概要：中国经济目前的发展趋势和20年前的日本极为相似，随着“房地产泡沫”的日渐破灭，当年发生在日本的“十年萧条”可能会重现在中国大地上！日本政府当时用尽各种办法，使国民收入的损失几乎降到了最低！而作为社会主义国家的中国，对“房地产”和“能源行业”的过分依赖正在把中国经济一步步逼到悬崖边上！中国怎么办？这个相当严肃的问题！
作者：John Lee，2010年8月31日
Now that China has officially overtaken Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, there is growing speculation by influential Chinese and U.S. economists, such as Wu Jinglian and John Makin, that China will soon endure its own “lost decade” as it suffers a Japanese-style malaise. The idea that contemporary Japan offers a glimpse of China’s economic future is credible, given similarities in the two growth models. But Japan’s economic decline has at least been a gradual and comfortable one for the Japanese people and government. For the Chinese Communist Party and the nation’s people, following in Japan’s footsteps would likely be much more traumatic.
目前，中国已正式超过日本成为世界第二大经济体，但诸如吴敬琏、John Makin等中美知名经济学家却纷纷推测，中国可能要经历与当年日本极为相似的经济低迷期——“十年萧条”。鉴于中日两国的经济增长模式非常相似，所以当年日本的情况对于未来的中国经济还是非常有参考价值的。不过日本的经济衰退对与人民和政府来说是个“循序渐退”的过程，而对于中国共产党和中国人民来说，重蹈日本覆辙将会带来更多的痛苦
Before there was conclusive proof that Japan was in an extended period of stagnation, some economists were warning about the dangers of over-reliance on exports and fixed investment to drive growth. Common wisdom counseled that Japan held advantages intrinsic to contemporary East Asian systems. For example, unlike the myopic policies pursued by constantly changing governments in Western systems, the dominance of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (which ruled nearly without interruption from 1955 to 2009) allowed long-term policy thinking and implementation to occur in Tokyo. In combination with a populace of clever, responsible, hard-working people, Japan was well-placed to manage the necessary transition toward a more sustainable growth model.
有确凿证据证明，在日本的“经济萧条期”延长之前，一些经济学家就对过分依赖“出口”和“固定资产投资”来拉动经济增长的危险模式提出了警告。毋庸置疑，日本在当代的东亚体制中具备先天的优势，例如，西方体制中的政党更迭经常会造成的政府决策缺乏远见，而与此不同的是，日本自民党的长期统治（自1955年至2009年）使东京政府可以对决策进行深入探讨和执行，再加上聪明、负责、勤劳的人民，使得日本可以进行必要的调整来向“可持续发展模式”过渡。
Although “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” does not seek to replicate any particular model, its similarities to the Japanese approach are striking. Like Japan in the 1970s and ’80s, China is nearing the end of its reliance on exports and fixed investment to drive growth—and looking to shift toward policies that can enhance domestic consumption. To achieve this, it is seemingly blessed with an authoritarian government that can concentrate on policies that need not sacrifice the country’s long-term interests for short-term political expediency.
尽管“中国特色的资本主义”并不想去复制任何模式，但与“日本之路”的相似之处确实非常明显。正如上世纪七八十年代的日本一样，中国政府也在逐步调整依靠“出口”和“固定资产投资”来拉动经济增长的方式，转而采取“拉动内需来带动经济增长”的政策，为了实现这个目标，极具“权力主义”的中国政府没有为了短期的政治私利来牺牲国家的长期利益，而是集中精力推行这些政策。
JAPAN BUILT SOLID CIVIL INSTITUTIONS
日本建立“稳固的国民制度”
Yet, as Beijing’s response to the global financial crisis reveals (bank lending jumped, from $750 billion in 2008, to $1.4 trillion in 2009), China is becoming more—rather than less—dependent on an unsustainable model to drive economic growth. Domestic consumption as a proportion of gross domestic product is actually declining. At just over 30 percent, it is the lowest of any major country in modern economic history. The figure has declined, from more than 50 percent in the 1980s, to 40 percent at the turn of this century. It was around 36 percent prior to the global downturn in 2008.
但是，和北京政府当初应对“全球金融危机”时采取的方式一样（银行贷款从08年的7500亿美元飙升至09年的1.4万亿美元，）， 中国正在用一种不可持续的方式来拉动经济的增长。“国内消费”在GDP中所占的比例实际上是下降的，目前刚刚超过30%，这是近代经济史上所有主流国家中最低的。其实这个数据一直在不断下降，从上世纪80年代的50%强降至世纪之交的40%，08年全球经济下滑之前约为36%。
Similar models tend to lead to similar problems, as do the demographic problems in China, which will soon resemble Japan’s. Worse, differences between the two political economies may bode ill for China. When the Japanese economic malaise began, the country had built solid institutions: rule of law, property rights, and a stable political system. The latter was clearly evident when the LDP lost power last year and initiated a handover without turmoil or bloodshed. Even though the Japanese development model is frequently described as a state-led approach, the private sector generally received around three quarters of the country’s capital. This meant that prosperity was broadly distributed during the growth years. Even in structural decline, most Japanese are living the “good life”—and have grown rich before getting old.
相似的模式往往导致相似的问题，例如中国的人口问题就与日本极为相像，但更糟糕的是，两个政治经济体间的差异对中国来说应该不是个好兆头。日本“经济萧条期”开始时，政府已经建立起一套稳固的制度（体系），包括法律、财产权和稳定的政治体系。虽然日本的发展模式一度被称为是“国家主导型”，但“私营经济”却占据着约四分之三的国有资金，这就意味着在“经济增长期”国民可以大有赚头，而即便在“经济萧条期”，大部分日本人仍然可以过上“好日子”——并且能在变老之前成为一个“富人”。
In contrast, these institutions in China are relatively undeveloped, even after three decades of reform. Moreover, the Chinese model of development has taken the state’s role to unprecedented levels. Even though state-controlled enterprises (SOEs) produce between one-fourth and one-third of all output, they receive over 75 percent of the country’s capital. During the flood of lending from 2008 to 2009, state-controlled enterprises received over 90 percent of all capital; private industry received less than 5 percent.
与此相反，在长达30年的改革之后，这些制度在中国依然很不成熟，同时，中国的发展模式把“国家”的作用提升到一个前所未有的高度。尽管国有企业的产出只占全部产出的四分之一到三分之一，他们却拥有75%以上的国家资产，在08年到09年的“贷款潮”中，国企“霸占”了90%以上的国有资金，而私企却只有不足5%。
Heavy bias toward the state-controlled sector reversed what had occurred during the first 10 years of reform (1979-1989) and was the direct result of the Chinese Communist Party having retaken control of the levers of economic power following the Tiananmen protests in 1989.
国企所拥有的巨大“偏向性优势”（在引起民众不满后）导致第一个 “十年改革（1979到1989年）”的发生，但中国共产党在1989年又通过种种手段（译者注：和谐起见，此处省略——你懂的）重新夺回对经济权力的把持。
ASIA’S MOST-UNEQUAL INCOME SPREAD
亚洲“国民收入”最不均衡的地区
Focusing on China’s unmatched bias toward its state-controlled sector is not merely about the inefficient use of capital, although that is putting serious strains on the sustainability of its economic model. Since so much of the country’s wealth is concentrated in approximately 120,000 SOEs (and their countless subsidiaries), a relatively small group of well-placed, well-connected insiders benefit, while opportunities to prosper are denied to the vast majority.
中国目前所存在的无可比拟的“国企一头大”现象不仅会造成资金使用率低，并且会使经济的可持续发展面临巨大的压力。国家的大部分财富集中在大约12万家国企（及其数不清的子公司）手中，只有那些有身份、有关系的“少数人”才会从中受益，而绝大多数人则被剥夺了致富的机会。
For example, household incomes have increased by around 2 percent to 3 percent a year since 2000, while the coffers of the state-controlled sector enjoyed double-digit increases. Despite impressive GDP growth, about 400 million people have seen their net incomes stagnate or decline over the past decade. According to official data, the number of illiterate Chinese adults increased, from 85 million in 2000, to 114 million in 2005. From 2001, a 2006 World Bank study indicates, the income of China’s poorest 10 percent was declining by 2.4 percent every year, suggesting that absolute poverty increased when national GDP was growing by double digits every year. It is no wonder that within one generation, China has gone from being the most equal (albeit from a low base) to the most unequal country in Asia, in terms of income distribution, according to World Bank calculations.
例如，自2000年以来，家庭收入每年增长2%到3%，但国家相关部门的收入去一直维持在两位数的增幅上。虽然GDP的增长率引人瞩目，但是却有4亿人的纯收入在过去的十年里有减无增。根据官方的数据，我们的“成年文盲”人数正在增加，从2000年的8500万增至2005年的1.14亿。而世界银行在2006年进行的一项研究表明，自2001年起，中国最贫穷的那10%人口的收入平均每年下降2.4个百分点，这意味着每年在GDP实现两位数增长的同时，国内的贫富差距却正在被逐渐拉大！根据世界银行的测算，几代人以来，在收入分配方面，中国已经从亚洲“收入最均衡”的国家（尽管当时的起点很低）“成功”变成“最不均衡”的国家！
The fact that the vast majority of Chinese have missed out on the fruits of economic growth has serious ramifications for social and ultimately, political stability. Instances of mass unrest—124,000 in 2008 according to official figures—are increasing at more than twice the pace of GDP growth. Beijing now spends more on internal security than it does on the People’s Liberation Army. By the CCP’s own calculations, the country needs 8 percent GDP growth per annum for the Party to remain in power. Unlike Japan, the vast majority of Chinese people will grow old and never be rich. This suggests that we are witnessing the rise of a profoundly fragile power.
绝大多数的中国人没有尝到到经济增长的甜头，这个事实会对社会稳定甚至政治稳定产生严重的影响。2008年共发生了12.4万起社会不稳定事件（官方数字），其增长率是GDP增长率的两倍，而目前北京在“城市治安”方面的投入要高于“军队建设”。根据中共自身的推断，中国的GDP必须保持8%的年增长率，才能保证该党的执政地位。与日本的情况大相径庭——中国人一样会变老，但大部分永远不会变富。而这些则表明，我们正在目睹一支异常脆弱的力量正在悄然崛起
It would be better for China if it were a lot more like Japan. Economic malaise eventually led to a peaceful change of government in Tokyo. If the same were to occur in China, the transition might not be as smooth.
如果中国能走上真正的“日本之路”就好了，经济萎靡最终导致“东京政权”的和平更迭。但如果指望同样的情况发生在中国，恐怕过渡起来不会那样顺利。（译者注：其实根本就不可能！）
John Lee is a foreign policy research fellow at the Center for Independent Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. He is the author of Will China Fail? (CIS: 2009).
作者简介：John Lee，“独立研究中心”外交政策研究员；华盛顿“哈德森研究所”交换学者；著有《中国会失败么？》一书。
