Marriage rates in China continued to plummet last year, deepening the country’s demographic crisis and highlighting the public’s changing attitudes towards marriage, childbirth, family planning, and more. Despite government incentives, fewer young men and women are choosing to tie the knot. “Given that the vast majority of births in China occur within marriage … the sharp decline in marriage registrations in 2024 is a clear indicator that the birth rate will continue to drop in 2025,” said He Yafu, a Guangdong-based independent demographer. Farah Master at Reuters reported that in 2024, the number of marriages registered in China fell by 20 percent, the biggest drop on record:
More than 6.1 million couples registered for marriage last year, down from 7.68 million a year earlier, figures from the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed.
"Unprecedented! Even in 2020, due to Covid-2019, marriages only decreased by 12.2%," said Yi Fuxian, a demographer at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
He noted that the number of marriages in China last year was less than half of the [peak of] 13.47 million in 2013.
If this trend continues, "the Chinese government’s political and economic ambitions will be ruined by its demographic Achilles’ heel," he added. [Source]
The issue of declining marriage registrations and birth rates is a sensitive and often-censored topic in China. A detailed censorship directive from January 2020, recently reprinted as part of CDT’s “Minitrue Plus Five” series,” cautioned media outlets “not [to] call population statistics into question,” and added: “Do not hype matters such as […the] population crisis, low fertility rates, demographic aging, the shrinking number of children, the dissipation of demographic dividends, ‘growing old before growing rich,’ comprehensive relaxation of birth restrictions, encouragement of childbearing, social support payments, and so on.” Past CDT coverage touches on the high cost of raising children in China, the effect of the pandemic on birth rates, public mockery of the government’s pronounced U-turn on family planning policy, and the overwhelming skepticism—particularly among Chinese women—toward government propaganda and incentives aimed at raising the the birth rate.
Official measures to promote marriage and childbearing have taken a variety of forms. Recently, state media floated the idea that universities should offer classes on love education. Local officials have called women to ask intrusive questions about whether they have a boyfriend and are planning to get pregnant. Recent laws have also made it harder for couples to divorce, including a controversial 30-day “cooling off” period for divorces that has been widely criticized for endangering the lives of victims of domestic violence. CNN’s Nectar Gan shared more examples of government initiatives aimed at reversing current demographic trends:
To reverse the decline [in births and marriages], Chinese officials have rolled out a raft of measures, from financial incentives to propaganda campaigns, to nudge young people to tie the knot and have children.
Officials have organized blind dating events, mass weddings, and attempted to curtail the tradition of large “bride price” payments from the groom to his future wife’s family that put marriage out of reach for many poor men in rural areas.
Some local governments have even handed out cash incentives for young couples to get married.
Since 2022, China’s Family Planning Association has launched programs to create a “new-era marriage and childbearing culture,” enrolling dozens of cities to promote the “social value of childbearing” and encouraging young people to get married and give birth at an “appropriate age.” [Source]
As Sinologist and legal expert Carl Minzner summarized for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Collapsing marriage rates reflect a convergence of social forces: a declining population of young adults, a darkening economic outlook for recent graduates, changing attitudes towards marriage, and escalating gender polarization between men and women.” Leta Hong Fincher, who has conducted extensive research on gender and feminism in China, spoke with PRX The World about why more young Chinese women are rejecting marriage. Even China Daily reflected the changing social landscape by quoting a 31-year-old after-sales service engineer in Beijing who said finding a partner for marriage has become increasingly difficult for him, and a 28-year-old woman from Hangzhou who said, “It takes courage to step into marriage. I won’t marry someone mediocre just because of family pressure.” Helen Davidson from The Guardian shared Weibo comments from netizens who explained their views on the drop in marriage rates:
“It’s not that people don’t want to get married, but that they can’t afford to get married!” said one Changzhou-based commenter on China’s social media platform Weibo, which has had more than 46 million engagements about the topic since Monday.
[…] “For many young people, not getting married is an active choice. At the same time, having their own lifestyle and enjoying single life is also a big reason,” said another commenter on Weibo.
“Women can support themselves and do not need to rely on men. The willingness to get married is much lower than in the past.”
[…] “Ten years ago, what I heard most from relatives was about which daughter or son was not married by the age of 27 or 28. Now, what I hear is about those basically 30 years old and above. [Getting married before] 27 or 28 is no longer eligible for discussion.”
[…] “Why did the number of marriage registrations drop again in 2024? Because I am a lesbian,” wrote one woman. [Source]
Shanghai-based, English-language state-owned media outlet Sixth Tone has highlighted a number of trends that show how attitudes are shifting away from traditional norms regarding relationships and family planning. These include men sharing their vasectomy experiences online, success stories of single mothers raising children, and “two-sided marriages,” wherein couples eschew “bride prices” (money or gifts paid by the groom’s side to the bride’s family), jointly inherit the property and burden of caring for both sets of parents, and agree to have one child who will take the father’s family name and another who will take the mother’s family name. The evolution of these trends can also be seen in the latest edition of Lingua Sinica’s “Intersections” bulletin that includes an interview with Jinyan Zeng about her co-edited book, “Feminist Activism in the Post-2010s Sinosphere.” Among the topics covered in the book’s chapters are feminism in the digital arena, feminism in TV and media culture, female viewers’ responses to reality dating shows, the literary influences of a feminist Uyghur, and feminist podcasts in 2020s China.