In 2024, China’s trade volume with partner countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) grew by 6.4 percent year-on-year, accounting for over half of China’s total trade volume for the first time. At the start of 2025, over a decade since the BRI’s official launch in 2013, analysts reflected on how the BRI is being perceived in China and in partner countries around the world.
Chinese media and establishment voices have been predictably optimistic. A China Daily headline last month read, “Experts: BRI enters its golden decade.” The article noted that the Shenzhen-based think tank China Development Institute had launched a Belt and Road Research Institute. In order to overcome the challenge that “our voices can’t be heard globally,” two experts cited in the article argued, the BRI “is becoming an important platform for China to integrate into the world and to exert its influence on the world.” Syed Inam Ali Naqvi at the Silk Road School of Renmin University wrote a piece this week in The Diplomat describing what the Chinese public thinks about the BRI. The article explored the BRI’s relation to globalization and connectivity, collectivist vs. individualistic approaches to global leadership, regional inequalities within China, and tradeoffs between domestic and international investments. One section focused on the BRI as a cultural and soft-power initiative:
In interviews conducted with a diverse group of Chinese citizens, including students, professionals, and academics, the common sentiment was that the BRI is seen as a pivotal element of China’s geopolitical strategy. As one interviewee explained, “The BRI is not just about roads or ports; it is about integrating China into the global economy and securing our place in it.” For many, the BRI represents an opportunity for China to diversify its economic and geopolitical interests while promoting stability and cooperation globally.
[…] Beyond its economic and geopolitical dimensions, the BRI is also perceived as a cultural initiative – an effort by China to project its soft power on the global stage. In interviews with Chinese citizens, many highlighted the BRI’s role in promoting traditional Chinese culture and fostering people-to-people exchanges. “The BRI is an opportunity to showcase traditional Chinese culture and values to the world, promoting a harmonious global environment,” one participant noted.
In a world where China faces growing skepticism and negative perceptions, particularly in the West, the BRI is seen as a tool for countering anti-China narratives and enhancing China’s global image. Respondents argued that cultural diplomacy through the BRI allows China to present itself as a benevolent global leader, promoting cooperation and mutual benefit. This shift toward soft power is seen as a strategic response to international criticism and a genuine effort to foster deeper ties with other nations. [Source]
For a view from outside China, the Asia Society Policy Institute’s interactive map of global public opinion on China, published last month, allows for filtering BRI countries and tracing how their perceptions of China have changed over time. On the question of how China’s foreign policy will develop in 2025, 70 percent of respondents to the MERICS China Forecast 2025 published this week believe that China will enhance cooperation with non-Western partners (which constitute the vast majority of BRI countries), far ahead of those who believe China will strengthen relations with European countries (18 percent), or focus on domestic issues and reduce its involvement in global affairs (5 percent). The latest episode of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s China in the World podcast focused on the BRI in Southeast Asia, as analysts discussed the influence of the BRI on regional dynamics, China-Southeast Asian relations, and local perceptions of China. Angela Tritto published an academic article this week describing how Indonesia and Malaysia have channeled BRI capital flows towards their respective economic goals in the electric vehicle industry. And Jianxun Chu, Zameer Hassan, and Syed Muhammad Sikandar published an article this month in the Humanities and Social Sciences Communications journal about how the BRI is framed in Indo-Pakistani media:
The present study aimed to examine the representation of the BRI in Indo-Pakistani newspapers, specifically the Daily Dawn Pakistan and the Times of India, by employing computational framing analysis. A total of 2081 news reports from the Daily Dawn and 587 news reports from The Times of India were collected using the Lexis Advance database between March 23, 2013, and December 1, 2019. The findings revealed that the two newspapers utilized distinct framing strategies to represent the BRI. The Daily Dawn frames were related to development, security challenges, and political concerns, while India sees China as a strong opponent and the BRI as China’s geostrategic plan to extend its global power and military presence in the Indian Ocean, posing a challenge to India’s national interests. The results also indicated that bilateral talks, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) implications, and BRI concerns are the mainframes in the news coverage of The Times of India. [Source]
At a work conference related to the BRI last month, Xi Jinping stated that the BRI has entered a “new phase” that should prioritize “small and beautiful” projects that are more sustainable and bring greater benefits to local communities, which was not always the case in the previous phase of massive infrastructure projects. One branch of the BRI that might complement this objective is the Health Silk Road, a part of BRI dedicated to international health cooperation and promoting China’s experience as an alternative to Western models, and the subject of a report last month by the National Bureau of Asian Research. In an episode from the China-Global South podcast in November, Lui Kanyi, a Beijing-based project finance lawyer, gave an update on the BRI and discussed how the “small and beautiful” trend might play out in the next couple years:
[In policy documents, i]t is phrased in such a way that’s inclusive. But what the “second phase of the BRI,” this is not an official term, is about, is not connectivity. The BRI, as a whole, is about connectivity. So the second phase, “small and beautiful,” is one part of it. It is certainly a focus. Based on my recollection of that policy document, it says […] things such as focusing on sustainability, on energy transition, on agriculture. On the whole, I think what that means is “small and beautiful” is intended to refer to projects which are smaller than the traditional infrastructure/energy projects, but which benefit the local population more.
So, things like, as I mentioned, agriculture, manufacturing capabilities, productive assets, and things like working together with local banks to fund local businesses. I think those will all be part of a “small and beautiful” focus, and that in fact those are mentioned in the policy document. I think the idea is that now once you’ve got the basics in place—you’ve got lights on, you’ve got power, you’ve got roads to transport your goods—that now it’s the time to make sure that investments are channeled towards local businesses and to improve the livelihoods of the cities and the communities touched by the BRI.
And one of the major pushes in terms of offshoring, which you mentioned earlier, is part of this. So, as you set a manufacturing or factory base and hire local people, let’s face it, there’s no way you’ll be able to truck in people from China where it’s just far too expensive now, nevermind that people don’t want to move anymore. I think that builds the ties and improves the living standards locally. And I think that’s what this is aimed at. [Source]