China’s relationship with Israel has soured over the past year. Throughout Israel’s war in Gaza, China has repeatedly blamed Israel and its American backing for the continuation of violence, and has attempted to play the role of mediator between Palestinian factions, thereby winning some support in the Global South. In Israel, polls show that a majority of the public considers China to be unfriendly or hostile towards Israel, with a third of respondents reporting a negative change in their perception since last October. Recent articles highlight these fluctuations and their impact. Last week in The Wire China, Noah Berman reported on China’s declining economic ties with Israel:
Between 2010 and 2017, China invested some $10.8 billion in Israel across 187 transactions, according to Rhodium Group analysis, with tech sector deals prominent. In the years since, China has invested just $1.3 billion, Rhodium data shows. Overall Chinese investment overseas fell by 48 percent during the same period, according to the American Enterprise Institute.
[…] Meanwhile, goods trade excluding diamonds between Israel and China including Hong Kong fell by 17 percent in 2023, the steepest decline in a decade, although it is up 6 percent year-over-year through August 2024, according to Israeli Central Bank statistics. Israeli trade data routinely excludes diamonds, an outsized export that made up 40 percent of Israeli exports to Hong Kong last year, but only 3 percent of exports to mainland China. For its part, China’s customs agency reports a 9.3 percent year-over-year decline in trade with Israel from January to August of this year. [Source]
Some analysts speculated about whether China may have recently altered its stance towards Israel. On October 8, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated that the “legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people need to be realized and the reasonable security concerns of Israel need to be paid attention to,” which some claimed was the first time since last October that China emphasized Israel’s “reasonable security concerns.” This debate was picked up in Israel earlier this month. In an article by Jewish Insider, Lahav Harkov shared various reactions from other Israeli policy experts in her circle:
[Carice Witte, the executive director of SIGNAL Group, said,] “China realized Israel might win and is therefore adjusting its stance, realizing that, in order to be in the Middle East, Beijing will need some level of decent relations with Israel.”
One small sign of outreach from China to Israel was a recent Beijing-funded trip for four Israeli journalists and two think tank representatives, including one from SIGNAL, Witte said.
[…] “If Israel keeps winning, it will have the upper hand across many boards,” she said.
[…] Joseph Rozen, the former director of Asia-Pacific at Israel’s National Security Council for over a decade and currently a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Policy, was skeptical that anything had changed with China, noting that Chinese officials used similar language soon after the Oct. 7 attack. (The writer of this story is also a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute.)
“It’s a bit of wishful thinking to focus on this one nuance,” Rozen told JI. “I agree with the general view that China is always trying to find the opportunity to work with different parties, but it doesn’t mean there was a more dramatic shift in its position vis-a-vis Israel.” [Source]
Israeli analysts have also criticized China for its close ties with Iran, which is preparing for an imminent attack by Israel. In a blog post this month for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), an Israeli security think tank, INSS research associate and former IDF Spokesperson Unit officer Ofir Dayan claimed that the Iranian Embassy in Beijing was running a campaign on Douyin by posting footage of Israel’s war in Gaza and receiving cash donations (via digital “red envelopes”) from Chinese netizens in response. But despite its diplomatic meetings and oil-trade ties with Iran, China would not necessarily welcome a war between Iran and Israel. “China’s backing of Iran,” stated Foreign Policy’s James Palmer, is “opportunistic and limited.” Dismissing hyped-up concerns about “one of the most politicized bilaterals,” Jonathan Fulton cautioned in his China-MENA newsletter last week about “the myth of China’s leverage in Iran”:
Since October 7, 2023, I don’t think China has had any leverage in Iran. China mostly offers material incentives through economic engagement – trade and investment is nowhere near substantial enough to sway Iran at a time when it is facing political, ideological, and military threats.
[…] The limits of what Beijing is willing to do for Tehran have been made clear time and again. Since China is not able to move the needle on most political issues in the Middle East and is not willing to engage militarily, It has little to offer Iran during a major crisis. No doubt Iran will continue to publicly thank the PRC and hype up the bilateral, but they know there’s a very low ceiling of real support. China will continue to offer rhetorical support to Iran, but little in real terms. Anyone expecting China to broker some kind of meaningful breakthrough with Tehran will, in my opinion, be disappointed. [Source]
Another moment under the microscope was China’s reaction to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar last week. In Al-Monitor’s China-Middle East Briefing, Joyce Karam noted that China’s official statement was “starkly different in language and style from China’s reaction to the assassination of Sinwar’s predecessor, Ismail Haniyeh, in July.” The July statement, unlike this more recent one, offered firm condemnation of the “assassination” and deep concern over an expanding regional war. But Karam went on to note that last week’s statement was not so much an indication of a shift in China’s position as a reflection of China’s view that Sinwar was less popular among its Arab partners and a less pragmatic liaison for China.
Nevertheless, optics remain an Israeli concern. Last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz called China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and stated, “We expect that China will express a balanced and fair position in relation to the war […,] one which faithfully reflects who are the terrorist forces in our region.” An English version of the statement was posted to X from Katz’s account, and a Chinese version of the statement was posted to X by the Israeli Embassy in China. A day later, China Daily posted a cartoon to X that critiqued the blockade of Gaza. On Monday, China Daily also released a short video, in the form of a fast-paced Q&A between two young hosts, that claimed, “unlike some Western countries, China isn’t picking sides” between Iran and Israel.
