Last month, CDT wrote about the ways in which Chinese training programs for African journalists shape perceptions of China, and the extent to which African journalists’ active participation therein supports foreign media narratives. Recent pieces from African, Chinese, and Western authors continue this thread by demonstrating different ways of assessing the actors behind the media narratives shaping China-Africa relations. One such piece is by Samantha Custer, Director of Policy Analysis at AidData, who wrote broadly about how China uses information and public diplomacy to “win the narrative.” A tactic that she argued is particularly consequential is China’s efforts to “borrow local credibility through partnerships with media outlets and journalists in other countries”:
As of 2022, Beijing had brokered 429 content-sharing partnerships with local media outlets to reprint, share, or co-create Chinese state-run media content.
These agreements allow PRC narratives to directly infuse domestic media coverage with minimal intermediation. Citizens who consume local news are oblivious to the fact that they are effectively consuming the CCP’s propaganda.
Journalist exchange programs build rapport with individual journalists in the hope that they view China more favorably and that this translates into more positive coverage when they return to their home countries.
Access to officials, credentials, and visas to cover important events, advertising revenue and sponsored content are also important levers of control to incentivize media outlets to promote Beijing’s preferred narratives and censor criticism.
Beijing has used social media platforms, working with local influencers, to spread pro-China content aimed at younger, tech-savvy audiences. [Source]
Another approach focuses on disinformation. Kyle Hiebert at the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies wrote on Wednesday about how external actors, including China, have industrialized the viral spread of online falsehoods on the continent. He argues, “By mixing false and sensationalised content with legitimate critiques of Western policy failures, foreign illiberal regimes cast doubt on democracy” and fuel misinformation among the electorate. On the same theme, Haruna Mohammed Salisu and Idris Mohammed wrote a post this week for the Africa at LSE blog describing the risk of Meta ending its fact-checking system on its online platforms. They argue this will ultimately undermine local journalism and encourage Chinese propaganda:
Social media are the primary outlets for news consumption in most African countries, especially for younger people. Sadly, they are also drivers of toxic propaganda by state and non-state actors.
[Meta’s] decision will deplete the resources and capabilities of local news organisations and create an information gap — one that will erode trust on local content that informs citizens and situates world events within African context.
Fact-checking is expensive particularly at this age of hybrid warfare. No local outlet on the continent will be able to sustain its practices without support. With Meta ending its interventions, the space is now left for toxic exploitation. The weaponisation of information, by state players – China and Russia for instance – will fill in the gaps left by local journalism with propaganda that furthers their geopolitical agenda.
There is documented evidence that points to how China and Russia influence the socio-economic and political affairs of African countries, particularly the Francophone countries of Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad. [Source]
Of course, African journalists themselves provide another angle on how China is involved in shaping these narratives. This week, Chinese state-media outlet Xinhua published part of an interview with Amadu Djamanca, director general of Guinea-Bissau National Television, who lauded China’s media cooperation efforts through content-sharing and personnel training. Xinhua wrote that this will “amplify [Guinea-Bissau’s] voice on the global stage” and provide African media outlets with “opportunities to share their narratives,” and insisted that “unlike some Western countries … Beijing respects the sovereignty of African nations.” The latest Lingua Sinica newsletter analyzed the Xinhua article, noting issues with what some local experts describe as Guinea-Bissau’s growing dependence on China, and concluding that China’s media cooperation is a “crucial strategy to ensure it can better drive the conversation over its interests.” (Lingua Sinica also mentioned that it will publish an in-depth feature next week on StarTimes, a Chinese digital- and satellite-television company active in Africa.)
Enhancing the focus on African journalists, Hangwei Li at the Made in China Journal presented on Wednesday a more comprehensive way to assess the actors behind the media narratives shaping China-Africa relations. Li advocated for the use of a relational perspective in analyzing China-Africa media interactions, focusing on the role of African journalistic agency at the macro, meso, and micro levels. This approach illuminates the “structural imbalances, institutional constraints, and individual agency” that are integral to the narratives that emerge from African journalists’ participation in Chinese media initiatives with the continent:
At the micro level, the agency of individual journalists comes to the fore. Their experiences, decisions, and practices are instrumental in shaping how Chinese narratives are received, interpreted, and disseminated within African media ecosystems. On one hand, African journalists might be receptive to the narratives promoted by Chinese media—emphasising non-interference, mutual development, and alternative models to Western liberalism. On the other hand, their experiences in China can also provide them with a more nuanced understanding of China’s political system, economic opportunities and challenges, and Beijing’s engagement with their home country. To maximise the benefits of these training experiences while mitigating potential biases, African media organisations should take a stronger role in guiding journalists’ reporting practices after they receive training in China, which could involve providing clear guidelines, offering ongoing mentorship, fostering critical discussions about media ethics and independence, and ensuring that journalists are equipped to critically evaluate the information they receive.
[…] While acknowledging and appreciating the resistance, pushback, and reflections demonstrated by African media organisations when engaging with their Chinese counterparts, I argue that China–Africa media relations are not always shaped by fully informed or fully prepared decision-making. The decisions of African journalists, managers, and bureaucrats are often constrained by structural limitations and their ‘relational’ experiences, which together shape the complexities of these interactions.
[…] By examining China–Africa media relations through a relational perspective and analysing African journalistic agency across the macro, meso, and micro levels, this essay highlights the need to address structural imbalances, institutional constraints, and individual agency in understanding these interactions. While macro-level asymmetries create a significantly uneven playing field, meso and micro-level dynamics illuminate opportunities where African actors can assert agency and negotiate influence, even within the context of a highly asymmetrical relationship. [Source]
Underscoring the ideal goal of these analyses, Mohamed Mohamud at Global Voices recently described the “imperative to reclaim the agency of narration for African stories themselves.” While not explicitly naming China, he argued that independent control over the stories that are told on the African continent allows Africans to “confront and dismantle the indelible damage that colonialism and slavery have left on them, […] challenge historical misrepresentations, preserve the culture, and empower future generations.” This is in alignment with the African Union’s declaration of 2025 as the year of “Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations,” and it would apply to any foreign actor interacting with African media.
