编者按：在习近平会见美国总统奥巴马前夕，《纽约时报》推出了中国问题专家沈大伟 （David Shambaugh）的“Ten Questions for China’s Heir Presumptive”，问了10个相当尖锐的问题，中国学者陈平随即在上海的独立网站观察者网做出了反诘。转载双方各10问，供研究者参考。
作为中国问题专家，美国教授沈大伟肯定懂得高层外交的基本礼仪。中国有句古话：来而不往非礼也。我且模仿沈大伟的口气，也向未来美国总统提出十个问题。
我非常震惊地看到，2012年2月10日，就在中国国家副主席习近平即将访美的前夜，《纽约时报》发表【特邀评论员社论】《十问中国的未来继承人》，作者沈大伟（David Shambaugh）是美国乔治·华盛顿大学中国政策研究室的主任。
作为一个中国问题专家，沈大伟教授肯定懂得高层外交中的基本礼仪。但是现在不是与纽约时报编辑们纠缠这个问题的时候。中国有句古话：“来而不往非礼也。”我且模仿沈大伟的口气，也向未来美国总统提出10个问题。如果这些问题在一些美国读者看来挑衅味十足，那么我事先道歉。
自二战以来，美国媒体总是教导全世界，说美国总统的合法性来自于选举，但世界各地的民众都在深深怀疑美国领袖是否具备处理世界事务和地区和平的勇气和智慧，尽管他们自封为世界警察与道德裁判。
这将是一个让中国人民了解美国也让美国人民了解中国的好机会。美国政策的朝三暮四在本国众所周知，但是中国和其他亚洲国家并不清楚。
这里是观察美国的人们想要知道的十个问题，提给美国未来可能的领袖们，包括奥巴马和他的挑战者：
1. 美国领导人会让美国重归政治改革之路吗？
自2008年金融危机，世界经济深陷萧条。正如国际货币基金组织前首席经济学家、现麻省理工学院教授西蒙?约翰逊（Simon Johnson）所指出：危机之源在于金融寡头绑架了美国政府。拯救美国经济的唯一出路是拆分金融寡头。美联储前主席、奥巴马前经济顾问保罗?沃尔克（Paul Volcker）也建议拆分金融寡头。但是我们只见到奥巴马政府给金融巨头们注资一万多亿美元，却未见任何对危机制造者的惩罚措施。
美国领导人敢挺直腰板面对阻碍金融与政治改革的强大利益集团吗？他们包括金融寡头、军火工业集团、和跨国公司游说集团。还是像小布什那样，因为受过这些利益集团的好处而感激涕零？民主党和共和党的改革派们能在今年11月的党内选举中脱颖而出吗？
2. 美国领导人能实现“纠正预算失衡”之类的豪言壮语吗？
过去两年里，很多官方讲话都在号召把赤字财政的重心从社会福利和军事冒险开支向支持国内经济结构转型，以便为美国新的可持续经济增长奠定基础。但迄今为止，预算改革的现实和豪言壮语相去甚远。
3. 美国领导人能否为美国的印第安土著安排一套更为人性化的政策吗？
他们的人口从西方殖民者入侵北美之前的数千万持续锐减，如今已从美国的政治舞台上销声匿迹。
美国政府确实有勇气向二战时被投入集中营的日裔美国人道歉。然而对于修建了三分之二横贯北美大陆铁路的华工——不同于修建了三分之一铁路的爱尔兰籍劳工， 1882年至1965年的种族主义排华法案还排斥华工向美国移民——美国政府迟迟没有道歉。加拿大政府已经显示除了政治勇气，向华裔加拿大人道歉和赔偿。美国政府是否也有勇气面对他们在历史上欠下的人权债务？
4.美国领导人真能管住那些好战势力吗？
他们正在中国周边部署军事力量，把美国的霸权推向战争边缘。他们的意图是统治世界，在国际上横行霸道。
5. 美国领导人是否有足够自信，来放松对世界互联网基础系统和国际现金流的控制？
须知美国情报机构正是利用它们来干预任何国家、甚至他们的盟国的信息系统。
6. 美国人民能驾驭他们的领导人吗？
这些领导人自冷战时代起就显示出令人担忧的倾向：他们总是撇开联合国和国际法，在全世界发动入侵。
7.美国领导人能否少推行一些言过其实的外交政策？
在需要华盛顿采取切实行动的地方，我们只听到老生常谈的外交辞令。在这个危险的世界里，美国的辞令已经越来越不可信。尚能给人一线希望的是，奥巴马总统在2009年12月10日接受诺贝尔和平奖时做的演说。但问题是他对减少美国发动的战争和入侵，究竟做出了哪些历史性贡献？
8.美国领导人如何应对日益增长的来自非洲、中东、以及拉丁美洲国家的不满？
须知这些不满源于美国在能源、安全以及贸易上的帝国主义贪婪政策。
我们都知道美国以及其他西方强国人口只占世界人口的10%，但是却控制了世界上将近90%的资源，并且消耗世界上将近一半的能源。相比之下，中国人口比整个发达国家总和的两倍还多，却只消耗世界10% 的石油。今天，既然美国很有钱又深陷债务危机，为什么美国不按市场惯例出售资产偿还债务？或者与债权国达成债转股的协议？如此可以发展国际合作、处理金融危机，和平发展难道不比打贸易战好吗？
9.美国领导人能否在全球治理中扮演更积极而不是更消极、更难缠的角色？
美国的虚拟经济是美国实体经济的五十倍，是世界GDP的十倍，从美国流出的热钱引发了拉美、东亚、俄国、南欧以及美国自身的金融危机。美国是否要继续站在金融寡头一边，对抗20国首脑峰会上多数国家的要求？这些要求包括：全球变暖、国际金融监管以及制裁国际寡头的反垄断法。
美国的军事开支几乎占世界总军事开支的一半，比仅次于美国的前20名强国军事开支的总和还多。美国还是世界上第一个使用原子弹的国家。在中东、非洲、亚洲、和拉美的战争与军备竞赛中，美国扮演的角色究竟是矛盾化解者还是问题制造者？
10.美国领导人是否具有推进中美关系的战略远见？
当今世界，再没有比这两个国家的关系更重要的国际关系，然而当下的两国关系中弥漫着战略不信任。要改善两国关系就需要中国领导人——以及美国领导人信守诺言，推动两个大国间的战略互信。
历史上，中美两国并无地缘政治冲突，唯一的问题是台湾。要消除中美之间的不信任，有一个简单的方案：就是废止《台湾关系法》，以此换取两国在太平洋地区和其他世界事务上的合作。美国在内战期间并没有要求法国来做仲裁者。同理，台湾海峡两岸的中国人也不需要美国来监管中国的和平统一。美国现行政策为中国的和平发展与统一制造的麻烦远多于化解。
我相信多数美国商人和州长们都想抓住中国开放的市场机遇，并与中国人民成为朋友。只有少数冷战老兵还在犹豫着要不要睁开眼面对急剧变化的世界。
这样也无所谓。我们中国人一向有耐心。我们用100年的时间向西方列强抗争获得了国家的独立，人民共和国用了21年时间重返联合国，用15年的时间谈判加入了WTO，靠着2200年的统一历史，我们有自信等待美国的领导人意识到自从我们共同生活在这个地球上时，美国就需要中国，就像中国需要美国一样。
这也没什么了不起，中国人有的是耐心。我们打了一百年仗才从西方强权手中赢回国家独立。人民共和国等了21年，才重回联合国的合法席位；加入WTO又经过了15年的谈判。已有2200年统一历史的中国，有足够的信心等待美国领袖最终接受一个简单的现实：即美国需要中国，就和中国需要美国一样，谁让我们同住在一个小小的地球村！
习的访问不可能为这十个问题给出所有答案，而时间也会证明美国是能最终拥有一个在其内政外交上都赞成并推动积极变化的“改革型”领导人，还是不过又选出一个在政策上碌碌无为的政治秀客。
陈平博士，春秋综合研究院研究员，北京大学国家发展研究院教授，上海复旦大学新政治经济学研究中心高级研究员。德克萨斯大学奥斯汀校区物理学博士，研究经济周期和经济混沌。 导师普里戈金 (Ilya Prigogine) 教授是1977年诺贝尔化学奖获得者，非平衡态统计物理与耗散结构理论奠基人。
Ten Questions for America’s Leader Presumptive
By Ping Chen
I am surprised by the New York Time Op-Ed “Ten Questions for China’s Heir Presumptive” by David Shambaugh, published on Feb.10, 2012, on the eve of China’s Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States.
As a China expert, Prof. Shambaugh at Georgetown University certainly knows the minimum international curtsey for high level exchanges. But it is not this time for me or even the New York Time editors to dwell on this issue. As a Chinese saying goes“It is impolite not to reciprocate （来而不往非礼也）,” I would like to raise ten questions here in the similar tune of David Shambaugh. I would apologize in advance if my questions are somewhat provocative to some American readers. American media always lecture the world since the end of WWII that the US President is legitimate through election, but people around the world are deeply skeptical about the courage and wisdom of American leaders in dealing with world affairs and regional peace about their self-appointed role as world judges and police. This will be a good opportunity for Chinese people to familiarize with America and vice versa. As American policy inconsistency is well known in the United States, but not quite clear in China and other Asian countries.
Here are 10 questions America observers would like to know about the leaders of the United States, including the President Obama and his Republic challengers:
1. Will American leaders return to a politically reformist path for the American political system?
Since 2008 financial crisis, the world economy had been dragged into a recession. As Simon Johnson, the former IMF Chief Economist and now a MIT professor, pointed out: the root cause was financial oligarchs who captured the American government. The only way to save American economy is to break-up financial oligarchs. Paul Volcker, the Former Chair of Federal Reserve and former economic advisor to President Obama, also suggested the breaking-up of financial oligarchs. However, we only see the Obama administration injecting 1 trillion dollars into financial giants, but without doing anything to discipline crisis creators.
Can American leader stand up to the powerful interest groups that have blocked financial and political reforms — the financial oligarchs, the military-industry complex, the lobby groups for large multi-national enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as George W. Bush has been? Will any reformers in both Democrat and Republican be elected to top leader positions at the coming election in November?
2. Can the American leaders turn the rhetoric of budget “rebalancing” into reality?
Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the deficit budget away from the entitlement and the military adventure to domestic restructuring as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for the United States. To date the reality of budget reform has not matched the rhetoric.
3. Will American leader be able to devise a more humane policy toward Native American Indians, when their population had steadily dropped from tens of millions before Western colonists invaded the North America and now has disappeared from America’s political stage?
American government did have some courage to apologize to Japanese American citizens who were put in concentration camp during the world war two. However, American government owes an apology to Chinese Americans who built two thirds of transcontinental railway, but unlike Irish workers, Chinese immigrants were barred by the racist Chinese Exclusion Act from 1882 to 1965. As the Canadian government has political courage to offer an apology and some compensation, will American leaders have the similar courage to face their historical debt in human rights?
4. Can American leaders reign in the hegemonies that are pushing the American power to the edge of war on China’s neighbors, to “dominating” the world and behaving aggressively internationally?
5. Will American leaders be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on world internet infrastructure and international financial flow so that American intelligence apparatus could manipulate any country’s information system at any time including their allies?
6. Can the American people reign in their leaders, which have demonstrated a worrisome tendency since the cold war to undertake invasions around the world, act independently of United Nations and international laws?
7. Will American leaders conduct a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric?
America’s diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Washington. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech President Obama gave at the Nobel Peace Prize Forum on Dec.10, 2009. Did he make any historical contribution to make less America-led wars and invasions?
8. How American leaders handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over America’s rapacious and imperialist energy, security and trade policies?
We know American and other western powers have only 10 percent of the world population, but control near 90 percent of resources, and consume near half of produced energy. Now, the US is rich but deep in the debt. Why could the US simply follow the market convention to sell your assets to pay the debt or reach agreement for a debt-equity swap and international cooperation in financial crisis and peaceful development?
9. Will the American leaders begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance?
American virtual economy is ten times the world GDP and near fifty times of the US real economy. The US originated hot money ignited financial crisis in Latin America, East Asia, Russia, Southern Europe and the US itself. Will US continue to stand with financial oligarchs in the G20 meeting against the majority of other nations on issues like global warming, international financial regulation, and anti-trust law against international oligarchs? American’s military budget is near half of the world and more than the next top 20 nations combined. The United State was also the first nation to use the atomic bomb. Will US become part of solution instead of part of the problem in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America in preventing war and arm race?
10. Will American leaders have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with China?
There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China’s leaders — and the American leaders — to build strategic trust between the two great nations.
Historically, China and the US have no geopolitical conflicts except the Taiwan issue. To remove the mistrust between China and United States, there is a simple solution: to abolish the Taiwan Relation Act in exchange for economic cooperation in Pacific and world affairs. The United States did not ask France to be a broker during American Civil War. By the same token, Chinese people on the both sides of Taiwan Straits do not need American supervision for China’s peaceful unification. The US policy is more a problem than a solution in China’s peaceful development and unification.
I believe that most of American businessmen and state governors would love to participate in the open Chinese market and make friends with Chinese people. Only a few cold war veterans are reluctant to open their mind to a changing world.
That is o.k. We Chinese people have patience. We fought a hundred year war to regain China’s independence from West Powers. People’s Republic waited 21 years to return to the United Nations, and joined WTO through 15 year negotiation. Based on the 2200 year history of a united China, we have confidence to wait until American leaders finally realize that the United States needs China as much as China needs the United States, since we all live in the same small village of the earth.
As Xi’s visit is not likely to get all the answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if the United States finally has a “transformational” leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for America at home and abroad, or whether America just elect another risk-averse showman in American politics.
Dr.Ping Chen, is the Professor at National School of Development, Peking University in Beijing and Senior Fellow at Center for New Political Economy at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He got Ph.D. in physics at University of Texas at Austin by study of business cycles and economic chaos.
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纽约时报：十问中国的接班人(中英文)
中国副主席习近平下周的华盛顿之行，是一个绝佳的机会来近距离观察这个将在未来十年领导中国的人。
自从2007年被定为胡的继承人之后，习造访了多个国家，但在粉墨登场之机从未来到过美国（他上一次来访的身份是省级官员）。
这是习了解美国，也是美国认识他的好机会。他在中国之外少有人知，即使在国内也具有一些神秘色彩，观察人士将会努力寻找习的本土和国际政治导向。
以下是中国观察人士希望了解有关习近平的10个问题：
1，习会成为中国共产党的政治改革人士吗？
自从2009年以来，党的行为保守了许多，很多改革举措被习的前任曾庆红叫停。习能够敢于直面阻碍改革的强大、保守的机构吗——国家安全部、军队、党的宣传体制和大型国有企业？还是说他会像当下领导人一样对这些机构妥协？在10月份举行的第18届党代表大会中，一些改革人士，如李源潮、汪洋、薄熙来、王沪宁和刘延东会被选入政治局常委吗？
2，习和下一任总理会把口头上的“经济再平衡”落实在行动中吗？
过去两年里，很多官方发言都在呼吁，把国家的经济重点从沿海出口型转变为本地消费型，以形成中国可持续发展的经济基础。到目前为止，实际中的投资并未与此相吻合。
3，习有能力制定出针对西藏和新疆更加人性化的政策吗？ 那里的民族躁动情绪从2008年以来就不断上升，在本周达到顶峰。
政府安全部门的铁腕政策导致生命的逝去和更进一步的不安定局面，社会需要一种新的、柔和的手段。习具备足够强大的政治影响力来与当前残暴的体制抗衡吗？他能在焦躁不安的民族社团与中国政府间营造出一个和谐共存的局面吗？
4，习和党内机构能够有效控制激进的民族主义情绪吗？这种情绪现在已经让政府在与周边国家的领土争端中摆出比较极端的姿态，并且敢于“对抗”美国，在国际问题上咄咄逼人。
5，习有信心放松对主流媒体、社会媒体、互联网和教育的严格管制吗？
6，习有能力掌控军队吗？中国军方在近几年所展示出的令人担忧的动向激怒了临近的国家，而且，它的行动似乎独立于党的控制。
7，习会把口头上的外交政策落实在行动中吗？
在一个危险的世界里，北京需要有实际的行动，它那些老生常谈的口号已经越来越难令人相信了。一个值得欣慰的迹象是习在2009底在中央党校的讲话，他明确批判了国内和国际政策中滥用口号的现象，说要用实际行动来代替口号。
8，习将如何应对非洲、中东和拉丁美洲对中国疯狂掠夺资源的援助和贸易政策所表现出的强烈不满。
9，习和中国政府在国际政策上是否会扮演更积极、更支持的角色，而不是消极、阻碍的角色？中国还会继续与俄罗斯站在一起，在联合国安理会上违背大多数国家的意愿吗？就像叙利亚和伊朗问题，它更愿意成为大家眼中的问题还是解决方案？
10，习有足够的远见来事先培养与美国之间的关系吗？
当今世界上，再没有其它国家比得上这两个国家之间关系的重要性了，但目前的关系存在着诸多不信任现象。培养这样的关系，需要中国下一届领导人和美国总统首先在两个国家间建立起起码的信任。
习在访问美国期间不大可能直接回答这些问题。假以时日，我们就可以发现他是一个积极改变的“革新型”领导人，还是又一个安于现状的碌碌官员。
英文原文：
Ten Questions for China’s Heir Presumptive
WASHINGTON — The visit by China’s vice president, Xi Jinping, to Washington this coming week offers a unique opportunity to take the measure of the man who will lead China for the next decade.
While Xi has traveled the world since being anointed Hu Jintao’s designated successor in 2007, he has not been to the United States during this grooming period (he did visit earlier as a provincial official).
This will be a good opportunity for Xi to familiarize himself with America and vice versa. As he is not well known outside of China and enigmatic even inside the country, observers will be looking for clues to Xi’s domestic and international orientation.
Here are 10 questions China watchers would like to know about Xi Jinping:
1. Will Xi return to a politically reformist path for the Chinese Communist Party?
Since late 2009, the party has retrenched significantly — halting and rolling back reforms by Xi’s predecessor, Zeng Qinghong. Can Xi stand up to the powerful conservative institutions that have blocked reforms — the state security apparatus, the military, the party propaganda system and large state-owned enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as Hu Jintao has been? Will reformers such as Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Wang Huning and Liu Yandong be promoted to top Politburo positions along with Xi at the 18th Party Congress in October?
2. Can Xi and the next prime minister (the contenders are reportedly Vice Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) turn the rhetoric of economic “rebalancing” into reality?
Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the economy away from the export sector and the coastal regions to domestic consumption and the interior as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for China. To date the reality of investment has not matched the rhetoric.
3. Will Xi be able to devise a more humane policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic unrest has steadily risen since 2008 and has spiked in recent weeks?
Government security forces have responded with a heavy hand, resulting in loss of life and heightened instability. A new, softer approach is needed. But will Xi have the political strength to stand up to the repressive apparatus and put in place conditions for a more stable coexistence between restive ethnic groups and the Chinese state?
4. Can Xi and the party apparatus reign in the nationalism that is pushing the government to take extreme positions on territorial disputes with China’s neighbors, to “stand up” to the United States and behave aggressively internationally?
5. Will Xi be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on mainstream media, social media, the Internet and educational institutions?
6. Can Xi reign in the military, which has demonstrated a worrisome tendency in recent years to undertake actions that provoke China’s neighbors and, seemingly, act independently of civilian party control?
7. Will Xi authorize a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric?
China’s diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Beijing. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech Xi gave at the Central Party School in late 2009, in which he explicitly criticized the pervasive tendency toward sloganeering in domestic and foreign policy, arguing that slogans needed to be replaced by substance and hard work.
8. How will Xi handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over China’s rapacious and mercantilist energy, aid and trade policies?
9. Will Xi and the Chinese government begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance? Will China continue to stand with Russia in the United Nations Security Council against the will of the majority of other nations on issues like Syria and Iran — and become part of the solution instead of part of the problem?
10. Will Xi have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with the United States?
There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China’s next leader — and the American president — to build strategic trust between the two great nations.
As Xi’s visit is not likely to provide answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if he is a “transformational” leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for China at home and abroad, or whether he is another risk-averse apparatchik.
本文由自动聚合程序取自网络，内容和观点不代表数字时代立场
