{"id":231472,"date":"2021-06-02T15:29:29","date_gmt":"2021-06-02T22:29:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/?p=231472"},"modified":"2022-09-09T18:13:34","modified_gmt":"2022-09-10T01:13:34","slug":"is-xi-re-thinking-wolf-warrior-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/2021\/06\/is-xi-re-thinking-wolf-warrior-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Xi Re-Thinking \u201cWolf Warrior\u201d Diplomacy?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an in-depth report, Erika Kinetz of AP writes about a seven-month investigation by the Associated Press and the Oxford Internet Institute<\/strong> <\/a>which, \u201cfound that China\u2019s rise on Twitter has been powered by an army of fake accounts that have retweeted Chinese diplomats and state media tens of thousands of times, covertly amplifying propaganda that can reach hundreds of millions of people.\u201d As government officials and state media take a more active and sometimes aggressive position on social media to defend their views to a global audience, much of the engagement has come from fake accounts. An earlier report from ASPI<\/a> similarly found that government accounts “currently lack the linguistic and cultural refinement to drive engagement on Twitter through high-follower networks, and thus far have had relatively low impact on the platform.” From the AP report:<\/p>\n

Twitter, and others, have identified inauthentic pro-China networks before. But the AP and Oxford Internet Institute investigation shows for the first time that large-scale inauthentic amplification has broadly driven engagement across official government and state media accounts, adding to evidence that Beijing\u2019s appetite for guiding public opinion<\/a> \u2014 covertly, if necessary \u2014 extends beyond its borders and beyond core strategic interests, like Taiwan, Hong Kong<\/a> and Xinjiang.<\/p>\n

[…] Today, at least 270 Chinese diplomats in 126 countries are active on Twitter and Facebook. Together with Chinese state media, they control 449 accounts on Twitter and Facebook, which posted nearly 950,000 times between June and February. These messages were liked over 350 million times and replied to and shared more than 27 million times, according to the Oxford Internet Institute and AP\u2019s analysis. Three-quarters of Chinese diplomats on Twitter joined within the last two years.<\/p>\n

The move onto Western social media comes as China wages a war for influence \u2014 both at home and abroad \u2014 on the internet, which President Xi Jinping has called \u201cthe main battlefield\u201d for public opinion.<\/p>\n

[\u2026] This is the ruling Communist Party\u2019s global propaganda machine in action: Messages set by key state media outlets and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs get picked up by Chinese diplomats around the world, who repackage the content on Twitter, where it is amplified by networks of fake and suspicious accounts working covertly to shape public discourse for the benefit of China\u2019s ruling Communist Party. [Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

These official Twitter accounts are part of China\u2019s \u201cwolf warrior diplomacy\u201d tactic, which has become more prominent in recent years as Chinese diplomats and other government officials attempt to engage a global audience <\/a>with aggressive and sometime combative defenses of CCP policies, largely through Western social media platforms that are banned in China. An earlier post from CDT about wolf warrior diplomacy online also looked at the AP\/Oxford report<\/a>.<\/p>\n

However, a readout of a recent Politburo study session on diplomacy left observers divided on how to interpret a call by Xi Jinping for a \u201ctrustworthy, lovable, and respectable\u201d global image for China. Many are wondering if he is considering abandoning wolf warrior diplomacy in favor of a more moderate, traditional approach<\/strong><\/a>. From Bloomberg News:<\/p>\n

Xi told senior Communist Party leaders Monday that the country must \u201cmake friends extensively, unite the majority and continuously expand its circle of friends with those who understand and are friendly to China,\u201d according to the official Xinhua News Agency. Beijing needed \u201ca grip on tone\u201d in its communication with the world, and should \u201cbe open and confident, but also modest and humble.\u201d<\/p>\n

The remarks suggest that Xi may be rethinking his communication strategy on the global stage as President Joe Biden works to bolster U.S. relationships weakened under his predecessor\u2019s \u201cAmerica First\u201d policies. Xi has cast aside the party\u2019s decades-old \u201chide-and-bide\u201d strategy of keeping a low international profile in favor of a \u201cbig country diplomacy.\u201d<\/p>\n

[\u2026] China\u2019s emphasis on the superiority of socialism has caused some concern in the West, [Wang Yiwei] said, and the ridicule of other countries\u2019 failure to contain Covid-19 was \u201ca bit overdone.\u201d [Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At China Media Project, David Bandurski offered a corrective to Bloomberg\u2019s interpretation, arguing that China will continue to divide the world into \u201cfriends\u201d and \u201cenemies\u201d<\/strong><\/a>:<\/p>\n

Within the textual fabric of the news of the collective study session there is plenty to give pause: the characterization of the challenge at hand as a \u201cpublic opinion struggle\u2019 (\u8206\u8bba\u6597\u4e89), a term redolent of the Mao era; the persistently tone-deaf language about educating foreigners about the goodness of the CCP; the talk of mobilizing, funding and training and, importantly, ideologically assessing local leaders on their input in terms of international communication work, which hardly seems conducive to a broad change in tone. On the issue of broadening the \u201cfriend circle,\u201d how can it escape notice that the next line is a reiteration of the \u201cpublic opinion struggle\u201d? In such a struggle, there are friends in the form of compliant media and apologists, and there are enemies in the form of recalcitrant journalists, academics and politicians who insist on criticism \u2013 exactly what this external push is designed to neutralize.<\/p>\n

[\u2026] This was a collective study session, and such sessions, whatever their topic, generally benefit from the instruction of experts. In this case, we are told right at the outset of the official news release that \u201cprofessor Zhang Weiwei of Fudan University offered his explanations on this issue, and suggestions for work.\u201d What sort of teacher would Zhang Weiwei be?<\/p>\n

[\u2026] Zhang speaks of the urgent need and responsibility of the West to \u201cunderstand China.\u201d Given his emphasis on the glories of the \u201cChina Model\u201d and the objective truth of \u201cChina\u2019s story,\u201d which at its core is about the infallibility of the CCP, this need to \u201cunderstand China\u201d is not really about dialogue or dialectic. It is about acceptance. China must act with confidence to overcome these misunderstandings. As one senior German diplomat told GMF\u2019s Noah Barkin recently: \u201cDialogue is now conditional on us not criticizing China.\u201d [Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\n

yes, more than ever it's about drawing lines and distinguishing friend, enemies, and "potential friends."<\/p>\n

— Mary Gallagher (@MaryGao) June 2, 2021<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n