{"id":697392,"date":"2024-02-14T18:18:35","date_gmt":"2024-02-15T02:18:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/?p=697392"},"modified":"2024-04-15T10:45:14","modified_gmt":"2024-04-15T17:45:14","slug":"china-criticizes-israels-war-in-gaza-from-the-sidelines-to-us-annoyance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinadigitaltimes.net\/2024\/02\/china-criticizes-israels-war-in-gaza-from-the-sidelines-to-us-annoyance\/","title":{"rendered":"China Criticizes Israel\u2019s War in Gaza from the Sidelines, to U.S. Annoyance"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Chinese government <\/span>spoke out<\/span><\/a> this week against increasing Israeli military action in the southern Gazan city of Rafah. Its criticism, after a period of relative silence on the issue, has brought renewed attention to <\/span>China\u2019s position on Israel\u2019s war in Gaza<\/span><\/a> and the regional conflict that has ensued. Many American officials and analysts have expressed frustration over what they perceive as China\u2019s <\/span>lack of real commitment<\/span><\/a> to pursuing peace in the region. However, other experts have highlighted that China\u2019s position is motivated partly by a lack of leverage over regional actors, insecurity over its own human rights record, and most importantly, its satisfaction with letting the U.S. continue to <\/span>undermine its own global standing<\/span><\/a> by supporting Israel\u2019s <\/span>widely unpopular war<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

What prompted China\u2019s criticism on Monday was an Israeli <\/span>military operation in Rafah<\/span><\/a> that killed over 100 Palestinians and freed two Israeli hostages held by Hamas. That same day, Amnesty International released a <\/span>report<\/span><\/a> on four previous \u201cunlawful\u201d attacks on Rafah by the Israeli military that killed at least 95 civilians, including 42 children. In response to these attacks, the Chinese government called on Israel \u201c<\/span>to stop military operations as soon as possible<\/span><\/a>, do everything possible to avoid casualties among innocent civilians and prevent a more devastating humanitarian disaster in Rafah.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Many analysts in the U.S. policy space have been critical of China\u2019s response. L\u00e9onie Allard at the Atlantic Council wrote, \u201c<\/span>Beijing is freeriding on US and European security guarantees<\/span><\/a> to enhance its own presence and influence in the Gulf and the northwestern Indian Ocean. It is reaping benefits and advancing its own goals, while others carry the engagement and reputational costs of securing sea lanes.\u201d In Foreign Policy, Christina Lu relayed other comments from <\/span>American think-tank figures who have criticized China for sitting on the sidelines<\/strong><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

China is \u201cmostly hanging back and letting the United States collect abuse,\u201d said Jon Alterman, the director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. \u201cThe only interest China\u2019s pursuing in the Middle East is watching while a larger division opens between the U.S. and large parts of the global south,\u201d he added.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[…] China has \u201cclearly eschewed any substantive role in the ongoing conflict,\u201d Patricia Kim, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, told Foreign Policy in an email. While Beijing wants to portray itself as a regional power broker, she said, \u201cit has zero interest in serving as a security provider or directly intervening in challenging situations that might jeopardize its relationships in the region.\u201d [<\/span>Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Stakes for both the U.S. and China rose in late November when, in proclaimed solidarity with Palestine, <\/span>Houthi rebels in Yemen began attacking commercial ships<\/span><\/a> passing through the Red Sea. The Houthis have targeted ships with links to Israel and the U.S. (although other ships with no connection to Israel were also attacked), and said that they would not attack ships associated with China, as long as those ships have no links to Israel. Nevertheless, Chinese state-owned COSCO and Hong Kong-based conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings, two major shipping enterprises, <\/span>suspended their services<\/span><\/a> to Israel in early January.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The disruption of global shipping in the region has had <\/span>negative effects on China\u2019s economy<\/span><\/a>, although China has stopped short of taking military action to resolve the crisis. In late January, Reuters <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> that Beijing pressed officials in Iran\u2014which has historically <\/span>provided support for the Houthis<\/span><\/a>\u2014to help rein in Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea or risk harming business relations with China. Around the same time, The Financial Times <\/span>reported<\/span><\/a> that several Chinese shipping lines had redeployed their vessels to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, exploiting China\u2019s perceived immunity from Houthi attacks.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In an interview with NPR\u2019s Scott Simon, Dawn Murphy, an associate professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College, <\/span>suggested that the U.S. pursue peace by pressuring China to leverage its positive relationship with Iran<\/strong><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

From a U.S. perspective, China could encourage Iran [to change its behavior], and I specify encourage because I think there’s an unrealistic expectation that China would be able to coerce Iran into changing its behavior. But China does have positive relations both with Iran as well as the other countries in the region, as well as non-state actors. So I think that would be constructive.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[…] I think a lot of it will occur more through back channels. And part of why I say this is that this is a very delicate balancing act right now for China, not wanting to pick sides in the Israel-Hamas conflict, also not wanting to pick sides between the Saudis and the Iranians and the Israelis, right? So it’s not wanting to deviate from that. It also doesn’t want to be seen as taking the U.S. side too much because of the broader dynamic of competition. [<\/span>Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Indeed, Iran and China maintain close ties. Sara Bazoobandi, a fellow at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, published an article in Middle East Policy this week <\/span>underscoring the close ties between Iran and China<\/span><\/a>. She noted that Iran\u2019s understanding of the changing China-U.S. relationship has prompted Iran to deepen its ties with China, and to \u201c[revise] its policies in the hope that it can help contribute and be a part of what Tehran perceives as China’s new realm of influence in the Gulf region.\u201d But <\/span>Iran only has so much influence<\/span><\/a> over the Houthis and other rebel groups in Iraq and Syria that have conducted <\/span>over 168 attacks on U.S. personnel<\/span><\/a> since the start of the latest Israel-Hamas war last October. Moreover, as Jonathan Fulton wrote for the Atlantic Council, <\/span>there is a limit to China\u2019s leverage over Iran<\/strong><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

[D]espite China\u2019s interests in the region being threatened, Beijing has apparently been able to exert little influence over Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

[…T]he partnership with China has not delivered in economic terms to the degree the Iranians expected. Since finalizing the comprehensive strategic partnership deal in 2021, Iran has been the recipient of a flimsy $185 million in Chinese investment, which pales in comparison to the excess of $5 billion Saudi Arabia has provided over the same period. Iran\u2019s deputy economy minister Ali Fekri complained last year that he \u201cis not happy with the volume of Chinese investment in Iran, as they have much greater capacity.\u201d This frustration seems to have boiled over in January, when Iran decided that the days of cheap oil for China were done; Iran began withholding crude shipments to Beijing and demanded higher prices after long offering significantly discounted crude. The perception of Chinese leverage in Tehran\u2014much like the perception of Chinese power and influence in the Middle East and North Africa\u2014took a hit. [<\/span>Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Referencing another factor, Reid Standish from RFE\/RL wrote: \u201cBeijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that\u2019s <\/span>hurting America\u2019s interests arguably more than its own<\/span><\/a> at the moment.\u201d Echoing this point, Mordechai Chaziza, a senior lecturer at Israel\u2019s Ashkelon Academic College, told CNN: \u201c<\/span>China has no interest in joining a Western coalition led by the U.S.<\/span><\/a>; such an action would strengthen the position of the U.S. as a regional hegemon and weaken the Chinese position in the region.\u201d In an op-ed for the South China Morning Post, Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, argued that <\/span>China\u2019s \u201ceasiest and most politically convenient response to the current Middle East turmoil lies not in joining the US but blaming it\u201d<\/strong><\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

Chinese policy in the Middle East is shaped by two factors: China\u2019s threat perceptions and its strategic calculus regarding its great-power competition with the United States. And when it comes to dealing with the US, China\u2019s approach comes down to three \u201cnoes\u201d: no cooperation, no support and no confrontation. This credo underlies China\u2019s decision not to push back against the Iran-backed Houthis as they carry out drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.<\/span><\/p>\n

[\u2026China] relish[es] the decline of US credibility and leadership. The longer the US stands by Israel, the more opportunity China will have to consolidate its ties with other Middle Eastern countries and the more credible China\u2019s alternative approach to regional security will appear.<\/span><\/p>\n

[…F]or China, the easiest and most politically convenient response to the current Middle East crisis […] is to blame the turmoil since Hamas\u2019 October 7 attacks on Israel \u2013 the event that triggered the current conflict \u2013 on the failure of the US and Israel to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians and to treat such a deal as the precondition for any practical resolution to the ongoing crisis. [<\/span>Source<\/strong><\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In a recent <\/span>virtual roundtable on China\u2019s approach to the Middle East<\/span><\/a> hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Yun Sun implied that China\u2019s lack of bold action can also be explained by its tacit recognition of U.S. geopolitical primacy in the region, which she argued is a determining variable in all of China\u2019s interactions with regional countries. Given that China is not a primary security provider in the region, its mediation attempts and proposals are inevitably more theoretical than practical, she argued. Thus, given U.S. regional primacy, some experts argue that it is the U.S., and not China, that has greater responsibility for applying leverage to regional actors in order to bring an end to hostilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Ultimately, the entire discourse seems strange to me. <\/p>\n

Why are we so focused on what China can do in the Middle East? The truth is, not much.<\/p>\n

Why do we not ask why the United States, which has real influence to do more than drop bombs, is not using it to compel a ceasefire?<\/p>\n

— Bill Figueroa (@IranChinaGuy) February 7, 2024<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n