{"id":691489,"date":"2023-01-05T17:19:08","date_gmt":"2023-01-06T01:19:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/?p=691489"},"modified":"2023-01-24T16:20:26","modified_gmt":"2023-01-25T00:20:26","slug":"xi-maintains-close-ties-with-russia-as-war-in-ukraine-enters-a-new-year","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/2023\/01\/xi-maintains-close-ties-with-russia-as-war-in-ukraine-enters-a-new-year\/","title":{"rendered":"Xi Maintains Close Ties with Russia as War in Ukraine Enters a New Year"},"content":{"rendered":"

As Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine spills into 2023, China continues its policy of \u201c<\/span>pro-Russian neutrality<\/span><\/a>\u201d\u2014a balancing act that affords China enough <\/span>diplomatic<\/span><\/a> and economic cover to <\/span>tacitly support Russian aggression<\/span><\/a>, but not so much as to incur Western sanctions. At the turn of the new year, analysts took stock of the evolving dynamic between the two countries. Despite China and Russia\u2019s divergent interests and uncertain futures, Xi Jinping has refused to distance himself from Vladimir Putin, and has increasingly become the dominant force in their stated <\/span>\u201cno-limits\u201d partnership<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Experts argue that <\/span>China has the upper hand<\/span><\/a>. Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told The Atlantic, \u201cThe asymmetry that was built into this relationship even before the war has been galvanized by the war,\u201d and the relationship is now \u201c<\/span>more beneficial to China than for Russia<\/span><\/a>.\u201d Summarizing the main takeaways from their relationship in 2022, Joseph Webster argued in The Diplomat that <\/span>Russia\u2019s invasion rendered it even more dependent on China<\/strong><\/a>:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s dependency on China was pronounced before the invasion and will likely worsen. In 2021, Russian exports to China accounted for 4.4 percent of Russian GDP; this year the figure could easily exceed 5 percent, as Russian GDP falls and trade with the West contracts. Russia is shut out of Western technology markets and has little-to-no capacity to innovate on its own. Some surveys suggest more than 30 percent of Russian IT professionals have fled the country; the former CEO of Yandex, arguably Russia\u2019s most successful tech company, now lives in Israel. Unwilling to import technology from the West, and unable to innovate on its own, Russia will be forced to turn to China for semiconductors, 5G, and more. China\u2019s increasingly dominant economic and technological influence in Russia will continue to constrain Moscow\u2019s freedom of maneuver.<\/span><\/p>\n

How much dependency Russia can tolerate? With Russian comprehensive national power extremely likely to attenuate, Moscow must continue to accept Beijing\u2019s priorities over its own.<\/span><\/p>\n

[…] With China\u2019s economic and military capabilities likely to rise relative to Moscow\u2019s in the years to come, the relationship is becoming ever more imbalanced. Moreover, if China is able to phase out imports of Russian commodities such as oil, gas, and coal, it will have even less need for an unreliable, weak partner. Moscow and Beijing are set to draw closer in 2023, but the relationship\u2019s sustainability remains an open question. [<\/span>Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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After 300+ days of Russia's horrific war against Ukraine, where does China-Russia relationship stand? This week's events and some recent data tell a story of deepening ties and (surprise, surprise!) a rapidly growing asymmetry favoring Beijing. Let's take a closer look. 1\/ pic.twitter.com\/0bAoPAC8FX<\/a><\/p>\n

— Alexander Gabuev \u9673\u5bd2\u58eb (@AlexGabuev) December 23, 2022<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n