Recent media pieces have drawn attention to the growing popularity of Mandarin and the use of language in promoting socio-economic ties between China and other countries, especially in the Global South. One primary example is in the Middle East. Highlighting two pieces on the subject in his China-MENA Newsletter, Jonathan Fulton wrote that while “the Middle East has not been learning about China in a very structured or meaningful way,” new Chinese language programs “will eventually result in home-grown China watching talent.” Arab News reported that a Saudi university recently launched a new Chinese language and culture course through its Institute of Chinese Science and Culture, which “was established to facilitate knowledge and technology transfer between Saudi Arabia and China.” Writing in Modern Diplomacy on Friday, Sara Hillman also described how “Mandarin Chinese is finding its place in Qatar”:
Mandarin Chinese is more than just a language; it is a tool of soft power. By promoting its language abroad, China strengthens its cultural and economic ties. Qatar has started to embrace this, albeit cautiously compared to neighbors like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which have more widely introduced Mandarin Chinese in public schools and established Confucius Institutes.
At the forefront of this effort is Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU). Since 2014, HBKU’s Language Center has offered Mandarin Chinese courses to adults, enrolling over 800 students. Since 2017, the program has expanded to include children’s classes. For many, learning Mandarin is a way to connect with China’s global influence, whether for business, education, or cultural curiosity. HBKU’s Mandarin Chinese classes cater to diverse learners, from government officials to professionals interested in engaging with China’s booming economy. These classes also serve expatriate Chinese families, preserving their linguistic heritage.
[…] Despite the cautious approach, use of Mandarin Chinese is likely to grow in Qatar. The economic relationship between China and Qatar is expected to strengthen in the coming years, and Chinese language education in Qatar’s public schools is anticipated to expand. HBKU is also working to establish a robust Chinese Testing Center, highlighting a strategic recognition of China’s growing global influence. [Source]
Outside of academia, grassroots initiatives are also contributing to the region’s knowledge-building about China. For example, the Sino-Arabica Project launched last month as a platform for young scholars and professionals engaged in China-Mideast relations to collaborate and foster dialogue. Its latest piece introduces an Arabic script used to write in the Chinese language. Last month in Global China Pulse, Jie Wang published an article about a local Chinese conversation nādi (“club”) in Cairo, Egypt, which demonstrates how camaraderie and shared professional goals drive the popularity of Mandarin in the Middle East. (The next issue of Global China Pulse, scheduled for publication this month, is about the “frontiers of Chinese language.”)
Contributing to the globalisation of Mandarin and its adoption overseas, however, are also humble grassroots initiatives, such as Triple C in Cairo. Drawing from my field notes about this centre in 2024, I hope to direct the reader’s attention to spaces of private Mandarin training and learning. These spaces are significant because they open a window on to the social tenacity and microconditions that lie behind the popularity of Mandarin, which are closely bound up with individual extralinguistic experiences of a sense of community and camaraderie among fellow language learners and instructors.
Across today’s Middle East, Mandarin’s economic value is a socially accepted, powerful truth. By this, I mean two interrelated things. First, there is increasing awareness that Mandarin is an important language in global trade (Loh 2023); and second, proficiency in Mandarin provides a type of human capital useful to pursue promising job prospects and opportunities for free training and higher education in Chinese universities.
[…] The popularity of Mandarin training and learning overseas is commonly referred to in both common parlance and scholarship as ‘Mandarin fever’ (汉语热). Top-down approaches to this phenomenon foreground political economy as a key mechanism shaping Arab countries’ incorporation of Mandarin in their foreign-language policies in recent years, and locals’ receptive attitude towards this language. They inform us of the context and basis of this ‘fever’. However, as this essay has pointed out, it is important not to overlook how grassroots initiatives in Mandarin training are where this passion is generated and sustained. [Source]
The growing interest in Mandarin language learning can be seen in other regions of the Global South, as well. Last week, Xinhua noted that the Confucius Institute at the University of Botswana will begin teaching a new Chinese language course for a local secondary school, “preparing [students] for global opportunities and careers, particularly in China,” according to the secondary school’s principal. Fiji’s Ministry of Education also announced last month that twelve schools will pilot a new Chinese language program in collaboration with the Chinese government, whose ambassador said it would “open a new window for local students and teachers, and new opportunities for international cooperation.” Another recently profiled program for Moroccan students “blends Chinese language learning with professional skill-building,” in part through a cross-border e-commerce class where students leverage their language skills to generate income. And a Xinhua article from last month cited the trajectory of an Ethiopian doctoral student in China to tout the “rising global appeal of the Chinese language,” which “could potentially turn from being a coveted skill to an expected and necessary one.”
In the U.S., these language-related trend lines cut both ways as a result of geopolitical fluctuations. On the one hand, the migration of hundreds of thousands of "TikTok refugees" to RedNote/Xiaohongshu saw a massive increase in the number of users learning Mandarin on Duolingo and helped American and Chinese users humanize each other. On the other hand, the legacy of pandemic-era travel restrictions and lockdowns, along with the deeper currents of great-power competition, have severely eroded people-to-people exchanges. Only about 800 American students were in China in 2024, compared to about 11,000 in 2019, just before the pandemic. Several prominent language-learning and teaching programs were terminated or decamped from China to Taiwan. Mark Witzke wrote in The Diplomat last week about his experience with the Center for Teaching and Learning in China, which for almost two decades brought to Shenzhen English teachers eager for new opportunities, until it fizzled out in 2014. The arc of the program “reflects broader trends that have eaten away at Americans’ interest in working and studying in China”:
To understand how this came to pass, I spoke with more than a dozen of my former colleagues. A few major themes stood out: the difficulty in navigating cultural and language barriers, lack of opportunities for foreigners outside of teaching English, an increasingly repressive atmosphere, worsening relations with the outside world, and a change in U.S. perceptions of China. For many, COVID-19 disruptions were the final nails in the coffin of their China dreams.
[…] Those of us who returned to the United States collided with these shifting views on China. When we left, we were hailed as making a good move for our future; on our return many of us were met with skepticism. Nick Giorgio, now a teacher in Mississippi, tried his “best to change people’s perceptions because there were a lot of stereotypes out there.” Most had to scramble to adjust their career stories and de-emphasize their time in China. [Antonio] Jackson noted that when employers looked at his resume, “what [I thought would be] an advantage was actually a detriment.”
[…] Others complained that for government or other sensitive work, their time in China was seen as a potential hazard. Security clearances were especially difficult for those who had spent several years in China with a now defunct company. One former teacher remarked that “my entire shot at making it to [my current company] was held up because we could not prove I lived in China in the way that they needed.” At a time when the United States seemingly needed China expertise more than ever, those who could have made a difference were being turned away or faced extra obstacles.
[…] Those who tried the hardest to understand are viewed with suspicion and distrust. What could have been an era of increased cross-border investment, talent flows, R\&D collaboration, fair tech competition, tourism dollars, and increased trade has instead been for years an escalating tit-for-tat cascade of new restrictions. Tariffs, investment screening policies, restrictions on data flows, hostage diplomacy, race-fueled paranoia, shuttered consulates, and diplomatic boycotts have not brought the two sides closer to any fruitful resolution. [Source]
