In a sudden breakthrough in the Syrian civil war, rebel groups rolled into Damascus on Sunday and overthrew President Bashar al-Assad, putting an end to decades of his family’s dictatorial rule. There has been much commentary about the impact of the rebels’ victory on Syria’s relationship with China—which has acted as one of Assad’s few diplomatic supporters—and about how the Chinese government has reacted to the dramatic turn of events. Chinese observers appeared just as caught off guard by this outcome as many of their Western and Middle Eastern counterparts. During the start of the rebels’ latest advance, Miriam Verzellino at the ChinaMED Project shared perspectives from Chinese experts, all of whom were incorrectly in “general agreement that the war is far from over and that a new status quo will take some time to emerge.” The Chinese Embassy in Syria sent a WeChat notice last Thursday urging its citizens to “leave the country as soon as possible.” And while crowds in Damascus were parading through Assad’s mansion, freeing political prisoners, and toppling statues, coverage on China’s state broadcaster CCTV shielded Chinese viewers by showing only sanitized footage of the Syrian capital.
Xi Jinping hosted Assad last year in China, where they announced a strategic partnership between their countries. Of the 13 vetoes cast by the People’s Republic of China since it joined the U.N. Security Council in 1971, eight were in support of Assad. In the economic realm, Syria joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2022, but the country has had a relatively minor role in terms of bilateral and regional trade. "China in 2024 has way less money than China in 2013 – 2014, when the BRI was launched,” Bill Figueroa, assistant professor at the University of Groningen, told Reuters. “There is ‘an obvious reassessment going on in the direction of safer investments and reducing China’s risks overall.’” Sarah Shamim from Al Jazeera described how Chinese aid and investments have helped to support the Assad regime:
In December 2016, the Syrian government secured a victory against the rebels when it retook the city of Aleppo. This marked a turning point in China’s aid strategy, according to the Cyprus-headquartered independent risk and development consultancy, the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR).
China’s aid to Syria jumped 100 times from roughly $500,000 in 2016 to $54m in 2017, according to COAR reports. In October 2018, China donated 800 electrical power generators to Latakia, Syria’s largest port.
Beijing has also made major, long-term investments in Syrian oil and gas – totalling about $3bn.
[…] Earlier this year, Syria’s Minister of Electricity Ghassan Al-Zamel confirmed a 38.2 million-euro (about $40m) contract with a Chinese company to construct a large photovoltaic plant near Syria’s western city Homs, according to Berlin-based publication, The Syria Report.
[…] China has been Syria’s third-biggest source of imports behind Turkiye and the United Arab Emirates, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. In 2022, China’s exports to Syria stood at $424m, driven by fabric, iron and rubber tyres. Syria’s exports to China are negligible by comparison and are dominated by soap, olive oil and other vegetable products. [Source]
In reality, the strength of China’s relationship with Syria and in opposition to the U.S. has been overstated in both Syrian and Western narratives. Expanding on this, Jonathan Fulton wrote in his China-MENA newsletter that “the China-Syria relationship has been driven more by shared threats than opportunities.” He noted the CCP’s concern about political revolution abroad inspiring revolution at home (the Syrian civil war began with the 2011 Arab Spring), and about the thousands of Uyghurs who have traveled to Syria to fight the government alongside rebel groups. Middle East analyst Jesse Marks compared China’s relationship with Assad’s Syria to that with Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, in which Beijing ultimately abandoned its support of the Libyan dictator before he was ousted. In his latest Substack post, Marks described how changing dynamics have forced China to recalibrate its engagement in Syria:
China’s motivations for engaging in Syria were driven largely by the potential for post-war reconstruction and access to a substantial export market. However, with Iranian influence significantly weakened and Russia’s presence diminished, Syria now lacks a strong economic partner to sustain its population, much less to rebuild. While China remains one of the few states with the financial capital to support reconstruction, its involvement may require a delicate recalibration. Beijing’s relationships with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to play [a] pivotal role in this context if Beijing attempts to rebuild ties. These countries have increasingly assumed leadership roles in regional stabilization efforts and possess the financial resources and established networks to shape Syria’s reconstruction, but it remains to be seen whether or not they will. Their involvement may be an avenue for China to remain economically engaged without directly confronting the political uncertainties of Syria’s post-Assad transition.
[…] Ultimately, Syria’s post-Assad transition will test China’s ability to adapt its Middle East strategy. If Beijing seeks to maintain relevance and benefit from future opportunities in Syria, it may have to swallow a bitter pill and acknowledge whatever political structure follows. The extent to which China can leverage Gulf partnerships, manage reputational risks, and recalibrate its approach to align with a new Syrian government will define its role in Syria’s post-conflict order and shape its broader engagement in the region. [Source]
Syria is not as important to China as some analysts and media outlets are making out. 1/13 pic.twitter.com/xc53ui8E7T
— Dale Aluf (@AlufDale) December 10, 2024
Many experts expect China to pursue a flexible approach towards Syria regardless of which figure will replace Assad. “China will likely continue its collaboration with a new regime in Syria as much as it has continued its plans and projects in Afghanistan under Taliban rule,” said Mohammad Eslami, a Middle East expert at the University of Minho in Portugal. As James Palmer wrote in Foreign Policy, “[A]ny new leadership in Damascus will also probably be keen to build a relationship with Beijing,” and China will likely pressure Syria’s new leaders to exclude Uyghur fighters from any governance role and potentially to even deport them to China in exchange for economic support. Zhao Ziwen at the South China Moring Post shared other predictions from experts about how China and the new Syrian government might interact with one another:
Fan Hongda, a professor at the Shanghai International Studies University’s Middle East Studies Institute, said the new government’s attitude towards China would “certainly be less favourable to China than the Assad government”.
Although it is currently unknown if the new government will align with the United States or Turkey, “it is nearly sure that the rebels will not fall back on Russia and Iran, or China”, he added.
Fan said China’s approach towards Syria could remain largely the same as before.
“Facing Syrian issues, China has two diplomatic traditions. One is preventing the Syrian civil war from spilling over and causing mass chaos in the Middle East. The other is to maintain China’s diplomatic tradition, which is non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations,” he said.
Fan added that, for the sake of regional security, Beijing was very likely to maintain communication channels with the Syrian militant groups, including [the leading group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham]. [Source]
