Anura Kumara Dissanayake was sworn in on Monday as the new president of Sri Lanka after the country’s national elections this weekend. The 55-year-old self-described Marxist ran as an outsider from humble origins who promised to tackle corruption among the political elites and give voice to popular discontent over the country’s economic woes. The elections took place two years after Sri Lanka’s economy collapsed under the weight of debt, weak exports, and low taxation, touching off mass protests and forcing the president’s resignation. As Krishan Francis and Krutika Pathi reported for the Associated Press, observers are closely watching how Dissanayake will balance Sri Lanka’s ties with its powerful neighbors India and China:

[L]ooking beyond Sri Lanka’s borders, he also must navigate the rivalry between regional powerhouses India, the country’s next-door neighbor, and China, which Dissanayake’s party traditionally has leaned toward.

Located on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, Sri Lanka has long been eyed by the two regional rivals. Sri Lanka governments have swung between the two camps, and New Delhi and Beijing have intensely jockeyed for influence in the island nation of 22 million.

[…] Indian analysts say that Dissanayake’s victory comes as a number of neighboring countries have recently drifted towards Beijing, including Nepal and the Maldives, which now have more pro-China leaders, and Bangladesh, where the ouster of a pro-India leader last month is also testing New Delhi’s regional power. [Source]

Xi Jinping congratulated Dissanayake on his victory and pledged to facilitate more cooperation with Sri Lanka along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Their countries’ “all-weather” friendship has deepened in recent years with Chinese investment projects, such as the controversial Hambantota Port, and China remains Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor. Dissanayake’s political party, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), also traces its origins to the pro-China faction of Sri Lanka’s Communist Party. Writing for The Diplomat just before the election, Rathindra Kuruwita provided a historical overview that shows how Beijing has typically strengthened its engagement with Sri Lanka when left-leaning parties are in power:

This speculation largely stems from China’s relatively low profile in Sri Lanka over the past four years, especially in the last two. Aside from sporadic humanitarian aid and a $392 million agreement in May 2023 to build the South Asia Commercial and Logistics Hub (SACL) at the Colombo port, China has remained largely disengaged from Sri Lanka since the pandemic.

Several factors explain this reduced engagement. One is that both the current Wickremesinghe administration and the previous Gotabaya Rajapaksa government have proven unreliable partners for China, often reneging on commitments under Indian influence. Another reason is that Chinese diplomats have shifted their focus to the Maldives since late 2023, leaving less time for the Chinese embassy in Colombo to engage with Sri Lankan stakeholders. Additionally, after years of financing large infrastructure projects worldwide, many of which turned into white elephants, China has become more cautious, now only backing projects with sound business plans.

[…] While China has engaged with almost all Sri Lankan governments, a look at post-independent Sri Lankan history shows that there is a difference in the level of Chinese engagement in the country depending on whether Sri Lanka is run by the right-wing (represented by the United National Party or UNP) or the left of center (exemplified by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its offshoots) or coalitions led by these parties.  When a left-of-center government is in power China has provided more aid, more loans, and more political support than when a UNP government is in power. [Source]

There are signs that Dissanayake might pursue closer ties with China. His newly appointed defense secretary holds a master’s degree from National Defence University of China. The JVP has also criticized what it calls Indian expansionism, and Dissanayake promised to cancel a “corrupt” Indian-funded wind power project in northern Sri Lanka. Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times that Dissanayake is likely to reduce reliance on India and seek closer alignment with China’s development strategies. Cyril Ip from the South China Morning Post shared other views from analysts who believe Dissanayake will tilt towards China:

Dissanayake did not lay out a specific foreign policy position during his election campaign, but it is “highly probable” that he would prefer to work with China over its rival India, according to Priyanga Dunusinghe, an economics professor at the University of Colombo.

“President Dissanayake wants to get maximum support from China to develop Sri Lanka,” Dunusinghe said. “[He] may try to attract Chinese foreign direct investment and tourists to Sri Lanka and look for market opportunities for Sri Lankan exports.”

Since Sri Lanka is a member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Dissanayake may try to follow China’s development model, Dunusinghe said, adding that the president-elect might seek support from Beijing to develop digital infrastructure in the country. [Source]

Others stressed that Dissanayake would take a more pragmatic approach towards Sri Lanka’s neighbors. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, a think-tank in Colombo, told The Economist that the new administration will probably try to maintain a strict balance between Sri Lanka’s relations with China, India, and the U.S. Indeed, Dissanayake himself stated in a recent interview that he would prevent his country from being drawn into geopolitical rivalries: “We won’t be a competitor in that geopolitical fight, nor will we be aligned to any party. We don’t want to be sandwiched, especially between China and India. Both countries are valued friends and, under an NPP government [National People’s Power, the coalition that he leads], we expect them to become close partners.” Sreeradha Datta, a Sri Lanka expert from the India-based Jindal School of International Affairs, told DW that the JVP is expected to adopt a more moderate approach under Dissanayake’s leadership: “No president in Sri Lanka can afford to or would espouse such strong positions. For a head of the government, pragmatism is bound to offer greater opportunities and while many in India enjoy overplaying the China preferences, I do not think we need to focus on that too much.”