared to previous official statements:

China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, offered Japan a conciliatory tone during a meeting with a senior Japanese politician on Friday in an apparent effort to reduce the escalating tensions between the two countries over islands in the East China Sea.

In some of his first remarks on China’s foreign policy since becoming secretary general of the Communist Party, Mr. Xi told the Japanese lawmaker, Natsuo Yamaguchi, “The Chinese government remains committed to China-Japan relations,” according to an account provided by China’s Foreign Ministry.

Mr. Xi urged both sides to “look at the larger picture” and “push relations forward,” the Foreign Ministry said, language markedly more restrained than the combative exhortations from military officials and state-run media since the dispute over the islands erupted four months ago.

Natsuo Yamaguchi, the envoy who met with Xi, represented Japan’s new coalition government led by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, a man whose “hawkish” campaign statements concerning the Diaoyu Islands were a cause for concern in China. Japanese coverage of the meeting notes that Yamaguchi delivered a letter on Abe’s behalf requesting a face-to-face meeting between the two leaders, and that Xi responded agreeably. From The Asahi Shimbun:

During their hour-long discussion, Yamaguchi handed Xi a letter from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe requesting a summit meeting between the two new heads of government.

“I will seriously consider a high-level dialogue,” Xi responded. “To do so, arranging the proper environment is of vital importance.”

Upon returning to Tokyo, Yamaguchi expressed optimism about an eventual resolution to the territorial dispute. Reuters reports:

Japan takes a broad view of the issue and believes tensions can be resolved between the two countries, he told reporters before returning to Tokyo after a four-day visit.

“Japan wishes to pursue ties with China while looking at the big picture,” Yamaguchi said he told Xi, who is set to take over as China’s president in March.

“I firmly believe our differences with China can be resolved,” Yamaguchi said, adding that he did not directly discuss the islands issue with Xi.

“We agreed that it is important to continue dialogue with the aim of holding a Japan-China summit between the two leaders,” he added, though no specific details were given. “Secretary Xi said he will seriously consider a high-level dialogue with Japan.”

Another report from Reuters tells of an imminent U.N. investigation into the validity of China’s claims on the group of islands:

The United Nations is planning to consider later this year the scientific validity of a claim by China that a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea are part of its territory, although Japan says the world body should not be involved.

It was not immediately clear if the U.N. involvement would increase the likelihood the China-Japan dispute would be resolved peacefully. But launching an international legal process that should yield a neutral scientific opinion could reduce the temperature for now in Beijing’s spat with Tokyo.

In a submission to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China says the continental shelf in the East China Sea is a natural prolongation of China’s land territory and that it includes the disputed islands.

As China and Japan appear to be softening their rhetoric, Taiwan – another claimant to sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands – is reasserting its claims. The Asahi Shimbun reports on confrontation between the Japanese Coast Guard and a fishing boat full of Taiwanese activists on January 24:

The fishing boat, accompanied by four Taiwanese cutters, entered the contiguous zone off Japan’s territorial waters around the islands, but was chased off by the Japan Coast Guard using a water cannon. The uninhabited islands, called Diaoyutai in Taiwan, are effectively administered by Japan but are claimed by both Taiwan and China.

[...]The “Chinese Association for Protecting the Diaoyutais,” which sent the fishing boat, is a group of political activists, four of whom hold fishery certificates. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration said there was no reason to block the boat from leaving port, because the action was lawful.

[...]A Taiwanese Foreign Ministry source indicated the authorities approved the latest departure because the Ma administration was eager to assert Taiwan’s role and presence at a time when the United States, Japan’s ally, and China have come to loggerheads over the Senkakus issue.

“We have to assert ourselves whenever China takes a strong stand,” the ministry source said.

But Taipei has also been careful not to give the impression, either at home or abroad, that China and Taiwan are joining hands over the Senkakus dispute.

© josh rudolph for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: cross-strait relatioins, diaoyu islands, Japan, Japan relations, maritime disputes, maritime security, Taiwan, territorial disputes
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Natsuo Yamaguchi made no comments upon his arrival but told reporters in Tokyo he hoped his trip would help ease months of friction over the uninhabited East China Sea islands that are controlled by Japan but claimed by China.

“It is important for us to have consultations to normalise our relationship,” said Yamaguchi, a lawmaker who leads the New Komeito party, the junior partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

…

Both nations have called for dialogue recently, and Chinese state broadcaster CCTV led its noon news broadcast with a live report on Yamaguchi’s arrival in a sign of the importance Beijing attaches to his visit.

Yamaguchi is not a member of the government so his meetings in Beijing represent a type of quiet diplomacy that could allow for a franker exchange of views than official talks might.

On Wednesday, Reuters reported that two sides did not discuss the Diaoyu Island issue directly. Still, the People’s Daily commented that the visit signals that neither side wants to see the confrontation escalate beyond control:

China has always called for resolving the dispute through dialogue and consultation in the hope that the issue will not stand in the way of a stable and healthy bilateral relationship.

As a sign of good faith, China has invited Japanese politicians such as Yukio Hatoyama and Kenji Kosaka, a lawmaker from Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, to visit Beijing this month.

However, the situation remains tense and volatile. Japan needs to deal with the issue with calmness, reason and with a sense of reality.

In so doing, the two countries can find a way to move the issue in the right direction through diplomatic talks.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: diaoyu islands, Japan relations, maritime security, territorial disputes
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There are plenty of distinct and plausible shocks to the system that could knock our expectations of the future wildly off course — and plenty of surprises that we can neither predict nor anticipate, but that we can indirectly prepare for by attuning ourselves to the possibility of their occurrence. To take an example of one of the more plausible shocks we now face, a miscalculation in the South China Sea could easily set off a chain of events not entirely dissimilar to a shot in Sarajevo in 1914, with alliance structures, questions of prestige, escalation, credibility, and military capability turning what should be marginal to global affairs into a central question of war and peace.

While Emmerson concedes that China’s recent rise can’t serve as a perfect parallel to Germany in 1913, China’s foreign policy has grown increasingly aggressive as it pursues its national interests. And last week, the United States crept further into the fray when comments by Hillary Clinton about the disputed Diaoyu Islands set off media spin machines in both China and Japan. For the International Herald Tribune’s Rendezvous blog, Didi Kirsten Tatlow wrote that Emmerson’s 1913 echoes with familiarity in Asia:

Consider this: In Hong Kong over the weekend, Shotaro Yachi, the foreign policy adviser to the Japanese prime minister, accused China of “breaching the rule of international order” (his remarks were delivered by a former Japanese official, Takujiro Hamada, The South China Morning Post reported).

“You will be a superpower — much feared but not much liked,” Mr. Yachi warned China at the third Sino-U.S. Colloquium, organized by the China Energy Fund Committee.

China is asserting territorial claims by force, said Mr. Yachi, referring to Beijing’s actions at the Diaoyu Islands, which Japan calls the Senkakus and which are claimed by China, Japan and Taiwan.

…

A retired People’s Liberation Army major general, Pan Zhenqiang, now an adviser to the Chinese government, characterized Mr. Yachi’s statement as “very rude and arrogant” and warned Tokyo to treat China as an enemy at its peril, The Post reported.

© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
Post tags: diaoyu islands, Germany, Japan relations, South China Sea, territorial disputes, U.S. relations, World War I
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