Following a hotly contested U.S. election that reverberated across Chinese social media, drawing hundreds of millions of views on Weibo and birthing myriad memes, many Chinese academics and commentators are turning their attention to what a second Trump administration might bode for the future of China-U.S. relations. Two recent articles by very different authors illustrate some of the election-related themes, questions, and concerns now being discussed in Chinese online spaces.
The first, by political scientist Ding Xueliang (丁学良, Dīng Xuéliáng), was published by the public WeChat account 學人Scholar (xuérén Scholar), which features articles on current-affairs topics by a range of academics. Ding Xueliang is a professor emeritus at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and has published extensively on topics related to PRC history and contemporary Chinese politics. CDT has translated a portion of Professor Ding’s article, “The World Is on the Cusp of a Dramatic Change,” which discusses Trump’s foreign-policy approach and how it could alter the existing U.S.-dominated global geopolitical order:
I would prefer to see Team Trump defeat Team Harris, mainly because of three particular characteristics that Trump has demonstrated thus far in the field of international affairs:
The first characteristic is his isolationism, a policy orientation that has guided U.S. policy-making since the nation was founded.
[…] The second characteristic is that while Trump is not particularly knowledgeable about certain international issues, he is nonetheless quite confident and not shy about speaking out.
[…] The third characteristic of Trump is that he is extremely unreliable, inclined to abruptly alter, or even repudiate, his past statements or positions.
[…] I am most concerned about what impact these three characteristics will have on the existing international order, which was established shortly after the end of the war in 1945, and which has existed for nearly 80 years.
[…] These three characteristics of Trump will undoubtedly have a direct impact on us here in Northeast Asia. If during his second term, he cuts the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and Japan by half (as he had hinted at during his first term), ceases upgrading and expanding U.S. air and naval bases in the Philippines, and declines to provide military assistance to South Pacific island nations, it would greatly diminish the ability of these strategic locations to project medium- and long-range force against targets in the surrounding region.
If Trump were to take it a step further and declare that the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not germane to U.S. core interests, then he would be disinclined to risk serious American casualties by ordering the U.S. military to directly intervene in the event of a large-scale armed conflict in the region. On October 19, when asked by a reporter [from the Wall Street Journal] how he would deal with a threat of war against Taiwan, it was intriguing that his only response was to suggest raising tariffs.
If Trump serves a full four-year term after taking office in January 2025 and is able to enact a fundamental reshuffling of America’s strategic priorities, then it should be clear to all that the geopolitical order that has stood since 1945 in the “powder-keg region” of Northeast Asia will be rocked by a series of chain reactions. The reverberations from these chain reactions (which could persist for three years or more) will have a major impact on global economic trade, politics, security, and cross-border migration, far exceeding the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war.
If so, Trump may have (inadvertently or not) opened up a space in which tremendous changes can occur, becoming a once-in-a-century catalyst for a new era that will end the legacy of the Second World War—that is, the so-called global order that Western politicians and diplomats so frequently espouse—and consign it to the pages of history, once and for all.
Global opinion about Trump is polarized, largely because he is an outsider, a political amateur. If he gains a second term, the [above] three characteristics of his foreign policy approach will be on full display. Trump’s amateurish approach will give global revisionist forces an excellent opportunity to showcase their skills. The world is on the cusp of a dramatic change, and Hong Kong, positioned in Northeast Asia near the “eye of the typhoon,” ought to be better prepared for it. [Chinese]
“The Most Powerful President in American History (and His ‘Dark MAGA’ Revolution),” by prolific WeChat blogger Chairman Rabbit, is a sprawling long-form article comprised of 15 different subject headings, and followed by links to 24 of the author’s previous articles on U.S. politics and the election. Once described as a “cosmopolitan patriot,” Chairman Rabbit (aka Ren Yi) is the Harvard-educated grandson of the late reformist politician Ren Zhongyi. His article, a portion of which is translated below, discusses the MAGA-driven “great realignment” in U.S. politics, and speculates about how Trumpian authoritarianism and strongman-style leadership could alter American domestic and geopolitical calculations:
Economic diplomacy: Under an anti-globalist, protectionist, anti-neoliberal economic framework, [there will be] an across-the-board escalation in the use of tariffs to exclude foreign goods, in order to create impetus and incentives for the promotion of U.S. domestic industries.
International politics: “Isolationist” and “non-interventionist.” Will reduce U.S. involvement in international and regional geopolitics, reduce expenditures on [maintaining] the U.S.-led international order, and re-evaluate the political and economic relationships between the U.S. and its allies.
[…] New American politics: Our previous analyses have found that young Americans tend to be “left-leaning” on economic issues, hold progressive beliefs, and are sympathetic to, or at least not opposed to, socialism. In other words, in terms of economic values, they will likely become more similar to us [Chinese] in the future. Whether Trump’s rise to power will alter young people’s views on economic issues remains uncertain. But after all, Trump’s party is a grassroots, populist party that focuses on the job prospects and living standards of ordinary people. Therefore, the party under Trump has room for left-wing economic policies. On the other hand, Trump’s (and Musk’s) techno-authoritarian, conservative political alliance will infuse American political culture with more authoritarianism, paternalism, and strongman-style leadership, which adheres more closely to the East Asian tradition. In other words, it is possible that the America of the future will more closely resemble us [China].
[…] Taiwan: Trump believes that Taiwan “stole” the American chip industry, and moreover, that it is using its chip industry to pressure and coerce the U.S. Trump’s plan is to use a “carrot-and-stick” approach to induce Taiwanese companies to invest in [chip-manufacturing facilities] in the U.S. This puts Taiwan in a very awkward position: losing its chip industry will not only have a negative effect on the Taiwanese economy, it will also greatly reduce Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States. Meanwhile, neighbors Japan and South Korea are eyeing Taiwan’s chip industry covetously, hoping to get a piece of it. And those American companies (such as Nvidia) that have made Taiwan a centerpiece of their business strategy will also experience more political pressure in the future. Lastly, under his isolationist framework, Trump has absolutely no interest in Taiwan or the South China Sea, and has no intention of becoming embroiled in a conflict with China. If there is any difference between Trump’s first and second terms in office, it is that he will be less influenced by the “deep state” and more independent in his foreign policy decision-making.
Towards China: Trump will roll out a comprehensive policy of decoupling and disengagement. His first type of policy will be to restrict China’s access to the U.S. market by imposing a 60% tariff across the board, with the possibility of even higher tariffs on key products. If there is any difference between today’s Trump and the Trump of the past, it is that in 2018, Trump hoped to leverage trade to open China’s markets and force China to abide by the rules. But at that time, the White House was not yet focused on the idea of reviving U.S. domestic industry. Trump circa-2025 is guided by industrial considerations, and tariffs are just a means to exclude China from the U.S. market. Some ask, “Can’t Chinese companies just invest in the U.S. (through FDI, foreign direct investment) and build factories locally, generating American jobs and tax revenue, so that Trump will allow ‘Made in America’ Chinese brands access to the U.S. market?” In my opinion, that’s a no-go. Trump’s campaign agenda was about prohibiting China from investing in the U.S. and viewing China as a geopolitical enemy and security risk. I have written about this issue many times, exploring the “asymmetry” of Chinese and U.S. policy. Trump’s second policy will be to further crack down on China: for example, by restricting the export of key technologies to China; imposing sanctions on Chinese industries and companies; and restricting the flow of U.S. investment to Chinese industries and companies. It will be an all-out offensive, involving trade, economic, financial, and technological warfare. This is the stance Trump has taken. [Chinese]
