In the two weeks since the Ministry of Public Security and the Cyberspace Administration of China published a draft law proposing an ostensibly voluntary national Internet ID program and opened it up for public comment, there has been intense platform censorship of online discussion and articles about the proposal. By last week, Weibo was already blocking numerous related search terms (“national Internet ID,” “government plans to issue Internet ID numbers to all users,” “WeChat, Taobao, Xiaohongshu, others begin beta-testing national Internet ID system,” among many others) and most verified Weibo users posting about the proposal had disabled comment sections on those posts.

In the last week alone, CDT Chinese editors have archived eight deleted articles from Chinese academics, legal experts, and commentators expressing serious reservations about the national Internet ID proposal. Specific criticisms of the proposal include:

• The new law is unnecessary, given the existing real-name ID system.
• It is unlikely that the new measures will prove “voluntary” in practice.
• It could exert a chilling effect on online speech by making it easier for authorities to track and punish online dissent.
• The proposal raises more data privacy and security concerns than it solves.
• It would needlessly increase bureaucracy and bolster centralized control over internet users.
• The proposal may not be legal, or even constitutional.

Three articles in particular seem to have touched a nerve: a short essay by Tsinghua University philosophy professor Huang Yusheng led to his Weibo account being permanently banned, and two other articles—a short critical analysis by Lao Dongyan, a well-known professor of criminal law at Tsinghua University, and a longer critical analysis including commentary from Lao and Peking University law professor Shen Kui—led to Lao Dongyan’s Weibo account being temporarily muted, unable to add new posts for 90 days. Lao has also been the target of ad hominem and misogynistic attacks from online trolls due to her strong criticism of the proposed law.

Lao Dongyan’s now-deleted Weibo article, translated in a previous CDT post, likened the proposed national Internet ID system to “installing a monitor on each individual’s online behavior, allowing convenient, instantaneous access to all traces of [their] Internet activity (including their browsing history).” If the Internet ID system is enacted, Lao argued, it would mean that “going online or using services provided by ISPs will essentially become special privileges that require permission.”

A now-deleted WeChat article by Peking University law professor Shen Kui included Shen’s own analysis, Lao’s analysis, the full text of the draft law, and instructions for how to comment on the draft law. Shen emphasized the dangers inherent in entrusting individual citizens’ data to a centralized repository, including the chilling effect this might have on online speech:

In this Internet age, it is hard to avoid exposing some of my personal information, but in a decentralized system, commercial platforms can only get “part of me,” not “all of me,” so I am not “stripped naked,” with all of my data completely exposed. Furthermore, laws such as the Civil Code, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and ethical norms surrounding the use of AI require commercial platforms to clearly comply with protections related to individual privacy, personal information, data security, and so on.

However, were the unified national Internet ID system to be widely adopted, and were I to register on various platforms using my personal “Internet ID number” and “Internet credential,” it is conceivable—although by no means inevitable—that all of my activity on various platforms could be collected and analyzed by the centralized platform linking that number and credential to my real identity. Whereas my previous online existence could be described as “piecemeal exposure,” this sort of centralized platform could easily transform my online existence into a form of complete, or “naked exposure.” Although I might remain unaware of this exposure for a time, and although it might not necessarily inflict any immediate harm upon me, it would undoubtedly cause me to become overcautious and prone to self-censorship in my online behavior. No longer would I dare to endorse or oppose certain positions, nor to communicate fully with others, nor to read and browse as widely as before. And if this form of self-censorship, this self-shackling, were to become prevalent, how is it possible to maintain the vitality of our digital economy, improve our online social environment, and create new frameworks for online cooperation and collaboration?

In short, the vitality of our digital economy and online society springs from decentralization, rather than from some centralized monopoly. The potential risks and harms of a unified national Internet ID system are enormous, and its potential benefits—such as preventing platforms from excessive collection of user data, or from divulging users’ personal information and data, etc.—can be attained through existing or alternative means. In view of this, the question remains whether the unified national Internet ID proposal adheres to the core legal principle of “proportionality” and whether it is compatible with the development of our digital economy. As such, the proposal should be taken seriously, and rigorously questioned and examined. [Chinese]

A now-censored Weibo essay by Tsinghua University philosophy professor and former department head Huang Yusheng took a different tack, arguing that the Internet ID proposal is a needless throwback, because a truly modern nation should not subject its citizens to excessive monitoring, surveillance, or control. Both the title and body of the essay mention the phrase 编户齐民 (biānhù qímín), which refers to an archaic system of household registration used during the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 9 CE). The final paragraph makes reference to the “direction” the nation should be heading in—a not-so-veiled reference to Xi Jinping’s frequent directional pronouncements “pointing the way” forward in various areas of Chinese life. Huang Yusheng’s fiery essay was quickly deleted, and his Weibo account was permanently banned. A portion of Huang’s essay is translated below:

A nation that attempts to turn its citizens into transparent chess pieces that can be tracked and located at any given time will never become a vibrant and creative nation. This is because all creativity will remain hidden in the abyss, and because all vibrancy depends on our ability to live free of surveillance.

Such a nation, of course, can never achieve modernity, for a truly modern nation does not aspire to an archaic “bianhu qimin” system that registers and keeps tabs on each and every last one of its citizens. Rather, a modern nation is one in which all citizens enjoy abundant freedom, particularly freedom of speech, as well as freedom from being arbitrarily harassed, surveilled, threatened, or arrested by government authorities.

[…] Any nation that endeavors to monitor all aspects of its citizens’ lives and peek into every corner of their existence is showing us, in the most brutal and unvarnished way possible, that it is not a “nation-for-the-people.” A nation-for-the-people has no need to spy on its citizens or monitor their whereabouts, because it trusts its citizens, and its citizens likewise identify with, trust in, and wish to protect their nation. Nor does a nation-for-the-people seek godlike omniscience or omnipotence over the minds and mouths of its citizens, because a nation-for-the-people cannot be harmed by anything its citizens might think or say. On the contrary, it is precisely by protecting citizens’ right to exercise free speech and respecting their right to think for themselves that a nation maintains its vitality and creativity.

[…] If Chinese-style modernization is our goal and our direction, then it would be a mistake to run in the direction of an archaic system that seeks to register and control each and every citizen. We should be heading in the direction of more freedom, openness, independence, civilization, and prosperity. […] Without freedom, our sense of trust and self-confidence can neither withstand comparisons nor weather conflict. This is the secret to genuine trust and self-confidence. [Chinese]

An article by Zhai Zhiyong, a professor at Beihang University (formerly known as Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), analyzes the Internet ID proposal in terms of its relationship to China’s existing body of law. Zhai raises some compelling questions about both the necessity and the legality of the proposal, citing Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Cybersecurity Law; Article 18 of the Data Security Law; and Article 62 of the Personal Information Protection Law. He concludes that “if a new regulation diminishes the rights of citizens or burdens them with more responsibilities, if it increases the power of a government department or reduces its statutory obligations, it may not even pass the test of legality, let alone the test of constitutionality.”

Although the national Internet ID proposal is still in the stage of soliciting public opinion, 81 Chinese apps—10 public service platforms and 71 commercial apps including WeChat, Taobao, Xiaohongshu, QQ, and Zhaopin—have already rolled out beta-versions utilizing the new credentials. Despite widespread public concern over various aspects of the national Internet ID proposal, as Nikkei Asia’s Katsuji Nakazawa reported, the proposal appears to have powerful backers among the Party elite (who are currently holding their annual summer retreat at the seaside resort of Beidaihe), making it likely that the draft law will be implemented with its core elements unchanged:

Do not be fooled by the words “draft regulations.” The cyberspace ID plan will not be derailed as the reputations of two close aides to Xi are at stake: Chinese security czar Cai Qi and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong.

Cai is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top decision-making body, and is ranked fifth in the party hierarchy. Wang concurrently serves as state councilor, a vice premier-level post.

The two are key members of the Fujian faction, one of the two biggest political groups aiding Xi’s concentration of power, the other being the Zhejiang faction. Xi has known Cai and Wang since his time as a senior official in Fujian province.

[…] It remains to be seen how discussions at the ongoing Beidaihe meeting will affect the internet ID plan, with information about any key decision made there not expected to trickle out for days or even weeks, and then only in vague snippets. [Source]