Like their American counterparts, Chinese leaders in academia, government, and the media are working to discern and shape the new trajectory of U.S.-China relations under a second Trump administration, now that he has officially taken office this week. Some have seen early signs of optimism. Trump said he had a “very good” phone call with Xi Jinping on Friday, which Xinhua reported was held at Trump’s request. (Trump also reportedly told advisers he wants to visit China in his first 100 days in office.) Chinese Vice-President Han Zheng then made an unprecedented move of attending Trump’s inauguration on Monday, which according to James Yifan Chen, a professor of diplomacy and international relations at Tamkang University in New Taipei, was a “significant gesture [that] likely contributed to Trump not focusing heavily on anti-China rhetoric in his inaugural speech.” But overall, as Thomas des Garets Geddes and Paddy Stephens outlined in the Sinification substack this week, Chinese scholars have shown mixed reactions to Trump’s return to the White House:
[Zhu Feng, Director, School of International Studies, Nanjing University]: "During the Trump 2.0 era, the US’s China policy will continue its aggressive suppression and containment of our country. Curbing China’s strategic competitiveness and re-widening the power disparity between the US and China will remain the [core] strategy of the second Trump administration."
[… Yuan Zheng, Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)]: “Trump’s China policy team will be more stable (稳定), and his approach to our country will also be more predictable (更具可预测性), [thereby] reducing the likelihood of US-China relations being disrupted by unexpected events (突发性事件).”
[… Jin Canrong, Vice Dean and Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); Deputy Director, Centre for American Studies, RUC]: “Trump’s return to power is relatively favourable to us (比较有利). He is a businessman and has no particular affection (特殊情感) for Taiwan. If we are determined to advance the process of national reunification, Trump is more likely to make a deal (做交易) with us than Harris would have been.”
[… Jia Qingguo, Director, Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University; Standing Committee Member, CPPCC 14th National Committee]: “US-China relations will be very difficult to handle (非常麻烦). US-China relations will probably experience severe friction and confrontation (剧烈的摩擦和对抗). […] In my opinion, we must prepare ourselves for how to deal with some of Trump’s immoral and unprincipled behaviour (无道德，无底线的一些做法). Personally, I don’t think we should adopt a tit-for-tat approach on this issue (不能采取对等做法). Just because the other side is doing something bad doesn’t mean we should follow suit. We must find ways to retaliate without compromising our moral principles.” [Source]
Returning to his long-standing economic grievances against China on Tuesday, Trump threatened to impose a 10 percent tariff on Chinese imports. Some Chinese experts tried to put a positive spin on these confrontational policies. Wang Xiangwei, former editor-in-chief of the South China Morning Post, wrote that this “could work in China’s favour: the higher the tariffs and the harder the economic sanctions the upcoming Trump administration imposes on China, the faster Beijing will act to rebalance its economy.” Wang Huiyao, the head of the CCP-affiliated Center for China and Globalization, posited, “Trump’s commercial mindset, his business-oriented team and Chinese enterprises’ growing investment ambitions point to a clear path: strategic investment and localised production can transform economic tensions into shared prosperity. These business-driven approaches may offer the most practical way to rebuild trust between the world’s two largest economies, solving problems through commercial cooperation, one deal at a time.” In an interview with China-US Focus last week, Wang Jisi, a professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies and founding president of the university’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, said he sees reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic about the next four years under Trump:
The decisive factors in the China-U.S. relationship lie in changes in both countries’ domestic politics, rather than in their comparative strengths, or the so-called Thucydides Trap.
In the next four years, there won’t be disruptive changes in the two countries’ comparative strengths, but political conditions within each country may show new changes and developments. For instance, Trump’s comeback with such tremendous political advantages defied many people’s expectations, and his approach to governance, as well as the orientation of his domestic and foreign policies, remain difficult to predict.
Therefore, it is very difficult for me to be clearly optimistic or pessimistic about the relationship in the next four years. My pessimism lies in the fact that mainstream public opinion and the narrative framework in both countries continue to hold that the other side is the main external economic and security threat, which I’m afraid may not change in the coming four years. I also have reasons to be less pessimistic, because policies are made by national leaders and at high levels of the two governments, and the outcomes depend on people’s efforts.
If the two countries’ leaders could enhance communication in the future, seek convergence points of mutual interests and form more strategic consensuses, conditions may not necessarily get worse. Also, the public opinion environment is often formulated by political elites, and better relations between the high levels of the two governments may also be conducive to a reversal of public opinion. For example, unlike Biden, Trump as president-elect has on multiple occasions expressed hope for closer communication with China and bilateral cooperation on international affairs. He invited the Chinese leader to participate in his inauguration. [Source]
Other prominent voices continued to hedge or offer more negative assessments. Hu Xijin argued that “Trump will likely use tariffs as a long-term lever to pressure [China]” and that “Beijing should pay no attention to his blackmail.” In Reading the Chinese Dream, David Ownby translated a piece by history scholar Xiao Gongqin about how China will respond to the challenge of Trump 2.0, which warned his compatriots not to trust Trump on the issue of Taiwan. At the Beijing Channel substack, Xinhua journalist Yang Liu wrote up the transcript of a panel session on U.S.-China relations under Trump’s second term, hosted by Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations last week and featuring Yan Xuetong, Wang Jisi, Zhang Yuyan, and Li Bin. Yan Xuetong, a professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, predicted that technological competition will be exacerbated and prioritized by Trump but perhaps not as severe as during Biden’s tenure:
Regarding China, in the economic and technological fields, conflicts between China and the U.S. will be significant. Trump’s administration might exacerbate these conflicts. However, in the political and ideological realms, the situation might not be as severe as during Biden’s period. Why? Because Trump is a populist, the most pronounced conflict during his tenure is not between liberalism and socialism but between populism and liberalism. As populism mainly targets liberal political figures, Therefore, the ideological conflicts between China, the U.S. might not escalate as severely as in the economic and technological areas.
[…] After Trump takes office, major powers’ diplomatic policies will increasingly revert to power-based choices, meaning more reliance on violent means to resolve territorial disputes. This is an unfavorable development trend.
[…] Trump, under any circumstances, will prioritize technological competition. His China policy will undoubtedly consider how to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from narrowing, which he views as the core issue. Although his strategies may differ from Biden’s—for example, Biden might seek to organize a group of countries to exclude China, while Trump might argue that such an approach is unreliable and instead push for bringing production back to the U.S. and establishing a complete domestic industrial chain—the main objective remains to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from closing, which I believe is still central. [Source]
Chinese government and state media actors made a coordinated effort to signal their desire for cooperation and a mutually beneficial, stable bilateral relationship at this moment of change. After the inauguration, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Xie Feng wrote, “China is ready to work with the US side to adhere to the strategic guidance of the two leaders and follow through on their important consensus, so as to push for the steady, healthy and sustainable development of bilateral ties, to the benefit of both countries and the world.” One China Daily piece quoted a Trump supporter in D.C. who said, “China and America are the strongest two nations on Earth. And why cannot we work together? That’s my hope. That’s my dream.” The Global Times published an editorial titled, “Building a mature and stable China-US relationship from a new starting point.” A People’s Daily op-ed by Zhong Sheng, a byline reserved for official commentaries on important issues of international affairs, was titled, “To push China-U.S. relations to make greater progress from new starting point.” And a Xinhua commentary was titled, “Keep China-U.S. relationship sailing in right direction.”
