{"id":207692,"date":"2018-06-24T15:09:47","date_gmt":"2018-06-24T22:09:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/?p=207692"},"modified":"2022-04-13T10:34:27","modified_gmt":"2022-04-13T17:34:27","slug":"sinoposis-united-nations-with-chinese-characteristics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/2018\/06\/sinoposis-united-nations-with-chinese-characteristics\/","title":{"rendered":"Sinopsis & Jichang Lulu: UN with Chinese Characteristics"},"content":{"rendered":"
“The CCP has made it a major goal of its UN work to maximise its \u2018discursive power\u2019 at the organisation, seeking to redefine \u2018human rights\u2019 and get Xi Jinping\u2019s pet initiatives institutionally endorsed by an international body.” This is one of the conclusions in a new report published by Sinopsis<\/a><\/strong> and Jichang Lulu<\/a><\/strong>. The report:\u00a0United Nations with Chinese Characteristics:\u00a0– Elite Capture and Discourse Management on a global scale<\/em><\/strong>, \u00a0presents the first detailed look at diplomacy and corruption in Africa, Australia, Eastern Europe – and the UN.<\/p>\n \u201cIt is hard not to see a connection between the corruption cases in the United Nations and the rise of China\u2019s \u201cdiscursive power\u201d in the organisation. As top UN officials get arrested for corruption by Chinese actors, the global body increasingly adopts Beijing\u2019s narrative on a new \u201cGlobalisation 2.0\u201d, epitomised by the Belt and Road Initiative.\u00a0<\/span>\u201d<\/p>\n The full text of the report is here:<\/p>\n The PRC\u2019s involvement in UN affairs has been on the rise in recent years. It has become one of the largest contributors to the organisation, in terms of both funds<\/a> and soldiers<\/a>. Now it wants influence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n True to its attention to propaganda, the CCP has made it a major goal of its UN work to maximise its \u2018discursive power\u2019 at the organisation, seeking to redefine \u2018human rights\u2019 and get Xi Jinping\u2019s pet initiatives institutionally endorsed by an international body. These goals, repeatedly stated by authoritative sources, are being pursued through both diplomacy and other means.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Specialised CCP organs like the United Front Work Department and party-linked entities like CEFC employ some unorthodox tactics. These tactics, including elite capture and bribery, are applied both locally in vulnerable countries, and globally at the world’s foremost multilateral body. Some actors flawlessly span the whole range from individual East European and African states all the way to top UN officials. Evidence from recent court cases suggests a pattern of global interference combining both local and global \u201cpolitical work\u201d.<\/p>\n The UN talks the Xi-Talk<\/p>\n Growing Chinese influence has made UN officials more and more willing to explicitly support the CCP\u2019s political, economic and purely propagandistic projects. The PRC has managed to pass two resolutions<\/a> at the Human Rights Council (HRC). The most recent one, in March, promoted \u201cmutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights\u201d<\/a> together with such illustrious champions of said field as Eritrea, Cuba, Syria and Venezuela<\/a>. The first resolution invoked a favourite concept of Xi Jinping\u2019s, the \u201ccommunity of shared future\u201d<\/a>, thus officially making\u00a0 <\/span>Xi-speak (\u4e60\u8bed)<\/a> part of the UN lingo.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Controlling discourse at the UN human-rights system has been a priority for the CCP since the PR-debacle it suffered post-Tian\u2019anmen<\/a>. Tactics to impose \u201chuman rights with Chinese characteristics\u201d<\/a> have ranged from usual diplomacy to more characteristic intimidation<\/a>. A central goal is to obstruct the work of NGOs<\/a> within the UN system, embedding the CCP\u2019s abhorrence of civil society<\/a> into a new global \u2018human-rights\u2019 normal.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In what a former HRC special rapporteur has called a \u201cTrojan horse\u201d<\/a>, the vague \u2018win-win\u2019 language in the UN resolutions channels a state-centric approach that sees human rights as primarily the rights of rulers. Not long ago, the CCP had to rely on a few bizarre characters to promote its \u2018human rights\u2019 redefinition: from Tom Zwart, a Dutch academic who finds talk of repression \u201cunfair to the progress in human rights under Xi\u201d<\/a>, to a mysterious\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cHuman Rights Co., Ltd\u201d<\/a> of New South Wales. The HRC is now part of that club and this language infiltrates its resolutions. The US withdrawal from the Council will further accelerate this process<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Xi Jinping\u2019s \u2018discursive power (\u8bdd\u8bed\u6743)\u2019<\/a> isn\u2019t limited to the human-rights system. International endorsements of Xi\u2019s pet \u2018Belt and Road\u2019 initiative (BRI) are a major goal of propaganda<\/a> efforts<\/a> involving media, domestic and foreign like-minded think tanks<\/a>, and various multilateral organisations. \u201cMultilateralist\u201d language has indeed been recognised as a tool to \u201cdispel misgivings\u201d about Xi\u2019s geopolitical project. When conducting \u201cexternal propaganda [\u5bf9\u5916\u5ba3\u4f20, exoprop<\/em>]\u201d<\/a>, instead of haranguing countries to \u201cparticipate in the construction of the \u2018Belt and Road\u2019\u201d, implying a leading role for China, one should call for countries to \u201ccooperate\u201d in such construction: with China, but also \u201cwith each other, multilaterally\u201d. China\u2019s Belt and Road should not be called \u201cChina\u2019s Belt and Road\u201d; \u201clet us stress \u2018us\u2019, not \u2018me\u2019\u201d. The predilection for the term \u2018initiative\u2019 over \u2018strategy\u2019 in external propaganda reflects this: although we don\u2019t deny that the Belt and Road is part of the national strategy, when \u201cpropagandising and explaining it\u201d abroad we can\u2019t call it \u201ca national strategy led by one country\u201d: \u201cwould a country want to participate in another\u2019s national strategy?\u201d In this quest for multilateral-sounding backing, the UN was the big prize.<\/p>\n Discourse management at the UNDP<\/p>\n The UN Development Programme (UNDP) provided a suitable avenue. In early 2015, in a journal under the State Council Development Research Center (DRC<\/a>, \u56fd\u52a1\u9662\u53d1\u5c55\u7814\u7a76\u4e2d\u5fc3),\u00a0 <\/span>Wang Yiwei<\/a> \u738b\u4e49\u6845<\/a>, a senior BRI-proselytising<\/a> academic with his own column on the CCP News<\/a> website, advocated \u201cintegrating the Belt and Road into the [UNDP] Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda<\/a>, implementing the 18th Party Congress \u2018Five-in-One\u2019<\/a> [\u4e94\u4f4d\u4e00\u4f53<\/a>] concept\u201d and \u201cbuilding a green Silk Road\u201d. Propaganda portal Zhongguo wang<\/em> \u4e2d\u56fd\u7f51 reposted<\/a> Wang\u2019s article on 4 May, coinciding with a Beijing visit by the head of the UNDP, former New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark. Talking to state media, Clark was at that point still non- committal<\/a> about BRI. She was more receptive towards efforts to associate BRI with the UNDP 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Less than a month after the Agenda\u2019s adoption<\/a>, she told Xi<\/a> and others in Beijing that China\u2019s \u201ccommitment\u201d to his BRI project helped make the country \u201ca major contributor to development co-operation\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n On the same trip, she had a chance to discuss BRI and an attendant discourse-management endeavour, the Silk Road Think-Tank Network (\u4e1d\u8def\u56fd\u9645\u667a\u5e93\u7f51\u7edc)<\/a>, at the signature of an agreement with the DRC<\/a>.\u00a0 <\/span>By early 2016, an SIIS paper was already celebrating the expected propaganda milestone: the convergence between BRI and the Sustainable Development Agenda \u201chelps China obtain more discursive power and influence<\/a> within the new international system of development governance and even the entire global governance architecture.\u201d Mid-year, Xi himself linked<\/a> BRI to the Agenda at a meeting with secretary general Ban Ki-moon. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), a UN department described by a European diplomat as \u201ca Chinese enterprise\u201d<\/a>, endorsed the BRI-Agenda link in a study<\/a> commissioned by the PRC State Information Center (SIC, \u56fd\u5bb6\u4fe1\u606f\u4e2d\u5fc3) and written by a DESA employee who began his career<\/a> at the SIC\u2019s predecessor entity<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In September, now campaigning for UN secretary general, Clark signed a memorandum with the National Development and Research Commission \u201cto enhance collaboration\u201d for the \u201cimplementation\u201d of BRI and the Agenda, this time literally pledging the organisation\u2019s \u201csupport for the Belt and Road Initiative\u201d<\/a>. Clark praised Xi\u2019s Initiative, a \u201cpowerful platform<\/a>\u201d that \u201ccan serve as an important catalyst and accelerator for the sustainable development goals\u201d. Clark would later deny any connection<\/a> between her support for BRI and her campaign for the top UN job, during which her successor as New Zealand prime minister helpfully opined she was \u201crecognised as a friend of China\u201d<\/a>. She lost (ironically blocked by, among others, China<\/a>), but the winner, Ant\u00f3nio Guterres, endorsed BRI at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum<\/a> in Beijing. Post-Clark, UNDP has preserved her Xiist legacy<\/a>.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Li Wei <\/em>\u674e\u4f1f<\/a>, head of the<\/em> Development Research Center of the State Council, and then UNDP Administrator Helen Clark oversee the signature of an MoU, October 2015. Source: <\/em>DRC<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n Guterres\u2019 promotion of BRI<\/a> as a useful tool to fight poverty blissfully disregards multiple<\/a> studies<\/a> warning that the Initiative can lead poor countries into a \u201cdebt trap\u201d<\/a>. Perhaps the same logic lies behind his praise for the PRC\u2019s diplomatic efforts in solving the Korean crisis, despite its violation of UN sanctions by shipping oil to North Korea<\/a>.<\/p>\n CEFC at work locally and globally\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The CCP presumably owes these propaganda victories at the UN to good old diplomatic horse trading, sheer economic size and some harassment<\/a>. But its growing influence has also been accompanied by a striking, unprecedented phenomenon: a series of corruption scandals reaching to the top levels of the organisation. Surfacing cases of bribery raise suspicions that China is effectively buying the UN, top down.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This approach appears to mirror at a global level the PRC\u2019s tactics in its bilateral relationships with individual states, especially the more vulnerable ones in Africa, Latin America, SE Asia and Eastern Europe. \u201cElite capture\u201d in many of these countries<\/a> has been accompanied by reports of and court indictments<\/a> for outright corruption at the highest political level. Moreover, reported cases of global and local corruption intertwine, linked by specific actors operating both at the level of nation states and the UN system. Among these, perhaps the most curious is a mysterious Chinese conglomerate called CEFC. Various parts of the company have been connected with elite capture in Eastern Europe<\/a>, top-level political corruption in Africa<\/a>, and bribery at the UN headquarters in New York<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The director of CEFC\u2019s non-profit subsidiary, former Hong Kong official Patrick Ho (\u4f55\u5fd7\u5e73), was indicted last year in the US, accused of bribing several African politicians<\/a>, including Ugandan foreign minister Sam Kutesa, former president of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Coinciding with his arrest, CEFC donated 1 million USD<\/a> to the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA, the UN organ described as \u201ca Chinese enterprise\u201d). Just a day after Ho\u2019s arrest, both the UN secretary general and UNGA president excused themselves from attending the ceremony to award a $1m DESA grant<\/a> with \u201cfunding support\u201d from CEFC<\/a>. But DESA still kept the money.<\/p>\n According to the indictment, Patrick Ho had 500 000 USD<\/a> wired to an account chosen by Kutesa, months after making CEFC chairman Ye Jianming, Ho\u2019s boss, his \u201cspecial honorary advisor\u201d<\/a> as UNGA president. (Kutesa denies<\/a> the allegation.) Ho has been quoted as claiming that the case is not just against him, but against CEFC and the Belt and Road<\/a>.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sam Kutesa<\/em><\/a>, UN General Assembly president, CEFC chairman Ye Jianming and his second in command, <\/em>Chan Chauto <\/em>\u9648\u79cb\u9014<\/a> at Ye\u2019s appointment as advisor. August 2015. <\/em>Source<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n Earlier that year, in April 2015, Ye had been appointed \u201ceconomic advisor\u201d to Czech president Milo\u0161 Zeman. (Except for one news item<\/a> on the Chinese internet, Ye\u2019s Czech appointment would remain unreported until September that year<\/a>.) Ye Jianming is currently being held by the Chinese authorities at an unknown location.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Vratislav Myn\u00e1\u0159<\/em><\/a>, head of the office of Czech president Milo\u0161 Zeman, Ye Jianming and Chan Chauto at Ye\u2019s appointment as advisor. April 2015. <\/em>Source.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n Serial Corruption at UNGA<\/p>\n Remarkably, these accusations against CEFC are already the second case of a UNGA\u2019s president bribed by Chinese entities. Last May, Macau tycoon Ng Lap Seng \u5434\u7acb\u80dc<\/a> was sentenced to 4 years in prison for bribing Kutesa\u2019s predecessor as UNGA president, the Antiguan John Ashe, and a Dominican deputy ambassador to the UN, Francis Lorenzo. The indictment claimed that Ng spent more than $1.3m to get the UN to support the construction of a large UN conference centre in Macau; in exchange for bribe money, Ashe and Lorenzo submitted to the UN secretary general a document stating that the conference centre would \u201csupport the UN\u2019s global development goals\u201d<\/a>. In other words, Ng\u2019s bribery had similar goals to those pursued by the PRC through usual diplomatic channels (with the addition of direct profit for Ng\u2019s company). Ashe died while awaiting trial. Ng claimed the case was politically motivated<\/a>. He was found guilty on all counts<\/a>.<\/p>\n At the time he bribed Ashe and Lorenzo, Ng was a sitting member of the Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)<\/a>, an advisory body part the United Front system that did not expel him despite his arrest. He was not reappointed<\/a> last January.<\/p>\n CEFC also interacted with Ashe. In 2014, DESA and CEFC\u2019s think tank co-organised<\/a> an event about China\u2019s urbanisation plans, with PRC academics<\/a> as speakers, Patrick Ho as moderator and Ashe as \u201cofficiating guest\u201d<\/a>. An announcement for the event published by DESA, written in a style somewhat resembling Ho\u2019s own<\/a>, asserts CEFC\u2019s dedication to \u201cthe post-2015 development goals\u201d<\/a>. The event was hailed by PRC state media<\/a>. Not three months earlier, Ashe had attended a CEFC-organised \u201cLuncheon talk\u201d in Hong Kong, where he delivered a speech titled \u201cThe Post-2015 Development Agenda: Setting the Stage!\u201d<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n UNGA president John Ashe, bribed by CPPCC member Ng Lap Seng, with CEFC chairman Ye Jianming at a CEFC event in Hong Kong. April 2014. <\/em>Source.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n CEFC has also cultivated Ashe\u2019s predecessor, Vuk Jeremi\u0107, former Serbian minister of foreign affairs. After he left office in 2013, the Chinese company hired him as a consultant<\/a>. His cooperation with CEFC included \u201c[d]iscussing […] China and the New Silk Road\u201d with Patrick Ho, who lectured at Jeremi\u0107\u2019s think tank on BRI and the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda<\/a>. Jeremi\u0107 also moderated a CEFC event with Wang Yiwei<\/a>, the BRI-UN harmonisation advocate cited above, and a Silk and Road forum with DRC director Li Wei<\/a> as keynote speaker. Serbian media claim CEFC has donated money to Jeremi\u0107\u2019s think tank<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Australian connection<\/p>\n Two consecutive UNGA presidents being bribed is hardly a coincidence. Moreover, the Ashe and Kutesa cases are personally linked: Kutesa\u2019s wife was a board member<\/a> at the Global Sustainable Development Foundation, an organisation used by Sheri Yan, the \u201cQueen of the Australia-China social scene\u201d<\/a>, to bribe<\/a> Ashe \u201cin exchange for official actions […] to benefit several Chinese businessmen\u201d. The arrangement, which began before Ashe\u2019s presidency, and continued through and after it, involved Ashe\u2019s appointment as (remunerated) \u201chonorary chairman\u201d of the Foundation and its later reincarnation, the Global Sustainability Foundation. She pled guilty in 2016 and was handed a 20-month sentence.<\/p>\n In China, Yan\u2019s Foundation enjoyed a disproportionate degree of access given its novelty and vacuity. Two months before Yan\u2019s arrest, Chinese media reported, the Foundation bestowed an appointment to a former Shenzhen propaganda chief and counsellor to the State Council at no less a venue than the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse<\/a>. Sheri Yan was there, accompanying not Ashe but his successor Kutesa<\/a>. Yan has used her CCP connections to facilitate Australian access in China, and, allegedly, vice versa: an Australian media investigation claims she \u201cintroduced an alleged Chinese spy to her Australian contacts\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n Yan\u2019s Ashe-pampering included arranging for the dignitary to attend a private conference in his official capacity, hosted by \u201ca real-estate developer\u201d whom the indictment names only as \u201cC[o-]C[onspirator]-3\u201d, who was not himself charged. \u201cOne of [CC-3]\u2019s companies\u201d paid Ashe a $200k fee for his attendance. Although it doesn\u2019t name him, the indictment (p. 33 ff.)<\/a> provides sufficient information to identify CC-3. As open, authoritative sources show, the date for the conference (17 Nov 2013), where Ashe \u201cgave a speech\u201d, points to the event held at a venue provided by Kingold Group (\u4fa8\u946b\u96c6\u56e2), owned by Chinese-Australian billionaire Chau Chak Wing \u5468\u6cfd\u8363. Its official agenda, in Chinese<\/a> and English<\/a>, shows both Ashe and Chau spoke at the event; the official Kingold website also bilingually<\/a> summarises<\/a> his speech. The event was widely reported online by state media, in Chinese (CCP News<\/em><\/a>) and English (China Daily<\/em><\/a>). In short, if the quotes in the US indictment are correct, CC-3 is indeed Chau.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Chau has sued local journalist John Garnaut for defamation over a piece<\/a> that reached similar conclusions. Based on the reasoning above, however, Chau\u2019s identification, which Garnaut claims to have confirmed with additional sources, can only be called solid journalism. Moreover, Andrew Hastie, chairman of the Australian parliament\u2019s joint intelligence and security committee, recently confirmed he had learnt \u201cfrom US authorities\u201d that CC-3 is Chau<\/a>, and that he had not been indicted for \u201creasons that are best not disclosed\u201d. Chau, whose links<\/a> to the\u00a0 <\/span>links to the United Front system<\/a> are well-documented<\/a>, has generously donated to both sides of Australian politics, as well as to various causes<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As quoted in the US indictment, \u201cCC-3\u201d seemed to share the PRC\u2019s interest in UN affairs: Ashe\u2019s \u201csincere friend\u201d in Guangdong \u201chas the pleasure to offer you a permanent convention venue for the UN meetings on the sustainability and climate changes [sic] in the efforts to fully realize the Millennium Development Goals<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n New world a-comin\u2019…<\/p>\n Despite charges of high-level bribery, the non-profit subsidiary of CEFC, China Energy Fund Committee, \u4e2d\u534e\u80fd\u6e90\u57fa\u91d1\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a), still holds the title of special consultant to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), whose current chair is Czech diplomat Marie Chatardov\u00e1<\/a>.<\/p>\n Czech President Zeman has supported Chatarodov\u00e1 both for the ECOSOC position and as possible minister for minister of foreign affairs in discussions on cabinet formation<\/a>. Zeman, known for his pro-Beijing stance, has not dismissed his own honorary advisor, the ex-chairman of CEFC, Ye Jianming, who is now detained by the Chinese authorities at an unknown location. Similarly, the non-profit wing of CEFC remains in ECOSOC even as its leader Patrick Ho lingers in US custody on corruption charges.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n ECOSOC chair Marie Chatardov\u00e1 with Czech President Milo\u0161 Zeman. New York, September 2017. <\/em>Source<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n Chatardov\u00e1 and other high-ranking UN officials had been declining to comment on the situation despite repeated requests from Inner City Press<\/a>, a project specialised in investigative journalism within international institutions such as the UN or the World Bank.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
\nThe PRC joins like-minded states in the pursuit of mutual benefit. Source: <\/em>UNHRC<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n