From Le Monde diplomatique:

Perhaps the most important, yet least-mentioned aspect, of last month’s nuclear test conducted by North Korea, was the country’s careful calculation that the United States, China and Russia would not take major action, no matter how much they deplored the test.

The United States has never used nuclear weapons against Russia or China or other countries that possess a nuclear arsenal. It has not dared to do so. According to a declassified document, the US once planned a preemptive strike against China’s nascent nuclear force, but eventually backed off. Although the US might sympathise with, and even support, an independent Taiwan, it has publicly pretended the contrary, since it knows that could trigger a military confrontation between Beijing and Washington with catastrophic consequences given China’s sizable nuclear arsenal.

The US cannot politically accept a nuclear strike on its homeland or on its troops stationed overseas: such an event would make the damage caused by the 11 September attacks seem relatively trivial.

North Korea would not have had many technical difficulties in designing a nuclear weapon and conducting a nuclear test, since it has fissile materials for producing up to 10 Hiroshima/Nagasaki-class bombs. It already has the ability to extract weapons-grade plutonium chemically. First-generation weapon design is already a global open secret, as is North Korea’s mastery of detonation technology. North Korea has also developed the Nodong ballistic missile.

North Korea has understood the US position only too well, leading it to believe it should grasp its state security firmly in its own hands. The US has not waged war against nuclear countries but it has attacked non-nuclear Iraq. (It also bombed Belgrade, which certainly had no weapons of mass destruction.) This convinced North Korea that if it developed nuclear weapons delivered by missiles, it would create a nuclear deterrent against US targets in the Asia-Pacific region. It would realise its guiding philosophy of self-reliance (juche): it would not rely on establishing normal or friendly relations with the US nor depend on developing special relations with China, Russia and other countries.

Why the US will not attack

North Korea has five main reasons for believing that the US will not attack it: its nuclear deterrent; the deterrent effect of its conventional forces; the opposition of South Korea and Japan, both of them US allies; the opposition of China, Russia and other countries; the constraints put on the US by the Iraq situation, the Iranian nuclear challenge and the unstable situation in the Middle East.

North Korea has a million regular troops and 5 million paramilitaries. The offensive deployment of its ground force is a conventional deterrent to South Korea and to the US troops that are stationed there. If the US were to consider attacking North Korea, it would be opposed by South Korea and even by Japan. North Korea’s two Nodong ballistic missile tests on 5 July 2006 were meant as a warning to Japan.

It was recently revealed that, during the period of the Clinton administration, the US estimated the cost of overturning the Pyongyang regime, and rated it unacceptably high. The US would have had 100,000 military casualties; the direct cost would have been $100bn and the indirect cost $1,000bn.

A US preemptive strike against North Korea would definitely be opposed by China and Russia. China and North Korea signed a friendly and cooperative mutual assistance treaty in 1961. According to international law, this treaty is still valid and could only be revised or terminated if both parties agreed. So China would be obliged to come to North Korea’s assistance were it invaded. The US would therefore have no support from China and it has no interest in fighting China over North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. Russia also maintains delicate relations with North Korea and, for geo-security considerations, would strongly oppose the US use of force against Pyongyang.

Hands tied

Washington has its hands tied in the global political arena. The US war in Afghanistan has not ended. The tough US position on the Iranian nuclear issue is leading nowhere. Because of the mid-term elections, the ability of the Bush administration to stabilise the situation in Iraq is a pressing problem; some 2,700 US servicemen have died there and $300bn has been spent. At a moment when the Bush administration must win political support, it will not risk the future of the Republican party by attacking North Korea. This gives Pyongyang further opportunity to develop or even test nuclear weapons.

China’s current interests are to develop its economy and reunify the nation. For the ultimate goal of reunification, China’s main task must be to oppose any move towards Taiwanese independence. North Korea puts in check the tens of thousands of US troops in South Korea, helping to reduce US military pressure over the peninsula’s reunification. To some extent North Korea helps China to share the threat of US military force in the Asia-Pacific region. As an ally, North Korea also helps China defend the main gate of its northeast regions and contributes to China’s national security. It is impossible for China to abandon North Korea or to adopt comprehensive sanctions against the country just because of nuclear testing.

North Korea may calculate that China cares most that there should a stable situation on the Korean peninsula with no regime change; it may consider that China would have to accept the result of North Korea’s nuclear testing. North Korea may also hold that Russia, though unhappy about the tests, will not impose substantial sanctions. It has calculated that nuclear tests will neither provoke a US military strike nor real economic sanctions from the international community.

After a period of international sanctions following a successful nuclear test, North Korea would be accepted as a de facto nuclear weapons state, as were India and Pakistan after they tested weapons in 1998. Becoming such a state could also reduce spending on conventional arms, saving resources for economic development. Pyongyang may consider the gains greater than the losses.

……. North Korea believed its nuclear test would provoke limited sanctions by the international community. It thought that China would be forced to accept and take part in limited sanctions, the US would strengthen military cooperation with its East Asian allies, and an even more complicated security situation would emerge in northeast Asia.

But North Korea puts its national interests before its relations with China. It will not give up the independent guarantee of national security gained through nuclear weapons tests because of China’s concerns and the possibility of Chinese pressure. It believes its ultimate security lies in its own hands, rather than in its alliances.

China has few choices here. The Sino-North Korean security relationship is not a one-way street. It is impossible for China to apply excessive pressure or to prevent North Korea from realising its fundamental interests without harming Chinese interests. China has tried to persuade North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons programme for 12 years. It has failed.

Now that North Korea has announced its weapons test, China needs to take part in the sanctions (import/export restrictions on nuclear technology) that the international community will surely impose on North Korea. But China should block economic sanctions; it can only afford to choose between two evils: insufficient sanctions that would show lack of responsibility or harsh sanctions that would force North Korea to extremes or bring about a regime change.

Dingli Shen is executive dean of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, and also director of its programme on arms control and regional security