{"id":204699,"date":"2018-01-18T16:32:02","date_gmt":"2018-01-19T00:32:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/?p=204699"},"modified":"2018-01-18T16:41:52","modified_gmt":"2018-01-19T00:41:52","slug":"giving-credit-jeremy-daum-chinas-social-credit-system","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/2018\/01\/giving-credit-jeremy-daum-chinas-social-credit-system\/","title":{"rendered":"Jeremy Daum on China’s Social Credit System"},"content":{"rendered":"

China’s emerging Social Credit System has attracted growing media attention<\/a> as a centerpiece of the country’s increasingly advanced and pervasive surveillance regime<\/a>. Since its announcement, though, much of this coverage has included either sensationalist exaggerations or smaller misunderstandings or conflations. Yale Law School’s Jeremy Daum has been a consistent critic of these errors, both on Twitter<\/a> and at the China Law Translate<\/a> blog he edits. The site’s extensive collection of related resources<\/a> includes "Giving Credit," a series of blog posts explaining the goals and various elements of the developing social credit scheme, as well as some of the more persistent misapprehensions about it.<\/p>\n

The series continued this week with an examination of some of the limitations and safeguards, such as consent requirements, currently in place<\/a><\/strong>: <\/p>\n

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Each of the four local social credit Regulations defines Social Credit Information as information useful for understanding a subject\u2019s (ie a person or organization\u2019s) compliance with laws, regulations, and contractual obligations.<\/p>\n

This definition might seem like an empty bit of legalese, but it contains a critical point. It tells us that the focus of Social Credit is compliance with legal obligations, which roots the system in existing laws. The 2014-2020 social credit plan, and some of the local Regulations, also contain broad language discussing the construction of a \u2018culture of creditworthiness\u2019 and \u2018moral education\u2019, which has led many to fear that social credit will regulate and restrict behavior beyond the requirements of law. Here the rules show that when it comes to actual function, Social Credit\u2019s core concern is strictly with legal obligations.<\/p>\n

The understanding of \u2018credit\u2019 is thus narrower than many fear, but is still a broader concept than may be familiar elsewhere. [\u2026] <\/p>\n

[\u2026] The social credit apparatus is going to integrate information by regulating data exchanges and information sharing between different regions and departments, with much of it made public. That doesn\u2019t mean that the information will somehow be crafted into a unified score; mainly because that wouldn\u2019t be terribly useful to anyone.<\/p>\n

[\u2026] Information on natural persons\u2019 religious faith, genetics, fingerprints, blood type, illnesses or medical history must not be collected as either public or market credit information. I put this first because it shows limits to the scope of Social Credit Information. The government may well have some of this information on file for its citizens, but it is not to be considered in evaluating \u2018credit\u2019 no matter how useful it is for predicting compliance with legal obligations. [Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Authorities, particularly in Xinjiang, are indeed widely reported<\/a> to have been collecting this kind of information<\/a> outside the social credit system.<\/p>\n

Last month, the series’ second installment compared regional regulations issued by Shanghai, Hebei, Hubei, and Zhejiang<\/a><\/strong>, noting "the social credit systems\u2019 primary focus on organizations rather than individuals, and its development through blacklists and credit systems targeting specific industries." It went on to discuss some of the various incentives and punishments already in operation, including widely reported professional and spending restrictions<\/a> for those blacklisted for, wittingly or not, failing to comply with court rulings. "The requirements for inclusion in the lists," Daum wrote, "are generally that one endanger others or national interests through their untrustworthy conduct, but remain unnervingly vague despite definitions in the relevant articles."<\/p>\n

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Particularly important are the limits on high-spending in Hubei\u2019s article 30(5) and Zhejiang\u2019s article 26(4) above, because their connection to the conduct which had one entered onto the list is most tenuous. Unlike keeping people out of the profession in which they violated rules and regulations, this type of provision seems more punitive or vindictive (you can\u2019t have nice things if you were bad).<\/p>\n

[\u2026] China has always punished conduct that most believe should be legal, like speech. So, in considering potential issues in the emerging social credit system, I suggest looking at social credit in those areas where there is disagreement with China\u2019s regulation more generally. It\u2019s no surprise that to find that social credit doubles down in problematic areas.<\/p>\n

[\u2026] The impact of social credit can [\u2026] be seen [in the Internet Group Information Service Management Provisions]: Article 7 requires that \u201cInternet group information service providers shall establish a user credit level management system, providing services corresponding to credit levels<\/strong>. \u201c (emphasis added).<\/p>\n

[\u2026] Decreasing the level of access to internet services, not as the result of a criminal or administrative ruling, but as the result of an undefined credit variable, seems to be very new and very dangerous. The credit in these rules likely doesn\u2019t even reflect a nationally standardized system, but one created by the service provider who is trying to satisfy their own obligations under the rules. This is where the social credit system gets closest to the everybody-rating-everybody nightmare that depicted by so much media coverage of China\u2019s Social Credit. To protect themselves from liability, everybody needs to keep others in check. There is little to lose by overzealously limiting services, but real consequences for failing to stop others who are breaking the rules. [Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Other schemes of varying sophistication exist alongside the provincial-level and national court schemes described in the post: <\/p>\n

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How China's supposedly hi-tech social credit system actually works in one of the official pilot cities, Rongcheng: almost no one in urban areas has heard of it. In villages, they have this ultra low-tech rating system. pic.twitter.com\/M6S6jUi0NW<\/a><\/p>\n

— Tom Hancock? (@hancocktom) January 16, 2018<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n