原作者：
来源Nouriel Roubini: Chinese Save, but Should Spend – Newsweek
译者klyfly
The Confucian Consumer
Seven reasons why the Chinese save, when they really should be spending.
儒家文化下的消费者
中国人在该花钱的时候却存钱的七个原因
湖北省武汉国际大厦购物中心的奢侈品牌展示
The traditional Chinese model of economic growth required the U.S. and a few other countries to be consumers of first and last resort, spending more than their income and running ever-larger trade deficits—so that China could be the producer of first and last resort, spending less than its income and building ever-larger trade surpluses. That model is now challenged, if not altogether broken, because the excessive accumulation of private and public debt and deficit by the U.S. has forced a painful deleveraging: the overindebted U.S. consumer needs to spend and consume less, import less, and save more to reduce debt. Indeed, as the U.S. trade deficit shrinks, the Chinese trade surplus has been sharply shrinking, too.
中国传统的经济增长模式需要美国及一些其他国家作为可靠的消费国，过着开销大于收入贸易赤字的数据越来越大的日子，这样中国才能作为稳定的生产国，收入多花销少贸易盈余越来越庞大。如今这样的经济增长模式即使没有完全失去作用也遇上了点问题：美国的私人债务以及公共亏损的过度积累迫使美国经济经历了痛苦的去杠杆化，负债过度的美国消费者得少花些，少进口些，多存些钱还债。实际上随着美国的贸易赤字的减小，中国的贸易盈余也随之显著减少了。
How has China been able to maintain its high—8 percent–plus—growth despite the collapse of its net exports? It did not do it by reducing its saving and consuming more; rather, it has boosted further fixed investment in real estate (commercial and residential), in infrastructure (roads, airports, bullet trains), and in manufacturing capacity, which already suffers from a glut. Fixed investment in China is now close to 50 percent of GDP.
中国怎么样才能在净出口量暴跌的情况下保持超过8%的高增长速度？并不是通过减少储蓄增加消费，在产能已经过剩的情况下中国进一步增加了在诸如房地产（商用及住房）、基础设施建设（道路、机场、高速火车）和产能建设方面的固定资产投资。如今中国的固定资产投资额已占国内生产总值的金50%。
But no country can be so productive that it can take, every year, half its GDP and reinvest it into more capital stock without eventually ending up with a huge excess capacity and a mountain of bad loans. Thus, China needs to radically change its growth model from net exports and investment to reduced saving and more consumption. There are, however, many structural reasons why the Chinese save too much and consume too little. (Consumption in China is 36 percent of GDP, about half of what it is in the U.S. and in emerging economies like India and Brazil.)
但是没有哪个国家能如此多产又把近一半的国内生产总值做资本投资，却不落个产能过剩以及一大堆坏账的下场。所以，中国得从原来那种“净出口加投资”的增长模式彻底转向“少储蓄多消费”。但其实，中国人存得多用得少是有许多结构性的原因的。（中国的消费占国内生产总值的36%，这一数字是美国以及其他新兴经济体如印度、巴西等的一半。）
First, the Chinese save a lot because their social-security benefits are puny—a paltry $150 per citizen over a lifetime after retirement—and they need savings for old age.
首先，中国人存钱存得多是因为他们只有很少的社会保障福利金，每人在退休后仅能拿到150美元，他们得为老了以后的日子存钱。
Second, they also save because they want their children to attend private school and because public health care is poor, requiring a buffer for sick times.
第二个，孩子上私立学校要钱，公共医疗保健太差为生病的日子未雨绸缪也要钱，所以得存。
Third, there is little of a social safety net in China now that the “iron rice bowl” system of cradle-to-grave public services has broken down. Now you need a buffer of precautionary savings in case you lose your job.
三是，随着“铁饭碗”这种从摇篮到坟墓的公职体系的式微，没了多少保障，得存点钱防备着什么时候工作没了。
Fourth, the demographic consequences of the one-child policy have increased the need for savings for old age. The old social-security model of China—children taking care of old parents—is breaking down because of urbanization and the weight of the burden, with one child often having to take care of two parents and four grandparents.
第四，独生子女政策增加了为年老的日子存钱的必要性。中国旧时的社会保障模式是孩子照顾年老的父母，随着都市化，以及一个孩子得照顾两个父母四个祖父母面临的沉重负担，这一传统模式正在瓦解。
Fifth, Chinese financial markets for household borrowing—to finance home purchases via mortgage debt and consumption via credit cards and personal loans—are underdeveloped, limiting consumption growth.
第五，在中国像是通过抵押负债购房，通过信用卡以及个人贷款消费这样的针对家用借贷的金融市场还不完善，这限制了消费的增长。
Sixth, the system of legal restrictions for migrant rural workers in the cities nudges them to save to manage financial insecurity. Conversely, rural farmers with few public services need to save to deal with uncertain and volatile income.
第六，法律体系对进城务工的农村人口的限制迫使他们存钱以面对经济上的不稳定。而很少被公共服务覆盖的乡间的农民又因为收入不稳定得存钱。
Seventh, the average citizen in China doesn’t save more than one in Hong Kong, Singapore, or East Asia: they are all Confucian savers, and tend to salt away a third of after-tax income. A big difference, however, is that a whopping 25 percent of savings in China is in the form of the retained earnings of the corporate sector, mostly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In most private economies, those firms’ profits would become dividends that would increase household income and thus consumption. In China, they become retained profits that go into more capital accumulation and excess capacity. The Chinese policy of an undervalued currency and low cost of capital for public firms (and thus low return to savings for households) has implied a massive transfer of income from households (that thus can’t spend) to SOEs (that thus overinvest). Short of privatizing the SOEs or massively taxing their profits and transferring that income to households, savings will remain too high, consumption too low, and investment excessive. Yet the SOEs are politically powerful while households are impotent, so reform could prove a major challenge.
第七，在中国一个普通人不会比在香港、新加坡或其他东亚国家的人存得更多：他们都是儒家文化影响下的储蓄者，通常把税后收入的三分之一存起来。可是一个很大的区别在于，中国人储蓄中，足足25%是以企业，通常是国有企业的未分配的利润的形式存在的。在大多数私有经济中，公司的盈利会作为分红增加家庭收入以及消费。在中国，这些利润成为更多的资本积累和过剩的产能。中国的低估货币以及较低的企业资本成本（这也使得家庭的储蓄回报率低）的政策引导资金从家庭流出（这使得消费减少），流入国有企业（造成过度投资）。只有将国企私有化，通过对国企利润大规模征税将其收入转化成人民的家庭收入，才能改变储蓄过多、消费过少、投资过度的现状。国有企业拥有强大的政治力量，而争取利益民用的声音却是弱小的，改革将是一项大挑战。
Clearly China needs to radically change its broken growth model in the direction of reduced exports, investment and savings, and increased consumption. But there are structural—and cultural—reasons why the Chinese save so much and consume so little. Radical policy reforms may take more than a generation to rebalance the Chinese economy toward a more sustainable growth model.
显然，原有的经济增长模式已经行不通了，中国得转向“减少出口、投资和储蓄，增加消费”的新模式。但是中国人存钱多消费少是有社会结构以及文化上的原因的。要想通过激进的政策改革让中国经济在一个更加可持续的发展模式下重新取得平衡，可能得花上不止一代人的时间。
相关文章：
