This week, Israel invaded southern Lebanon and continued airstrikes on Beirut, while Iran launched direct missile strikes against Israel. Israeli attacks on Lebanon have killed more than 1,100 people over the past two weeks and displaced over 1.2 million residents, prompting the Chinese government to evacuate over 200 Chinese citizens and their family members from Lebanon, including three Hongkongers. Zhao Ziwen from the South China Morning Post provided more details:
“On [Tuesday], 146 Chinese citizens in Lebanon and five of their foreign family members arrived safely in Beijing,” the [Chinese embassy in Beirut] said in a statement. Another 69 Chinese nationals and 11 of their foreign family members had been evacuated to Cyprus aboard a Chinese vessel.
“All Chinese citizens who would like to evacuate [from Lebanon] have been safely evacuated,” the statement said, adding that embassy personnel would remain.
[…] Late last month, the Chinese embassies in Tel Aviv and Beirut issued travel advisories recommending that Chinese nationals return home as soon as possible or relocate to safer areas.
China’s embassy in Tel Aviv has not yet conducted any evacuations. [Source]
While the governments of China and various European countries organized evacuations for their citizens in Lebanon, the U.S. only advised its citizens to find commercial flights to leave the country (despite an Israeli airstrike killing one American citizen in Lebanon). By contrast, after Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023, the U.S. government helped evacuate its citizens from Israel while the Chinese government did not. Similarly, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Chinese government fumbled its evacuation in Ukraine, waiting until many other governments had told their respective citizens to leave. The Chinese government’s other notable state-led non-military evacuations from conflict or disaster zones include the Solomon Islands, East Timor, Tonga, and Lebanon in 2006; Chad and Thailand in 2008; and Haiti and Kyrgyzstan in 2010. During the Arab Spring of 2011, China evacuated thousands of its citizens from Egypt, Syria, and Libya. After the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, China carried out timely evacuations of its citizens from Japan. The Chinese navy evacuated both Chinese and non-Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015, the first time that the Chinese military rescued foreign nationals from a conflict zone. Other Chinese evacuations include Iraq and Vietnam in 2014, Sudan in 2016, Indonesia in 2017, and Sudan in 2023. Online discussions of certain evacuation efforts, such as Iran in 2020, have been censored by Chinese cyberspace authorities.
China has called on the U.N. Security Council to take “urgent actions” to de-escalate the situation in the Middle East. China’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated, “We oppose the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity,” adding, “China believes that the protracted fighting in Gaza is the root cause of this round of turmoil in the Middle East.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi also lent Chinese support to Iran, stating: “China has always been a trustworthy partner of Iran and will, as always, support Iran […] and oppose interference by external forces in Iran’s internal affairs and the imposition of sanctions and pressure.” Over 90 percent of Iranian crude oil exports go to China. China’s position during the war has remained fairly consistent: criticizing Israel from the sidelines, accusing the U.S. of hypocrisy in international law, channeling resentment from the Global South, and emphasizing China’s lack of leverage compared to the U.S. Erin Hale at Al Jazeera described how, in some ways, the war in Gaza has afforded China the opportunity to flex its diplomatic muscle at little risk:
Still, even as Chinese diplomats share rhetorical barbs with Israel and the US, Beijing’s actions over the past year have been more symbolic than substantive, analysts say, favouring rhetoric and low-risk policy moves, such as challenging Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories at the International Court of Justice.
China has refrained from taking a hands-on role in the war as countries such as the US, France, Qatar and Egypt – which have been deeply involved in negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict – and has maintained extensive economic ties with Israel despite its increasingly vocal criticism of the country on the global stage.
[…] “The biggest difficulty in ending the Gaza-Israel war now is the lack of an international consensus that is binding on both sides. I think China will continue to work with the international community to reach such a consensus. It is difficult for China to achieve results in the Gaza-Israel war alone,” [said Hongda Fan, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University]. [Source]
The fighting in Lebanon is the latest in a series of escalatory events resulting from what U.N. experts and the International Court of Justice describe as Israel’s “plausible” and ongoing genocide in Gaza. Over the summer in Beijing, China brokered an agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian groups that agreed to form a unity government for Gaza and the occupied West Bank after the war ends. While there is debate over how impactful the agreement will be, and no shortage of Israeli perspectives, Raphael Angieri outlined in his Circumspection Substack some perspectives on the Beijing Declaration from numerous Palestinian factions. Angieri highlighted internal and external structural forces, notably China:
Hamas, ostracized by international powers such as the United States, and still bogged down in a war which has been disastrous for its constituents in Gaza, is thought to be looking for ways to remain a player—even if in a diminished or indirect capacity—in post-war governance, ideally without compromising on core commitments including armed resistance. Fatah is under pressure from the Palestinian street and within the PLO to transcend partisan disputes, demonstrate solidarity with those suffering in Gaza, and reform its governance structures so that it can increase its impact on the ground. At the same time, as Fatah seeks to maximize its influence in Gaza on the “day after,” it faces the uncertainty of a US presidential election which may tilt international favor toward or against its participation in post-war governance. Taking part in the reconciliation process is thus seen as a means for Fatah to gesture at unity while hedging its bets.
Within these dynamics, the China factor is at once critical and ambiguous. Both Fatah and Hamas are thought to take an active interest in ingratiating themselves with China, as its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Middle East, and the Palestinian issue in particular, continues to intensify and break new ground. Given the country’s role in Saudi-Iran normalization and the vocal support it has given to Palestinian interests amidst the war in Gaza, China is perceived to be a potentially consequential player going forward. That said, China’s own motivations for involving itself in the reconciliation file—not to mention the leverage it can bring to bear or the lengths it is willing to go in pursuit of a resolution—have not received significant coverage from Palestinian observers, beyond noting the country’s apparent desire to establish itself as an alternative to the United States in a high-profile diplomatic arena. [Source]
