原作者：
来源A Black Hawk View on bin Laden | 黑鹰飞行员谈突袭拉登行动
译者幸福的微笑
A Black Hawk View on bin Laden
黑鹰飞行员谈突袭拉登行动
Cynthia Iris speaks with US Army Black Hawk pilot Col. Paul Bricker about his take on the special forces mission against Osama bin Laden and why it was successful.
辛西娅·艾丽斯（CynthiaIris）采访了美军黑鹰直升飞行员保罗·布里克上校（Col. Paul Bricker ），请他谈谈为什么这次突袭本·拉登的特别行动会如此成功。
The US Army’s Task Force 160 (Special Operations Aviation Regiment/the ‘Night Stalkers’) came into being as a result of the problems and failure of Desert One in 1980 in Iran as the United States tried to rescue the American hostages. What do you think the military has learned since that operation that helped the helicopter assault succeed with the bin Laden raid in Pakistan last week?
问：美国陆军160特遣队（亦称160特种航空团或“暗夜潜行者”）的成立是1980年伊朗人质营救行动失败的结果。你认为陆军从那次失败后到现在都学会了那些东西，从而成功地组织起上周在巴基斯坦展开的突袭拉登的直升机攻击行动呢？
I’ve never served in the 160th, but I’m relatively familiar with the organization. The senior leadership of the military determined that we needed some special capabilities, some niche capabilities, and one of those capabilities we need is with rotary link aircraft, helicopters. We needed to invest in a small organization, because it’s going to be expensive; helicopters are expensive. We were going to specially recruit and select warrant officers, commissioned officers, and sergeants that are in Army aviation, put them into operational units and, for the most part, not take them out. We developed a bench of incredibly skilled aviators, especially, that can operate at night. That’s why they’re called the ‘Night Stalkers.’ All the forces operate at night.
答：我没有在160特遣队里服役过，不过我对他们的组织比较熟悉。原先，军队的高层领导认为，我们需要把一些具有特殊才能或专长的人组织起来，其中之一就是擅长驾驶旋转式飞行器的飞行员，尤其是直升机。但我们只能在一小队人身上烧钱，因为要烧的钱很多，直升机也很贵。我们特别从航空部队里挑选了准尉、士官、军士级别的人才，并把他们布置到行动队里；大部分时候，不会让他们出任务。我们培养出了一些出色的熟练飞行员，他们尤其擅长在夜间飞行。这就是他们为什么被称为“暗夜潜行者”的原因。整个队伍都是在晚上作战的。
They come out (of those units) occasionally, but to a large degree, because we’re investing in them, because we want them to have the kind of skills that you saw the other night in that operation, you have to keep those folks in an organization like the 160th so that they can maintain those skill sets.
偶尔也有会人从行动队里离开，但规模很小。我们在不停往他们身上烧钱，因为我们希望他们能保持特别行动所需要特殊技能。所以，我们要把这些家伙放在一个像160特遣队那样的单位里，让他们能不断地保持技术水平。
One of the other things the Army has done is that they’ve invested in special helicopters that have special equipment on them—and I’m not talking about the ‘low observable’ aircraft. Since I came into Army aviation in 1985, they’ve always had the leading-edge technologies, whether it be in the cockpit, in the airframe, with regard to capabilities. That has benefited the rest of the Army as well, because some of those technologies then cascade into the rest of the army. But their aircraft have always been a little flashier with regard to the capabilities that they bring. They had GPS before anybody had GPS. They had specially mounted weapons systems. They had rescue hoists. They had special armour on the inside of the aircraft. They had forward-looking infrared radar, avoidance radar, air-to-air refuelling probes.
此外，美国陆军还投资购买了很多装备了特殊装置的特种直升机——我说的可不是那种“飞得低看得见”的飞机。自从我1985年进入陆军航空部队以来，他们一直在飞机的里里外外装备上所有能装得上的领先技术。这些技术也让陆军的其它单位受益，因为有些技术对于部队来说是通用的。不过直升机部队的装备相对来说更炫些。他们是最先拥有GPS的单位，还有特别安装的武器系统，救援用起重机。直升机内部还有特殊的装甲、前视红外雷达、障碍回避雷达、空中加油探头。
This all gave us this great capability that has been called upon on various occasions to put special folks into special places and pull them out. But you can always trace that back to Desert One, where we had, if I’m not mistaken, Marine Corps pilots flying Army helicopters operating off of Navy ships, rallying in the desert with an Air Force aircraft. So when you peel the onion back, we needed these capabilities resident, we needed a certain select unit. So there are Navy units. There are Army units and there are Air Force units. And to a large degree, they all have their own training and selection programme.
这些工作让我们拥有了超强的能力，能参与各种场合的任务，将特种部队投放到指定地点并将他们接回来。回想起当年的伊朗人质营救行动，如果我没有记错的话，海军陆战队的机师开着陆军的直升机离开了海军的舰艇，然后像参加拉力赛一样又坐着空军的飞机赶往“沙漠一号”集结点。这些连续的任务就像是一层层地在剥洋葱，我们需要能干的专家，我们需要一个特别挑选的团队。于是海军有海军的特种部队，陆军有陆军的特种部队，空军有空军的特种部队。他们在很大程度上又各自发展出一套训练与筛选系统。
As an aviation commander, I had 155 helicopters in Southern Afghanistan last year, and about 3,200 folks. Some of my warrant officer aviators and NCOs were assessed and were selected to go fly in the 160th, and they’re flying in the 160th today. It doesn’t surprise me that they (the Night Stalkers) were able to do what they did in the raid. They do a lot of things every single night in Afghanistan and Iraq that people never hear about.
作为一名航空部队指挥员，去年我在阿富汗南部指挥着155架直升机，3200名人员。我手下的一些准尉与士官飞行员参加了评估，被挑选出来在160特遣队中执行飞行任务，他们现在还在那里。所以，听到他们（“暗夜潜行者”）在这次突袭任务中所执行的一切，我一点都不惊讶。他们以前在阿富汗和伊拉克的晚上执行过更多人所未知的任务呢。
Are you worried that we’re here hearing too much too often about what should be, or used to be, secret operations? The bin Laden operation opened up a lot of press coverage and speculation, especially with the tail rotor of a helicopter left behind.
问：听到那么多的秘密任务，或者说，曾经是秘密的任务被宣扬开来，你担不担心？突袭拉登行动已经吸引了众多媒体的关注与推测，尤其是对行动后留下的直升机尾旋翼。
This is kind of the trade-off when you live in a society where you have freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and you’ve got so many people that want to share in good news. I think it would have been much more convenient had that component of the aircraft not been left there because that makes it really complicated. We invest a lot of money in technology. It’s one of the game-changing aspects of the United States military. It’s because of our investment in research and development, and those things aren’t cheap. Unfortunately, there others who want to exploit what we’ve invested in. We have the greatest scientists in the world that are teaming with smart folks in our military to help develop technologies that give our troops the advantage.
答：我们生活在一个言论自由、新闻自由的社会，还有那么多的人想要知道这个好消息，这就是代价。我想，如果后面那个飞机部件没有被遗留在那里，事情就不会那么复杂了。我们在技术上砸了不少钱。美国军队就是通过技术改变了战争的游戏规则。我们在武器研发上烧的钱太多了，这些东西都不便宜啊。不幸的是，那么多人想要知道我们把钱花到那去了。我们有世界上最出色的科学家，还有军队里最棒的士兵，他们组成的团队一起开发了那些让我们的军队在世界上领先的技术。
The helicopters used in the raid weren’t the first US military helicopters with stealth capability. Didn’t the Comanche helicopter have it?
问：这次突袭行动中使用的直升机不是美军历史上第一架具有隐身能力的直升机。那么科曼奇直升机也有隐身能力么？
It was a desirable aspect of the Comanche. Of course, there was so much we expected of Comanche. It was an aircraft ahead of its time, and technology couldn’t keep up. But there were some spinoffs with regard to technology that we’ve gone ahead and, I think, added into current day Army aircraft and other aircraft. The Blackhawk, for example—the Blackhawk is in the Navy, it’s in the Air Force, it’s in the Army. And it’s in other nations around the world. It’s a tremendously capable aircraft.
答：科曼奇直升机就该配备有这样的技术。当然，科曼奇身上承载了太多的期望了。这是一架领先于时代的飞机，很多技术我都跟不上。不过，我们已经把很多先进的技术装备到陆军的很多飞行器上，从中也获益非浅。比如说，黑鹰直升机，海陆空三军都有装备，其它国家也有配备。这是一架具有非凡能力的飞机。
Do you think the fact that the rotor section got left behind and Pakistan now has it – is there a realistic possibility they’re going to share technology with China?
问：你觉得，现在遗在留在巴勒斯坦的旋翼部分会不会有可能被拿去与中国一起分享技术呢？
I hope not. But I think anything’s possible when you’re dealing in this environment. I would hope that that the component would be turned back to the United States so that we could safeguard it.
答：希望他们不要这么干。不过我觉得在现在的环境下凡事皆有可能。我希望这部分能安全回到美国。
When you first heard about the bin Laden raid, what were the biggest things that you thought could go wrong from a pilot’s point of view?
问：当你第一次听到突袭本·拉登行动的时候，从飞行员的角度来看，你觉得会遇到的最大问题是什么？
Well, when I looked at the distances. I’m somewhat familiar with that portion of Afghanistan, having spent quite a bit of time there. I figure they probably had to refuel and launch from one of these bases that’s right on the border. When you look at the distance to Islamabad, and then based on the reporting, it was about 30 miles north of that. Well, that’s about 150 to 170 nautical miles. If we just do a planning factor of 120 knots or 110 knots, it’s going to tell you, ‘wow, that was like a five-hour operation.’ So when you start thinking about a five-hour operation, in somebody else’s backyard, you don’t want anything to go wrong, because if anything goes wrong, it’s above the fold stuff in the Washington Post. So you’ve got to have second and third order of contingencies addressed, and we’re not even talking about taking enemy fire and getting shot down—we’re talking about penetrating the airspace, flying the mission profile, an airplane that runs into problems. So the contingency, if you have an aircraft go down, then you’ve always got to think back to Somalia. What happens when an aircraft goes down? It’s like a magnet for jihadists. And how quickly can I get a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in there to secure it and get the folks out? And then what happens if somebody gets hurt?
答：嗯，我是从距离远近来观察的。我有点熟悉这次行动的阿富汗地区部分，我研究过那个地区一段时间。我想他们不得不在边境附近的几个基地之一停留，重新加油起飞。根据报告，到伊斯兰堡的距大约是30英里，也就是差不多150-170海里。如果我们再考虑到速度是120节或110节，你就会知道，‘哇，这是个5小时的行动。’想想吧，你要在别人家的后院搞上5个小时，可不要出什么差错了。要是弄砸了，就等着上《华盛顿邮报》头条吧。所以，你还得再弄出个第二套第三套突发事件处理方案。而且，我们还没有开始考虑到敌方火力和被击落的可能性呢，我们只是讨论到如何穿越领空、飞行任务规划、飞机出故障的可能性这些问题而已。应急方案该怎么做呢？如果有飞机坠落，会不会又是一个索马里，有无数的圣战者涌过来？怎样尽快在当地组织快速反应部队保护战友？如果有人受伤了，该怎么办？
Is there a higher rate of helicopter failure in the military than you would expect at this point? It seems that more helicopters go down than you might think.
问：那么，是不是出现过直升机在军事行动中的失败率比你预估中要高的情况呢？也就是说，有比你设想中更多的直升机坠落下去。
When you look at the literally millions of hours we fly, it’s a miracle we don’t have more accidents or more aircraft go down. So we’re flying in an incredibly hazardous environment. We’re flying a lot at night. We’re flying with people shooting at you, and we’re doing pretty well. These crews, we’ve got the best-trained crews that I’ve ever seen in my entire career, I think since Vietnam.
答：看看我们数百万小时的飞行记录吧，没有更多的意外发生，没有更多的飞机坠落，真是个奇迹。我们是在令人难以置信的危险环境下飞行。大部分飞行时间是在夜间。下面还有人向你开火，我们真是太棒了。我手下这些人得到了最好的训练，我认为，自从越战以来，他们是我整个军事生涯中见到的最好的飞行员。
Why?
问：为什么会这样呢？
They are flying their trails off. Most of these warrant officer aviators and commissioned officers have three times the amount of flight time I did when I was their age. It’s because they’ve got repetitive, two, three, four tours down range where they’re getting hundreds and hundreds of hours. I had some guys who came back last year with 1,000 hours in one year, which is almost unheard of. When I was growing up, there were some officers would go their whole career and get 1,000 hours. Now we’ve got majors and captains that are at 1,500, 2,000 hours because of all the flying that they’ve done down range.
答：他们把追踪者都甩掉了。大部分的准尉飞行员和士官飞行员都接受了比我当年多三倍以上时间的飞行训练。他们从下级士兵开始就不断地接受重复训练，每升一级，都会练上成百上千个小时。我手下有些人去年归队，他们一年飞行了1000个小时，真是闻所未闻。当我在部队里成长起来的时候，有些军官在整个职业生涯中总共才飞行了1000个小时。我们现在有些少校和上尉级别的军官也只飞行了1500-2000小时，因为他们在下层的时候已经飞得够多的了。
When you get that kind of flight time, the quality of your force goes up. I think accidents have gone down relatively speaking from the beginning of the war to where we are now. We’ve incorporated our lessons learned, our tactics, techniques and procedures. We’ve put modifications on the aircraft to help deal with the environment. For example, with the new Chinooks that we’re putting in now, we’ve got the capability to shoot an approach into a complete ‘zero-zero’—basically you can’t see in front of your aircraft, but you’ve got a capability now where you can do an approach to a hover and then mechanically bring it down to the ground because we’ve got sensors that are helping the crew by providing information. When we first started the war, we didn’t have that in our aircraft.
飞行员有足够的飞行时间，整个队伍的素质自然会提高。我觉得，自从（反恐）战争开始以来，我们现在的飞行意外发生率相对已经降低了。我们把那些经验教训融入到我们的战术、技术和作战程序中了。我们对飞机进行了修改，让它能更好地应对环境。比如说，新型的“支奴干直升机”已经可以在能见度为零的情况下安全着陆——基本上你是看不到飞机的前方状况的，但现在我们配备了新的传感器，能向飞行员提供信息，飞机可以在着陆点上方悬停，然后下降着陆。在战争刚开始的时候，飞机上没有配备这些东西的。
We’ve lost a lot of aircraft in dust landing conditions. So, the Army has invested heavily in this ‘reset programme.’ Reset is when we bring aircraft back from the theatre. We rip them down to the frame, and we replace components. We clean out all the dirt, and we do a comprehensive ‘depot level’ evaluation of all our aircraft. That’s helping extend not only the life, but it’s also identifying problems before they happen. In addition, the crews are more experienced—that helps, but it’s still dangerous.
灰尘满天的着陆情况曾让我们损失了很多的飞机。因此，陆军重金投入了“复位计划”。“复位计划”就是我们从战区把飞机取回来，把机身拆开，更换部件，清理污垢。我们甚至“全面地”评估了一遍我们所有的飞机。这样做不仅延长了飞机的寿命，也让我们能在故障发生前找到问题所在。此外，飞行员也得到更多的经难——这么做有帮助，但危险依然存在。
I don’t know what caused that aircraft to go down in bin Laden’s compound. There’s a lot of speculation over what caused that aircraft to go down. It could have been enemy fire. Of course, nobody wants to believe that.
我不知道是什么原因让突袭本·拉登的直升机坠落。有很多原因会让飞机坠落。有可能是敌人的炮火。当然，没人这么想。
What do you think ensured it was successful getting out of Pakistani airspace undetected?
问：你觉得是什么原因让他们穿过巴基斯坦领空又不被人发现?
When you look at the terrain over there, it’s very challenging to be able to see ‘electronically’ the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. So if you pick some valleys, you can probably beat it. We go through pre-mission planning, and if we’re trying to evade something, you can put up receivers, and you understand at what altitude that radar is going to be effective. So if you fly below that radar, then that would be a way in which you could conceal your ingress and egress. Also, we would have airborne command and control aircraft in Afghanistan on big operations.
答：从那里的地形来看，想要从电子设备上看清楚阿富汗与巴基斯坦边境的很困难的。所以，如果选择在山谷中飞行的话，很容易就会骗过去了。通过任务前的规划，我们可以知道要躲开些什么东西，设置什么接收器，在什么样的高度雷达会起作用。飞得比雷达低，就是一个隐藏自己进出踪迹的好方法。此外，在阿富汗的大行动中，空中会有指挥机进行控制。
The US got bin Laden in what has to be considered a phenomenally successful counterterrorism operation. You’ve had years of experience in Afghanistan. What do you think of continuing a counterinsurgency operation with the big success of counterterrorism at this point?
问：美国消灭本·拉登被认为是反恐行动中一个重大的胜利。你在阿富汗呆过好些年了。你认为在反恐中取得这么大的胜利对于继续阿富汗的平叛有什么意义？
Bin Laden was the head of al-Qaeda. Our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is really focused on winning the people. So they’re separate and distinct. Now, if I was a mid- or a high- level insurgent, I would be aware that they just nailed bin Laden. Most of those folks who are operating in Afghanistan are already running tired and scared because similar forces have been hunting those guys down for the last few years. If you can separate the head from the body, it enables the conventional as well as the other forces that are operating on the ground to really protect the people.
答：本·拉登是基地组织的领导人。而我们在阿富汗的平叛运动的真正着眼点是赢得民心。这是不同的两码事。假设我现在是个中等或者是高层次的反叛分子，我会注意到本·拉登刚被干掉。大部分阿富汗的叛乱分子已经又累又怕了，因为类似的部队这几年来一直在猎杀他们。如果我们能把敌人的首领干掉，那会让在地面上的常规部队及其它军事部队能更好地保护好人民群众。
As for the counterinsurgency campaign—this summer is going to be a critical period. I was in Afghanistan (in 2009 and 2010) in Kandahar and this is where we’re going to understand the success we’ve had with providing the security for the Afghan people.
对于平叛行动来上，今年夏天会是一个关键时期。我（2009年和2010年）在阿富汗的坎大哈，我们为阿富汗人民提供了安全保护，这才是我们想要的成功。
Do you think there is a wedge now between the Taliban and al-Qaeda out of this?
问：你认为现在在塔利班与基地组织之间是否形成互相需要的局面？
I would think that this would perhaps create an opportunity for the Karzai government to be a little bit more appealing to the Taliban. So some reconciliation or reintegration. I think it was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who stated in February that it was US policy now to support the reconciliation process with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. These are venues, opportunities for the Taliban to reintegrate into Afghan society. I believe that as long as they are willing to operate peacefully and within the boundaries of Afghan civil society, that they would be welcome at the table.
答：我认为，这次胜利可能会创造一些机会，让卡尔扎伊政府能更多地向塔利班分子呼吁和平，并取得某种程度的和解，促使某些人重返社会。我记得，二月份的时候，国务卿希拉里·克林顿表示，美国现在的政策是支持阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊提出的和解进程的。对于塔利班分子来说，这是一次的重返阿富汗社会的机遇。我相信，只要他们愿意在阿富汗社会的容忍界限内和平地运作，他们在谈判桌上会受到欢迎的。
For a soldier, that is somewhat frustrating, because we’ve lost a lot of men and women in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. But at the end of the day, it’s their country. This counterinsurgency campaign is created to win the people. If the people elect Karzai, and they have a political process that’s peaceful, and it includes this party called the Taliban, maybe it will be the Taliban in name only. I don’t think that they’re going to tolerate the kind of violence that the Taliban have inflicted on their people as the ‘new normal.’ The Afghans we ran into, they hated the Taliban; they feared the Taliban. And that repressive justice does nothing for their children. Just like we do, they want what’s best for their kids. They want for the next generation better than what they had.
作为一名军人，出现这样的情景多少会感觉沮丧，因为我们在阿富汗与塔利班的作战中已经失去了很多优秀的生命。但毕竟，这是别人的国家。发动这场平叛战争目的在于赢得民心。如果人民选择了卡尔扎伊，他们会有一个和平的政治进程，也许还会包括一个塔利班党，他们也只能叫塔利班了。我不认为他们会容忍过去塔利班所带给他们的暴政，那是所谓的“新的正常秩序”。我们所遇到的阿富汗人，对塔利班是又恨又怕。压制正义对他们的孩子一点好处都没有。就像我们一样，他们也希望能把最好的东西给自己的孩子。他们希望下一代能过上比他们更好的生活。
You’ve had a long career in the military. From your experience and viewpoint, does it make sense for the head of the CIA to now be a military general, and for the new head of the Defence Department to come from heading up the civilian CIA?
问：你在军队里呆了那么长的时间。从你个人的经验和观点来看，现在中央情报局（CIA）领导是一位军事将领，而国防部的领导则是来自中央情报局，你是怎么看待这事的？
I think both their records are incredible, and Gen. David Petraeus is, I think, the closest thing that our generation has seen of a ‘George Marshall’ type leader. Gen. Petraeus has given so much to this nation. He understands Afghanistan, he understands Iraq. He can continue to serve our nation at a time when there aren’t a lot of folks that have the kind of background that he has. He’s a statesman.
答：他们两个人的记录都很非常出色。我感觉戴维•彼得雷乌斯将军（Gen. David Petraeus，任CIA局长）是我们的将军中最像“乔治•马歇尔”的一位。彼得雷乌斯将军为我们国家作出了很大贡献。他了解阿富汗，也了解伊拉克。他不仅继续为国家效力，而且他还拥有很多人所不懂的背景知识。他是国家栋梁。
How do you think he’ll fit in with the mission and culture of the CIA, where it’s an intelligence-gathering, civilian, secretive agency, not a military organization?
问：你觉得他会适应合CIA的使命与文化吗？毕竟这个地方是情报汇集地、政府机关、秘密组织，不是军事组织。
He’s going to do great. He’s the kind of leader who wants you to kind of check your rank at the door when he has his sessions. He expects his people to speak the truth to him. He has the ability to get the best out of his people. When you have a session with him, you think he’s really interested in how you think, what you think. I was sitting next to him in a meeting in Afghanistan in 2009. He was genuinely interested in the way in which we were working with the Canadians in an area west of Kandahar City. Petraeus probably knew the answers to the questions before he asked them. But this gives him an opportunity to confirm or deny what he thinks. He asked very probing questions and was constantly taking notes.
答：他会做得很好的。他是那种很重视等级观念的领导。他希望手下一直对他讲真话。他善于用人。如果你和他一起开过会，就会发现他这人对别人的想法，和为什么会出现这种想法特别感兴趣。2009年的时候我在阿富汗的一次会议上坐在他旁边。他对我们与加拿大人在坎大哈市以西地区一同工作的方式非常有兴趣。彼得雷乌斯将军在提问之前可能心里面已经有自己的答案了。但这次会议让他有机会检验自己的想法是否正确。他问了很多尖锐的问题，并且不断地做笔记。
We’ve been much closer involved with the intelligence agencies in the battlefield today because tactical intelligence is critical to our soldiers. And so we get information when we’re deployed. Sometimes we don’t know where it comes from, but I’ve got to believe that there’s a much greater consensus and much better ability for folks who work at certain levels to ensure that the folks who need the information are getting it. He understands what the war fighters need, and I think he’ll just increase that focus as the director of Central Intelligence.
今天， 我们在战场上与情报机构的协作是越来越紧密了，因为战术情报对于我们的士兵来说是至关重要的。我们通过情报部署部队。有时候我们不知道情报是从那来的，但我相信，在某个层次上工作的人们会尽力让那些需要这些情报的人们获得信息，这种共识越大，我们拥有的能力也越大。他懂得战场上的士兵需要些什么，我想他在中情局局长的位置上会更多地关注这些东西。
Col. Paul Bricker has just completed a year at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center as Harvard’s Senior US Army Fellow. Prior to this posting, he commanded the 82nd Airborne Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade, and recently completed a 12-month deployment in Kandahar Afghanistan in support of the International Security and Assistance Force. Col. Bricker has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the US, South Korea, Afghanistan twice, and Iraq.This interview was conducted by US-based reporter Cynthia Iris.
保罗·布里克上校刚刚在哈佛大学韦瑟中心完成了为期一年的哈佛大学美国陆军高级研究员培训。在此之前，他指挥着第82空降师的航空战斗旅，并于最近完成了在阿富汗坎大哈市的12个月部署，以支持国际安全援助部队的工作。布里克上校曾在美国、韩国、阿富汗、伊拉克等不同地区和部门工作过，两次到过阿富汗。访问由我们的记者辛西娅·艾丽斯进行。
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